JEFFERSON, APPELLANT, v. BUNTING, WARDEN, APPELLEE.
No. 2015-0175
Supreme Court of Ohio
February 23, 2016
2016-Ohio-614
Submitted November 17, 2015
{¶ 1} Appellant, Sell Jefferson, pro se, appeals from the judgment of the Third District Court of Appeals granting summary judgment to appellee, Jason Bunting, and dismissing Jefferson’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus. For the reason set forth below, we affirm.
{¶ 2} Jefferson is presently serving a life sentence at the Marion Correctional Institution on a 1975 Cuyahoga County conviction for aggravated murder. Bunting is the warden of that institution. On May 7, 2013, Jefferson filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that he remained in prison solely under an order that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to issue. He asked the court of appeals to order his immediate release.
{¶ 3} The court of appeals granted Bunting’s motion to dismiss the case on grounds of res judicata. Jefferson appealed. Because the appellate court had relied on documents outside the pleadings, we remanded the case for the court to convert the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment and to provide Jefferson with notice and an opportunity to respond. Jefferson v. Bunting, 140 Ohio St.3d 62, 2014-Ohio-3074, 14 N.E.3d 1036.
{¶ 4} On remand, the court of appeals again dismissed the petition, granting summary judgment to Bunting. Jefferson appealed.
{¶ 5} When a petitioner has filed a previous habeas corpus action, the doctrine of res judicata prevents the petitioner from raising in a successive habeas petition an issue that the petitioner raised in the previous habeas action. Hudlin v. Alexander, 63 Ohio St.3d 153, 586 N.E.2d 86 (1992). The claim that Jefferson raises in this appeal was unsuccessfully raised in one of his prior petitions for habeas corpus. See Jefferson v. Morris, 48 Ohio App.3d 81, 548 N.E.2d 296 (4th Dist.1988). Therefore, the doctrine of res judicata bars his claim, and he is not entitled to habeas relief.
{¶ 6} In light of the foregoing, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.
Judgment affirmed.
O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, KENNEDY, FRENCH, and O’NEILL, JJ., concur.
Michael DeWine, Attorney General, and Gregory T. Hartke, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL v. JACKSON.
No. 2015-1004
Supreme Court of Ohio
April 21, 2016
2016-Ohio-1599
Submitted July 7, 2015
{¶ 1} Respondent, Jesse Jackson Jr. of West Chester, Ohio, Attorney Registration No. 0086184, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 2010. On December 15, 2014, relator, disciplinary counsel, charged Jackson with 31 violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct and one violation of the Rules for the Government of the Bar.
{¶ 2} Much of Jackson’s misconduct occurred within a few months after the then-new lawyer began employment with the law firm of Caparella-Kraemer & Associates, L.L.C., in May 2011. Prior to joining the law firm, Jackson was a sole practitioner with offices in Fairfield and Lebanon, Ohio. After the law firm hired him as an associate to handle bankruptcy and probate matters, Jackson agreed to close his two other offices and to split equally with the firm all fees for work he performed. Approximately five months after Jackson began working for the law firm, however, the firm discovered that Jackson had not closed his other offices and that he was not sharing fees for court-appointed work and other work that he had performed. As a result of Jackson’s failure to share the fees with the law firm, criminal charges were brought against him. He was subsequently found guilty of petty theft, a first-degree misdemeanor, and was sentenced to