73 Fla. 635 | Fla. | 1917
W. B. Jarvis seeks relief here from a conviction of the crime of perjury. The first assignment is based upon the overruling- of the motion to quash the indictment. The indictment is quite lengthy and it would serve no useful purpose to set it out'in its entirety. Suffice it to say that it alleges the pendency of a certain chancery cause in the Circuit Court in and for Jackson County, wherein M. L. Dekle was complainant and W. B. Jarvis was defendant, in which H. A. Bowles had been appointed receiver and in the order appointing such receiver W. B. Jarvis was required forthwith to surrender to the receiver a certain described contract and
“That the said statements, depositions and testimony, of the said W. B. Jarvis, so made and given under his oath aforesaid, to the effect that the said Contract or Lease and the said Note, at the time the said Receiver made demand for same, were locked in a safety deposit box in the Bank of Greenwood, at Greenwood, Fla., and that he could not get to said Contract or Lease and said-Note on account of their being locked in said safety deposit box in said bank, were then and there knowingly,“ designedly, wilfully, wickedly and corruptly perjured, false and untrue, and the said W. B. Jarvis then and there well knew the said statements, depositions and testimony, in *the particulars aforesaid, were false, perjured and untrue, but notwithstanding, he the .said W. B. Jarvis, then and there, in the said court, in said cause, then and there the same, upon their oath aforesaid, testified and swore for the purpose of deceiving the said court, and cause the said court to release him from arrest and punishment for the said contempt of court.
“That whereas, in truth and in fact, the truth of the said matters then and there so sworn and testified to by the said W. B. Jarvis, was that the said Contract or Lease and the said Note, were not in a safety deposit box in the Bank of Greenwood, at Greenwood, Fla., when the said Receiver made demand upon the said W. B. Jarvis
“So the Grand Jurors aforesaid, upon their oath aforesaid, say, the said perjury, he the said W. B. Jarvis, did in manner and form aforesaid then and there commit.
“Contrary to the form of the statute in such cases made and provided, to the evil example of all others in like cause offending, and against the peace and dignity of the State of Florida.”
The motion to quash is as follows:
“Now comes defendant and moves the court to quash the Indictment herein upon the following grounds, to-wit:
“1. Because said indictment is vague, indefinite, uncertain and does not sufficiently allege any offense to have been committed by defendant.
“2. Because said indictment fails to allege that defendant had access to the papers mentioned.
“3. Because said indictment fails to allege that defendant knew where the papers mentioned were.
“4. Because said indictment fails to allege that defendant did not know or have reason to believe that papers in question were as stated.”
We have carefully read the brief of the defendant in support of this assignment and have also examined the following authorities which he cites and upon which he relies : Craft v. State, 42 Fla. 567, 29 South. Rep. 418; Brown v. State, 47 Fla. 16, 36 South. Rep. 705; Markey v. State, 47 Fla. 38, 37 South. Rep. 53; Fudge v. State, 57 Fla. 7, 49 South. Rep. 128, 17 Ann. Cas. 919. We are of the opinion that these authorities fail to support his contention. The indictment would seem to measure up to the requirements which we laid down in Fudge v. State, supra. Also see the excellent note to this case on
The only other assignment is the second, which is based upon the overruling of the motion for a new trial. It is contended that the evidence is insufficient to support the verdict. We cannot agree with the defendant in this contention. It would be a fruitless task indeed tp set out all the evidence adduced at the trial, or even to attempt a synopsis thereof. A careful reading of the evidence convipces-us that it is amply sufficient,’therefore we feel constrained to concur with the jury and the trial judge in so holding.
The defendant took the witness-stand in his own behalf and proceeded to testify, during- the course of which he stated that he “was bothered,” whereupon the following- question was- propounded to him by his counsel, “What were you bothered about?” The State interposed an objection to this question, which was sustained, and one of the grounds of the motion for a new trial is that this ruling constitutes reversible error. Again we find
The fifth ground of the motion is based upon the refusal of the trial court to give the following requested instruction, which ruling was duly excepted to: “The defendant is presumed to be innocent throughout the trial of his case until the State proves his guilt and the fact his testimony may have been untrue does not of itself mean he is guilty of this offense.”
No error is made to appear here, as the principle had been fully and more correctly embraced in the charges and instructions previously given.
The judgment will be affirmed.
Browne, C. J., and Taylor, Whitfield and Ellis, JJ-, concur.