OPINION
{1} This case presents the issue of whether the statute of limitations on filing a claim under the Medical Malpractice Act (the Act), NMSA 1978, § 41-5-13 (1976), violates the due process rights of a minor who would be required to file a malpractice claim by age nine under its terms. Because of our cases that have held that the notice provision and the statute of limitations of the Tort Claims Act violate due process in similar circumstances, we hold that the Act’s statute of limitations also violates the due process rights of minors falling under this provision. Acсordingly, we reverse and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
{2} Because this case arises from the grant of a motion to dismiss, we take the well-pleaded facts stated in the complaint to be true. Valles v. Silverman,
{3} On August 27, 1999, Lisa Jaramillo (Plaintiff) filed suit as Child’s next friend, alleging that Defendant was negligent in discontinuing the phenobarbital and not prescribing an alternative anti-seizure medication despite his knowledge of Child’s disorder. Defendant moved to dismiss on statute of limitatiоns grounds, and the district court granted this motion. Plaintiff appealed.
{4} Plaintiff had also filed a separate suit against UNMH in April 1999, which the district court had dismissed on statute of limitations grounds under the Tort Claims Act. See Jaramillo v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of N.M. Health & Scis. Ctr.,
{5} We certified the appeal in the present case to our Supreme Court so it could be considered in conjunction with Jaramillo I. Athough our Supreme Court originally accepted certification in June 2001, the Court quashed certification and remanded the case back to this Court in June 2004 when it quashed certiorari in Jaramillo I. Both parties and Amici Curiae New Mexico Trial Lawyers Association, New Mexico Defense Lawyers Association, and New Mexico Medical Society filed briefs in either this Court or the Supreme Court. We have considered the briefs, as well as the post-mandate filings and the argument heard in the Supreme Court, and we now proceed to review the merits of the case.
DISCUSSION
{6} This ease presents only one question: does the Act’s statute of limitations violate Child’s constitutional rights? We review this legal question de novo. Fernandez v. Walgreen Hastings Co.,
{7} Section 41-5-13 states:
No claim for malpractice arising out of an act of malpractice which occurred subsequent to the effective date of the Medical Malpractice Act [this article] may be brought agаinst a health care provider unless filed within three years after the date that the act of malpractice occurred except that a minor under the full age of six years shall have until his ninth birthday in which to file. This subsection [section] applies to all persons regardless of minority or other legal disability.
Plaintiff argues that this provision violates Child’s due process rights because it is unreasonable to require a minor to bring a claim on his or her own behalf at age nine. We agree.
{8} We begin with the notion that “considerations of fairness imрlicit in the Due Process Clauses of the United States and New Mexico Constitutions dictate that when the [Legislature enacts a limitations period it must allow a reasonable time within which existing or accruing causes of action may be brought.” Garcia v. La Farge,
{9} We have developed the concept of reasonableness in the context of minors’ claims by lоoking more broadly at the barriers that all minors face. In Rider v. Albuquerque Public Schools,
{10} Defendant seeks to distinguish other due process cases on a number of grounds. First, Defendant argues that the Act’s provision is different because it specifically contemplates the statute of limitations for minors, unlike the notice provision in Rider. However, thе statute of limitations of the Tort Claims Act, which we said violated the reasonableness requirement as applied to minors in Jaramillo I, id., also contained a provision identical to that in the Act, stating, “This subsection applies to all persons regardless of minority оr other legal disability.” NMSA 1978, § 41-4-15 (1977). This type of provision does not foreclose constitutional challenges to the Act. Furthermore, the holding in Rider was not limited to grandparents, as its language clearly instructs. Rider,
{11} Defendant also argues that we cannot hold that the time frame for allowing minors to bring suit under the Act is unreasonable because our courts have already held that the Aсt’s statute of limitations is not unreasonable in the ease of Cummings v. X-Ray Associates of New Mexico, P.C., 1996— NMSC-035, ¶ 39,
{12} Next, Defendant argues that the Act is unique in that Section 41-5-13 is a statute of repose rather than a statute of limitations. This alone is not dispositive, as we have noted that “due process problems may arise when an otherwise valid statute of repose leaves an unreasonably short period of time for certain victims to pursue them legal claims.” Rider,
{13} However, there are also important policy objectives underlying our holdings that certain notice provisions and statutes of limitation violate minors’ due process rights. As we have noted in past cases, we have a “long tradition of interpreting laws carefully to safeguard minors.” Rider,
{14} Defendant also argues that parents and custodians have a duty to file suit on behalf of their children when malpractice occurs. The fact that the Legislature has not affirmatively acted to impose a parental or custodial duty to bring a cause of action for a minor, which we noted in Rider, 1996— NMCA-090, ¶ 5, continues to be true. Recоgnizing that Rider, id. ¶¶ 10-14, already rejected the notion that legislative silence does not imply a parental or custodial duty to bring actions for minors, Defendant instead argues that we can infer such a duty from a patchwork of statutes that impose other duties on parеnts and custodians.
{15} Perhaps closest in nature to the duty that Defendant contemplates is a statute imposing a duty on a guardian to protect the property of a minor ward. NMSA 1978, § 45-5-209 (1995). However, that statute deals specifically with the powers and responsibility of an аppointed guardian under the Probate Code. Because no such situation exists here, we do not decide the question of whether that statute imposes a duty on a guardian appointed pursuant to the Probate Code to bring a cause of action on behalf of his or her ward.
{16} Rule 1-017 NMRA also does not impose a duty on a parent to bring a cause of action on behalf of a minor child. Rule 1-017(C) reads in pertinent part:
C. Infants or Incompetent Persons. When an infant or incompetent person has a representative, such as a general guardian, or other like fiduciary, the representative may sue or defend on behalf of the infant or incompetent person. An infant or incompetent person who does not have a duly appointed representative may sue by next friend or by a guardian ad litem.
This rule permits a parent to bring a cause of action on behalf of a minor child, but does not require it. See Montano v. Los Alamos County,
{17} Defendant also urges us to imply that a parent has a duty to pursue a cause of action on behalf of his or her minor child from the existence of statutes that impose other types of duties on parents. We fail to see how statutes or ease law imposing duties on parents to ensure school attendance or to provide child support relate to a parent’s responsibilities in conjunction with filing a medical malpractice cause of action. See NMSA 1978, § 22-12-2(C) (2001) (making a pаrent, guardian, or custodian of a school-age child responsible for that child’s school attendance); Quintana v. Quintana,
{18} Furthermore, our existing law on this subject already takes the possibility of a parental or сustodial duty into account. Just as in cases involving the statute of limitations of the Tort Claims Act, if a Defendant can show from the circumstances of the case that “someone on the child’s behalf should have filed suit under the circumstances,” then a defendant may be ablе to argue that the child cannot assert due process rights to avoid the limitation of Section 41-5-13. Jaramillo I,
{19} In summary, we hold that under the circumstances of this case, the provision in Section 41-5-13 that requires a minor who experienced malpractice before the age of six to bring a claim under the Act by his or her ninth birthday violates due process. Because this issue alone disposes of the appeal, we do not address the parties’ equal protection arguments.
CONCLUSION
{20} We reverse the district court’s grant of Defendant’s motion to dismiss, and we remand to the district court for further proceedings.
{21} IT IS SO ORDERED.