25 F. 503 | S.D.N.Y. | 1885
The libelant shipped on board the schooner W. L. White for Havana and back, as seaman, for wages at the rate of $16 per month. lie served on board from December 8, 1884, to the twer.oyeighth of January, 1885, on which day, having received a hurt while in the service of the ship at Havana, he was sent to the hospital. Upon the application of the master to the United Stales consul at that port, the seaman was on the same day discharged, under section 4583 of the Devised Statutes, as amended by section 3 of the act of June 26, 1884, c. 121, known as the “Dingley Bill.” The consul collected at the time one month’s extra wages from the ship, and the arrears of wages due the seaman, $25.73, making together $41.73.
It is doubtful whether any additional authority is conferred upon consular officers by the third section of the act of June 26, 1884, known as the “Dingley Act.” The third clause of that section declares that “whenever a seaman is discharged by a consular officer in consequence of any injury received in the service of the vessel, such eon'sular officer shall require the payment by the master of one month’s extra wages over and above the wages due at the time of the discharge.” By the maritime law, a seaman hurt in the service of the ship is entitled to wages to the end of the voyage, and also to the expenses of his cure, so far as cure is possible. . If this seaman had come home in the ship he might have been discharged at the end of the voyage, so far as the payment of wages was concerned; but that discharge would not have operated to-absolve the ship from her obligations to him, under the maritime law, to pay for all the additional expenses of his medical treatment and cure, within a reasonable time afterwards. This was expressly adjudicated by Story, J., in Reed v. Canfield, 1 Sum. 195, 197. See Brown v. Overton, 1 Spr. 462; The Laura, 2 Sawy. 245; The City of Alexandria, 17 Fed. Rep. 390, 393; The Centennial, 10 Fed. Rep. 397; Croucher v. Oakman, 3 Allen, 185; Couch v. Steel, 3 El. & Bl. 402; The Enchantress, 1 Hagg. 395. But even if the discharge were held authorized by the language of section 3 of the act of June 26, 1884, above quoted, the act does not .specify the consequences of such a discharge. It requires the payment of only one month’s extra wages. This, in fact, corresponded with the precise time within which the voyage was afterwards completed. The discharge, if authorized, would doubtless bar all claims for wages subsequent; and the “discharge” would itself imply that result.
By section 4552, the legal effects of a discharge by a shipping commissioner at the end of the voyage are stated in detail. The second section declares that it “shall operate as a mutual discharge and settlement of all demands for wages between the parties thereto on account of wages, in respect of the past voyage or engagement.” A discharge by the 'foreign consul should have the same effect and no more. Section 4552 does not absolve the vessel from liability for
The words “other necessaries,” though literally broad enough to cover expenses of cure in the ease of a .previous hurt, are equally applicable to the ordinary expenses of a seaman who is uninjured and well, and has no such special claim against the ship. There is nothing in the act of June 26, 1884, intimating any intent to absolve the ship from her legal obligations to an injured or sick seaman, beyond, possibly, the wages to the end of the voyage that might otherwise have been recovered, instead of one month’s extra pay after discharge. Section 4600, as amended by the same act, provides that the consular officer, in case of apprehension of a seaman deserting on account of “unusual or cruel treatment, shall discharge himrequiring payment •of one month’s extra pay. It is impossible to suppose that congress intended that one month’s wages Should be taken as a satisfaction of whatever claim to damages might exist for any actual injuries inflicted by such cruelty, or as a bar to such a claim. The “discharge” must be deemed to leave such claims unaffected. The words “other necessaries,” in section 4581, aro in my judgment to be held to refer to the ordinary expenses of a well seaman who has no special claim against the ship on account of previous sickness or injury. Where these claims exist for the seaman’s subsequent treatment, although in one sense they are incurred by the seaman, yet they are in! law really incurred on account of the ship, because she is already liable for them. Callon v. Williams, 2 Low. 1. If vessels could in this way relieve themselves from all charges for treatment of sick or wounded seamen, it would be an extreme hardship upon seamen, and would be liable to lead to abuses. The effect in this instance has been to deprive the seaman of the entire fruits of the voyage.
There being no dispute as to the facts, the form of the libel should be deemed amended to correspond with the proof, and a decree allowed for $41.73, with costs.