Appellant Eliot Ellorton Jeffers was convicted of malice murder and other related offenses in connection with the stabbing death of Jocilyn Dawn Williams and the aggravated assault of Daniel J. Stringfellow.
Viewed in a light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence shows that Williams rushed into a fast-food restaurant managed by Stringfellow, her boyfriend, and asked to hide in his office. She explained that Jeffers, her ex-boyfriend, was following her. String-fellow took Williams to the office and allowed her to remain there while he returned to his duties in the dining room. Moments later, Jeffers entered, approached Stringfellow and another employee, and asked if they had seen Williams. When they denied seeing her, Jeffers left. After ascertaining that Jeffers had left the parking area, Stringfellow walked Williams to her car.
Williams returned to the restaurant about two hours later. She was seated with Stringfellow in a booth when Jeffers entered, approached Williams, and asked her to go outside. Williams refused. Jeffers then left the restaurant, circled around the building, and
1. When construed most strongly in support of the verdicts, the evidence was sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to find Jeffers guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes for which he was convicted, and to reject Jeffers’ insanity defense. Jackson v. Virginia,
2. Jeffers submits that the trial court erred by allowing the prosecutor to state, during closing arguments, that Jeffers had “flipped a bird” at someone in the courtroom during the course of the trial. On appeal, Jeffers claims that the argument was improper because there was no showing that Jeffers actually made the obscene gesture, and because the comment impugned his character.
First, there was no contemporaneous objection to the argument; therefore, the issue is waived for purposes of appeal. Martin v. State,
3. Jeffers recasts his claim of improper closing argument by the prosecutor as ineffective assistance of trial counsel because of counsel’s failure to object thereto.
In order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
4. Jeffers submits that the trial court erred in allowing certain hearsay statements into evidence under the necessity exception to the hearsay rule, OCGA § 24-3-1 (b). Specifically, Jeffers asserts that the statements lacked the “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness” necessary for their admission.
Jeffers filed a pretrial motion in limine in which he sought to preclude the State from presenting through Williams’ friends and co-workers Williams’ hearsay statements concerning her relationship with Jeffers. At a pretrial motions hearing, the prosecutor described the nature of the relationship each witness had with Williams and the anticipated testimony of each witness; no witnesses testified at the hearing. It was agreed that the court would make a preliminary determination based on the State’s proffer as to whether each witness would be permitted to testify at trial, and if so allowed, defense counsel would be given the opportunity to voir dire the witness in advance of their direct testimony at trial and perfect their objection.
(a) Stringfellow. On direct examination by the State, String-fellow was asked how Williams characterized her relationship with Jeffers. Stringfellow replied, “She told me that she was unhappy with him. He cheated on her. She told me that he had beat her before. He kind of follows her around when she doesn’t really know it.” The evidence, which came in just after the lunch break, was received without objection, and counsel did not avail themselves of the opportunity to voir dire the witness. Stringfellow’s testimony continued throughout the afternoon. At the end of the day, the witness
Standard practice in Georgia has long required a party to make and obtain a ruling on an objection to evidence in the trial court, before or as the evidence is admitted, in order to preserve the objection for appeal, and standard practice also allows parties to raise on appeal only the same objections that were properly preserved below.
Higuera-Hernandez v. State,
(b) Modupe. After establishing that Williams and Dara Modupe had been co-workers and had developed a close confidential relationship, the State elicited testimony from Modupe that Williams told her she and Jeffers had been in a “tumultuous” relationship; that Williams was at “her wits end” with him; that Jeffers had been “saying mean things to her”; that Williams was afraid Jeffers would be “very angry” if he found out she was dating someone else; and that she had been followed home from work one night by a car without lights and that she believed Jeffers to be the driver. The foregoing was introduced without any hearsay objections from Jeffers. Again, this claim has been waived on appeal. Higuera-Hernandez, supra at 555 (2).
(c) Hull. Hillary Hull and Williams had been roommates for a year. Shortly after they moved in together, Williams disclosed to Hull that Jeffers had beaten her. Jeffers’ counsel asked to voir dire the witness outside the presence of the jury. Although it was established that Williams made the disclosure to Hull shortly after they had gotten to know each other, they subsequently became “best friends” and continued that relationship until Williams’ death. Over Jeffers’ objection that Hull’s testimony lacked particularized guarantees of trustworthiness, the witness was permitted to testify Williams told her Jeffers had come into their home on one occasion and had beaten her. Hull also identified photographic evidence of bruises on Will
In order for hearsay to be admitted under the necessity exception, two requirements must be satisfied: “necessity” and “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.” [Cits.] “Necessity” is demonstrated when the declarant is deceased, when the statement is shown to be relevant to a material fact, and when the statement is more probative of the material fact than other evidence that may be produced and offered. [Cit.] The requirement of “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness” is satisfied when the declaration is coupled with “circumstances which attribute verity to [the declaration].” [Cit.]
Glenn v. State,
(d) Battiste. Tameka Battiste and Williams were co-workers and friends who confided in each other and discussed their personal lives and relationships. Williams told Battiste that Jeffers was “controlling,” and that she was not happy and wanted to end the relationship. A few weeks before her death, Williams told Battiste that she ended the relationship with Jeffers but was “nervous” about the breakup. Williams also disclosed that Jeffers was “harassing her, calling her, following her, stalking her, coming to the job.” At that point defense counsel moved for a mistrial on the ground that the prosecutor had been told to caution her witnesses to refrain from referring to Jeffers as a stalker as he was not charged with that crime. The motion was denied, and with the agreement of counsel, the court instructed the jury that the defendant is on trial for the charges contained in the indictment only and the jury should not consider allegations of any other crimes. Counsel acquiesced in the curative instruction and did not renew the motion for mistrial; therefore, any claim of error is waived for purposes of appeal. Thomason v. State,
(e) Lawrence. Williams met Amanda Lawrence when the two were in high school, and they remained close friends. When Williams graduated from high school she moved in with Lawrence and her family while she attended college. The two shared a room for several years and had a type of “sister” relationship, up until August 2005
The trial court does not abuse its discretion when it uses the necessity exception to admit hearsay testimony that relates an uncontradicted statement made by an unavailable witness to one in whom the declarant placed great confidence and to whom the declarant turned for help with problems.
Tuff, supra at 93 (2). Under the circumstances, we find no abuse of the court’s discretion in admitting the hearsay testimony under the necessity exception. See also Azizi v. State,
5. Finally, Jeffers asserts that the trial court erred in failing to give the jury curative instructions with respect to the use of the word “stalking” by another witness who had been instructed to avoid that word. Defense counsel made a contemporaneous motion for mistrial, which the trial court denied. Later in the proceedings, the court reminded counsel that it had offered to give a curative instruction with regard to the stalking reference, but had overlooked doing so. The court again offered to give such an instruction, but trial counsel declined, opining that it was now too late for the instruction to cure the defect because several hours had passed since the witness made the objectionable reference. “Since defense counsel declined the trial court’s offer to give curative instructions to the jury, appellant will not now be heard to complain.” (Punctuation omitted.) Pickren v. State,
Judgment affirmed.
Notes
On January 25, 2007, a Cobb County grand jury returned an indictment charging Jeffers with malice murder, felony murder while in the commission of an aggravated assault, and possession of a knife during the commission of an aggravated assault in connection with the stabbing death of Jocilyn Dawn Williams, aggravated assault and aggravated battery of Daniel J. Stringfellow, and possession of a knife during the commission of the aggravated assault of Stringfellow. The crimes occurred on October 30, 2006. Trial commenced on November 3, 2008, and on November 13, 2008, a jury found Jeffers guilty as charged. He was sentenced on December 19, 2008 to life imprisonment for malice murder, 20 consecutive years for aggravated assault, 20 consecutive years for aggravated battery, plus five consecutive years for each of the weapons offenses. The felony murder count was vacated under Malcolm v. State,
There is no contention, nor do we find, that the statements were testimonial in nature under Crawford v. Washington,
We also note that the court gave a similar instruction later in the proceedings, informing the jury that it could not consider evidence of uncharged crimes. See Division 4 (d), supra.