Jaymar Stanton ADAMS, Petitioner-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Respondent-Appellee.
No. 16-3231
United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.
Submitted: March 10, 2017. Filed: August 25, 2017.
633
Using this definition of referring, I would conclude that insufficient evidence supports Iqbal‘s convictions for receiving kickbacks as charged in Counts Four and Five because the government failed to establish that he exercised decision-making control over Dr. Siddiqui‘s or Dr. Bhutto‘s referrals. With respect to Dr. Siddiqui, as the district court noted: “Although it is clear from the context that Iqbal had some relationship with the doctor and was apparently providing some services to him, there is no evidence ... that he actually managed this doctor‘s practice, as he had represented to PCP.” Similarly, with respect to Dr. Bhutto, the evidence establishes merely that Iqbal told Saeger to contact Dr. Bhutto‘s staff for a referral—evidence which may demonstrate Iqbal had some type of relationship with Bhutto, but not that Iqbal exercised decision-making control over Dr. Bhutto‘s referrals.
However, I would affirm Iqbal‘s conviction for soliciting kickbacks as charged in Count Three, because in my view, sufficient evidence supports the conclusion that at their March 16, 2011, meeting, Iqbal held himself out to Saeger as having the ability to make referrals in exchange for payment, regardless of his actual ability to do so. I would also affirm Iqbal‘s conviction for making a false statement, for the reasons explained by the court. Accordingly, I concur in part and dissent in part from the court‘s opinion.
Jaymar Stanton Adams, pro se, Federal Correctional Institution, Florence, CO, Ronald A. Parsons, Jr., Johnson & Janklow, Sioux Falls for Petitioner-Appellant.
Stephanie Carlson Bengford, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Kevin Koliner, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney‘s Office, Sioux Falls, SD, Eric D. Kelderman, Assis
Before WOLLMAN, COLLOTON, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.
COLLOTON, Circuit Judge.
Jaymar Stanton Adams pleaded guilty in 2013 to a charge that he conspired to distribute 100 kilograms or more of marijuana in South Dakota and elsewhere. The district court1 sentenced him to 60 months’ imprisonment. Adams later moved unsuccessfully to vacate his sentence under
Adams owned a medicinal marijuana farm in California. In January 2013, a grand jury in South Dakota charged him with conspiring to distribute 100 kilograms or more of marijuana in South Dakota and elsewhere from 2008 until 2012. Randolph Daar, an attorney based in California, represented Adams, and Daar arranged for Nichole Carper to serve as Adams‘s local counsel in South Dakota. Daar sent Adams a plea agreement and a supporting statement with a factual basis for the plea. The factual basis statement said that Adams had knowingly joined an agreement “to illegally distribute more than 100 kilograms of marijuana in South Dakota and elsewhere,” and that Adams had “distributed ... marijuana, or caused it to be distributed in South Dakota and elsewhere.” Adams signed both documents and then pleaded guilty. The district court sentenced Adams to 60 months’ imprisonment and ordered a forfeiture of $50,000 cash.
Adams later moved to vacate his sentence under
Adams argues on appeal that his counsel was ineffective in recommending the guilty plea and that the district court erred by rejecting his claim without a hearing. We review for abuse of discretion the district court‘s denial of Adams‘s
To convict Adams of the charged offense, the government was required to establish (1) that there was a conspiracy, i.e., an agreement to distribute 100 kilograms or more of marijuana in South Dakota and elsewhere; (2) that Adams knew of the conspiracy; and (3) that Adams intentional
After judgment was entered, however, Adams attempted to recant. He alleged that he had not actually conspired to distribute marijuana in South Dakota. He claimed that he did not understand the plea proceeding, and blamed attorney Daar for urging him to plead guilty blindly. Adams asserts that he did not understand the plea agreement or factual basis statement, and that Daar never explained the documents. Adams says that he signed them only because Daar instructed him to do so. Adams also disowns his testimony at the change-of-plea hearing. He claims that Daar instructed him simply to answer “yes” to every question. Adams insists that although he had grown over 100 kilograms of marijuana at his farm in California, he never conspired to distribute marijuana in South Dakota. He asserts that he thought his admissions in court pertained only to activities in California. Daar and Carper dispute Adams‘s account; both concluded that there was an ample factual basis for the plea, and Daar avers that he instructed Adams to answer all of the court‘s questions truthfully.
A court may resolve a
An inmate is not automatically entitled to a trip back to the district court for an evidentiary hearing simply because he files an affidavit that conflicts on its face with the sworn statements of his attorney. The court may deny an evidentiary hearing if the movant‘s allegations “cannot be accepted as true because they are contradicted by the record, inherently incredible, or conclusions rather than statements of fact.” Thomas v. United States, 737 F.3d 1202, 1206-07 (8th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation omitted).
We see no abuse of discretion in the district court‘s conclusion that Adams‘s motion could be denied without a hearing. Adams‘s contention that Daar instructed him to answer “yes” to every question at the change-of-plea hearing is refuted by the fact that he answered “no” to multiple questions. The debunking of Adams‘s “all-yes” theory also undermines his contention that he signed the plea documents at Daar‘s behest without understanding them. Given that Adams chose between “yes” and “no” when answering the court‘s questions, the court was permitted to hold Adams to his sworn “yes” statements at the plea hearing that the plea-related documents were accurate, and that he read the documents, discussed them with his counsel, and understood them. A “defendant‘s representations during the plea-taking carry a strong presumption of verity and pose a formidable barrier in any subsequent collateral proceedings.” Nguyen v. United States, 114 F.3d 699, 703 (8th Cir. 1997) (internal quotations omitted).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Adams‘s motion without an evidentiary hearing, because the record showed conclusively that counsel did not render ineffective assistance and that Adams was not prejudiced by the performance of counsel. The judgment of the district court is affirmed.
COLLOTON
CIRCUIT JUDGE
Rodney GOODWIN, Petitioner-Appellant v. UNITED STATES of America, Respondent-Appellee
No. 16-1669
United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.
Submitted: November 15, 2016. Filed: August 25, 2017.
Rehearing Denied September 28, 2017