Jenna Gordius v. Randall G. Kelley

change” analysis and reconsid “substantial or retroactive ter

er whether reduction obligation support

mination of McLeod’s ten-year of a obli

after two

gation contravenes and undermines the original

purposes provisions fixing general a term of judgment

divorce un

spousal support in consideration of an prevents Ma-

equal property division regaining

cul benefits to which from ever might

she otherwise be entitled. See Pet

tinelli, practice

It is that the court consider best original

the foundation which the di analysis

vorce was based its

whether and to what extent a modification spousal support

of a award is warranted. Accordingly, we vacate judgment and remand to

amended divorce proceedings

the trial court for further reassess,

reconsider consistent with decision, or to what

this extent modify motion to should de-

McLeod’s any respect.

nied or at all or entry is: Judgment

Amended Divorce vacated. proceedings

Remanded for further consis- opinion.

tent with this

Jenna GORDIUS

Randall KELLEY et al. G.

Docket No. Han-15-100.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine. Sept.

Submitted Briefs: 2015. May

Decided: Gordius’s child.

a de facto Jenna in conflict key factual are vacate the findings, in the court’s we must for and remand court’s decision proceedings.

I. BACKGROUND following facts de [¶ 2] The trial court’s and rived from the defer we review them with considerable Buck, 33, 5, 113 Buck v. ence. were in a ro- Kelley and Gordius ten approximately mantic for May they were married years before July child was born 2012. Gordius’s Gordius and at a time when Although together but unmarried. were together for a living two had been at the time of the number birth, J. Pennartz is the Arvide April the child. On father of and were shortly before Gordius married, in the complaint filed a Gordius against Pennartz for de- District Court Ellsworth, Whalley, Esq., Christopher parental J. paternity termination later, Kelley. appellant year Randall G. A responsibilities. for rights and en- the District Court May Ellsworth, Toothaker, Esq., Jeffrey C. Pen- that determined tered Jenna Gordius. appellee Gordius and paternity, nartz’s awarded SAUFLEY, C.J., and and re- rights Panel: parental shared Pennartz GORMAN, MEAD, ALEXANDER, pri- Gordius granted sponsibilities, HUMPHREY, JABAR, and JJ. child and Pennartz mary residence contact. weeHy C.J., MEAD, SAUFLEY, Majority: agree that while parties Both HUMPHREY, JABAR, GORMAN, together lived before Gordius JJ. 21, 2013, Kelley breakup on October their SAUFLEY, C.J., and Concurrence: of Gordi- very supportive to and was close GORMAN, J. filed for divorce Gordius us’s child. When a mo- breakup, Kelley filed ALEXANDER, following their J. Dissent: re- rights and modify tion to JABAR, J. Gor- between order entered sponsibilities Pennartz, intervenor claiming from a dius Kelley appeals Randall G. The court (Ellsworth, as a the District Court judgment of that the divorce Kelley’s request J.) Mallonee, that he was not determining claiming the motion action and ent articulated in Pitts v. ¶¶ parenthood consolidated. A.3d 1169 opinion). Gordius maintains that the court Following hearing con- on the correctly determined that cir- matters on March solidated cumstances as outlined in Pitts are not order preliminarily an interim issued present in this matter. Kelley parent de facto granting status and to awarding right him the have contact the 9] Because issues in this appeal [¶ with the child “to be coordinated with application concern of the of de law facto On schedule.” this same parenting [Pennartz’s] to the court’s factual determina- date, court Gordi- the divorce to that Kelley tion not a necessary did meet Kelley. us and parenthood, element of de facto as set out Pitts, Kelley and because had the bur- hearing After a [¶ December 6] of proof, den must we determine first 2014, the court entered a final order whether the correctly court articulated the Kelley’s parenthood. claim for de facto In and, so, applicable law if whether the court order, the court stated that “[a]l- properly applied the law the to facts in though the terms the judg- [divorce] determining Kelley whether was a de facto [finding Kelley par- ment to be a de facto expressed not temporary, were as ent] parties the court treated them as De B. Facto Parenthood such.” The court also stated that it “re- “Despite [numerous] ... Kelley mains convinced that Mr. has in family shifts ... today’s structure [in a permanent, equivocal, undertaken com- society], it firmly remains established that mitted, responsible parental role in parents liberty have a fundamental inter life ... and that Mr. care, est direct custody, to and control from exclusion hurt [the child’s] life will Pitts, of their children.” Despite child.” (quotation marks omit court concluded failed estab- ted); Granville, see Troxel v. 530 U.S. lish facto parent his status as a de to the S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 49 child because the “circumstances cannot be However, this right is not abso exceptional.” deemed lute, and there are situations where inter filed consolidated motion right ference with that is constitutionally of fact and conclusions permitted. Whenever there an attempt of law a motion to alter or amend the ed right, interference with that we must 59(e). judgment pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. Pitts, evaluate it with scrutiny. strict The court denied these motions and ¶59, 12, Pitts, 90 A.3d 1169. In we timely appealed. held the State’s intrusion into the parent-child relationship permitted II. DISCUSSION when “there urgent is some reason or A. Standard Review there are exceptional circumstances affect Kelley,argues that com- ing the child.” Id. Before us is one of mitted an error of failing those situations that will interfere with the proper determining parent-child standards normal claim—a Kelley qualified par- a de facto parenthood.1 of de facto status, party Once a court that a concludes has established de party in that responsible parental role held that In we must that role. child’s life is removed from seeking evi- by clear two elements added). writing, In (emphasis so first, he or she has undertaken dence: drawing language were on the we had used committed, and permanent, why permit to discuss courts could this life; in the child’s parental role responsible type of interference with a cir- second, that there parent’s wishes: “to ensure that a adoptive to allow the court cumstances2 sufficient not, cause, child does without lose the rela adoptive par- with the to interfere person previous with the who has tionship Id. 27. rights.3 ents’ acknowledged [parent] ly been Here, trial court found that through development prong two-part Kelley met the first Young relationship over time.” v. Young, test, a perma- “has undertaken ¶ 5, 845 A.2d We ex nent, responsi- unequivocal, committed and plained exceptional that the circumstances in life.” Be- parental role ble allowing a court to so interfere exist challenged this party cause neither has when “the child’s life would be substantial focus on the sec- finding by the we if ly negatively person and affected of the test —whether there are prong ond unequiv permanent, who has undertaken a sufficient to “exceptional circumstances” ocal, committed, responsible parental and rights to interfere with the allow the court in is removed from role that child’s life biological parents. Moore, that role.” Pitts v. Pitts, exception- held that In we 1169, 1181. harm to the al circumstances exist when Although the trial court found claiming occur if the child will by the child would be harmed acknowledged to be the facto status is not ¶29. life, removal of from the In a child’s de facto noting “that Mr. exclusion from type plurality opinion, explained “the effect justify life will hurt the child” and [his] harm that needs to be found rights: ruptured relationships children of these interference with a on wounding,” the court con- deeply can be announcing “harm” are not here We sadly circumstances are cluded that “the equivalent in these cases must be unexceptional.” Kelley requested in Nonethe- “jeopardy” title cases. conclusions, specifically and ask- less, an order that contemplating a court court to the de facto ing the non-parent a out of a creates Pitts, by provid- standards established determine that the child’s must life first proposed ed the court with negatively substantially would be as. 52(b). The court by M.R. Civ. P. required undertak- person if the who has affected committed, request. denied permanent, en a Legislature purposes 3. Since our decision in for all and the court Act, parental Parentage or her passed must then determine his the Maine effective has rights responsibilities pursuant to 19-A yet July the statute is not in 2016. As generally C.E.W. v. M.R.S. 1653 See effect, inapplicable to this case. it is D.E.W., Concurring Opinion paragraph 2. See 18 of the "exception- discussion of the term for further al circumstances.” The court to have that the trial court misapprehended not, “exceptional”

applied requirement suggests, standard and as the dissent generic in a fashion deter disagree circumstances because we with the trial court’s essence, it mining, Indeed, is not unusual findings of fact. as the Court has by today’s noted, world for child be harmed yet the trial court has not made a changes relationships. in adult Al key factual finding. though generic excep assessment defining The confusion in “ex- tionality may play a role the court’s final ceptional circumstances” have been facts, consideration of the the court’s focus caused our own of multiple use terms to ulti must be on child himself. The single concept. describe a As we noted question mate is whether the harm to this adjectives Pitts v. “urgent,” child creates the circumstances “compelling,” “exceptional” are all “in- parental that allow the interference with heightened tended to address the i.e., determines, rights, whether the court present the State must it may before inter- evidence, that “the parent’s right fere in a to raise child.” substantially neg child’s life would be ¶59, 12 n. 90 A.3d 1169. We if atively affected” is removed from have further elucidated this in- heightened committed, “permanent, unequivocal, his by explaining terest government ” Pitts, responsible role.... may infringe a parent’s fundamental ¶ 29, 90 A.3d 1169. Because liberty interest if a failure to do so would the court not reach did the child-focused “substantially negatively” affect the analysis, component of the it did not artic life, child’s id. opinion), ulate the harm that it found would meaning that a government failure of the “substantially negatively” affect the to act would have a child’s life. traumatic, upon effect the child’s well-be- the trial court conclud- Riendeau, ing.” Rideout v. Kelley’s ed that removal from the child’s ¶26, Although we .have life the child harm would cause without articulated different formulations of what determining whether the removal would circumstances would constitutionally sup- negatively” affect this port infringement a parent’s liberty child, we remand the case to the trial to protect well-being, a child’s court. Because children’s needs all formulations describe a unified time, change with we leave the decision on concept specific related to the child before reopen updated whether.to the record for the court. information discretion of the trial here, In the matter at issue it judge. appears from judgment that the trial entry The is: require court understood the law it to

Judgment vacated. Remanded for fur- determine whether had established proceedings ther opin- consistent with this “exceptional circumstances sufficient to al- ion. low the court to interfere” with rights, SAUFLEY, C.J., GORMAN, with whom 1169, by evaluating whether circum- J., joins, concurring. stances large. were unusual the world at I [¶ concur 17] Court’s The dissent to understand the law have, separately similarly. however, and write to make clear consistently that we We vacate because it appears interpreted “exceptional the term eircum- remand, findings trial to reach circumstances to mean instead stances” as applying proper as to the individual fact standard Thus, the existence of child. today. clarified it Because it is we have circumstances,” Kelley was “exceptional the role of the trial court to decide the instance, required should not facts in the first harmed that the child would be those factual find- assumptions evidence make about from his life and that by Kelley’s removal of the ings misapprehension where a child would “sub- specific the harm to this exists. negatively” affect the child’s

stantially and

life, meaning id. (plurality opinion), ALEXANDER, J., dissenting. a “dra- absence would have I respectfully dissent. matic, even appeal This addresses a sad sce- child’s nario that recurs hundreds or thousands of the trial court 761 A.2d 291. Because year in Maine—a times may suffer simi- many found that children of a child has a primary with residence harm,- not reach with lar it did friend, fian- long-term relationship with on this specific impact to the respect cée, biolog- not the child’s spouse or who is may have aris- Although child.4 confusion friend, fiancée, spouse ical describing this criti- language en from our positive, parent-like relation- develops intersection of a aspect cal the child. The child’s ship with with the State’s interest liberty interest friend, fiancée, spouse sepa- then harm, with the the child from protecting saddened, or, rate, and the child is today, decision clarity of the Court’s here, “hurt” the loss of trial court found court should be able to the law trial ex-friend, fiancée, or contact with the now at trial. developed to the facts spouse. remand, clear, if, on To be parent-like relationship The be Kelley prove [¶ 23] that has failed to court finds Kelley and the child existed Randall child’s life would be tween that this years following two approximately that the re- negatively affected” such child, before Jenna Gordius Kelley “perma- role of a birth of the moval of from the committed, Kelley separated. point, To that nent, respon- ¶ 59, 29, breakup tracked the relationship 90 parent, 2014 ME sible” cases,5 of similar of thousands opinion), would have scenario A.3d 1169 “sadly court found circumstances the trial sepa at Looking similar unexceptional.” ¶ rations, that ter the trial court observed will affirm that “can relationships of such compels mination unless the evidence determination Williams, in v. wounding” for the children Carter deeply contrary finding, ¶ Here, the trial court did 50, 9, Significantly, volved. 792 feelings, the beyond “hurt” however, mis- not find that possible we have identified a loss, in this case must, hurt to the child injury, there- of the law. We apprehension greater than the any different or fore, and allow the would be vacate the that, Including certainly say the scenario Pitts not because 4. We would ¶¶ A.3d which also many harm at the hands of children suffer long-term relationship ended by that drug parents, involved addicted the harm suffered of the child. unexceptional. nearly two after the birth child an individual is any stability in thousands of similar child—needs con- hurt to children child— cases. to support sistent direction emotional de- velopment and well-being. explicit “sadly court’s unex- finding finding Kelley is a that ceptional” reality The Court’s is in his burden to that the failed to meet remanding explanation for a further hurt, or “harm” to this child this case is explicit findings Kelley trial that court’s than hurt any greater different or had failed to meet burden to his expe- thousands of children experienced the hurt this child was unusual or ex- circumstances. To em- riencing similar ceptional compared to other children Kelley point that had failed to phasize its similar circumstances. Such a remand is proof, the court also meet his burden appellate practice unusual in review in re- that, regarding found termination quiring explanation a detailed of a trial Kelley relationship between and this child finding that a with the burden “circumstances cannot be deemed ex- proof has failed to meet that burden of 6 Beyond referencing ceptional.” the trial Wandishin, proof. See Wandishin v. empha- court’s it also must be (trial ME nothing suggests sized that in the record facts, having explain found the need not hurt harm any to this child from rationale to support finding). used each relationship termination of the with party, Kelley, A like who has the all was at or indicated issue, proof prevail burden of on an can long child’s suffered unusual term emo- challenge finding to a that his burden tional harm loss of the with only has not been met if can he demon today A long past. contrary strate that a finding compelled now will add confusion and remand by the evidence. Guardianship Gion stress to the life in effort to child’s est, 128 A.3d 1062. The judicially long-passed reestablish a connec- not Court should utilize a claimed need for tion to the child. explanation a more detailed of the ratio Gordius, Jenna the child’s moth- finding nale for the trial court’s er, already pa- has a court-ordered shared proof failed to meet his burden of to turn rights arrangement rental her with of fact try issue into an issue of law to That father. order to overturn a fact-finding the Court approximately allow the child’s father two not like. child, days parts a week with his of up recognizes, As the Court days to four a week in some Court’s weeks. Opinion “firmly the law is established Awarding Kelley parent de facto parents inject liberty will a third into have fundamental already schedule; care, custody, divided visitation to direct the remove the week; child from home for more time each control of children.” v. their Davis ¶ Anderson, 125, 18, instability and increase confusion and 2008 ME 953 A.2d Granville, parenting and at a (citing direction time when the 1166 v. Troxel 530 U.S. order, parent In its the District Court to status seeks to have the Stale interfere applied preponderance have of right the evidence in a fundamental constitutional child, proof parent standard convincing of to evaluate whether Randall the clear and proof applies had met his burden to evidence standard of to such parent Gionest, Guardianship status. It then determined efforts. See 1062; Moore, had failed to meet even this lower burden of ME Pitts v. 59, 27, ¶ proof. de effort to establish facto 90 A.3d 1169. Johnson, 147 L.Ed.2d 49 2054. See also Samuel Are You 120 S.Ct. Riendeau, (2000); 2000 ME My Critique Rideout Mother? A the Require- ¶ 198, 12, opinion)). de ments Facto Parenthood in Maine for Following the Law Court’s Decision in The clear direction Gion- Pitts v. 67 Me. L. Rev. 370- est, Davis, Troxel, precedents and Rideout recognizes respects our liberty interest constitutionally protected The District finding Court’s parents parent of a their child parent failed to meet his burden to Nothing interference. free from state something less than the constitutional harm to the record before us indicates “dramatic, standard of even traumatic ef ” that could meet the constitu- “this child upon well-being” fect sufficient “dramatic, of a and even tional standard support government interference with upon the child’s well-be- parents’ rights their child harm a ing.” degree That is the to child should be affirmed. This record does not necessary to support that we have held is compel findings, to the clear and convinc if, if, award standard, ing evidence of harm that will proven by harm is have a traumatic ef evidence. fect Ride [this] out, focus on whether a The Court’s now, Mandating litigation and the child’s interests would be potential injection into the child’s life of a by the denial of negatively affected” party sharing parenting contentious third claim to de facto status is decision-making, time and harm will simply way asking a different stability for child’s need and consistent parent status to a an award of de facto support. Kelley direction and nonparent would be the best interest of separated and the child have now been standard, “negative child. That affect” than life. more half of the child’s This continued adopted litigation should end now. I would affirm here, likely vague Court’s judgment. the trial court’s given the United States unconstitutional in Troxel that Supreme Court’s conclusion interest of the child standard is

the best

constitutionally support judi- insufficient to parent’s rights.

cial interference with a Troxel, at

See 530 U.S. S.Ct.

Case Details

Case Name: Jenna Gordius v. Randall G. Kelley

Court Name: Supreme Judicial Court of Maine

Date Published: May 26, 2016

Citation: 139 A.3d 928

Docket Number: Docket Han-15-100

Court Abbreviation: Me.