Jared Don Thrasher v. Tabitha Nicole Thrasher
CL-2025-1084
ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS
July 10, 2026
FRIDY, Judge.
SPECIAL TERM, 2026; Aрpeal from Marshall Circuit Court (DR-25-900146)
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before the oрinion is published in Southern Reporter.
FRIDY, Judge.
Jared Don Thrasher (“the husband“) appeals from a judgment entered by the Marshall Circuit Court (“the trial court“) divorcing him from Tabitha Nicole Thrasher (“the wife“). We affirm the trial court‘s
Procedural History
On June 5, 2025, the wife filed a complaint in the trial court seeking a divorce from the husband. She requested, among other things, an awаrd of sole legal and sole physical custody of the parties’ child (“the child“), who was born in May 2014; an award of child support; an equitable division of the parties’ real and personal property and an apportionment of the parties’ debts; an award of alimony; and an award of attorney‘s fees. She also requested pendente lite relief, including interim alimony and an order directing the husband to prevent the foreclosure of the parties’ marital residence. On June 5, 2025, the trial court entered an initial pendente lite order directing, among other things, that the parties refrain from disposing of any assets or property and that they continue to pay the marital debts and expenses in the same manner as they had before the commencement of the action. On June 18, 2025, the husband filed an answer to the wife‘s complaint and a counterclaim for a divorce in which he requested, among other things, an award of joint legal and physical custody of the child, an award of child support, an
On July 3, 2025, the trial court entered a pendente lite order in which it indicated that both parties had been present for a hearing on that date. Among other things, the trial court awarded the wife the “care, custody, and control” of the child, subject to the husband‘s visitation “for no fewer than four (4) hours per week,” directed the husband to “inform the [wife] in writing no fewer than 72 hours prior to his intent to exercise visitation,” directed the husband to pay child support to the wife in the amount of $847 per month, granted the wife possession of the marital residence, directed the husband to immediately satisfy any debt arrearage currently owing on the marital residence to avoid foreclosure, and directed the husband to pay to the wife temporary spousal support in the amount of $1,900 per month beginning on August 1, 2025.
On October 23, 2025, the trial court conducted a trial. On October 28, 2025, the trial court entered a judgment divorcing the parties. The divorce judgment awarded the “care, custody and control” of the child to
Regarding alimony, the divorce judgment provided:
“1. As alimony-in-gross, the [husband] shall pay the sum of Twenty Five Thousand and No/Dollars ($25,000.00) to the [wife]. [The husband] shall pay $150.00 per month until the entire sum is paid in full. This amount represents the value of the [wife‘s] equity in the former residence of the parties due to non-payment of [the husband]. This amount is a property settlement and is not modifiable.
“2. As periodic alimony, the [husband] shall pay to the [wife] the sum of One Thousand and NO/Dollars ($1,000.00) per month. All such payments shall be made directly to the [wife]. The first such payment of periodic alimony shall be due on or before the 1st day of November, 2025. This periodic alimony shall terminate upon the expiration of sixty (60) months or as otherwise prescribed by law.
“Subsequent payments shall be made on or before the first day of each month thereafter.”
The trial court found the husband in contempt for his failure to pay child support and alimony as directed in the pendente lite order and ordered, among other things, that the husband could purge himself of the contempt by paying to the wife $5,391 within 180 days of the date of the entry of the divorce judgment. The trial court ordеred the husband to pay attorney‘s fees to the wife in the amount of $7,000 and denied all remaining requested relief.
The husband filed a motion to alter, amend, or vacate the trial court‘s judgment. The trial court held a hearing on that motion, after
Issues
The husband raises three issues on appeal: (1) whether the trial court‘s division of property and awards of alimony are equitable; (2) whether the trial court erred in its award of attorney‘s fees to the wife; and (3) whether the limitations placed on the husband‘s visitation with the child are reasonable and in the child‘s best interests.
Analysis
The husband contends on appeal that the trial court‘s awards of alimony in gross and periodic alimony are due to be reversed. Regarding the trial court‘s award of “periodic alimony,” the husband argues, among other things, that the trial court failed to make the express findings required by
“(a) Upon granting a divorce or legal separation, the court shall award either rehabilitative or periodic alimony as provided in subsectiоn (b), if the court expressly finds all of the following:
“(1) A party lacks a separate estate or his or her separate estate is insufficient to enable the party to acquire the ability to preserve, to the extent possible, the economic status quo of the parties as it existed during the marriage. - “(2) The other party has the ability to supply those means without undue economic hаrdship.
- “(3) The circumstances of the case make it equitable.
“(b) If a party has met the requirements of subsection (a), the court shall award alimony in the following priority:
- “(1) Unless the court expressly finds that rehabilitative alimony is not feasible, the court shall award rehabilitative alimony to the party for a limited duration, not to exceed five years, absent extraordinary circumstances, of an amount to enable the party to acquire the ability tо preserve, to the extent possible, the economic status quo of the parties as it existed during the marriage.
- “(2) In cases in which the court expressly finds that rehabilitation is not feasible, a good-faith attempt at rehabilitation fails, or good-faith rehabilitation only enables the party to partially acquire the ability to preserve, to the extent possible, the economiс status quo of the parties as it existed during the marriage, the court shall award the party periodic installments of alimony for a duration and an amount to allow the party to preserve, to the extent possible, the economic status quo of the parties as it existed during the marriage as provided in subsection (g).”
The husband cites Merrick v. Merrick, 352 So. 3d 770, 775 (Ala. Civ. App. 2021), in which this court stated: “The legislature has clearly required that an alimony award be either rehabilitative alimony or periodic alimony and that, to award either type of alimony, the trial court must make certain express findings after considering the various factors described in
The husband also challenges that portion of the divorce judgment addressing his visitation with the child. First, the husband argues that limiting his visitation with the child to the first and third weekends of the month, along with a few hours on Thanksgiving and Christmas, barring other holiday or summer visitation, amounts to a limitation on his visitation with the child that is unsupported by the evidence. Additionally, the husband argues that the requirement that he inform the wife of his intent to exercise his visitation rights in writing seventy-two hours in advance is “ambiguous” and does not state that the wife must accommodate the visitation following that notice.
In his October 31, 2025, motion to alter, amend, or vacate the divorce judgment, the husband asserted that the divorce judgment “imposes a modified version of the Marshall County Unified Family Court Standard Custody and Visitation Order,” and he requested that the trial court reconsider and amend that portion of the divorce judgment tо
The husband asserts that the wife had interpreted the seventy-two-hour-notice requirement in the pendente lite order to mean that the husband could visit the child only at the times that she selected. He points to his trial testimony in which he stated that, when he had attempted to visit the child following the entry of the pendente lite order, the wife had denied him visitation on the day that he requested and hаd informed him that he “could only have [the child] for whatever the times was [sic] that she picked“; the husband asserts that the trial court‘s reinstatement of the seventy-two-hour-notice requirement in the divorce judgment reinforces the belief that the husband‘s visitation “is completely at the whim of [the wife].” The husband‘s brief, p. 32.
We note first that, unlike in the divorce judgment, which awarded the husband visitation on the first and third weekends of each month, the July 3, 2025, pendente lite order awarded the husband “visitation for no fewer than four (4) hours per week” and directed him to inform the wife in writing no fewer than seventy-two hours before his intent to exercise visitation. Moreover, we note that the husband did not testify at
Because the husband challenged the trial court‘s award of a more limited visitation schedule in lieu of standard visitation in his postjudgment motion, we consider his arguments on appeal as to that issue. In Pratt v. Pratt, 56 So. 3d 638, 641 (Ala. Civ. App. 2010), this court stated, in pertinent part:
” ‘The trial court has broad discretion in determining the visitation rights of a noncustodial parent, and its decision in this regard will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion.’ Carr v. Broyles, 652 So. 2d 299, 303 (Ala. Civ. App. 1994). In exercising its discretion over visitation matters, ’ “[t]he trial court is entrusted to balance the rights of the parents with the child‘s best interests to fashion a visitation award that is tailored to the specific facts and circumstances of the individual case.” ’ Ratliff v. Ratliff, 5 So. 3d 570, 586 (Ala. Civ. App. 2008) (quoting Nauditt v. Haddock, 882 So. 2d 364, 367 (Ala. Civ. App. 2003) (plurality opinion)). A noncustodial parent generally enjoys ‘reasonable rights of visitation’ with his or her children. Naylor v. Oden, 415 So. 2d 1118, 1120 (Ala. Civ. App. 1982). However, those rights may be restricted
in order to protect children from conduct, conditions, or circumstances surrounding their noncustodial parent that endanger the children‘s health, safety, or well-being. See Ex parte Thompson, 51 So. 3d 265, 272 (Ala. 2010) (‘A trial court in establishing visitation privileges for a noncustodial parent must consider the best interests and welfare of the minor child and, where appropriate, as in this case, set conditions on visitation that protect the child.‘). In fashioning the appropriate restrictions, out of respect for the public policy encouraging interaction between noncustodial parents and their children, see
Ala. Code 1975, § 30-3-150 (addressing joint custody), and§ 30-3-160 (addressing Alabama Parent-Child Relationship Protection Act), the trial court may not use an overbroad restriction that does more than necessary to protect the children. See Smith v. Smith, 887 So. 2d 257 (Ala. Civ. App. 2003), and Smith v. Smith, 599 So. 2d 1182, 1187 (Ala. Civ. App. 1991).”
The husband argues on appeal that the trial court‘s more restricted visitation schedule is unsupported by the evidеnce presented. He asserts that the record contains no allegations that he had endangered the child; that the wife did not request restrictions on his visitation with the child; and that, although his work schedule had previously interfered with his ability to visit the child, he had obtained employment that allowed him to visit the child more often. We note that, at the October 23, 2025, trial, the trial court took notice of thе testimony and other evidence that had been presented at the pendente lite hearing, without objection by the husband. A transcript of that hearing does not appear in the record on
The husband‘s son from a previous relationship testified that he had worked a long-haul trucking job with the husband from January 2025 until the beginning of May 2025. The husband testified that he had continued working for the company where he had worked with his son until September 2025 but that he was going to begin a new job at a different trucking company on the Monday after the October 23, 2025, trial. He stated that he would work Monday through Friday of each week
“When a trial court hears ore tenus testimony, this court will presume on appeal that the trial court‘s findings on disputed facts are correct, and we will not reverse its judgment based on those findings unless the judgment is palpably erroneous or manifestly unjust.” Crenshaw v. Crenshaw, 386 So. 3d 42, 51 (Ala. Civ. App. 2023). The evidence presented indicates that, for a year following the trial, the husband will be driving from Mobile to Chicago and back on “short hauls”
Conclusion
The trial court‘s judgment is reversed insofar as it awarded the wife periodic alimony, and we remand the case to the trial court for it to enter a new judgment that complies with
AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.
Moore, P.J., and Edwards, Hanson, and Bowden, JJ., concur.