1
Jefferson County, Colorado, Petitioner
v.
Krista Dozier. Respondent
No. 23SC483
Supreme Court of Colorado, En Banc
June 9, 2025
Certiorari to the Colorado Court of Appeals Court of Appeals Case No. 21CA1726
Attorneys for Petitioner:
Jefferson County Attorney's Office
Kimberly S. Sorrells, Jefferson County Attorney
Eric T. Butler, Deputy County Attorney
Jason W. Soronson, Assistant County Attorney
Golden, Colorado
Attorneys for Respondent:
Law Offices of Jonathan S. Willett
Jonathan S. Willett
Boulder, Colorado
Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Colorado Counties, Inc.:
Hall & Evans, L.L.C.
Andrew D. Ringel
Denver, Colorado
JUSTICE HOOD delivered the Opinion of the Court, in which CHIEF JUSTICE MÁRQUEZ, JUSTICE BOATRIGHT, JUSTICE GABRIEL, JUSTICE HART, JUSTICE SAMOUR, and JUSTICE BERKENKOTTER joined.
OPINION
HOOD JUSTICE
¶1 After slipping and falling on an unmarked puddle of water in the Jefferson County courthouse, Krista Dozier brought a tort action against Jefferson County (the "County"). The County moved to dismiss the case, claiming immunity under the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act ("CGIA"), §§ 24-10-101 to -120, C.R.S. (2024). Dozier countered that the spill was a "dangerous condition" of a public building, an exception to CGIA immunity. The district court found that the County's response to the spill was reasonable, and so the dangerous-condition exception didn't apply. The court then granted the County's C.R.C.P. 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss Dozier's claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. A division of the court of appeals reversed, holding that (1) the reasonableness of the County's response wasn't relevant to the court's jurisdiction, and (2) the County had waived CGIA immunity under the dangerous-condition exception. Dozier v. Jefferson Cnty., No. 21CA1726, ¶¶ 14, 18-19 (May 25, 2023).
¶2 We now reverse the judgment of the court of appeals. We hold that when disputed jurisdictional facts are inextricably intertwined with the merits, a plaintiff must demonstrate a likelihood of the existence of the facts necessary to establish a waiver of CGIA immunity. We further hold that a plaintiff must show that a public entity's negligent act or omission proximately caused the condition in question for the dangerous-condition exception to apply. Because the district
court found that the County's response to the spill was reasonable, it correctly concluded that Dozier had failed to establish that the spill was a "dangerous condition" and that it lacked jurisdiction over her claims.
I. Facts and Procedural History
¶3 In March 2019, an employee at the County courthouse noticed a puddle of water in a hallway and contacted facilities management. But before the spill was cleaned up, Dozier slipped on it and fell.
¶4 In 2021, Dozier brought a premises liability and negligence action against the County. The County moved to dismiss, arguing that it was immune from liability under the CGIA because the spill wasn't a "dangerous condition" of a public building. See § 24-10-106(1)(c), C.R.S. (2024). Specifically, the County maintained that its failure to warn of or to clean up the spill before the accident wasn't negligent because less than five minutes had elapsed between an employee learning of the spill and Dozier's fall. Dozier contended that the employee had known about the puddle for closer to twenty minutes.
¶5
The district court held an evidentiary hearing pursuant to
Trinity Broadcasting of Denver, Inc. v. City of
Westminster,
County didn't "kn[ow] about it in enough time to correct it before Ms. Dozier fell." So, it granted the County's motion to dismiss.
¶6
A division of the court of appeals reversed, reasoning that
the district court had conflated the issues of immunity and
liability. Dozier, ¶¶ 12-14. In the
division's view, whether the County acted reasonably
after it learned of the spill wasn't "relevant to,
let alone determinative of," the district court's
jurisdiction; instead, the County's conduct related to
the factual merits issue of causation. Id. at ¶
14. Applying what it deemed "the appropriate legal
standard," id. at ¶ 15, the division then
determined that Dozier's allegations established the
requisite "minimal causal connection"
between her injuries and the County's failure to warn of
or to clean up the spill, id. at ¶ 17 (citing
Tidwell ex rel. Tidwell v. City & Cnty. of
Denver,
¶7 We granted the County's petition for review.[1]
II. Analysis
¶8 We begin by discussing the principles that govern interpretation of the CGIA. After explaining the standard of review, we examine the relevant CGIA provisions. We then consider the plaintiff's burden to prove that a public entity waived CGIA immunity and provide the framework for assessing whether a public entity has waived immunity under the dangerous-condition exception. Finally, we apply that framework.
A. Interpretive Principles
¶9
Resolving the issues presented in this case requires us to
interpret the CGIA. In doing so, we recognize that, because
the CGIA derogates Colorado's common law, we must
strictly construe legislative grants of immunity and broadly
construe exceptions, or waivers, to that immunity.
Tidwell,
language is ambiguous, "we may consider other aids to
statutory construction," Hice v. Giron, 2024 CO
9, ¶ 10,
B. Standard of Review
¶10 The CGIA generally immunizes public entities "from liability in all claims for injury that lie in tort or could lie in tort." § 24-10-106(1). However, the legislature has carved out exceptions that, when applicable, constitute a waiver of immunity and subject public entities to liability as if they were private persons. See §§ 24-10-106 to -107, C.R.S. (2024).
¶11
Whether CGIA immunity applies in a particular case is a
jurisdictional issue governed by Rule 12(b)(1)'s standard
of dismissal. Maphis v. City of Boulder,
¶12
At the evidentiary hearing, a district court "may
receive any competent evidence pertaining to" a factual
attack on the jurisdictional allegations of the complaint.
Trinity,
¶13
Thus, a district court's resolution of a Rule 12(b)(1)
motion to dismiss presents a mixed question of fact and law.
Maphis, ¶ 14,
C. A "Dangerous Condition" of a Public Building
¶14 A public entity waives CGIA immunity when the plaintiff's injuries resulted from "[a] dangerous condition of any public building." § 24-10-106(1)(c). Dozier argues that this exception applies here because her injuries resulted from an unmarked spill in the courthouse, which no one disputes is a public building.
¶15 The CGIA defines a "[d]angerous condition" as
either a physical condition of a facility or the use thereof that constitutes an unreasonable risk to the health or safety of the public, which is known to exist or which in the exercise of reasonable care should have been known to exist and which condition is proximately caused by the negligent act or omission of the public entity or public employee in constructing or maintaining such facility.
§ 24-10-103(1.3), C.R.S. (2024) (emphasis added).
We've interpreted this definition as creating a
four-factor test. E.g., Walton v. State,
¶16 The County argues that the reasonableness of its response is relevant to the fourth factor; namely, whether the spill was proximately caused by the County's negligent act or omission. Dozier counters that she need only show that the County had notice of the spill to prove that the dangerous-condition exception applies. Thus, the parties dispute only the fourth factor: proximate cause.
¶17 Before interpreting and applying the fourth factor of the "dangerous condition" test, we first clarify the burden the plaintiff must meet to prove that a public entity waived CGIA immunity.
1. Burden of Proof
¶18
We've long held that the plaintiff's burden to prove
that a public entity waived immunity is "relatively
lenient." Dennis, ¶ 11,
¶19
We examine three options. First, we consider a prima
facie showing. We've held that this evidentiary burden is
appropriate when the district court relies only on
documentary evidence and thus doesn't need to engage in
factfinding to decide a Rule 12(b)(2) motion to dismiss for
lack of personal jurisdiction. Archangel Diamond Corp. v.
Lukoil,
purpose of a Trinity hearing"); see also
Finnie v. Jefferson Cnty. Sch. Dist. R-1,
¶20
Second, on the other end of the spectrum, we could
simply require the plaintiff to prove an immunity exception
by a preponderance of the evidence. After all, this is the
standard that generally applies in civil actions. §
13-25-127(1), C.R.S. (2024). And we've applied this
standard in both the personal and subject matter jurisdiction
contexts when the jurisdictional facts were disputed and
necessitated a hearing. See Archangel Diamond Corp.,
¶21
Third, we could take guidance from federal
precedent, which offers a middle ground-the likelihood
standard-when disputed jurisdictional facts are "bound
up with the claim on the merits."
Foster-Miller,
¶22 Although this "likelihood standard" itself is hardly pervasive, it has friends. Several federal courts of appeals have relaxed the plaintiff's burden of proof when disputed jurisdictional facts are inextricably intertwined with the merits under the federal analog to the CGIA, the Federal Tort Claims Act. The Third Circuit, for example, has instructed district courts to "demand 'less in the way of jurisdictional proof than would be appropriate at a trial stage'" under these circumstances to "ensure that defendants are not allowed to use Rule 12(b)(1) to resolve the merits"
before the plaintiff has been "given the benefit of
discovery." CNA v. United States,
¶23
The likelihood standard appropriately addresses the
countervailing considerations we've discussed. Unlike the
prima facie standard, it involves weighing evidence and
making factual findings and "enhance[es] the courts'
ability to weed out unfounded claims of jurisdiction" at
the pleading stage, as the CGIA mandates.
Foster-Miller,
¶24 So, we hold that when a public entity asserts CGIA immunity and the disputed jurisdictional facts are inextricably intertwined with the merits, the likelihood standard applies. We now return to the fourth factor of the "dangerous condition" test and consider whether the disputed jurisdictional facts are inextricably intertwined with the merits of Dozier's claim.
2. Fourth Factor of a "Dangerous Condition": Proximate Cause
¶25 The division concluded that Dozier needed to prove only that the County had notice of the spill to establish that the spill was a "dangerous condition." Dozier, ¶¶ 11-14. According to the division, by considering the reasonableness of the County's response, the district court essentially required Dozier to prove liability at the Trinity hearing. Id. at ¶ 14. We disagree.
¶26 While the division is correct that Dozier didn't need "to prove that the County was negligent and liable for her injuries," id. (emphasis added), as that inquiry is properly reserved for trial, the definition of "dangerous condition" plainly requires the plaintiff to prove that the "condition [wa]s proximately caused by the negligent act or omission of the public entity," § 24-10-103(1.3) (emphases added). Indeed, the definition goes on to state, "The mere existence of wind, water, snow, ice or temperature shall not, by itself, constitute a dangerous condition." Id. (emphasis added). So, Dozier was required to prove that the allegedly dangerous condition existed because of the County's negligent act or omission. Cf. Springer,
¶27
It was therefore appropriate for the district court to rely
on negligence principles, including the reasonableness of the
County's response to the spill, to determine whether the
County's failure to warn of or to clean up the spill was
a negligent omission under the circumstances. See,
e.g., Greenberg v. Perkins,
¶28
The division's reliance on Tidwell to conclude
otherwise was misplaced. In Tidwell, we explained
that "a waiver will exist where a plaintiff alleges
facts proving a minimal causal connection between the
injuries and the specified conduct."
that he suffered from 'injuries resulting from' conduct enumerated by subparts (a) through (f)."). And even if that interpretation were applicable here, it doesn't help Dozier because, before we may consider whether Dozier's injuries "result[ed] from" a "dangerous condition," she must first prove that the spill was a "dangerous condition."
¶29
We also reject Dozier's argument that the district court
erred by relying on section 24-10-106(1)(d)(I) and
(III)'s reasonable-time-to-act language in considering
the "dangerous condition" test's fourth factor.
See § 24-10-106(1)(d)(I) (waiving CGIA immunity
for injuries resulting from certain "dangerous
condition[s]" of public roads and sidewalks); §
24-10-106(1)(d)(III) (waiving CGIA immunity for injuries
resulting from certain "dangerous condition[s] caused by
an accumulation of snow and ice" on public walkways). As
we've explained, the fourth factor incorporates prima
facie negligence principles, of which reasonableness is the
cornerstone. Further, the "dangerous condition"
test explicitly includes consideration of reasonableness.
§ 24-10-103(1.3) ("[W]hich [condition] is known to
exist or which in the exercise of reasonable care
should have been known to exist . . . ." (emphasis
added)). Accordingly, neither we nor the district court
improperly added language from section 24-10-106 to section
24-10-103; rather, we simply applied common-law principles to
interpret a common-law term. See Allen v. People,
common law may be used in aid of the meaning to be given statutory language, when such language is not defined in the statute.").
¶30 Although we resolve this case under the CGIA's plain language, we further note that the division's interpretation could lead to absurd results. If the reasonableness of a public entity's response were irrelevant, a plaintiff could overcome immunity and proceed to trial despite being injured by a condition only seconds after the public entity learned of it. Such a result is not only illogical, it's antithetical to the CGIA's purpose to "protect the taxpayers against excessive fiscal burdens" that could arise from "unlimited liability." § 24-10-102, C.R.S. (2024).
¶31
Finally, we conclude that the disputed jurisdictional facts
are inextricably intertwined with the merits of Dozier's
claim. Whether the County's failure to act was a
negligent omission is at the heart of the merits. Under
Colorado's premises liability statute, Dozier would have
to prove that the County didn't exercise reasonable care
to prevent her accident to prevail on her underlying claim.
§ 13-21-115(4)(c)(I), C.R.S. (2024); see also Vigil
v. Franklin,
¶32 Accordingly, to establish waiver under the CGIA's dangerous-condition exception, the plaintiff must demonstrate that it was likely that the public entity's negligent act or omission proximately caused the allegedly dangerous condition.
And, as the district court acknowledged, the reasonableness of the public entity's response is relevant to that inquiry.
¶33 With this framework in mind, we consider whether Dozier proved the existence of a "dangerous condition."
D. Whether the County's Negligent Omission Proximately Caused the Spill
¶34 The district court found that only a few minutes had elapsed between the County learning of the spill and Dozier falling. But instead of relying on this finding, and without determining that the district court's finding was clearly erroneous, the division relied on Dozier's allegations to conclude that she had sufficiently established that the County's negligent maintenance of the courthouse proximately caused her injuries. Dozier, ¶ 18. This was error.
¶35 Because the district court's temporal finding is supported by the record, that finding isn't clearly erroneous. The employee who reported the spill, Kim Knight, testified that she learned of the spill at "about 12:10 [p.m.] or so" and called facilities. She further testified that she received an email from facilities management confirming her request at 12:12 p.m. and that Dozier was sitting on the floor when she went to lunch at 12:15 p.m.
¶36 While Dozier argues that the district court disregarded the "undisputed fact that 'another county employee,'" Debbie Platten, told Knight about the spill, she offered no evidence about when Platten learned of the spill, a fact as to which she
bore the burden of proof. Knight testified that "[a]s soon as [Platten] walked in the door, she told [Knight] that there was a spill" approximately twenty feet from Knight's office door. Knight said that she didn't know how Platten learned of the spill. Even after drawing all reasonable inferences in Dozier's favor, as the district court must do when the evidence is undisputed, we can't conclude that the court's finding was clearly erroneous without some evidence of when or how Platten learned of the spill.
¶37
Moreover, accepting the district court's factual finding
that only a few minutes had passed between the County
learning of the spill and Dozier's fall, we agree with
the district court's legal conclusion that the County
didn't have a reasonable time to warn of or to clean up
the spill before Dozier fell. See, e.g., Miller
v. Crown Mart, Inc.,
¶38 Therefore, in this case with disputed jurisdictional facts that are inextricably intertwined with the merits, we conclude that Dozier failed to establish that it was likely that the County's failure to warn of or to clean up the spill was a negligent omission that proximately caused the condition. Accordingly, she failed to prove that the County waived immunity.
III. Conclusion
¶39 We reverse the judgment of the court of appeals, and we reinstate the district court's order dismissing Dozier's complaint.
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Notes:
[1] We granted certiorari to review the following two issues:
1. Whether, for purposes of analyzing whether a waiver of immunity exists based on a "dangerous condition," the reasonableness of a public entity's response to a spill on its floors is a jurisdictional fact that must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence.
2. Whether the court of appeals erred in determining that Plaintiff's contested allegations that her injury was proximately caused by the County's failure to maintain a public building sufficiently established that her injuries resulted from a dangerous condition.
[2] Other federal circuit courts of
appeals have concluded that a district court should assume
jurisdiction exists and treat "'the objection as a
direct attack on the merits of the plaintiff's case'
under either [Fed. R. Civ. P.] 12(b)(6), [a motion to dismiss
for failure to state a claim,] or [Fed. R. Civ. P.] 56[,] [a
summary judgment motion]," to offer the plaintiff
"'a greater level of protection.'"
Montez v. Dep't of Navy,
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