Jefferson v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.
8:24-cv-02939
D. MarylandJun 4, 2025Check TreatmentDocket
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
KEONA JEFFERSON,
Plaintiff,
v Civil Action No. 24-2939-TDC
JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Keona Jefferson has filed this civil action against Defendant JPMorgan Chase
Bank, N.A. (“Chase”), in which she asserts claims under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act
(“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692—1692p, and state law claims arising from the repossession of her
car by Chase. Chase has filed a Motion to Dismiss, which is fully briefed. Having reviewed the
submitted materials, the Court finds that no hearing is necessary. See D. Md. Local R. 105.6. For
the reasons set forth below, the Motion will be GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
On November 22, 2023, Jefferson purchased on credit a used 2020 Cadillac Escalade □□□□□
Cadillac”) from AutoNation Chevrolet Laurel (“AutoNation”) in Laurel, Maryland. The
transaction was memorialized in a retail installment sale contract, pursuant to which Jefferson
agreed to make 75 monthly payments of $1,238.42 beginning on January 6, 2024. AutoNation
retained a security interest in the Cadillac and had the option to repossess it if Jefferson were to
default on her payments. At the time of the transaction, AutoNation assigned its interest in the
contract to Chase.
Jefferson alleges that, on June 17, 2024, the Cadillac was “unlawfully repossessed by a
company acting on behalf of Defendant without proper notice or due process as required by
Maryland law and federal regulations.” Am. Compl. { 6, ECF No. 12. She further alleges that, on
September 4, 2024, she provided Chase with a “Notice of Failure to Respond and Right to Cure,
requesting adequate assurance of performance as required under [Uniform Commercial Code
(“UCC”)] § 2-609,” as well as a “demand for documentation, including a Certificate of Loss or
Expenses.” /d. 4/7. Jefferson asserts that Chase “failed to provide any required documentation
validating the alleged debt or repossession action” in violation of UCC § 2-609 and the FDCPA,
15 U.S.C. § 1692, and that she has “suffered financial harm, emotional distress, embarrassment,
and negative impacts on credit due to Defendant’s unlawful actions.” Jd. □□□ 8-9.
On September 4, 2024, Jefferson filed the original Complaint in this case in the Circuit
Court for Prince George’s County, Maryland. On October 9, 2024, Chase removed the case to this
Court. In the currently operative Amended Complaint, Jefferson alleges four causes of action
against Chase, numbered as follows: (1) violations of the FDCPA for “[flailure to validate the
debt under 15 U.S.C. § 1692g,” “[flalse representations regarding the debt under 15 U.S.C.
§ 1692e,” “[e]ngaging in conduct intended to harass, oppress, or abuse Plaintiff, contrary to 15
U.S.C. § 1692d,” and “[uJtilizing unfair practices, in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692f,” Am. Compl.
4 11; (2) acclaim for breach of contract in violation of section 2-609 of the UCC, which Maryland
has adopted as section 2-609 of the Maryland Commercial Code; (3) a claim for “Emotional
Distress and Embarrassment,” Am. Compl. | 16—18; and (4) a claim for “Violation of Economic
Rights and Unauthorized Use of [Personally Identifiable Information (“PII”)].” id. 19-21.
Jefferson seeks compensatory and punitive damages as well as injunctive and declaratory relief.
DISCUSSION
In the Motion to Dismiss, Chase asserts the following arguments for dismissal pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6): (1) each of Jefferson’s FDCPA claims should be
dismissed because Chase is not a debt collector as defined in the statute and, even if Chase were a
debt collector, Jefferson fails to plead facts sufficient to state any cognizable claim; (2) Jefferson’s
breach of contract claim should be dismissed because section 2-609 of the Maryland Commercial
Code does not apply to Jefferson’s transaction to purchase the Cadillac and in any event does not
provide a private right of action allowing an individual to file a civil action under that provision;
(3) Jefferson’s claim for “Emotional Distress and Embarrassment” should be dismissed because it
must be construed as a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, and Jefferson fails to
allege facts demonstrating that Chase’s conduct was “extreme and outrageous” or that her
emotional injuries were sufficiently severe to state such a claim; and (4) Jefferson’s claim for
“Violation of Economic Rights and Unauthorized Use of PII” should be dismissed because no such
state common law tort exists. Am. Compl. at 2-3; Mot. Dismiss at 9-10, ECF No. 21-1.
Legal Standard
To defeat a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the complaint must allege enough facts
to state a plausible claim for relief. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678(2009). A claim is plausible when the facts pleaded allow “the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” /d. Legal conclusions or conclusory statements do not suffice. Jd. A court must examine the complaint as a whole, consider the factual allegations in the complaint as true, and construe the factual allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Albright v. Oliver,510 U.S. 266, 268
(1994); Lambeth v. Bd. of Comm'rs of Davidson Cnty.,407 F.3d 266, 268
(4th Cir. 2005). A self-represented party’s complaint must be construed liberally. Erickson v. Pardus,551 U.S. 89, 94
(2007). However, “liberal construction does not mean overlooking the pleading requirements under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” Bing v. Brivo Sys., LLC,959 F.3d 605
, 618 (4th Cir. 2020).
Il. Fair Debt Collection Practices Act
As to the FDCPA claims in Count 1, Chase primarily argues they must be dismissed on the
grounds that all of the cited provisions of the FDCPA apply only to the conduct of a “debt
collector,” but Chase is not a “debt collector” pursuant to the FDCPA’s definition of that term.
Mot. Dismiss at 5.
In Count 1, Jefferson asserts violations of the FDCPA provisions in 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692d,
1692e, 1692f, and 1692g. Each of these provisions prohibits certain actions taken by a “debt
collector” in the course of debt collection activities. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692d (“A debt collector may
not engage in any conduct the natural consequence of which is to harass, oppress, or abuse any
person in connection with the collection of a debt.”); 15 U.S.C. § 1692e (“A debt collector may
not use any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the
collection of any debt.”); 15 U.S.C. § 1692f (“A debt collector may not use unfair or
unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect any debt.”); 15 U.S.C. § 1692g (“Within five
days after the initial communication with a consumer in connection with the collection of any debt,
a debt collector shall, unless the following information is contained in the initial communication
or the consumer has paid the debt, send the consumer a written notice ....”). The term “debt
collector” is defined in the FDCPA as “any person who uses any instrumentality of interstate
commerce or the mails in any business the principal purpose of which is the collection of any
debts, or who regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or
asserted to be owed or due another.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6). This term generally includes “any
creditor who, in the process of collecting his own debts, uses any name other than his own which
would indicate that a third person is collecting or attempting to collect such debts.” /d. The
FDCPA also provides for various exceptions to this definition, including that a “debt collector”
does not include “any officer or employee of a creditor while, in the name of the creditor, collecting
debts for such creditor.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)(A).
Here, Jefferson has not alleged facts that would demonstrate that Chase meets this
definition. In particular, she has not asserted facts showing that Chase, a lender, is engaged in a
business “the principal purpose of which is the collection of any debts” or regularly collects or
attempts to collect debts owed or due to “another.” 15 U.S.C.§ 1692a(6). Rather, based on the
contract for the sale of the Cadillac and its provision assigning AutoNation’s interests to Chase, it
is apparent that, for purposes of these activities, Chase was a creditor who, to the extent it was
involved in any relevant activities, was collecting debts owed to Chase itself and thus was
“collecting debts for such creditor,” which excludes it from the definition of a “debt collector.” 15
U.S.C. § 1692a(6)(A). The allegations, which assert that the repossession was effected by “a
company acting on behalf of Defendant,” Am. Compl. { 6, also do not support the conclusion that
Chase was directly seeking to collect its own debts using a different name, or that it otherwise met
any other part of the definition of a debt collector.
Although Jefferson argues that Chase could be liable under the FDCPA for actions by third-
party agents during the repossession, the opposite is true. When a third-party company engages in
debt collection activities on behalf of a creditor, it is that third-party company, not the creditor,
that is a “debt collector” under the FDCPA. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6); Henson v. Santander
Consumer USA, Inc., 817 F.3d 131, 135-36 (4th Cir. 2016) (“With limited exceptions, a debt
collector . . . collects debt on behalf of a creditor. A creditor, on the other hand, is a person to
whom the debt is owed, and when a creditor collects its debt for its own account, it is not generally
acting as a debt collector.”).
As support for her position, Jefferson principally relies upon Heintz v. Jenkins, 514 U.S.
291(1995), which she cites for the proposition that “the FDCPA applies broadly to financial institutions and attorneys involved in debt collection.” Opp’n at 2, ECF No. 23; see also Am. Compl. 12. Although Heintz involved a bank seeking to recover the unpaid balance on a car loan, the defendant in that case was not the bank itself, but the bank’s attorney and law firm, which had sued the plaintiff on the bank’s behalf. See Heintz,514 U.S. at 293
. The United States Supreme Court held that the FDCPA “applies to attorneys who ‘regularly’ engage in consumer- debt-collection activity, even when that activity consists of litigation,” but it did not address whether a creditor such as the bank is a “debt collector” under the FDCPA. /d. at 299. Where the allegations in the Amended Complaint do not show that Chase is a debt collector under the FDCPA, the FDCPA claims will be dismissed for failure to state a claim. See Henson,817 F.3d at 137-38
(dismissing the plaintiff's FDCPA claims where the plaintiff failed to allege facts
supporting the conclusion that the defendant was a debt collector within the meaning of 15 U.S.C.
§ 1692a(6)). Accordingly, the Court need not and will not address Chase’s remaining arguments
relating to those claims.
Ill. Breach of Contract
In the Motion, Chase argues that Jefferson’s breach of contract claim, which is based on
section 2-609 of the Maryland Commercial Code, should be dismissed because that provision, as
well as all of Title 2 of the Maryland Commercial Code, does not apply to the sale of the Cadillac.
In addition, Chase argues that Jefferson’s claim fails because section 2-609 of the Maryland
Commercial Code does not provide a private right of action.
Section 2-609 of the Maryland Commercial Code provides that:
(1) A contract for sale imposes an obligation on each party that the other’s
expectation of receiving due performance will not be impaired. When reasonable
grounds for insecurity arise with respect to the performance of either party the other
may in writing demand adequate assurance of due performance and until he
receives such assurance may if commercially reasonable suspend any performance
for which he has not already received the agreed return.
(2) Between merchants the reasonableness of grounds for insecurity and the
adequacy of any assurance offered shall be determined according to commercial
standards.
(3) Acceptance of any improper delivery or payment does not prejudice the
aggrieved party’s right to demand adequate assurance of future performance.
(4) After receipt of a justified demand failure to provide within a reasonable time
not exceeding thirty days such assurance of due performance as is adequate under
the circumstances of the particular case is a repudiation of the contract.
Md. Code Ann., Com. Law § 2-609 (LexisNexis 2013).
As to Chase’s threshold argument that the transaction at issue is not subject to Title 2 or
section 2-609, the Court notes that the Court of Appeals of Maryland, now known as the Supreme
Court of Maryland, has characterized a transaction involving the sale of a vehicle on credit as both
a sales transaction under Title 2 of the Maryland Commercial Code and a secured transaction under
Title 9 of the Maryland Commercial Code. See Scott v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 691 A.2d 1320,
1321, 1322(Md. 1997). It is thus not clear that Title 2 and section 2-609 can never apply to the transaction at issue. As for the threshold argument that there is no private right action under section 2-609, the Court notes that the Maryland Court of Special Appeals, now known as the Appellate Court of Maryland, has considered section 2—609 in conjunction with a breach of contract claim under section 2-610. Rad Concepts, Inc. v. Wilks Precision Instrument Co.,891 A.2d 1148, 1162
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2006). Section 2-610 provides that when “either party repudiates the contract with respect to a performance not yet due the loss of which will substantially impair the value of the contract to the other, the aggrieved party may . . . [rJesort to any remedy for breach.”Md. Code Ann., Com. Law § 2-610
; see Rad Concepts, Inc.,891 A.2d at 1162
. The Court thus does
not readily conclude that a plaintiff invoking section 2-609 cannot assert a breach of contract claim
if routed through section 2-610.
Nevertheless, assuming without deciding that Jefferson can overcome these threshold
arguments, the Court finds that the allegations do not support a plausible claim for relief based on
sections 2-609 and 2-610. These provisions center on the circumstances under which a party to a
contract for a sale of goods may make a demand for performance when it does not appear that the
contract will be fulfilled, and when the failure to respond to such a demand may constitute a
repudiation of the contract. See Md. Code Ann., Com. Law §§ 2-609, 2-610; Rad Concepts, Inc.,891 A.2d at 1162
. Maryland courts, as well as other courts considering identical provisions of the UCC, apply such provisions to circumstances in which one party has failed to provide either the goods or the payment, such that there are “reasonable grounds for insecurity” with “respect to the performance of either party,” and the other party makes a written request for “adequate assurance of due performance” before the performance is actually due.Md. Code Ann., Com. Law § 2-609
; see Rad Concepts, Inc.,891 A.2d at 1162-63
(finding that, under sections 2-609 and 2-610, after a party shipped goods and made multiple requests for payment that were not answered, that party could suspend future shipments until payment or “acceptable assurances” were received); BRC Rubber & Plastics, Inc. v. Cont’l Carbon Co.,981 F.3d 618
, 622, 627 (7th Cir. 2020) (finding that,
under a state law adopting section 2-609 of the UCC, the defendant seller gave the plaintiff buyer
“reasonable grounds for doubting that it would perform” and “then repudiated by failing to provide
adequate assurance that it would continue to perform,” such that the buyer was entitled to terminate
the contract and seek damages). Section 2-609 thus “addresses the problem that arises when one
party to a contract” for the sale of goods “has reasonable concerns about another party’s ability or
intent to fulfill its promises before performance is actually due.” BRC Rubber & Plastics, Inc.,
981 F.3d at 623.
Here, section 2-609 is plainly inapplicable. By the time of the events at issue i the
Amended Complaint, Jefferson had already received all the performance that was due under the
contract for a sale of goods in that the vehicle had been transferred to her. At that point, all that
was left to be performed was a financing agreement. To the extent that one party could have made
a demand for “adequate assurance of due performance” on the contract for the sale of goods, it
would have been Chase seeking that Jefferson provide assurances that she would make the monthly
payments before the repossession occurred. In the Amended Complaint, however, Jefferson,
alleges that the “demand” for “adequate assurance of due performance” was her demand to Chase
for “validation and documentation regarding the alleged debt,” Opp’n at 3, which does not
constitute a demand for performance on the contract, whether for delivery of the goods or payment
for the goods. Other than citing to a case that does not exist, Jefferson provides no authority for
how such a request by the party who has not made all required car payments, and a failure to
respond to it, could constitute a repudiation of the sales contract by Chase under sections 2-609
and 2-610, much less one that “substantially impaired the value of the contract.” Rad Concepts,
Inc., 891 A.2d at 1162. Because Jefferson seeks to invoke section 2—609 in a manner inconsistent
with the provisions of either section 2-609 or section 2-610, the Court will dismiss Jefferson's
breach of contract claim based on those provisions for failure to state a plausible claim for relief.
IV. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
Chase next argues that Jefferson’s claim for “Emotional Distress and Embarrassment” in
Count 3 must be dismissed for failure to state a claim. Although Jefferson does not specify the
authority for her claim, she cites Hamilton v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 502 A.2d 1057(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1986), which examined a common law claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress (“ITED”) in the context of a debt collection relating to, and repossession of, a vehicle purchased on credit. Seeid. at 1062-65
. Where Maryland law does not recognize a tort for negligent infliction of emotional distress, seeid. at 1065
, the Court will construe Count 3 as
asserting an ITED claim.
Under Maryland law, the tort of ITED has four elements: “(1) The conduct must be
intentional or reckless; (2) The conduct must be extreme and outrageous; (3) There must be a
causal connection between the wrongful conduct and the emotional distress; (4) The emotional
distress must be severe.” Harris v. Jones, 380 A.2d 611, 614 (Md. 1977).
The Court concludes that, at minimum, Jefferson has failed to allege that her emotional
distress was sufficiently severe to state a claim of IIED. Typically, a plaintiff must allege
“evidentiary particulars” that would support the conclusion that the plaintiff suffered severe
emotional distress. Manikhi v. Mass Transit Admin., 758 A.2d 95, 115(2000) (quoting Harris,380 A.2d at 617
). To meet this element, the plaintiff must have suffered “an emotional response so acute that no reasonable person could be expected to endure it” such that the plaintiff was “unable to function.” Hamilton,502 A.2d at 1064
. Here, however, Jefferson states only that she
“has suffered financial harm, emotional distress, embarrassment, and negative impacts on credit
due to Defendant’s unlawful actions” and that Chase caused her “significant emotional distress
and embarrassment,” without any additional facts. Am. Compl. §§ 9, 18. She does not allege
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concrete facts demonstrating “with reasonable certainty the nature, intensity or duration of the
alleged emotional injury,” such as facts about whether she sought psychological treatment, “how
long the treatment lasted, whether it was successful or is still continuing, whether it was periodic
or intensive, and so forth.” Manikhi, 758 A.2d at 115(concluding that the plaintiff, who had alleged severe physical and verbal sexual harassment, did not sufficiently allege severe emotional distress where the facts alleged about her emotional distress were that she sought medical treatment, was fearful at work, had to change job sites, and had to be on alert constantly); Hamilton 502 A.2d at 1064—65 (finding that evidence that the plaintiff was upset, had difficulty sleeping, and was embarrassed was insufficient to demonstrate severe emotional distress). Where Jefferson has provided no facts illustrating the severity of her emotional distress and nowhere alleges that she required treatment for any emotional injury, the Court concludes that Jefferson has not pleaded the “evidentiary particulars” necessary to state a claim for IED. Manikhi,758 A.2d at 115
(quoting Harris,380 A.2d at 617
). Accordingly, Jefferson’s claim in Count 3 for “Emotional
Distress and Embarrassment” will be dismissed on this basis, and the Court need not and will not
reach Chase’s remaining arguments relating to this claim.
Violation of Economic Rights and Unauthorized Use of PII
Finally, Chase argues that Jefferson’s claim in Count 4 for “Violation of Economic Rights
and Unauthorized Use of PII” should be dismissed because such a tort does not exist under
Maryland law. Indeed, Jefferson cites no statute or case law providing for such a cause of action.
Rather, Jefferson cites only to the “Maryland Commercial Law Article, Title 14, which protects
consumers from deceptive trade practices and misuse of personal information.” Am. Compl. § 20.
Where Title 14 of the Maryland Commercial Code contains at least 50 different subtitles, the Court
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cannot discern under which subtitle Jefferson is proceeding. Moreover, Jefferson’s factual
allegations are conclusory, stating without factual development that:
Defendant engaged in the unauthorized use of Plaintiff's PII in violation of the
Maryland Commercial Law Article, Title 14, which protects consumers from
deceptive trade practices and misuse of personal information.
Defendant’s actions violated Plaintiffs rights by engaging in unauthorized
transactions involving Plaintiff's information and failing to secure or verify proper
documentation for the repossession.
Id. §§| 20-21. Where Jefferson has failed to identify a specific legal provision giving rise to a cause
of action, and where Jefferson has failed to allege non-conclusory facts substantiating her cause of
action, the Court will dismiss her claim for “Violation of Economic Rights and Unauthorized Use
of PII.” See Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985) (stating that,
although courts are expected to construe self-represented complaints liberally, they are not
required to “conjure up questions never squarely presented to them”). Even if the Court were to
identify a specific Maryland law provision barring the misuse of PII, the Amended Complaint fails
to state a plausible claim for relief because it alleges no facts about what PII was used and how
that use was improper or violated the law. See Bing, 959 F.3d at 618 (affirming a district court’s
dismissal of a self-represented complaint where the plaintiff presented “no facts to support his
conclusory allegations”).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Chase’s Motion to Dismiss will be GRANTED, and the
Amended Complaint will be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. A separate Order shall issue.
Date: June 4, 2025
THEODORE D. CHUA}#
United States District
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