Jeffrey BEEGLE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, COMMISSIONER, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 11-15565
United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.
July 23, 2012.
483 F. App‘x 483
Non-Argument Calendar.
In this case, the district court considered the Agreement between Williams and the state of Alabama in ruling on Adams‘s motion to dismiss. Williams did not mention the Agreement in his complaint, but Adams attached it to the motion to dismiss. The Agreement appears to be central to Williams‘s claim that his constitutional rights were violated. Moreover, while Williams argues that the Agreement is invalid, he does not dispute the authenticity of the document. Therefore, the district court did not have to convert Adams‘s motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. SFM Holdings, Ltd., 600 F.3d at 1337.
Turning to the merits, Williams alleges that Adams violated his due process rights by assessing a 30% recovery fee after he failed to pay court ordered fines and restitution. However, the 30% recovery fee appears to have been assessed when Williams entered into the Agreement with the state of Alabama, and not by any action that Adams took. Even assuming, then, that Williams was deprived of his due process rights, he has not alleged facts showing that Adams deprived him of those rights.
Williams further alleges that Adams violated his equal protection rights by assessing a 30% recovery fee without first conducting a hearing on his indigent status. Yet this allegation does not amount to a claim that Adams violated Williams‘s equal protection rights for two reasons. First, рer the Agreement between Williams and the state of Alabama, Adams did not impose the recovery fee. Second, Williams has not alleged that he received disparate treatment from similarly situated individuals, and he has not shown that any such treatment implicated a fundamental right or was based on his membership of a suspect class. DeYoung, 646 F.3d at 1327. Because Williams has not pleaded facts indicating that Adams violated his rights to due proсess or equal protection, we affirm.1
AFFIRMED.
Jerome M. Albanese, Social Security Administration Office of the General Counsel,
Before CARNES, MARCUS and WILSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Jeffrey Beegle appeals the administrative law judge‘s (“ALJ“) denial of disability insurance benefits under Titles II and XVIII of the Social Security Act. Although the ALJ found that Beegle suffered from the severe impairments of osteoarthritis in his right knee and carpal tunnel syndrome, the ALJ also found that Beegle was not disabled because he did not suffer from a severe mental impairment on account of his depression, and because, despite Beegle‘s impairments, a significant number of jobs existed in the national economy that he could perform. On appeal, Beegle argues that: (1) substantial evidence does not support the ALJ‘s finding that he did not suffer from a severe mental impairment on account of his depression; and (2) substantial evidence does not support the ALJ‘s finding that a significant number of jobs existed in the national economy that he could perform. After careful review, we affirm.
In a Social Security appeal, we must determine whether the ALJ‘s decision is supported by substantial evidence and based upon proper legal standards. See Winschel v. Comm‘r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 1176, 1178 (11th Cir.2011). Substantial evidence requires more than a scintilla of evidence, and is such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as sufficient to support a conclusion. Id. We do not decide thе facts anew, reweigh the evidence, or substitute our own judgment for that of the ALJ. Id. Rather, so long as it is supported by substantial evidence, we must defer to the ALJ‘s decision even if the evidence may preponderate against it. See Crawford v. Comm‘r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1158-59 (11th Cir.2004).
Eligibility for disability insurance benefits requires that the claimant is under a disability.
In order to determine whether a claimant is disabled, the Social Security Administration (“SSA“) applies a 5-step sequential evaluation.
When evaluating whether a claimant suffers from a severe mental impairment, the SSA considers how the impairment affects four functional areas: (1) activities of daily living; (2) social functioning; (3) concentration, persistence, and pace; and (4) episodes of decompression.
Medical opinions, which include physician statements regarding the nature and severity of the claimant‘s impairments, may support the ALJ‘s determination of whether a claimant suffers from a severe impairment. See
A treating physician‘s opinion must be given substantial or considerable weight unless “good cause” is shown to the contrary. Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1179; see also
Upon considering medical opinions, the ALJ must state with particularity the weight given to different medical opinions and the reasоns therefor. Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1179. Otherwise, it is impossible for us to determine whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ‘s decision, and
At the fifth step of the disability analysis, the Commissioner bears the burden of showing that, in light of the claimant‘s residual functional capacity and other factors, there exist in the national economy a significant number of jobs that thе claimant can perform. Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1180; Jones v. Apfel, 190 F.3d 1224, 1228 (11th Cir.1999);
When evaluating a claimant‘s statements regarding his symptoms and their functional effects, the ALJ may consider whether the level or frequency of treatment is consistent with the level of complaints. See Social Security Regulation (“S.S.R.“) 96-7p at 7. Nonetheless, the ALJ may not draw any inferences about an individual‘s symptoms and their functional effects from a failure to seek or pursue medical treatment without first considering any explanations that might explain the failure to seek or pursue treatment. Id. Thus, the ALJ must consider evidence showing that the claimаnt is unable to afford medical care before denying disability insurance benefits based upon the claimant‘s non-compliance with such care. See Ellison, 355 F.3d at 1275. Nonetheless, reversible error does not appear where the ALJ primarily based her decision on factors other than non-compliance, and where the claimant‘s non-compliance was not a significant basis for the ALJ‘s denial of disability insurance benefits. See id. at 1275-76.
In this case, substantial evidence supports the ALJ‘s finding that Beegle did not suffer from a severe mental impairment on account of his depression, but rather, had mild impairments in his activities of daily living, social functioning, and concentration, persistence, and pace, and no episodes of decompensation of extended duration. As for Beegle‘s daily living activities, record evidence showed that Beegle lived alone, could take care of his personal needs without assistance, cleaned up around the house, took care of his son on the weekend, did his laundry, and took some responsibility for his finances. As for his social functioning, Beegle hunted and fished if someone else went with him, talked on the phone with others several times per day, and got along well with others. Beegle also reported to Dr. Robert Storjohann, who had met with Beegle and submitted a report on Beegle‘s mental health, that he got along well with his parents and had regular contact and a good relationship with two of his siblings. As for his concentration, persistence, and pace, Beegle did not require reminders to take care of his personal needs, or encouragement to perform household chores. He also managed his finances. Finally, no
To the extent Beegle argues that the ALJ improperly substituted her own medical opinion for that of Dr. Storjohann, substantial evidence supports the weight that she assigned to the opinion. As a physician who only examined Beegle on a single occasion and did not treat him, the ALJ was not required to defer to Dr. Storjohann‘s opinion. See McSwain, 814 F.2d at 619. Moreover, the ALJ was justified in assigning Dr. Storjohann‘s opinion “little probative weight,” as evidence on the record contradicted it. See Sryock, 764 F.2d at 835. For example, despite some contrary representations in Dr. Storjohann‘s report, Beegle represented to the ALJ that he could manage his finances, talked on the phone with others several times a day, did not have difficulty getting along with others, got along well with his parеnts, had regular contact and good relationships with two of his siblings, went hunting and fishing when others took him, and did not require reminders or encouragement to take care of his personal needs or complete chores. Likewise, Dr. McKeown testified that Dr. Storjohann administered the Beck Depression Inventory, but that the test was not a diagnostic tool, and that, in his opinion, Dr. Storjohann overstated Beegle‘s residual functional capacity assessment. In any event, the ALJ did not have to defer to Dr. Storjohann‘s residual functional capacity assessment, which appears to suggest that Beegle‘s depression constituted a severe mental impairment, since it spoke to a matter that was reserved for the ALJ‘s own determination. See
As for Beegle‘s claim that the ALJ failed to explain her decision assigning “little probative weight” to Dr. Storjohann‘s opinion, the record demonstrates otherwise. In support of her finding, the ALJ explained that elements of Dr. Storjohann‘s report conflicted with Beegle‘s previous representations to the SSA and with Beegle‘s activities, Dr. McKeown‘s testimony cast doubt upon Dr. Storjohann‘s opinion, and Beegle had not alleged, or sought treatment for, mental health issues. As for Beegle‘s argument that the ALJ improperly drew an adverse inference аgainst him when she noted that no evidence established that he sought mental health treatment, Beegle‘s failure to seek mental health treatment was not the primary or significant basis for the ALJ‘s decision, and, as a result, any inference that the ALJ improperly drew from Beegle‘s failure to seek treatment did not constitute reversible error. See Ellison, 355 F.3d at 1275-76. Accordingly, substantial evidence supports the ALJ‘s finding that Beegle did not suffer from a severe mental impairment on account of his depression, and thus that Beegle was not disabled because of his depression. See
Likewise, substantial evidence supports the ALJ‘s finding that a significant number of jobs existed in the national economy that Beegle could perform. As for Beegle‘s claim that the ALJ improperly substituted her own medical judgment for that of Dr. C.K. Jin, a hematologist and practitioner of internal medicine, when she determined his residual functional capaci
Additionally, Beegle argues that the ALJ drew an improper adverse inference against him when, in support of her rejection of his claim that he could not work because of his right knee pain, she considered that Beegle: (1) did not take prescription drugs; (2) did not seek treatment from any physician other than Dr. Hardy from October 2006 to April 2008; and (3) did not seek treatment after April 2008. However, the record reflects that the ALJ largely based her findings on Dr. Hardy‘s opinions, not Beegle‘s lack of treatment. Beegle also claims that the ALJ drew an improper adverse inference when, in finding that he was not disabled because of his left knee pain or carpal tunnel syndrome, the ALJ cited the fаct that he had not sought treatment for his left knee pain or carpal tunnel syndrome. However, the record further shows that the ALJ primarily based her findings on Dr. Jin‘s report and evidence of Beegle‘s activities that contradicted his claim. Accordingly, any adverse inferences that the ALJ may have improperly drawn from Beegle‘s lack of treatment did not constitute a primary or significant basis for the ALJ‘s findings, and do not constitute reversible error. See Ellison, 355 F.3d at 1275-76.
Beegle next argues that the ALJ presented insufficient hypothetical questions to Randal McDaniel, a vocational expert. But two of the hypothetical questions that the ALJ presented accounted for the limitations that the ALJ found were supported by the record—and in fact, were supported by Dr. McKeown‘s testimony and the report of Dr. Hampton Smith. McDaniel testified that a hypothetical сlaimant with these limitations could perform a significant number of jobs that existed in the economy. While, as Beegle points out, McDaniel testified that a hypothetical claimant could not perform Beegle‘s past work if the ALJ assumed the limitations set forth in Dr. Storjohann‘s report, we‘ve already concluded that substantial evidence supports the ALJ‘s rejection of Dr. Storjohann‘s opinion. Consequently, the ALJ did not need to rely uрon McDaniel‘s answer to this hypothetical question because elements of that hypothetical question were unsupported by the record. See Graham, 790 F.2d at 1576.
Further, although Beegle is correct in his argument that the ALJ‘s hypothetical questions did not explicitly account for his right knee pain, they implicitly did so. As the record shows, the ALJ expressly relied upon the limitations set forth in Dr. Smith‘s report, which specified a number of limitations based upon Beegle‘s right knee ailments. In turn, Dr. Smith relied upon, in part, Beegle‘s persistent pain in
Nor were the ALJ‘s hypothetical questions incomplete because they omitted any reference to Beegle‘s fatigue or neеd to miss work. The only evidence of fatigue on the record was Beegle‘s testimony that he lacked energy on account of his depression. As we‘ve noted, however, substantial evidence supports the ALJ‘s finding that Beegle‘s depression did not constitute a severe mental impairment, and the ALJ did not have to proceed further with her analysis of Beegle‘s depression. See
AFFIRMED.