Jeffrey Goodwin v. Margarette Ghee
330 F.3d 446
6th Cir.
2003
Check Treatment
Docket

*1 my opinion, prejudice In must mean than that the something government more Jeffrey GOODWIN, Petitioner- put proof,

will on its be forced to or that a Appellant, prepare will have to for trial witness v. first instance. United States testify Margarette GHEE, Defendant-Appellee. Allen, F.Supp. 572-73 (N.D.Iowa 1997) (interpreting Morrison Eighth Circuit requir- other cases as United States Appeals, Court of “beyond ing prejudice necessity trial, taking merely which matter re- quires the exercise of the defendant’s con- rights, ‘pleading

stitutional instead of Chaiten, Louis A. Day, Cleveland, Jones ”). out.’ OH, for Petitioner-Appellant. opinion compare The lead seems to Marti, R. Todd Office of Atty. General position government and victims Section, Litigation Columbus, Corrections immediately before Lineback’s motion to OH, for Defendant-Appellee. withdraw was filed with what position their MARTIN, if guilty plea be is allowed to Before Chief Judge; Circuit

withdrawn, BOGGS, BATCHELDER, and comes to DAUGHTREY, the conclusion MOORE, government COLE, CLAY, that the will be in a less favor- This, GIBBONS, position ROGERS, able after the withdrawal. Judges. not the opinion, comparison is correct were, prejudice. to determine If it then ORDER always there be a finding preju- Pursuant to Rule 35 of the Federal dice government upon the withdraw- Rules of Appellate Procedure and Sixth al guilty plea. of a I would instead com- Circuit Rule a majority of the active pare position government and judges of this court grant voted to pled guilty victims before Lineback with review of this case. Following arguments position what their would be if plea is by counsel and a among conference allowed to be withdrawn. Based en judges, it was determined that banc us, I record before would conclude that court is divided this case. Five they similarly are situated all relevant members favor affirmance of aspects, precluding basis to find of the district and five favor rever- prejudice. sal. Pursuant Stupak- to our decision in States,

Thrall v. United (6th 89 F.3d 1269 Cir.1996), the judgment of the district court affirmed an equally divided vote.

The mandate will not issue for fourteen (14) days from the date of this order. Members of the court separate file opinions if they wish.* * 447-448) Judge (pp. 448-449) separate Judge GILMAN filed a (pp. COLE separate filed a concurring opinion, Judges in which dissenting opinion, BAT- Judges in which DAUGH- CHELDER, GIBBONS, TREY,MOORE, joined. and ROGERS joined. and CLAY

447 Judge, concurring. fense level of four rather than seven. In arriving at the conviction-offense level of incarcerated, Jeffrey While Goodwin four, however, Denton and Vance did not criticizing wrote a letter Ohio Parole consider the armed robbery offense. allegedly engaging Board for in discrimi- alleges Goodwin that soon after in natory practices that resulted unneces- April 1999 hearing, Matthews him called sentences, sarily long and for exercising into room to tell him that he This letter unfettered discretion. was Goodwin’s, referring case to the in published the Cleveland Call and Post full Parole Board. allegedly Matthews al- in newspaper October of 1996. luded to the letter in the Cleveland Call and Post he when told Goodwin that “the parole hearing Goodwin had his first in outcome the full Parole [before Board] May of 1998 before Parole Board members 30,1999, would be different.” On June Larry Matthews and Donald Cataldi. full Parole Board conducted a third pro- During Mathews ceeding, at which time it determined that give threatened to an Goodwin “excessive- proper Goodwin’s conviction-offense level in punish pub- sentence” order to him for seven, was indeed continuing his sen- licly criticizing the Parole Board and to imprisonment tence April until at least doing deter others from the same. Mat- of 2005. assigned thews then Goodwin a conviction- despite allegedly offense complaint, which is based 1983, having acknowledged that Goodwin was 42 alleges U.S.C. Ohio Parole Board only entitled to a conviction-offense level of retaliated him Guidelines, violation of his rights. four. First Amendment Under The Court’s basic test for the pre- the conviction-offense level of seven validity of a 1983 action by prisoners— becoming eligible vented Goodwin from for a plain- “whether favor of the 1, 2005, April release until after whereas a necessarily tiff would imply invalidity conviction-offense level of four would have sentence,” prisoner’s] conviction or [the entitled him to almost immediate release 477, 487, Humphrey, Heck v. 114 U.S. from incarceration. The defendants assert (1994) 2364, S.Ct. 129 L.Ed.2d 383 —re- the increased offense level was as- quires that these actions must be exam- signed alleged to Goodwin because of his case-by-case ined on a basis in order to in an robbery, involvement prisoner cog- determine whether the has a published retaliation for his letter key Supreme nizable claim. Another Call and Post. Cleveland decision, Balisok, Court Edwards v. request Goodwin filed a for reconsidera- 137 L.Ed.2d 906 Board, seeking tion with the full Parole (1997), possibility, clearly addresses “the review the determination Matthews envisioned that the nature of the 12, 1999, February Cataldi. On a procedures could be such majority of the full Parole Board voted to necessarily invalidity as the prior ruling rescind and rehear judgment.” 117 S.Ct. 1584. matter. given Goodwin was then a second The of Heck basis April hearing on 1999 before Parole Edwards, granted the state’s motion Jay Board members Denton Bernice summary judgment ruling for because a Vance. Denton and Vance found that necessarily imply Goodwin’s favor would -a Goodwin was entitled to conviction-of- Parole Board’s deny decision to him an immediate release the fact of his conviction or the duration of parole. his confinement. only Goodwin seeks before the Ohio Adult Parole Of the three cases are before inus Board —not immediate Although release. en banc appeal, *3 this consolidated Good- the duration of Goodwin’s sentence win’s claim is the one that is most analo- possibly impacted by a successful chal gous prisoner’s to the facts that barred the lenge pursuant § to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim in Edwards. The nature of duration of his confinement will not neces goes very Goodwin’s claim heart of sarily be affected. See Heck v. Humphrey, why Supreme Court ruled Edwards 477, 481-82, 512 U.S. that prison procedures an attack on can (1994). Therefore, L.Ed.2d 383 I would of the underlying con- § conclude that 1983 is the appropriate viction or sentence. As in the case before vehicle for this suit. us, Edwards’s 1983 challenge was based suggested Defendants at oral argument personal against animus him that that, should Goodwin succeed on his place took at a disciplinary hear- claim, § 1983 he would be to im entitled ing: mediate release because his conviction of Respondent’s ... claim assert[s] fense level would automatically be de the cause of the exclusion of the exculpa- creased from seven to four. simply This is tory evidence was the deceit and bias of not the case. If he were to succeed on his officer himself. He con- claim, § 1983 Goodwin would receive tends that the officer lied about “nothing more than a ‘ticket get to ” statements, the nonexistence of witness door parole of the Anyanwutaku board.’ “intentionally and thus denied” him the Moore, (D.C.Cir. 151 F.3d right present to exculpatory evidence. 1998). Goodwin would not be guaranteed parole or a shorter sentence. See id. at (internal 647, 117 S.Ct. 1584 citations Rather, Goodwin would receive a omitted). Yet the Court held hearing just as he did when he moved that Edwards’s 1983 claim could not be for reconsideration and received a second maintained, allegation because the in of hearing, when the Parole Board tentional part misconduct decided to parole reconsider his eligibility hearing officer at the disciplinary proceed for a third time. ing necessarily implied the invalidity of the decision Edwards. The same is At this new the Parole Board claim, true of Goodwin’s and I see no would have considerable discretion under principled distinction between the two Ohio law to determine the appropriate con- cases. I therefore concur in affirming the viction offense level and release date for judgment of the district court. Goodwin. See (C). 5120:1-1-07(B), §§ Although Good-

COLE, Judge, dissenting. win might receive an offense four Although, by vote divided at this hearing, he could receive a today between, the court affirms the some score in or even higher court’s dismissing plain- example, score. For prove Goodwin could tiff Jeffrey suit, rights Goodwin’s civil First Amendment claim showing write separately retaliation, because it is view that but at the same fail time procedural pa- to his demonstrate that the Parole fabri- Board role hearing does not necessarily attack charge cated the robbery to increase from score

allegedly caused his scenario, Good- to seven. Under

four immediate release. might not receive

win might ex-

Alternatively, the Parole factors to consider

ercise its discretion previously, such not considered had prison conduct in since June

as Goodwin’s previously consid- other conduct

ered, made any or new recommendations department rehabili- staff agencies. or of its

tation and correction *4 5120:1-1-07(0).

See and, if seeks success-

Because Goodwin

ful, at which receive a new its exercise discretion, I would find

broad barred 1983 claim not 129 L.Ed.2d 383. respectfully dissent.

SHERWIN WILLIAMS CO. EMPLOY- TRUST, Peti-

EE HEALTH PLAN

tioner-Appellant, OF INTERNAL

COMMISSIONER

REVENUE, Respondent-

Appellee. of Appeals,

United States Court 13, 2003.

Argued March

Decided Filed