Jefferson v. ReddishJefferson v. Reddish
- Reporters:
- ,
- Before:
- Robert D. Sack, Peter W. Hall, Christopher F. Droney
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY
Appearing for Plaintiff-Appellee: ROSEMARIE PAINE, Jacobs & Dow, LLC, New Haven, CT.
Appearing for Defendants-Appellants: THOMAS GERARDE, Beatrice S. Jordan, on the brief, Howd & Ludorf, LLC, Hartford, CT.
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the appeal is DISMISSED.
Plaintiff-appellee Jordan Jefferson brought this action against individual police officers, supervisors, and the City of New Haven, alleging they were involved in his seizure and arrest during a Yale-sponsored event at a nightclub in downtown New Haven. Jefferson claimed that the officers who arrested him violated his Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights and that the supervisors—Chief Limon, Assistant Chief Melendez, and Sergeant Guliuzza—were liable for failing to train or properly supervise the officers. Jefferson also alleged numerous state law causes of action. Defendants moved for summary judgment, and the district court granted summary judgment in part by dismissing the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment claims. It denied summary judgment in part, determining there were disputed issues of material facts as to Jefferson‘s Fourth Amendment and state law claims. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the relevant issues on appeal
In this interlocutory appeal, defendants appeal the district court‘s denial of qualified immunity for the defendants as to the false arrest claim. To the extent defendants also appeal the district court‘s denial of summary judgment for Chief Limon and Assistant Chief Melendez as to the supervisory liability claims, we consider those arguments an appeal from the denial of qualified immunity. “[W]e
On the record before it, the district court correctly determined that there were genuine disputes of material fact as to the false arrest and supervisory liability claims that precluded granting summary judgment. The parties agree that Jefferson was arrested for failure to abide by an order regarding cell phones and for speaking with a friend. But on the record before us, there are disputed issues of material fact as to the scope of the officers’ instructions to refrain from cell phone use and from talking to other patrons. The record, moreover, does not definitively determine whether Jefferson‘s conduct constituted non-compliance with those orders. These factual disputes preclude determining whether the officers are entitled to qualified immunity. See Savino v. City of New York, 331 F.3d 63, 71 (2d Cir. 2003).
We also conclude there are similar disputes of fact regarding Jefferson‘s supervisory liability claims. Chief Limon and Assistant Chief Melendez assert that they were not present for Jefferson‘s arrest and cannot be held liable under
Because a jury could reasonably find that defendants lacked probable cause or even arguable probable cause to arrest Jefferson and could also find as a fact that the Chief and Assistant Chief were present during the alleged violations of Jefferson‘s constitutional rights, genuine disputes of material fact preclude our determining as a matter of law whether defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. That being the case, we lack jurisdiction over the false arrest claim and any claim for qualified immunity as to the supervisory liability claim made for the first time on appeal. See DiMarco v. Rome Hosp. & Murphy Memorial Hosp., 952 F.2d 661, 666 (2d Cir. 1992). To the extent defendants seek to appeal anything other than the denial of qualified immunity, we also lack appellate jurisdiction to consider those arguments in this interlocutory appeal. See O‘Bert ex rel. Estate of O‘Bert v. Vargo, 331 F.3d 29, 38 (2d Cir. 2003).
We have considered defendants’ remaining arguments in favor of appellate jurisdiction over their federal and state law claims and find them to be without merit. This appeal is DISMISSED.
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O‘Hagan Wolfe, Clerk