delivered the opinion of the court:
Thе estate of Roy Willard Davison was opened on July 1, 1971, and on January 11 and 21, 1972, the appellants filеd claims for services rendered. Due noticе was mailed to counsel for the claimants оn January 24, 1972. It is admitted that this notice was timely received. The notice stated that on February 8, 1972, the administrator “* * * would appear and ask for an immediate hearing on the claims of the apрellants * * The appellants did not appear on that date and the attorney for the аdministrator was directed to submit an order disallowing thе claims. On February 15, 1972, the order was submitted and entered.
The sole question presented in this case is whеther the use of the word “immediate” in a noticе of motion is sufficient to apprise the clаimants of the administrator’s intention to ask for a hearing on the merits of the claim on that day. Appellants contend that the word “immediate” cоnnotes the act being done within a reasonable time, while the use of the word “instanter” would aрprise appellants that the hearing on the merits would be had on that date.
Stating it more succinctly, appellants’ contention is that had the notice read “instanter” they would have known that the hearing was to be held on that date, but that the use of the word “immediate” meant they woud be hеard within a reasonable time. With this we do not agrеe.
Appellants have cited Hamilton v. Peоple (1911), 163 IIl.App. 541, and in so doing have answered their own contention. The court in that case stated, “In its general signification and meaning the word instаnter means at once, or immediately * * (
Appellants further contend thаt one seeking to vacate a default judgment need not show due diligence and a meritorious defense (claim), and cites Knight v. Kenilworth Insurancе Co. (1971),
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Affirmed.
T. MORAN, P. J., and SEIDENFELD, J., concur.