39 Haw. 506 | Haw. | 1952
This is an action in tort for compensatory and punitive damages in the total sum of $100,000, half of which is for compensatory damages and the other half for punitive damages. It involves personal injuries of the plaintiff suffered at the hands of two brothers, the defendants, in an alleged assault and battery without justification or excuse. At the close of trial, the trial judge, over objection of the defendants, instructed the jury "that under the evidence presented here, the defendants had no justification in law for the forcible ejection of the person of the plaintiff from the premises in question, and on the evidence as presented the allegations of assault and battery on the person of the plaintiff have been proven." On submission of the issues of damages the jury rendered a verdict in favor of the plaintiff and assessed damages against the defendants in the total sum of $21,000, of which $20,000 is for compensatory damages *508 and but $1,000 for punitive damages. With respect to compensatory damages the verdict, however, broke the sum of $20,000 for it into three sums, i.e., $8,000 as general damages, $2,000 as special damages and $10,000 as damages for loss of future earnings. The defendants prosecute exceptions to this court.
The bill of exceptions contains twenty exceptions, all of which are relied upon as alleged errors in a specification. The specification of alleged errors, however, presents but three questions of law meriting consideration. The first is whether there was sufficient evidence of plaintiff's loss of future earnings or impairment of earning capacity to submit the issue thereof to the jury, and if so, whether that evidence is sufficient to support the verdict in assessing damages for such loss or impairment in the sum of $10,000. The second is whether it was prejudicial or reversible error to admit evidence as to the wealth or financial standing of the defendants and to instruct the jury that they may consider such evidence in assessing punitive damages. The third is whether it was error to have instructed the jury that the issue of forcible ejection by an assault and battery without justification or excuse, as alleged in the complaint, had been proved by the evidence.
As to the first question, the defendants contend that the evidence as to earning capacity, and hence as to impaired earning capacity, is insufficient on the ground that prior earnings were not proved with reasonable certainty but left to mere conjecture. The plaintiff testified that before being injured he had earned between $150 and $200 a month in a private business of buying, making and selling colored motion picture film as sole operator independently from his regular employment as a hotel security officer. He detailed his expenses and stated his gross income which fixed the average net earnings in his business at $211.26 a month for a period of two years. Although he admittedly *509 kept books and "all the required records," the plaintiff did not produce them but testified from his own knowledge and memory without objection from the defendants. Nor did the defendants call upon him to produce those books or records, even though he informed them that such books or records were located at a certain address within the city. Nevertheless, the plaintiff did produce his tax returns which substantiated his testimony as to gross income. The absence of other substantiating documentary evidence constitutes the crux of contention made by the defendants in challenge of the quantum of proof as to prior earnings. That contention is untenable. Prior earnings were proved with reasonable certainty by the certain and explicit testimony of the plaintiff, which withstood the test of cross examination and stands uncontroverted. Such testimony is based on actual knowledge at first hand and constitutes substantial and direct evidence of prior earnings. That it is not fully substantiated by documentary evidence goes to its weight but not to its sufficiency. Even had it not been partially so substantiated, the plaintiff's testimony of itself would have sufficed to put the jury in the position from which it could readily determine net earnings without having to engage in any conjecture.
At this juncture it is pertinent to note that evidence of prior earnings is but one of many factors bearing upon the value of impaired earning capacity resulting from a permanent injury and that such value is the ultimate fact for the jury to determine. Nor need evidence as to any one of those factors be clear and indubitable to entitle it to go to the jury and the law exacts only the kind of proof of which the nature of the case is susceptible. (See Coney v. Lihue Plantation Co., Ltd.,
As to the second question, the defendants contend that evidence of their wealth is inadmissible under all the authorities. In support thereof, they cite the majority rule that where more than one tortfeasor is sued for damages the wealth or financial standing of one or more of the defendants is not a proper matter for consideration by the jury in assessing punitive damages. The theory underlying that rule appears to be that consideration of the individual wealth of one or more defendants would result in an unjust punishment and burden being imposed on defendants less able to pay where they are all liable jointly. (See the leading case of Washington Gas Light Co. v. Lansden,
As to the third and final question, the defendants contend that there is more than a mere scintilla of evidence to support a verdict in favor of the defendants on the issue of an assault and battery without justification or excuse. "To amount to more than a mere scintilla the evidence must be of a character sufficiently substantial, in view of all the circumstances of the case, to warrant the jury, as triers of the facts, in finding from it the fact to establish which the evidence was introduced" or, in this case, to find that the defendants used reasonable force to eject the plaintiff and did not assault and batter him without justification or excuse. (Holstein v. Benedict,
Exceptions overruled.