Jasper C. Pressley v. C. L. SwainJasper C. Pressley v. C. L. Swain
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Bazelon
Lead Opinion
Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge TAMM.
TAMM, Circuit Judge:Along with Palmore v. Superior Court, 169 U.S.App.D.C. —, 515 F.2d 1294, this case considers whether
Appellant was convicted in April, 1971 of grand larceny and larceny from the Government and sentenced to concurrent prison terms of twenty-two to ninety-six months and twenty months to five years respectively. His conviction was affirmed by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals. Pressley v. United States, No. 6063 (D.C.Ct.App., decided May 22, 1972).
On June 5, 1972, appellant, pro se, filed a motion ‘for a new trial, claiming, inter alia, ineffective assistance of counsel; the motion was denied without a *1292hearing, and Pressley appealed. Counsel was appointed, and after full briefing and argument, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals again affirmed. Pressley v. United States, No. 6631 (D.C.Ct. App., decided March 2, 1973).
In July, 1972, during the pendency of his second appeal, Pressley filed another pro se motion to compel production of the grand jury voting record in his case. The trial judge dismissed the motion for want of jurisdiction. Again after full briefing and argument by appointed counsel, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed, not on the jurisdictional ground, but on the merits. Pressley v. United States, No. 6803 (D.C.Ct. App., decided July 6, 1973).
On May 23, 1973, appellant filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, alleging that his custody violated his constitutional rights to due process and effective assistance of counsel. On July 18, 1973, the district court dismissed the petition, stating that “this Court does not have jurisdiction over this matter, by virtue of
Pressley appealed to this court, which on October 30, 1974, sua sponte remanded the record to the district court for clarification of its order. Specifically, we instructed that
[t]he District Court should indicate whether, in ruling that he was without jurisdiction to entertain the petition for a writ of habeas corpus under23 D.C.Code § 110(g) , he considered the applicant as one who had exhausted his remedies in the local court system, or whether he ruled only that he was without jurisdiction because the applicant had not first sought a writ of habeas corpus in Superior Court as required by16 D.C.Code § 1901(c) and23 D.C.Code § 110(a) .
Pressley v. Swain, No. 73-1973 (D.C.Cir., Oct. 30, 1974).
On remand, the district court “respectfully advise[d] that on the papers then before it, it appeared that appellant had not adequately exhausted his remedies in the local court system. The Court made no determination as to the constitutionality of
Appellant now contends that the district court has jurisdiction to entertain petitions for habeas corpus, even after passage of
regardless of whether appellant has actually exhausted his local remedies by an application to the Superior Court under23 D.C.Code § 110 , under the special circumstances of this case— where it is clear that the local court system has had a full opportunity to resolve the issues raised in appellant’s petition — appellant should not be forced to relitigate his claim in the local court system before filing a petition in the District Court.
Response to Appellant’s Supplemental Memorandum Directed to the Issue of Exhaustion of Local Remedies at 7 (footnotes omitted). We agree with appellant both as to jurisdiction and exhaustion.
Today in Palmore v. Superior Court, supra, we held that
Appellant argues that the district court erred in concluding that he failed to exhaust his remedies in the local court system. We agree. Pressley’s two pro se collateral attack motions, which he styled “Motion for a New Trial,” were, as such, clearly untimely under Super.Ct.R.Crim.P. 33. The Government, in opposing the motion on the merits, argued that compliance with rule 33 was jurisdictional, but then stated:
should this Court decide to review appellant’s argument on the merits (i. e., by treating his motion for new trial as a motion to vacate sentence under23 D.C.Code § 110 (Supp.V, 1972); cf.28 U.S.C. § 2255 ), we submit that it is utterly meritless.
Supplemental Memorandum Directed to the Issue of Exhaustion of Local Remedies at 8 n.25 (emphasis added). See also id. (Gov’t, in last local appeal “characterized the motion on appeal as a motion to vacate sentence under
“[Adjudication upon the underlying merits of claims is not hampered by reliance upon the titles petitioners put upon their documents.” Andrews v. United States, 373 U.S. 334, 338, 83 S.Ct. 1236, 1239, 10 L.Ed.2d 383 (1963); See Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 430, 82 S.Ct. 468, 7 L.Ed.2d 417 (1962). This rule applies with special force to pro se motions. We therefore agree with appellant that “[b]y any reasonable analysis, [his] ‘Motion for a New Trial’ was in fact a collateral attack under
Under any circumstance, no matter how the motions were styled, the local courts fully considered the constitutional claims on the merits. Thus, the local courts “had a full opportunity to determine the federal constitutional issues before resort was made to a federal forum, and the policies served by the exhaustion requirement would not be furthered by requiring submission of the claims to the [local] courts.” Francisco v. Gathright, 419 U.S. 59, 63, 95 S.Ct. 257, 42 L.Ed.2d 226 (1974) (citations and footnotes omitted).
We hold that the district court erred in dismissing the petition on exhaustion grounds and reverse and remand for consideration on the merits.
So ordered.
Dissenting Opinion
(dissenting):
For the reasons stated in my dissent in Palmore v. Superior Court, 169 U.S.App.D.C. -, 515 F.2d 1294, I dissent.