96 F. 625 | U.S. Circuit Court for the Southern District of Iowa | 1899
This action is submitted upon an agreed statement of facts. The pressure of official duties will not permit an extended statement of the grounds upon which 1 reach the conclusions hereinafter stated. The facts relating to actual occurrences are not in dispute. Briefly slated as to each of the main questions involved, the findings and conclusions drawn therefrom are as follows:
1. As to plea to the jurisdiction, I find: (1) That the present bill is ancillary to tbe suit heretofore decided in this court, and hereinafter more particularly described, to wit, John Gubbins v. A. C. Lautenschlager and William Huttenlocher, No. -, Equity; decree rendered July 16, 1896. 75 Fed. 615. (2) That under said decree the master commissioner therein named sold the real estate described in said decree, and as therein directed, and plaintiff, Jenks, is the grantee under deed of conveyance duly issued by said master, and brings this suit to have said decree construed and enforced as
I conclude: (1) That, since the pending suit is ancillary to said principal suit, this court has jurisdiction to hear and determine same, although said named defendants have become, since said decree was rendered in said principal suit, and were at institution of pending suit, citizens and residents of the same state of which plaintiff herein was then a citizen and resident. (2) Decree must pass against said plea to the jurisdiction of this court herein.
2. As to the effect on parties herein of the decree entered in the district court of Lee county, Iowa, I find: (1) That in October,-1891, A. 0. Lautenschlager and William Huttenlocher purchased a 10-acre tract of land near Ft. Madison, Iowa, intending to erect thereon an establishment for meat-packing purposes. In January, 1892, one John Gubbins contracted to furnish materials and work for a refrigerating plant to be by said Gubbins placed in said establishment, which establishment said Lautenschlager and said Huttenlocher erected on said tract of land. Gubbins placed such plant therein, and on July 8, 1892, duly filed, in accordance with the statutes of Iowa, his mechanic’s lien against said real estate and the improvements thereon for such material and labor. Upon August 8, 1892, said Gubbins began suit in this court for foreclosure of such mechanic’s lien. In that suit said Lautenschlager and Huttenlocher were made sole defendants. Such suit was prosecuted to decree, which was entered therein upon July 16, 1896. Under such decree the said premises were duly sold on September 2, 1896, and certificate of sale issued to one W. 0. Kevin, who assigned said certificate to plaintiff, Jenks, who now is the holder of deed duly issued to him upon said certificate. At said sale, and before the property was sold, notice was publicly given that under the Fred W. Wolf Company contract, hereinafter specially stated, the refrigerating plant then in said packing establishment, and which had been there placed by said Wolf Company, was claimed to be the property of said Wolf Company, and did not pass under said sale to the purchaser thereat. (2) Upon July 12, 1892, said Lautenschlager and Huttenlocher contracted with the Fred W. Wolf Company for a refrigerating plant for said establishment, to be placed in said packing establishment in place of the said refrigerating plant theretofore placed therein by said Gubbins. TMs Wolf & Co. contract was made before any work was commenced on the plant therein contracted for, and before any materials for such plant had been placed in said packing establishment. Such contract provided that, “until purchase price is fully paid, in cash, the property rights of the plant” should remain in said
“Hie court further finds that in and by virtue of the contract made and (altered into on the said 12th day of July, A. D. 1802, the said IFred W. Wolf Company retained the title and right of possession in and to the said property heroínaiier described, and that in and by virtue of the said contract the said property hereinafter described retained its character as personal property; and the said plaintiff in this cause is entitled to a special execution re storing to him the possession of the personal property described in said contract of July 12, 1802, free and clear from (lie claim, right, title, and interest of any of the defendants here'in. The court further finds that the said plaintiff, James 0. Brewster, as trustee, is entitled to a first lien upon the said personal property described in and sot out in the said contract of (late July 12. 1802, in the ft,id sum of SS),f>7(>.27, together with (>% interest from the 4th day of September. A. I). 1801; said sum being decreed a first lien upon said property, prior, paramount, and superior to the right, claim, or interest of each or any of the defendants herein. s ⅜ * It is further ordered and decreed that plaintiff is entitled to a special execution to issue to the sheriff of Bee county. Iowa, authorizing and directing the said sheriff to place the plaintiff in possession of said property, provided that the defendant John Gubbins may redeem said property by paying to the plaintiff, or to the district court of Bee county, Iowa, for his use and benefit, within ten days after the signing of this*628 decree, tlie sum of §9,576.27, with interest from the 4th day of September, A. D. 1894, and the costs of this suit, taxed at-dollars, and upon the payment of said sum by said defendant the lien of plaintiff shall be satisfied, as against said property.”
. — (8) That said decree as rendered by said state court stands in its original force, with no appellate proceedings pending, (á) That the district court within and for Lee county, Iowa, as a court of equity, and under the constitution and statutes of said state, had jurisdiction of the general subject-matter in the action above described, wherein the Fred W. Wolf Company was the original plaintiff, and subsequently James C. Brewster, as trustee, was substituted as plaintiff, and John Gubbins and others were defendants; being the action described in paragraph 2 of statement of facts found herein. (5) That said district court of Lee county, Iowa, had acquired in said action jurisdiction over said John Gubbins; said Gubbins, by counsel, appearing therein and pleading to said petition. (6) At the date of the institution of said action in said state court by said Fred W. Wolf Company, the suit was still pending and undetermined which said Gubbins had instituted in this court for the foreclosure of his said mechanic’s lien; that hearing in said action in said state court and decision therein were not had until after decree in this court had been entered in this court in said Gubbins foreclosure suit, and said real estate had been sold under the provisions of said foreclosure decree. (7) No attempt is shown to have been made by said Gubbins, in his said foreclosure suit in this court, to have said Wolf Company or said Brewster, who, as trustee, was the substituted plaintiff in said action in said state court, brought as parties into said foreclosure suit, nor any of the issues tendered in said action in said state court actually litigated or decided in said foreclosure suit; and the decree entered in this court in said foreclosure suit does not expressly state or decide the matter so tendered and then at issue in the pleadings filed in said action in said state court.
I conclude: (1) That said district court of Lee county, Iowa, at the date, of the decree therein entered in said action then pending therein, wherein said Brewster, as trustee, was plaintiff, and said John Gubbins and others were defendants, had jurisdiction of the subject-matters in issue therein, and of said John Gubbins, with reference thereto, and said decree is binding on this court in this action, and upon plaintiff, Jenks, herein, and said plaintiff is bound thereby; and the question of priority of liens upon the property, to wit, the refrigerating plant in controversy in said action in said state court, and as between said Brewster, trustee, and said plaintiff, Jenks, is not open to inquiry in this action. (2) Upon such issue as tendered herein in petition by said plaintiff, Jenks, and as to his prayer for injunction against said Brewster, trustee, to restrain removal of said refrigerating plant, decree must pass against said plaintiff, Jenks.
3. As to said question of taxes, presented against defendants other than said Brewster, I find: (1) That said real estate, to wit, said packing-house establishment, as described in decree by this court entered in said suit brought by said Gubbins for foreclosure of his said mechanic’s lien, was sold for delinquent taxes of the year 1895, to
I conclude: (1) That the fact that said Samuel Atlee and Dennis A. Morrison were at date of said tax-sale purchase and subsequent payment, and ever since have been, stockholders and directors in said Ft. Madison Stock-Yards Company, furnishes no sufficient grounds to authorize decree, as prayed by plaintiff herein, declaring said tax-sale purchase or said subsequent tax payment to have been made for or on behalf of, or that same inures to the benefit of, said stock-yards company; thereby becoming, as to plaintiff herein, merely the payment of taxes by the holder of the legal title to said real estate. (2) As to the matter of said tax sale and subsequent payment, decree herein must pass against plaintiff.
Decree ordered dismissing hill at costs of plaintiff.
