123 Mich. 7 | Mich. | 1900
From a judgment of $400 obtained by plaintiff against defendant, she has appealed. This action is brought under the provisions of section 5593, 3 Comp. Laws 1897. We do not deem it necessary to discuss all the questions raised by counsel. It was the claim of the plaintiff that, while driving upon the highway, his horse was attacked by a dog of which the defendant was the keeper; that the dog barked at the horse, and bit its heels, causing it to kick; and that plaintiff was kicked in the face by the horse. His nose was broken, and the horse ran
The first thing which needs our attention is the direction the court gave the jury that, under the .evidence in the case, they must find the defendant was the keeper of •the dog, within the meaning of the statute. It is said this question should have been left to the jury. The testimony' of the defendant disclosed that while her son Martin,, a man about 28 years old, owned the dog, he made his home with her, at her residence in Flint, and worked for her upon her farm near Flint. She testified she was owner of all the personal property in the house and on the premises in the city of Flint; also of the stock and tools and farming utensils on the farm, and used in connection therewith. She further testified that she purchased and paid for all the groceries and supplies used about the house in the city, and that she was the head of the family, and had absolute charge of the house and the property thereabouts; that she owned and controlled all the personal property, including the horses, vehicles, and all farm implements; that she ran the farm, and directed all the operations on and about the farm; that Martin worked for her, and she paid him for his services in a share of the crops raised; that she directed what crops should be put in, and how the same should be disposed of. It is apparent, from the testimony, that the home of Martin was with defendant, and that the only home the dog had was upon the premises owned and controlled by the defendant. The court very properly said to the jury the defendant was the keeper of the dog. Burnham v. Strother, 66 Mich. 519 (33 N. W. 410); Newton v. Gordon, 72 Mich. 642 (40 N. W. 921); Fye v. Chapin, 121 Mich. 675 (80 N. W. 797).
The court instructed the jury that, unless the injury to plaintiff was directly caused by the assault made by the dog upon the horse, the plaintiff could not recover. It is
Judgment is affirmed.