Jansen v. PEOPLES ELEC. CO., INC.
317 N.W.2d 879
Minn.
1982
Check Treatment

*1 Felhaber, Larson, & Vоgt Fenlon and Dawson, JANSEN, Relator, Minneapolis, Peoples James M. for John R. Elec. Inc. Gen., Volz, Spannaus, Atty. Warren Joan COMPANY, ELECTRIC PEOPLES Gen., Sp. Atty. Andrews, Asst. and Peter C. INC., Respondent, Paul, for Dept, St. Minnesota Security. Commissioner of Economic

Security, Respondent. 81-574.

No.

Supreme Court of Minnesota. SIMONETT, Justice.

April bumped An who was from his

job by seniority provision reason of the bargaining his collective agreement seeks rеview of a denial of com- pensation Finding legis- lature has chosen not to discard the “con- rule, voluntary quit” structive we affirm. Jansen, Relator John R. a member Electrical Workers Union Local employed year for by respondent about a Peoples Company, Electric Inc. Under the contract, union probationary, Jansen was a nonseniority employee, yet since he had not 1,800 worked the passed hours nor the ex- required seniority. amination Janu- On ary 28,1981, “bumped” Jansen was from his replaced by and another union electri- cian, seniority a man with had lost his job with electrical cover- another contractor by agree- ed the same collective replace- parties agree ment. Both required agreement. ment was by and willing Jansen was able to continue termination, time work there no reduction the number of Peoples electricians at as a result of Electric being Jansen’s terminated. The рrovision of his union’s contract was the sole cause of Jansen’s termination. Bene- fits were awarded by deputy; claims Appeal the award was reversed Tri- bunal, and af- this denial benefits was firmed representa- the commissioner's tive. Jansen now seeks review here. 1(1) (1980), dis- qualifies when voluntarily individual without “[t]he employer” cause attributable to the Noonan, Paul, James C. St. for relator. discontinues his or her *2 880 (1951); Co., words, 47 N.W.2d 449 tor

other when a termination is volun- Minn. Corp., 244 tary, LaGrange v. Shoe only benefits are awarded when the Johnson (1955). response In 70 N.W.2d 335 employee “good resign cause” to due to however, benefits, judicial of part on the limitation еmployer. some conduct of the passed statutory amend- keeping purpose This is in with a basic unem- deny anyone providing “any that individual statute to benefits ployed as a of a ‍‌‌​​‌​‌​​​‌​​‌‌‌‌​​​​​‌‌​‌‌​​‌​‌‌​​‌‌​‌‌​​​​‌​​‌‍uniform vacation whose termination was volitional and not a result volun- beyond result of shutdown shall not be deemed to be circumstances his control. 268.04, Corp., tarily unemployed.” v. Fiberite 269 N.W.2d Minn.Stat. § Christensen (Minn.1978). 20 subd. 23 Later, of an Corp.,

In Amusement 254 we held that termination Anson v. Fisher (1958), collectively bargained due to a employee Minn. 93 N.W.2d 815 a movie con- mandatory plan projectionist who was a member of a nonlo- retirement should voluntary Bergseth job cal union lost his to a of the sidered a termination. member Co., Minn. 89 Baking local union with status. v. Zinsmaster 252 On later, facts, years 20 nearly ap- Nearly identical to those on this N.W.2d 172 benefits, by we peal, holding denied that since this decision was agent the union was in effect to section employee employee’s l(2)(d), disqualification from stating termination would that voluntary. explained: be construed as benefits should result from forced not retirement. Whether the from em- ployment voluntary involuntary is the or v. Electric In Collins Stawikowski act of the employee by is determined not (Minn. N.W.2d 390 Construction the immediate cause or motive for the act 1979), employеe his as an elec lost by employee directly whether the or seniority provisions trician because indirectly exercised a free-will choice and contract. court followed An- nonper- control as to the or employee son and denied benefits. The formance act. If the act of em- time, working apprentice as an at the ployment separation performed by legislature responded by to this conflict will, directly him of his own free or indi- leaving the broad constructive rectly by vesting his act of in another quit rule untouched but added an amend discretionary authority to act in his be- 24, 1979, allowing ment on March half, the resulting ultimate act is a volun- instances where the em those narrow tary disqualifies one which him for com- due ployee separated employment “is pensation. This is likewise true when an completion apprenticeship pro of an * * directly acts in obedience to a gram, segmеnt thereof Minn. which, representative by control his own l(2)(f) (1980). Stat. choice, he has vested in another as his In the interaction between this agent. court’s legislative decisions and amend Minn, (emphasis N.W.2d at complicated. ments became more Two added). challenged cases arose which the construc dоctrine of “constructive tive v. Le rule. In Loftis quit,” first enunciated the court in An- gionville Safety Patrol son, complex then, has history had a since Center, Inc., (Minn.1980), 297 N.W.2d 237 both in terms of the decisions of this court tempo had been for a hired legislature’s reaction. position only, rary for 11 weeks. Com cases, In two earlier Minnesotа exam- Department missioner of the ple, benefits were denied employees Security 297 N.W.2d 239 were put out of work a vacation terminated shut- were approved down or required by their union. civil service ex they because failed to Minneapolis-Honeywell Regula- Jackson v. em- required aminations fоr their continued held, sider ployment. statutory changes In both eases we on the definition ‍‌‌​​‌​‌​​​‌​​‌‌‌‌​​​​​‌‌​‌‌​​‌​‌‌​​‌‌​‌‌​​​​‌​​‌‍rehearing, terminations were employ- discontinuance of thus voluntary and we awarded provisions governing ment and employer opinions time Between the our contributions, confident its resolu- were filed and new were issued on tion will serve the best interests rehearing, again amended public. *3 statute, again did so a piecemeal, on 289 N.W.2d at 395. The narrow basis. 1980 amendments sim- response request legisla- In to this provided ply that “a from em- to statutory changes, ture consider leg- ployment by its reason of temporary nature islature has chosen to repeal the Anson or for to a or inability test for inability rule; instead, legislature has so far left to meet standards” would not in general application rule intact voluntary quit. be deemed a Section 268.- only application and has modified its in 09, But, 1(1). before, subd. as the broader narrow, carefully specified situations. quit constructive voluntary rule of Anson context, we do we not think should was left intact.1 statutory interpretation overrule a that the The strongly Anson rule has been criti- legislature has chosen not to overrule. See, e.g., Campbell cized. Soup Co. v. The of facts this case cannot be distin- Review, 431, Board of 13 N.J. 100 A.2d 287 guished from Anson itself. Thus we con- (1953); v. Unemployment Compen- Warner clude we must affirm the decision Review, sation Board of 396 Pa. 153 representative. commissioner’s (1959); Annotation, A.2d 906 Termination Affirmed. Employment as a result of union action pursuant or to union contract as “volun- SCOTT, (dissenting). Justice tary” for purposes unemployment com- respectfully I We should reverse dissent. benefits, pensation 90 A.L.R.2d compensation the denial of unemployment (1963); Note, 64 Minn.L.Rev. 1243 and, long, benefits because of its arduous We have noted these criticisms our history, agree volun- that the “constructive hand, recent decisions. On the other we tary quit” rule v. of Anson Fisher Amuse- have also noted our statute as construed by Corр., 93 N.W.2d 815 long Anson has been in force. “When a (1958), legal gasp. has had its last Our 1980 court of last resort has construed the lan- Legionville in Loftis v. School law, guage a legislature in subse- Center, Inc., Safety Training Patrol quent subject laws on the same intends the (Minn.1980), N.W.2d 237 and Commissioner same placed construction to be upon such Depаrtment Security v. language.” 645.17, Minn.Stat. subd. 4 § (Minn.1980), 297 N.W.2d 239 (1980). Consequently, in Stawikowski we clearly express ‍‌‌​​‌​‌​​​‌​​‌‌‌‌​​​​​‌‌​‌‌​​‌​‌‌​​‌‌​‌‌​​​​‌​​‌‍our intention that Anson be said: overruled.

When a longstanding judicial decision deeply out, rooted in social majority and economic con- opinion points As the clearly siderations is not wrong, quit” we be- doctrine of “constructive proper lieve statute, our role is to entirely judicial outline By the was a creation. problem, judicial view, articulate the an employee disqualified receiving refer the matter to the legislature. if unemployment compensation therefore exhort employee to con- “voluntarily and without Lеgionville only language addressing 1. Relator cites in Loftis v. The 1980 amendment was our Safety Center, Inc., opinions. Patrol Loftis Duluth may N.W.2d nn. 1 & 3 While some of the rationale behind Anson questioned Anson was the 1980 have amendments, limited been 1(1), § Minn.Stat. do we not think it can be said the Minn.Laws, ch. 9. We think this overruled Anson. language broadly. Loñis states casе too ing grounds, the case on other Hanson employer” discon- cause attributable to Co., 308 Properties Management tinues his or her I.D.S. 1(1) legislature, (1976), The we ex- Minn. 242 N.W.2d 833 however, “voluntary.” has not defined pressed following: employee for the illustrated Counsel court, Anson, judicially used the argument principal problem well at oral a created doctrine of “constructive statutory with scheme un- Anson. quit” to hold that an is deemed to compensation voluntarily quit derlying when employment have Anson, sign in fact he has not done so. In as in tends to force an individual us, case where the job, before union to take an available contract accepted the voluntarily employment as him benefits he is then denies when governed by bargain- the union’s collective theory “bumped” on that he voluntar- ing agreement, the termination deemed ily consented to termination. “bumped” by when he was *4 425, 242 at Id. at N.W.2d 835. rules, though even the the legislature recognizеd The has also job give up did not want to and had no in which inequities Every of the rule. case choice the matter. applied this court has the vol- constructive This contrary policy rule is under- untary quit disqualify rule of Anson to oth- lying unemployment compensation stat- eligible erwise been overruled claimants has public policy utes. The declaration by legislative action. “unemployment section 268.03 stresses that ‍‌‌​​‌​‌​​​‌​​‌‌‌‌​​​​​‌‌​‌‌​​‌​‌‌​​‌‌​‌‌​​​​‌​​‌‍began The most recent interaction with reserves to be used for the benefit of [are] v. Collins Electric Stawikowski Construc persons unemployed through no fault of Co., tion N.W.2d (1980). their own.” Minn.Stat. 268.03 A which this court considered the voluntаri position more consistent with this stated resulting ness of a termination from a se policy expressed is that in the leading case niority provision in a collective Campbell Review, Soup Co. v. Board of agreement. equities We concluded that the 13 N.J. 100 A.2d 287 In that favored an award of benefits: Brennan, case Justiсe then a member of the department court, Security] Economic Jersey New developed [of a test based reversed, urges prior that our decisions upon be employee’s situation at the time of test, that the constructive termina- the termination. Under this a termi- repudiated, tion rule and test voluntary only nation is “where that the the decision go lay whether to or to for voluntariness enunciated in the stay at the time Campbell Soup with the adopted. worker alone.” Id. at case be We ful- ly agree A.2d at underlying purpose 289. that the and objective unemployment compen- of our The only sense in which relator can be sation statute would be better served unemployed said to be because of his own applying the test advocated claimants fault is that he took a in a field with a * * department *.” seniority system already intact which he could foresee would lead to his at being unem- Id. nevertheless denied benе- ployed fits, if the electrical trade ever enjoyed with an exhortation to the less than full statutory changes should not to consider in the defini- make his eventual termination voluntary so tion of voluntary. Id. at 395.

as to deny unemployment him filed, the opinion Even before previously

We have recognized ineq- speсific addressed fact situa- uities in the constructive tion of Stawikowski and enacted an amend- rule as enunciated in Anson.1 allowing While decid- benefits to be Legionville Safety (Minn. 1. Loftis v. Construction Patrol 289 N.W.2d Inc., Center, 1979). 297 N.W.2d 238-39 (Minn. 1980); Stawikowski v. Collins Electric unem- amendments is to overrule Anson5 and paid to an individual became longer that Anson is no viable.6 completion appren- ployed due to the of an ticeship program.2 Stawikowski was thus Respondent Peoples Electric contends legislatively opin- at the time legislature, by failing to enact ion was filed. overruling specifically the con- rule, quit structive has intended petitions granted Thе court then applicable to reaffirm the Anson rule. The City Loftis rehear and whose construction,7 however, requires pre- rule of opinions denying in situa- initial cisely opposite conclusion. Our most involving temporary employment tions quit recent construction termination civil service were statute in Loftis аnd of Duluth states simultaneously filed with Stawikowski.3 though rule is the Anson dead. Even rehearings pending, While these were differ, may vitality the facts is of Anson legislature added the second sentence to the fully by the in Loftis undermined decisions “voluntary negate definition of leave”4 to inaction, By legis- of Duluth. impact decision any de- adopted presumed lature is have nying benefits. The section now reads as construction. follows: to benefits Relator also entitled be- Voluntary The individual volun- leave. good cause he was terminated for cause tarily and without cause attributa- attributable, part, employ- least to-the ble to the employer discontinued his em- 1(1) er. ployment with employer. such For the Relator not choose of his own volition to did *5 clause, purpose of this a Peoples ‍‌‌​​‌​‌​​​‌​​‌‌‌‌​​​​​‌‌​‌‌​​‌​‌‌​​‌‌​‌‌​​​​‌​​‌‍leave Electric. He left because he

employment by temporary reason of its comply had no with the alternative to inability nature or for to a test seniority system in effect. That system bargain- inability for meet was the result of collective stan- bargaining ing the union between necessary dards for continuation of em- representative employer, of the Paul St. ployment not be voluntary. shall deemed Chapter of the National Electrical Contrac- 1(1) (1980). Minn.Stat. § (NECA). suggest tors To Association Upon rehearing, the original opinions in Peoples Electric does not benefit Loftis and of Duluth were withdrawn proc- bargaining outcome of this collective voluntary quit constructive rule of ess, employees, ignore as well as is to applied employees. Anson was not tо these process. It is .realities Their termination was deemed volun- say employer is more reasonable to that an awarded, tary and benefits were even equally responsible outcome of in- for the Anson, though, as in dustry-wide bargaining. collective When accepted knowing work it was of a limited industry economy hires or fires as the or limitable opinions specifi- duration. The falls, rises and is that the costs theory cally places state in four employer the effect of will balance out on an 24, 1979, nn.l, May 5. 297 at 2. Act ch. 238 & 3. § Minn.Laws codified at Minn.Stat. l(2)(f)(1980). § at 241 n.l. 6. 297 petition rehearing 3. No Stawi- filed for 645.- The rule found ; presumably kowski it was considered unnec- 17(4)(1980): essary legislative because of favorable action. When a court of last resort has construed law, language sub- 7, 1980, April 4. Act ch. subject sequent on the same matter laws Laws 479. The effective date for that placed construction intends same 27, 1979, particular provision July the date languagе. upon such Loñis and of Duluth were filed. YETKA, industry-wide period (dissenting). basis over the Justice contract. join I Justice the dissent of Scott.

Because the constructive WAHL, (dissenting). Loftis, Justice rule has been abolished since because relator is entitled to benefits under join I of Justice the dissent Scott. statute, I would reverse the denial

TODD, Justice (dissenting). join

I in the dissent of Justice Scott.