Case Information
*1 In the Supreme Court of Georgia
Decided: June 2, 2014 S14A0190. JARNIGAN v. THE STATE.
S14A0191. DAVIS v. THE STATE.
B LACKWELL , Justice.
Deonshowna Jarnigan and Grant Alexander Davis were tried together by a DeKalb County jury and convicted of the murder of Dontavious Blair, among other crimes. Jarnigan and Davis appeal, both contending that the trial court improperly commented on the evidence in the presence of the jury. Davis alone also contends that the trial court erred when it admitted certain evidence at trial, when it restricted his cross-examination of a witness for the prosecution, and when it charged the jury. Upon our review of the record and briefs, we see no error, and we affirm.
*2 1. Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence shows that Brittnee Mahoney and Krystale Jennings hosted “stripper parties,” and they invited Jarnigan to their home to discuss whether Jarnigan might wish to work at such parties. In anticipation of visiting their home, Jarnigan devised a plan to rob them, and Jarnigan enlisted the aid of Davis and Sylvester Antoine Guice. On April 28, 2010, Jarnigan went to the home, and as she visited with Mahoney and Jennings, Davis and Guice — both of whom were armed — hid nearby. After a few minutes, Jarnigan left to go to a store, but she shortly returned to the home.
robberies of Blair and Kyle Baber, a consecutive term of imprisonment for twenty years for
burglary, and four consecutive terms of imprisonment for twenty years for the aggravated
assaults upon Baber, Brittnee Mahoney, Darvi Stevenson, and Krystale Jennings. Davis was
sentenced to an additional consecutive term of imprisonment for five years for unlawful
possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. The verdict as to felony murder
was vacated by operation of law, Malcolm v. State,
Jarnigan, however, did not come back inside the home. Jennings saw Jarnigan outside, she came out to speak with Jarnigan, and when she did, she was accosted by Davis and Guice, who pointed a gun at Jennings. Davis and Guice entered the home, where they confronted Kyle Baber and took his pants from him at gunpoint, evidently because he refused their demand that he empty his pockets. Davis and Guice then tried to enter a bedroom, but Mahoney and Blair held the door shut. A shot was fired through the door, and it fatally wounded Blair. At that point, Davis and Guice broke into the bedroom, put a gun to Mahoney’s head, and took a wallet from Blair’s body. As Davis and Guice left the home, they encountered Darvi Stevenson and put a gun in his face. Jarnigan then drove Davis and Guice away. Investigators later found Davis’s fingerprints on the glass of the front door of the home.
Neither Jarnigan nor Davis disputes the legal sufficiency of the evidence.
We nevertheless have independently reviewed the evidence to assess whether
it is sufficient to sustain their convictions. Upon that review, we conclude that
the evidence adduced at trial was sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact
to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Jarnigan and Davis were guilty of the
*4
crimes of which they were convicted. Jackson v. Virginia,
2. Jarnigan and Davis both contend that the trial court improperly commented on the evidence in the presence of the jury. During closing arguments, the lawyer for Jarnigan said:
[T]he State wanted you to believe Krystale Jennings. The same young lady who sat on that stand and pretty much admitted to you that she runs stripper parties, and implied that she’s kind of a pimp. She collects money; she benefits. She also sat there and told you that she cards people and looks at their IDs. I submit to you that’s not true. She has not been honest with you at all. My client is eighteen years old.
At that point, the prosecuting attorney objected that “[t]hat didn’t come into evidence,” and the trial judge responded, “I’m going to sustain that objection.” According to Jarnigan and Davis, the ruling of the trial court on the objection of the prosecuting attorney amounted to an improper comment upon the evidence. We disagree.
Pursuant to OCGA § 17-8-57, “[i]t is error for any judge in any criminal
case, during its progress or in his charge to the jury, to express or intimate his
opinion as to what has or has not been proved or as to the guilt of the accused.”
But in almost all cases, “sustaining or overruling an objection is not a violation
*5
of OCGA § 17-8-57.” Walker v. State,
3. Davis claims that the trial court improperly admitted hearsay testimony when it allowed Emily Taylor — an expert fingerprint examiner with the Georgia Bureau of Investigation who testified for the prosecution — to testify *6 that another fingerprint examiner had “verified” her work. [2] Before Taylor said that another examiner had “verified” her work, she explained that GBI fingerprint examiners use a methodology known as “ACE-V,” a term that *7 derives from the four steps of the process, “analysis, comparison, evaluation, and verification.” Viewed in this context, the testimony that another examiner had “verified” the work of Taylor tended to show that Taylor had followed a standard and accepted methodology in her field of expertise, and the verification to which Taylor testified, therefore, formed a basis for her own expert opinion.
When offered and admitted for such a purpose, testimony about the
verification of a fingerprint comparison that is as limited as that to which Davis
objected, see note 2 supra, is not inadmissible hearsay. An expert witness
generally is permitted to explain the basis for her opinions, including the
standard and accepted methodology that she used to form her opinions. See
Miller v. Miller,
In some fields[,] corroboration or verification is part of the standard procedure by which judgments are reached. Fingerprint examiners, for example, generally follow a procedure known as ACE-V, an acronym standing for analysis, comparison, evaluation, and verification. One of the necessary steps that a fingerprint examiner must follow to declare a match is verification – confirming that a second expert agrees with his conclusion. When courts permit a fingerprint expert to testify about ACE-V, they are allowing testimony that an out-of-court expert has corroborated the opinion of the witness.. . . If the bolstering process is built into the methods of the field, courts may be less likely to exclude corroboration as *8 bolstering, for in any given instance, the verification by another qualified expert shows that the expert is following an established protocol in the discipline.
David H. Kaye et al., The New Wigmore: Expert Evidence § 4.7.1 (b) (1). The
North Carolina Supreme Court has agreed that testimony about the verification
of a fingerprint comparison is not inadmissible hearsay to the extent that the
verification is part of a standard and accepted methodology and thereby forms
a basis for the opinion of the testifying fingerprint examiner. State v. Jones, 368
SE2d 844, 848 (N.C. 1988). We do not have to decide in this case, however, the
full extent to which testimony about the verification process is permissible.
Here, Davis objected when Taylor said that another examiner “verified” her
work, but he made no hearsay objection when Taylor later explained that the
other examiner had employed the same examination process, and he made no
hearsay objection when she implied that the other examiner had reached the
same conclusions. Compare State v. Connor,
4. Davis also claims that the trial court improperly restricted his cross-
examination of Taylor. Although the accused is generally entitled to a thorough
and sifting cross-examination of the witnesses for the prosecution, the scope of
cross-examination is not unlimited, and trial courts “retain wide latitude to
impose reasonable limits on cross-examination based on concerns about, among
other things[,] interrogation that is only marginally relevant.” Nicely v. State,
291 Ga. 788, 796 (4) (733 SE2d 715) (2012) (citations and punctuation
omitted). Here, Davis complains that, when he asked Taylor about the precise
standards applied by fingerprint examiners in certain other countries, the trial
court sustained an objection to the relevance of the question. But the trial court
permitted Davis to elicit testimony that there is no national standard in the
United States that identifies how similar two prints must be to amount to a
match. Moreover, the trial court allowed Davis to elicit testimony that the degree
of similarity is determined by each examiner, based on her own training and
experience. Davis also complains that, when he tried to ask Taylor about a
*10
particular case in which the Federal Bureau of Investigation mistakenly
identified an Oregon lawyer as a terrorist based on a fingerprint match,
[3]
the trial
court sustained an objection. But as to misidentifications in fingerprint
comparison, Davis never attempted to cross-examine Taylor about her general
awareness of other cases in which faulty fingerprint analysis led to a
misidentification. Moreover, Davis was permitted to cross-examine Taylor about
the possibility of mistakes in fingerprint comparison. See In re H.A., 311 Ga.
App. 660, 660, n.1 (
5. Last, Davis argues that the jury charge on unlawful possession of a
firearm during the commission of a felony worked a constructive amendment of
the indictment, so as to permit his conviction in a manner that was not charged
in the indictment. Davis complains that the indictment charged only that he
unlawfully had a rifle “on his person” during the commission of the predicate
felonies, but the trial court charged the jury that a person has a firearm during
the commission of a felony when he has a firearm on his person
or
“within
*11
arm’s reach of” his person. Davis did not object to this instruction, however, and
for that reason, we review it only for plain error. See OCGA § 17-8-58 (b). See
also State v. Kelly,
Where the indictment charges that a defendant committed an offense in
one specific way, it generally is error for a trial court to instruct the jury that the
offense could be committed in another way. Williams v. Kelley,
Judgments affirmed. All the Justices concur.
Notes
[1] The crimes were committed on April 28, 2010. Along with Sylvester Antoine Guice, Jarnigan and Davis were indicted on April 12, 2011, and each was charged with malice murder, three counts of felony murder, two counts of armed robbery, one count of burglary, and five counts of aggravated assault. In addition, Davis and Guice were charged with unlawful possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. The trial of Jarnigan and Davis commenced on April 25, 2011, and the jury returned its verdict four days later, finding both guilty on all counts. Jarnigan and Davis each was sentenced to imprisonment for life for the malice murder of Blair, two consecutive terms of imprisonment for life for the armed
[2] Davis objected on hearsay grounds when Taylor testified that the initials of Jessie
Wargo appeared on a fingerprint card, when Taylor identified Wargo as another fingerprint
examiner, and when Taylor testified that Wargo had “verified” the work that Taylor had
done. But without more, the identification of a person who put initials upon a document is
not hearsay. See People v. Mandez,
[3] See generally Mayfield v. United States,