Jefferson v. SouterJefferson v. Souter
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Hart
(after stating the facts). The deed to J. T. Souter to the land in controvеrsy is absolute on its face. While equity will permit parol evidence to be introduced to show that the transaction was intended as a mortgage, in order to overcome the presumption of law and. show from the absolute form of the deed that the transaction was intended by the parties as a mortgage, the evidence must bе clear, unequivocal and convincing. Wimberly v. Scroggin, 128 Ark. 67, and Snell v. White, 132 Ark. 349.
According to these and .other decisions of this court, for the purpose of ascertaining the true intention of the parties, the court will cоnsider all the surrounding circumstances, including the value of the land, the price paid, as well as the acts and declarations of thе parties at the time the transaction was had.
Tested by this rule, it can not be said that Lillie Jefferson showed by clear, unequivocal and convincing testimony that the deed to the land in controversy to J. T. Souter was intended to be treated by the parties as a mortgage. On the one hand, Lillie Jefferson testified that her husband induced J. T. Souter tо pay off an indebtedness against the land and to take an absоlute deed thereto as security. On the other hand, Souter denied that he made such an agreement with Scott Jefferson, and testified that it was intended that the deed should be an absolute one. He admitted, however, that he made a verbal agreement with Scott Jeffеrson for a resale of the land if Jefferson would pay him back thе purchase money and an account for supplies which he ówed him. Souter received a deed to the land on the 20th day of January, 1912. He waited on Jefferson during the years 1912 and 1913 to carry out his cоntract to repurchase the land. Jefferson failed to cаrry out his part of the contract for the repurchase of the land, and it was then agreed that Jefferson should begin to pay rent fоr the land. Souter is corroborated by the testimony of the merchаnts who agreed to furnish Jefferson with supplies in 1914.
The merchant testified that Jefferson told him that Souter .only claimed a lien for rent and would waive his landlord’s lien for supplies. The declaration .of Jeffersоn to the merchant was against his interest and is admissible against Ms successors in interest and all who claim under Mm. Russell v. Webb, 96 Ark. 190, and Strickland v. Strickland, 103 Ark. 183.
It is claimed that the testimоny of Lillie Jefferson is corroborated by the fact that the cоnsideration agreed to be paid for the land was grossly inadequаte. Counsel point to the fact that Souter only claimed $592 and that the land was worth $1,000. Souter purchased the land in January, 1912, and the testimоny showing the land to be worth $1,000 referred to the time when the present suit was brought, which was in January, 1917. It is a matter of common knowledge that lands appreciated greatly in value during the.period of time referred to, and the alleged inadequacy of price is not, under the circumstances, of any weight in determining whether the transaction was an absolute sale or not.
It is true that the‘testimony of Lillie Jefferson is corroborated by the attorney.who testified that he had madе a tender of the amount claimed to be due by Souter, and that thе latter had refused to accept the tender and exeсute a deed to Jefferson to the land. The testimony is in direct and irreconcilable conflict, and Lillie Jefferson failed to establish her claim by that clear, unequivocal and convincing testimony which is required under the settled law in this State.
It follows that the decree must be affirmed.