129 A. 815 | R.I. | 1925
This is an action in assumpsit to recover the value of two bales of cotton which were shipped from Boston over the defendant's railroad. The point of destination was Darlington, R.I. One of the bales was included *73 in a shipment on May 1, 1920, of six bales and the other was a part of a shipment on May 10, 1920, of two bales. Neither of the bales in question was delivered. The case was tried by the Presiding Justice of the Superior Court sitting without a jury and the case is before us on the plaintiff's exception to the decision of said justice for the defendant.
The defence is that the action is barred by the plaintiff's failure to make a claim for the loss within the time specified in the bill of lading which provided that, in the event of failure to make delivery, claim must be made in writing to the originating or delivering carrier within six months after a reasonable time for delivery has elapsed.
The unlost portion of the first shipment was delivered May 20, 1920, and that of the second, May 22, 1920. The evidence shows that ten days was a reasonable time within which to make a delivery from Boston to Darlington but the dates on which the unlost portions of the shipments were delivered must respectively mark the limit of reasonable time for making delivery. SeeBrewster v. Davis, 202 N.Y. Supp. 574. The six months' period within which a claim could be filed in compliance with the condition in the bill of lading expired as to one bale November 20 and as to the other November 22, 1920. The claim in writing was not made until the following January.
It is admitted that the defendant had notice of the loss within the six months' period, and the plaintiff contends that the defendant waived the provision in the bill of lading as to the time within which a claim must be made and is estopped from setting up the plaintiff's failure to comply with said provision. The bills of lading were for shipments in interstate commerce, a subject which by authority of the Federal constitution has been regulated by Congress. A copy of the form of the bills of lading has been filed with and has the approval of the Interstate Commerce Commission. The defendant contends that the condition was a part of the tariff which has the force of a statute and can not be waived. *74
A Federal question is presented and we are bound to follow the latest decision of the United States Supreme Court on the subject. It was supposed that the question was settled byGeorgia c. Ry. Co. v. Blish Milling Co.,
A shipper and carrier are no longer permitted to contract as they please for an interstate shipment. Many of the terms of their contract are prescribed for them. The conditions affecting liability are a part of the fixed rate and it is settled "That a carrier cannot be prevented by estoppel or otherwise from taking advantage of the lawful rate properly filed under the Interstate Commerce Act." See Texas Pacif. Ry. Co. v. Leatherwood,supra, and cases cited at page 481. A carrier has even been permitted to collect the legal rate when the shipper was prejudiced by the carrier's mistake in quoting a lower rate. In order that there may be no discrimination it is the policy of the law not to permit railroads to waive the conditions in bills of lading for interstate shipments. See Metz v. Boston M.R.R., 116 N.E. (Mass.) 475 and cases cited.
Our conclusion is that the defendant is not estopped from relying upon the condition requiring claims for loss to be made within six months and that the action is barred by reason of failure to comply with said condition.
The plaintiff's exception is overruled and the case is remitted to the Superior Court with direction to enter judgment on the decision.