Jаson McKinley Ward is the only Orthodox Jewish prisoner at Ely State Prison in Ely, Nevada. He brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, arguing that the prison infringes upon his First Amendment right to exercise freely his religion by not providing him with a kosher diet, clothes made of a single fabric, or an Orthodox rabbi; by not allowing him to have candles in his cell; and by refusing to guarantee that he will not be transported on the Sabbath. He seeks injunctive relief only, and appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment in favor of the warden after a bench trial.
I
Religion is the first of our rights under the First Amendment and the Bill of Rights. The right to the free exercise of religion is a precious American invention, distinguishing our Constitution from all prior national constitutions. The right to the free exercise of religion is to be jealously guarded. It is the right of a human being to respond to what that person’s conscience says is the dictate of God. It is not a right to be readily trammeled by the state. A human being does not cease to be human because the human being is a prisoner of the state. “The free exercise right, however, is necessarily limited by the fact of incarceration, and may be curtailed in order to achieve legitimate correctional goals or to maintain prison seсurity.”
O’Lone v. Shabazz,
Turner
set forth four factors to be considered in determining when a regulation is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. First, there must be a “ ‘valid, rational connection’ between the prison regulation and the legitimate governmental interest put forward to justify it.”
Id.
at 89,
The warden argues that free exercise claims of prisoners are no longer governed by
Turner,
but instead must be evaluated under the standard announced in
Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith,
*877
We see no reason to depart from
Turner.
The Supreme Court has held that
Turner
applies to all constitutional claims arising in prison with the exception of Eighth Amendment claims.
See Washington v. Harper,
II
Ward argues that the prison is obliged to provide him with a strict kosher diet at the prison’s expense “that is certified or deemed religiously acceptable by an outside independent Orthodox Jewish Organization ... at the time the food is physically served to Orthodox Jewish inmates.” The diet requested by Wai’d would require the prison not only to provide kosher food, but to store and to prepare the food in a special manner. Moreover, Ward requests that the food be served in an “eating area [that is] kept kosher for all Jewish inmates.”
We have held that “[i]nmates ... have the right to be provided with food sufficient to sustain them in good health that satisfies the dietary laws of their religion.”
McElyea v. Babbitt,
The warden provides a pork-free diet to inmates who request it, but does not provide a full kosher diet. Whether the culinary policy is reasonable rеquires a balancing of the degree of intrusiveness into the right of free exercise against the costs of accommodation, giving appropriate deference to prison officials’ assessment of the costs. The
Turner
factors help focus this determination. The first
Turner
factor requires us to consider whether there is a logical connection between the policy and the legitimate governmental interest that justifies it. The prisоn has a legitimate interest in running a simplified food service, rather than one that gives rise to many administrative difficulties.
Ka-key,
The second
Turner
factor requires us to consider whether Ward has alternative means by which he can practice his religion. The relevant inquiry under this factоr is not whether the inmate has an alternative means of engaging in the particular religious practice that he or she claims is being affected; rather, we are to determine whether the inmates have been denied all means of religious expression.
O’Lone,
In contrast, Ward’s ability to participate in religious observances has been significantly circumscribed within the prison. Because of the remoteness of the area, he does not have access to an Orthodox rabbi. Since he is the only Orthodox Jewish prisoner in the institution, he does not have access to religious services. Moreover, he cannot congregate with other practitioners of his faith for prayer and discussion. It is true that Ward is encouraged to practice other observances of his faith privately. The district court heard testimony from an Orthodox Jewish rabbi that private prayer is a significant aspect of the practice of the Jewish religion. However, we cannot conclude that the opportunity to engage in private prayer is enough to satisfy the second
Turner
factor as interpreted by
O’Lone.
If it were, the factor would have no meaning at all because an inmate would always be аble to pray privately.
See Sample v. Borg,
Also relevant to the evaluation of the second factor is a distinctiоn O’Lone had no occasion to make: the distinction between a religious practice which is a positive expression of belief and a religious commandment which the believer may not violate at peril of his soul. It is one thing to curtail various ways of expressing belief, for which alternative ways of expressing belief may be found. It is another thing to require a believer to defile himself, according to the believer’s conscience, by doing something that is completely forbidden by the believer’s religion. In order to determine what alternatives are open to Ward, findings must be made as to what is or is not forbidden by his religion. The district court made no such findings; we must remand so that the court can do so.
In making these findings, it will be appropriate for the district court to consider Ward’s challenge to thе orthodoxy of the rabbi who testified on behalf of the state. In religious matters, we take judicial notice
of
the fact that often the keenest disputes and the most lively intolerance exists among persons of the same general religious belief, who, however, are in disagreement as to what that faith requires in particular matters.
See Thomas v. Review Bd.,
The third
Turner
factor requires us to consider the “impact accommodation ... will have on guards and other inmates, and on the allocation of prison resources generally.”
Washington v. Harper,
More important are the administrative difficulties that could potentially arise in accommodating Ward’s request. Common sense tells us that there would be some disruption to the efficient operation of culinary services if the prison were required to provide a special meal for one prisoner. The district court, however, made no findings regarding how great the disruption wоuld be. Indeed, the district court made no findings regarding whether the prison had explored the possibility of accommodating Ward. Although we must give deference to the prison official’s own assessment of the burden on prison operations, we cannot simply accept the war *879 den’s assertion on appeal that the disruption would be significant. Likewise, the district court made no findings regarding the financial impact of accommodation. Again, it is clear that providing a kosher diet would give rise to some expense, not only from the cost of Ward’s meals but also from the cost of accommodating others with similar claims of entitlement to a religious diet. We cannot determine how heavily this factor weighs in the prison’s favor, however, because the magnitude of these costs is a factual question for which the district court made no findings.
Finally, under the fourth factor, we must consider whether there are ready alternatives to the prison’s current policy that would accommodate Ward at de minimis cost to the prison. “[T]he absence of ready alternatives is evidence of the reasonableness of a prison regulation,”
Harper,
In the absence of sufficient factual findings regarding the second, third, and fourth factors, it is impossible for us to determine whether the denial of a kosher diet is reasonably related to the prison’s legitimate interest in streamlined food service. In
McElyea
we established the principle that inmates have the right to be provided with food that satisfies the dietary laws of their religion.
McElyea,
III
Ward argues that he must be allowed to have candles in his cell to observе certain rituals of his religion. The warden asserts that candles pose a significant fire hazard, and thus under no circumstances are prisoners allowed to have them in their cells. The Turner factors clearly weigh in favor of the prison officials on this claim. The serious safety and security concerns raised by allowing inmates to possess and use candles outweigh the curtailment of Ward’s religious рractice. Thus, we conclude that the regulation is reasonably related to a legitimate penological purpose and thus is valid under Ttimer.
IV
Ward argues that the warden violated his First Amendment rights when it transferred him to Ely on the Sabbath. He asks for an injunction to prevent the prison from transporting him on any Sabbath or Jewish holiday, comprising eighty-eight days in the year.
Again the application of the Turner factors leads to the conclusion thаt the prison’s policy is reasonably related to a legitimate governmental interest. First, the prison has a legitimate penological interest in having a standardized, efficient transportation system. Prisoners are transported for medical, security, and other reasons. According to the *880 warden, the health, safety, and welfare of the prisoners is dependent upon the ability to movе prisoners quickly and efficiently when necessary. The prison policy of not guaranteeing that inmates will be transported only on certain days is logically connected to the legitimate government interest in security and efficient transportation.
Second, Ward does not contend that the prison intends to transfer him on every Sabbath. Because he can observe most Sabbaths, we conсlude that he has alternative means of exercising his religion as contemplated by O’Lone.
Third, a hard and fast rule that Ward and other Jewish prisoners could never be transported on the Sabbath or holidays could have a significant impact on guards, other inmates, and prison resources. Such a policy could disrupt the efficient administration of the transportation system at the prison.
Fourth, Ward does not offer any alternatives that could fully accommodatе his rights at de minimis costs to valid penological interest. The prison’s current transportation policy is to accommodate the religious beliefs of the inmates when at all possible. Given this policy, we conclude that Ward is not entitled to the injunction he seeks.
V
Ward has requested that the prison provide him with an Orthodox rabbi. Since Ward is the only Orthodox Jewish prisoner in the institution, the prison does nоt have a rabbi on staff. It is not clear whether the prison made any effort to contact an Orthodox rabbi on Ward’s behalf; however, a prison official testified that there were no Orthodox Jewish rabbis within a one hundred mile radius of the prison. No rabbi has volunteered to come to the prison. The prison, however, in no way restricts Ward’s ability to contact a rabbi on his own to come into thе prison, nor does it forbid rabbis from coming into the prison. Thus, the issue here is whether the prison has an affirmative obligation to provide a rabbi for Ward.
We have previously held that prison officials have no such obligation. In
Allen v. Toombs,
Ward argues that he would have access to a rabbi if he were moved to a different prison. However, the prison officials point out that Ward is a maximum security prisoner, and that Ely is the only maximum security prison in the Nevada prison system. We cannot conclude that Ward’s placement at Ely is not reasonably related to a legitimаte penological purpose, and therefore we must affirm the district court on this issue.
VI
Ward argues that the prison has an affirmative obligation to provide him with clothing that is made with only one fiber. The prison has refused to do so, but has informed Ward that he may provide his own clothing as long as it conforms to the prison dress code. All prisoners are required to wear solid blue denim clothing.
Ward does not question the necessity of the prison’s policy requiring prisoners to dress uniformly. Rather, his argument focuses on whether the prison has an affirmative obligation to provide him with clothing that conforms to the dictates of his religion. We conclude that under the Turner standard, the prison does not have such an obligation. The third and fourth factors of Turner are determinative. Allowing one prisoner to receive preferential treatment with regard to clothing could potentially cause conflicts among inmates and providing each prisoner with the clothing or other implements necessary to the practice of their religion would impose a cost that would be more than de minimis. We conclude that the prison’s policy of allowing Ward to buy and to wear his own clothing satisfies the Turner standard.
*881 VII
Ward seeks an injunction ordering the prison to allow Jewish inmates to wear religious jewelry, yarmulkes, and talliths (prayer shawls). It appears, however, that inmates are already allowed to possess and to wear these items under existing prison policy. Since Ward can show no injury that can be redressed by the injunction he seeks, he has no standing to bring this claim.
See, e.g., Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for a Separation of Church & State, Inc.,
VIII
In a letter of April 26, 1993, addressed to this court, Ward has raised a question of retaliation for bringing this suit. We are in no position to adjudicate this contention, but if Ward’s claims are true, there would have been serious interference with the jurisdiction of this court. On remand, we assume that the district court will have the opportunity to examine these contentions, which relate to Ward’s access to this court on appeal.
Each party to bear its own costs.
AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part and REMANDED.
Notes
. Courts that have considered the question have reached varying results.
Compare, e.g., Kahane
v.
Carlson,