delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is an appeal by Josephine Jenkins, a former employee of Wm. Schluderberg-T. J. Kurdle Co., appellee, from an order and judgment of the Superior Court of Baltimore City, sustaining without leave to amend, appellee’s demurrer to her declaration. Her suit is for damages for her allegedly wrongful discharge from employment by the appellee in violation of a collective bargaining agreement between the union of which she was a member, the Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen of North America, Local No. 149, A.F.L.-C.I.O. (the “Union”), and the appellee (sometimes referred to below as the “Employer”). Her declaration states that she had been an able and satisfactory employee of the appellee for fourteen years prior to her discharge; that the Union failed and refused to arbitrate her grievance although she requested it to do so; that the Union acted in a “discriminatory, wilful, and arbitrary manner toward the plaintiff, which accounted for its failure and refusal to arbitrate plaintiff’s discharge”; and that the Employer refused to comply with her request for reinstatement and back pay.
The appellee’s demurrer was based chiefly on two theories: (1) that the collective bargaining agreement barred the plaintiff from maintaining this suit for wrongful discharge (though this was not explicitly stated as a ground of demurrer) ; and (2) that state courts are precluded by the National Labor Relations Act from asserting jurisdiction in such an action. At the hearing on the demurrer, the appellee did not urge the second point, and on appeal it has not relied on this point, which we assume has been abandoned. 1 The trial court sustained the appellee’s demurrer on the first theory, and we shall consider solely the correctness of this ruling.
The collective bargaining agreement between the Union and Employer is an elaborate document covering all the usual *559 aspects of labor-management relations. Section 1(B) of the agreement provides that “No employee shall be unjustly discharged or laid off.” The appellant claims that she was unjustly discharged and that the employer has committed a breach of the agreement.
There no longer seems to be any doubt that in certain situations an individual employee may sue his employer for the breach of a collective bargaining agreement. Several theories have been advanced to explain this result. 2 One view is that although the agreement gives no rights to individual workers, whenever a man goes to work, his individual contract incorporates the union agreement as a local custom or usage so that every breach of the collective agreement is also a breach of the individual contract of employment. A second theory holds that a collective bargaining agreement is a contract with the employer as promisor, the union as promisee, and the employees as third party beneficiaries. A third view is that the collective bargaining agreement is like a trust, with the union holding the employer’s promises in trust for the benefit of the individuals. Under any of these theories, the individual may sue the employer for infringement of his individual rights.
What are these “individual rights” for which he can sue? Certainly, promises relating to such things as union security, recognition, deduction of dues, the use of bulletin boards, and access to the plant run to the union and are not individual rights. On the other hand, it is felt that claims regarding wages, seniority, and wrongful discharge peculiarly affect the individual and for them he should be able (at least in the absence of some bar under the agreement) to bring an individual action. With a discharge, for example, it is
his
job that is at stake and
his
income. Writing specifically with re
*560
gard to discharge cases, Professor Cox has stated, “The great weight of authority sustains the individual’s right of action.” “Rights under a Eabor Agreement”, 69 Harv. L. Rev. 601, 647 (1956). And see cases cited in Annot., 18 A. E. R. 2d 352, 367 (1951). See also
Ass’n of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.,
Naturally, the employer does not wish to be harassed with a lawsuit each time an employee has a grievance regarding wages, seniority, or wrongful discharge. Nor does he want to incur the risk of a strike because the union may sympathize with a disgruntled employee. Hence the collective bargaining agreement usually provides for a detailed procedure through which all grievances are channeled. In the instant case, the grievance procedure, we understand, is of a rather usual type. It is as follows:
“Should any difference arise between the Union or employee members, and the Company, as to the application and interpretation of this Agreement, there shall be no strike, stoppage or suspension of the work on the part of the Union or its members, or lockout on the part of the Company on account of such conditions. The following procedure shall be followed in settling such difference:
(A) Complaints or Grievances presented by the Union and/or employees:
(1) Employee or Shop Steward or both shall take up question with the foreman.
(2) In the event a satisfactory conclusion is not reached, question may be taken up with the Sectional Superintendent.
(3) In the event a satisfactory conclusion is not reached, question may be taken up with Plant Superintendent.
(4) If the Complaint or Grievance is not satisfactorily determined by steps 1, 2, and 3 above, representatives of the Company Management shall meet with a Grievance Committee, consisting of *561 not more than six (6) employees selected by the Union and/or its Business Representative, at the Union’s option, to discuss such complaint or grievance in an attempt to resolve the same.
(5) Any such complaint or grievance not satisfactorily settled by step 4 above, shall upon the application of either the Company or the Union, be referred to an Impartial Arbitrator to be selected by the mutual agreement of both parties. If the parties shall fail, within 10 days after notice for arbitration, to agree upon an Impartial Arbitrator, such arbitrator shall be appointed by the then Chief Judge of the Supreme Bench of Baltimore City. The decision of the Impartial Arbitrator so selected or appointed shall be final and conclusive upon the Company, the Union and the employees.”
The general rule is that before an individual employee can maintain a suit, he must show that he has exhausted his contractual remedies:
“This rule, which is analogous to the rule requiring the exhaustion of administrative remedies as a condition precedent to resorting to courts * * * is based on a practical approach to the myriad problems, complaints and grievances that arise under a collective bargaining agreement. It makes possible the settlement of such matters by a simple, expeditious and inexpensive procedure, and by persons who, generally, are intimately familiar therewith. * i? The use of these internal remedies for the adjustment of grievances is designed not only to promote settlement thereof but also to foster more harmonious employee-employer relations.” Cone v. Union Oil Co.,129 Cal. App. 2d 558 , 564,277 P. 2d 464 , 468 (1954).
Thus, if the employee refuses to take even the initial step of requesting the processing of the grievance, he will not be *562 granted relief in the courts. The difficulty arises when he presents his grievance to the union and he is dissatisfied with the way in which the union handles his case. There are not many cases on this issue, but the trend seems to be that he cannot sue the employer if he does not like the result of the union efforts at negotiation. See Cox, “Individual Enforcement of Collective Bargaining Agreements”, 8 Rab. L. J. 850 (1957). 3
However, that is not the case which confronts us. For purposes of a ruling on demurrer, we must accept as true the facts in appellant’s declaration. The Employer has not elected to press any challenge to the allegations of wrongful discharge on its part and of wilful, arbitrary and discriminatory conduct on the part of the Union is failing and refusing to carry the plaintiff’s grievance to arbitration, on the ground that these allegations are not sufficient as statements of fact, but constitute mere conclusions of the pleader. Cf.
Conrad v. City of Takoma Park,
The collective bargaining agreement in the instant case does not contain any express, affirmative statement that the only remedies which employees covered by it may have against their employer for alleged breaches of the agreement shall be through the grievance procedures provided for by the agreement. We think, however, that such a limitation may be implied from the agreement as to such matters as those in which the Union may be the aggrieved party or in which the interests of different groups of employees may be involved, and also generally (but subject to an exception which we shall state later) as to matters which may be considered as primarily individual rights.
The late Dean Shulman, of the Yale Law School, in an article entitled, “Reason, Contract and Law in Labor Relations”, 68 Harv. L. Rev. 999, at pp. 1006-1007, contrasted the different interests involved in labor agreements in matters of seniority and in matters of discipline. As to the latter, he pointed out the interest of the union to challenge the soundness of the exercise of the employer’s discretionary power to discipline or discharge and the interest of the employer to reduce this vulnerability of the disciplinary action taken by the employer, and then stated: “So most collective bargaining agreements do not go much beyond recognizing the employer’s power to discipline or discharge and providing that the action shall be for cause, or good cause, and shall be subject to challenge by the employee and the union, subject to a few limitations or exceptions.” At the conclusion of this article (p. 1024), Dean Shulman stressed the importance of self-government and of arbitration as a part thereof in labor relations, saying: “The arbitration is an integral part of the system of self-government. And the system is designed to aid management in its quest for efficiency, to assist union leadership in its participation in the enterprise, and to secure justice for the employees. It is a means of making collective *564 bargaining work * * *. When it works fairly well, it does not need the sanction of the law of contracts or the law of arbitration. It is only when the system breaks down completely that the courts’ aid in these respects is invoked. But the courts cannot, by occasional sporadic decision, restore the parties’ continuing relationship; and their intervention in some cases may seriously affect the going systems of self-government.”
We think that under the provisions of the agreement now before us the Employer is generally entitled to immunity from suits by individual employees, that the Union is to consider carefully and fairly the alleged grievances of its members, that it is likewise to exercise its judgment and discretion fairly on behalf of its individual members in determining upon what terms it believes any grievances of theirs should be adjusted and whether such grievances should be carried to arbitration, if negotiations for settlement or adjustment fail. It is conceded in the present case that, but for the prohibition against unjust discharge contained in the collective bargaining agreement, the plaintiff would have no claim at all against the Employer. We think that she must take the bitter with the sweet and cannot select and rely upon one provision of the agreement which is to her advantage and at the same time reject or ignore another provision which limits or is a condition to the exercise of the provision which she invokes.
But, accepting that promise, the question is whether or not she is barred from redress through litigation for allegedly wrongful discharge by the Union’s refusal to carry her claim to arbitration, notwithstanding that the Union’s refusal is due to conduct which, on the pleadings before us, must be taken as wilful, arbitrary and discriminatory.
In discussing such a problem in his article on “Rights under a Labor Agreement”, 69 Harv. L. Rev. 601, Professor Cox says in part (at p. 652) : “While the rule which bars an individual employee from bringing an action on the contract when the union is unwilling to take the case to arbitration is sound if the union has made an adjustment or is satisfied that the grievance lacks merit, nevertheless it would work injustice in situations where the union is unwilling to *565 press the claim because of indifference or reluctance to suffer the expense. Both factors come into play under open-shop contracts when a grievance having no precedent value is filed by a non-member, whose failure to pay dues means that he contributes nothing to the cost of acting as his representative. One solution would be to open arbitration proceedings to individual grievants. Another alternative is to allow the employees to bring suit against the employer and union as co-defendants upon analogy to the bill in equity which the beneficiary of a trust may maintain against the trustee who fails to press a claim against a third person. The suit would fail on the merits if it appeared that the collective bargaining representative had dropped the grievance for lack of merit or had negotiated a reasonable adjustment.” 4
Professor Cox expresses much the same idea in his article entitled, “Individual Enforcement of Collective Bargaining Agreements”, 8 Rab. R. J. 850 (1957) where, at p. 858, he states: “In my opinion the presumption should be against individual enforcement of a collective bargaining agreement unless the union has unfairly refused to act * * *. The bargaining representative would be guilty of a breach of duty if it refused to press a justifiable grievance either because of laziness, prejudice or unwillingness to expend money on behalf of employees who were not members of the union. Individual enforcement would then become appropriate. The proper remedy would be an action against the union and employer analogous to the action maintained by the beneficiary against the debtor of a trust when the trustee refuses to bring the action. It would be a defense to show that the union and employer had made a settlement or that the union’s decision not to press the claim was honest and reasonable.” (Emphasis added.)
Although we have not been referred to, nor have we found, any case exactly on all fours with the instant case, an analysis Gf related cases will, we think, demonstrate the soundness of this approach.
*566 A number of these cases deal with failure of the employee to exhaust contractual procedure.
In
Pattenge v. Wagner Iron Works,
In
United Protective Workers v. Ford Motor Co.,
In
Nichols v. National Tube Co.,
In
Youmans v. Charleston & W. C. Ry.,
175 S. C. 99,
In many cases where it has been held that an employer cannot be sued until the contractual remedies have been exhausted, the facts show that the employee had initiated the grievance procedure but the union rejected the claim on its merits as unworthy, and these cases are the converse of the exception suggested by Professor Cox, which we have quoted.
Thus, in DiSanti v. United Glass and Ceramic Workers, 33 CCH Lab. Cas. 94, 785 (Pa. C. P. 1957), the plaintiff claimed seniority over another worker who was taken off the job. The other worker initiated a grievance claim under the contract machinery and eventually the plaintiff was removed from his job. Plaintiff then sued the employer for wrongful removal. The union and the other worker were joined as parties defendant. Against plaintiff’s contention that it would have been futile to exhaust his remedy under the contract, because of the prior adjudication, the court held that plaintiff was bound by the union’s actions in settling the dispute when the other worker had brought his grievance. The Court distinguished the situation there found to exist from such a situation as is alleged in the present case and said (p. 94, 789) : “In stating that plaintiff is bound by decisions arrived at according to the provisions of the contract, the Court does not mean to imply that a member of a collective bargaining agency can never seek the protection of the courts for wrongs done him. Certainly where it is made clear that *568 the decision was arbitrary or capricious or where fraud is sufficiently set forth, the courts are open to redress such wrong. However, such is not the case here * * (Emphasis added.)
Chacko v. Pittsburgh Steel Co., 32 CCH Lab. Cas. 94, 452, 105 Pitt. L. J. 429 (Pa. C. P. 1957) was a suit to enjoin an employer from depriving the plaintiff of proper seniority rights. The grievance machinery was similar to the procedure in the agreement in the present case. The court there found that the union refused to process either grievance any further because it felt that they had no merit, and went on to say: “Under the collective bargaining agreement, the Union alone has authority to demand arbitration and is entitled to exercise its honest discretion in deciding whether or not an employee has a grievance which justifies appeal to arbitration. * * * At best, plaintiff’s own case indicates that his Union used sound judgment in refusing to take his grievance to arbitration.” (p. 94, 455)
In
Garner v. KMTR Radio Corp.,
In
Terrell v. Local Lodge 758,
A case often cited is
Cone v. Union Oil Co., supra,
Cortez v. Ford Motor Co.,
Our Court has repeatedly held that proper exercise of such discretion over grievances and interpretation of contract terms in the interest of all its members is vested in authorized representatives of the union, subject to challenge after *570 exhaustion of the grievance procedure only on grounds of bad faith, arbitrary action or fraud.” (p. 529)
See also
Zdero v. Briggs Mfg. Co.,
A case most heavily relied upon by appellee is Taschenberger v. Celanese Corp., 26 CCH Lab. Cas. 86, 944 (1954), decided by the Circuit Court for Allegany County, Maryland. There, the discharged plaintiff presented his grievance to the union. A hearing was held, after which the union filed with the employer notice of its intention to arbitrate plaintiff’s case. Subsequent investigation by the union, however, disclosed that there was not sufficient evidence to warrant arbitration. Plaintiff decided not to appeal this refusal to arbitrate to the executive board of the union, but instead sued the employer. His declaration did not, so far as appears from the report of the case, allege that the union had acted arbitrarily with respect to his grievance. The employer’s motion for summary judgment which showed the facts above stated was granted.
In
Jorgensen v. Pennsylvania R. R. Co.,
25 N. J. 541,
In
Mello v. Local 4408,
82 R. I. 60,
In
Transcontinental & Western Air, Inc. v. Koppal,
The strongest case for the appellee, we think, is
Guszkowski v. U. S. Trucking Corp.,
Additional cases which deny the employee a judicial remedy where his claim has already been considered on the merits include:
Peoples v. Southern Pacific Co.,
A slim minority of cases grants the employee relief even, though the union has rejected his grievance on the merits.
Alabama Power Co. v. Haygood,
In
Moore v. Illinois Central R. R.,
One other case supporting the minority position is
In re Norwalk Tire & Rubber Co.,
In the complex field of labor relations many factors and many interests are involved. Collective bargaining is now established as a matter of national policy under the Wagner Act and the Taft-Hartley Act, as well as under the Railway Labor Act. Arbitration of labor disputes and the finality of arbitration awards therein are provided for under Article 7 of the Maryland Code of 1957. Conflicts of interest may exist or develop in many instances in grievance matters as between individuals or groups of employees represented by the same bargaining agent. It seems desirable that the bargaining agent should have power to deal with such problems. It is possible that even the discharge of a single individual might have wide repercussions in employer-employee relations, though usually this would not seem probable.
Possibilities of indifference, favoritism, discrimination and of trading off the interests of one group or member for the benefit of another group or member, of course, exist. Yet, possibilities of abuse of trust and confidence exist, in many fields. Through the law of trusts and of fiduciary or confidential relations, protections against such possible abuses have been developed in many situations. The law does not in such matters strike down discretionary powers conferred upon trustees merely because such powers might be abused. Nor *575 in the corporate field does it prohibit a corporation from issuing bonds or other evidences of indebtedness or different classes of stocks merely because the interests of holders of such bonds or of different classes of stock may differ. Courts will redress misuse of power. In the case of trusts they may take over the direction and control of the administration of the trust in greater or lesser degree, but ordinarily they do not do so and leave the trustee free to exercise the discretionary powers which the trust instrument confers upon him. In corporate affairs, the courts do not undertake to take over the functions of the board of directors, though they may grant relief when the board abuses its powers, as by favoring the interests of one stockholder or group of stockholders at the expense of others.
Another analogy which suggests itself is that of court review of administrative action, notably in zoning cases. In such cases, many conflicting interests may have to be resolved by the duly constituted zoning authorities, and their action may be judicially reviewed. The rule is well established in such matters that a court may not, substitute its judgment for that of a zoning board, and that it will not set aside the action of the board unless such action is unreasonable, arbitrary, capricious or illegal. Thus, a court will not reverse the board if the question decided by the board is fairly debatable, whether or not the court itself would have reached the same conclusion on the same evidence.
Analogies are a favorite basis for legal reasoning, but they are rarely perfect and they may bring about a collapse of reasoning, if stretched too far. Though we recognize this danger, we think that the above analogies are persuasive, and we are of the opinion that the rule suggested by Professor Cox, referred to above, is sound. This is that as a general rule grievance procedures provided by a collective bargaining agreement should be a bar to suits by individuals against the Employer based upon alleged violation of the agreement, but that such suits are not barred if the Union acted unfairly towards the employee in refusing to press the employee’s claim through to, and including, arbitration under the collective bargaining agreement. We accordingly hold that under *576 the agreement here involved, the plaintiff is not barred from bringing this suit against her employer for allegedly wrongful discharge, where, on the facts alleged (and admitted by the demurrer) the Union acted arbitrarily and in a discriminatory manner in refusing to press the plaintiff’s grievance to arbitration under the agreement. The order and judgment appealed from will therefore be reversed and the case remanded.
We think that on remand the Union would be a proper party to the suit. We are not prepared at this time to say that it is a necessary party. Neither are we now prepared to say that the suit should be in equity or that it should be transferred from law to equity. (See Professor Cox’ suggestion in 69 Harv. U. Rev. at p. 645.) If any relief by way of injunction or mandamus against any party should be appropriate, it would seem to be available under Secs. 61-73 of Article 75 of the Code (1957).
Order and judgment reversed, the costs of this appeal to be paid by the appellee; and case remanded for further proceedings.
Notes
. See
International Association of Machinists v. Gonzales,
. See Cox, “Rights under a Labor Agreement", 69 Harv. R. Rev. 601 (1956); Gregory, “The Collective Bargaining Agreement", 1949 Wash. U. R. Q. 3; Warns, “The Nature of the Collective Bargaining Agreement", 3 Miami L. Q. 235 (1949) ; Lenhoff, “The Present Status of Collective Contracts in the American Legal System", 39 Mich. R. Rev. 1109 (1941) ; Witmer, “Collective Labor Agreements in the Courts”, 48 Yale R. J. 195 (1938).
. See also, Rose, "The Nature of a Grievance in Labor Relations”, 3 Lab. L. J. 599 (1952); Dunau, “Employee Participation in the Grievance Aspect of Collective Bargaining”, 50 Colum. L. Rev. 731 (1950); Sherman, The Individual and His Grievance—Whose Grievance Is It?”, 11 U. Pitt. ‘L. Rev. 35 (1949); Hamilton, “Individual Rights Arising from Collective Labor Contracts”, 3 Mo. L. Rev. 253 (1938); "Individual Grievances”, 50 N. W. U. L. Rev. 143 (195S) ; Note, 3 Buffalo L. Rev. 270 (1954) ; Comment, 1949 Wis. L. Rev. 154.
. See 3 Scott, Trusts, Sec. 282.1 (1956).
