46 Conn. 601 | Conn. | 1879
This is a hill in equity to set asido a judgment at law, and open the case to allow the petitioner to make defense to it, and for an injunction against the sale of certain real estate obtained by the respondent by means of the levy of an execution upon it issued upon the judgment, and for a reconveyance of the property to the petitioner.
The petition, which was brought in April, 1878, alleges that the respondent recovered the judgment in question against the petitioner seventeen years before—in January, 1861, in the Superior Court in New London County; that the petitioner had no notice or knowledge whatever of the bringing of the action at the time it was-brought or of its pendency, nor of the fact that the judgment had been taken until a short time before the present petition was brought; that judgment
In determining what are the equitable rights of the petitioner in this case it is not necessary for us to regard the judgment as fraudulently obtained, or to suppose that the process in the action at law was not served by the officer in good faith. We may treat it as a case where a party in good faith brings an action at law against another upon a claim honestly made, and in which notice failed to reach the defendant in the action of the bringing and pendency of the suit. Such failure of notice may have been owing to some mistake of the officer in leaving the copy intended for the defendant, or to some other casualty wliich pi’evented its reaching him.
It is now too late for the petitioner to avail himself of either of these remedies. Is he therefore without remedy ? It is very clear upon the facts alleged and admitted by the demurrer that great injustice may have been done him. He has failed to have that opportunity which the law intends carefully to secure to every defendant in court, to make a
But what is the limitation of such a petitioner’s rights in a court of equity ? He is barred of his remedy at law in three years. "When is he barred of his remedy in equity ? Clearly he is bound to seek the aid of a court of equity with no unreasonable delay, and whether he has been negligent in any particular case will depend upon the facts and circumstances of the case. Courts of equity apply a rule of limitation in analogy to the statute of limitations, and ordinarily the period that would bar a remedy at law will bar a remedy in equity. Thus, if the petitioner in this case had had full knowledge of the existence of the judgment from the day it was rendered, we should consider him as barred of all remedy in equity when he had by his neglect of his legal rights become barred at law. Equity does not encourage parties to procrastinate in such cases. But where a party, as here, had no knowledge of any necessity for his moving in the matter, his neglect to move is not imputable to him as negligence. Here the petitioner had no suspicion of the existence of the judgment against him for seventeen years after it was rendered, and down to within a few days before the petition was brought; while the conduct of the respondent during all that period was such as to prevent any such suspicion. The petitioner clearly has been guilty of no such negligence as should bar or in any way prejudice his remedy in equity.
But while the case in its general character is one that entitles the petitioner to relief, it is very clear that the petition as it stands is insufficient. It by no means follows as a matter of course that an injunction is to issue against the enforcement of a judgment, or that the judgment is to be set aside and the petitioner to have a new opportunity to make his defense, merely because he, without fault, lost his opportunity to make defense in the first instance. It must be alleged and shown that injustice was done by the judgment.
As the petition now stands the demurrer must be sustained.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.