Facts
- Mason Herndon was a tenant at a property leased by Ambassador Investment Properties, which allegedly provided defective smoke alarms and unsuitable electrical appliances leading to a fatal fire. [lines="40-49"].
- The Herndons filed a wrongful death action against Ambassador, asserting it had a duty to ensure the property was safe according to the Virginia Residential Landlord and Tenant Act (VRLTA). [lines="50-52"].
- The trial court initially sustained Ambassador's demurrer but allowed the Herndons to amend their complaint. [lines="55-56"].
- The amended complaint reiterated claims of wrongful death and sought recovery for unpaid rent and damages to personal property under the VRLTA. [lines="60-68"].
- The trial court ultimately dismissed the complaint with prejudice, ruling the Herndons failed to state valid claims. [lines="65-68"].
Issues
- Did Ambassador have a duty to repair the electrical system and smoke alarm defects that contributed to Mason's death under the common law and the VRLTA? [lines="86-88"].
- Did the amended complaint sufficiently allege a basis for recovering rent paid by Mason? [lines="133-135"].
Holdings
- The court held that the common law does not impose a duty on landlords to maintain or repair properties once control has been transferred to tenants, and the VRLTA does not eliminate this rule. Thus, no duty of care was owed by Ambassador. [lines="86-128"].
- The court found the amended complaint failed to allege necessary facts to recover rent, specifically not demonstrating compliance with statutory requirements regarding notice of termination. [lines="153-166"].
OPINION
Case Information
*1 Before: WARDLAW, BADE, and H.A. THOMAS, Circuit Judges.
Jared J. Bailey appeals pro se from the district court’s order dismissing his action alleging federal and state law claims relating to his arrest and criminal *2 prosecution. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Puri v. Khalsa , 844 F.3d 1152, 1157 (9th Cir. 2017). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Bailey’s action because Bailey failed to allege facts sufficient to state any plausible claim. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (to avoid dismissal, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors , 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001) (courts are not required to accept as true allegations that “contradict matters properly subject to judicial notice or by exhibit” or allegations that are “merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences”).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying further leave to amend because amendment would have been futile. See Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. , 656 F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011) (setting forth standard of review and explaining that leave to amend may be denied when amendment would be futile); Metzler Inv. GMBH v. Corinthian Colls., Inc. , 540 F.3d 1049, 1072 (9th Cir. 2008) (explaining that “the district court’s discretion to deny leave to amend is particularly broad where plaintiff has previously amended the complaint” (citation *3 and internal quotation marks omitted)).
We reject as meritless Bailey’s contention that he was entitled to a default judgment.
We do not consider arguments and allegations raised for the first time on appeal. See Padgett v. Wright , 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
AFFIRMED.
[*] This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
[**] The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).