The opinion of the court was delivered by
This is аn appeal from an order of the district court which changed the custody of a child from its mother to its father.
It appears that on August 26,1939, the pаrties to this action were divorced, and the custody of their only child, William Leroy Janney, then eight years old, was awarded to the plaintiff mother. By the tеrms of that decree the father was given the right to visit the child at reasonable times, and “to take said child with him during vacations and over week-ends at rеasonable times and intervals, and for reasonable lengths of time.” The dеcree further provided that the father should furnish all clothing, books and medical attention for the child, and pay to plaintiff $20 per month for his suppоrt.
It also appears that following the rendition of the foregoing decree in 1939, while the child was in the actual as well as the legal custody of thе mother, he did not do well in school; and gradually,
Sometime in 1943, on an intimation that plaintiff planned to take the boy to Oklahoma the father filed a motion in the district court which had rendered the divorce decree in 1939, praying for an order conferring his son’s custody on him.
On June 25, 1943, this mоtion was heard. Each party produced several witnesses who testified in the case, as likewise did the plaintiff and defendant personally.
The trial court found that both parents had remarried, and—
“That the minor child, William Leroy Janney, has actually been in the custody of the defendant, Roy W. Janney, for a period of approximately three yeаrs, except while visiting with the plaintiff during school holidays; that said child was in custody of plaintiff on August 26, 1939.
“That said minor child should continue in the custody of the defendant subjеct to the right of the plaintiff to visit with him at reasonable times.”
The court’s order and judgment was in accordance with the quoted finding. This order made generous provision for the mother and child to visit each other, and that the child should make an annual visit of two months to his mother, and that his father should pay the mоther $30 toward the support of the child for each of such two months’ periods. These and other details of the order need no present attention.
The one matter which is complained of is the principal feаture of the order- — changing the legal custody of the child. Counsel for appellant asserts that he “relies on the record” to show that the presiding judge “absolutely abused his discretion” in changing the custody of the child.
This court hаs studiously perused the record, and we are constrained to hold that thеre is not the slightest basis for such an assertion. Quite the contrary. And without recapitulating the evidence which induced the court to reach its judgment, we think it was sufficient to justify the order changing the custody of the child, and can discern nоthing in the record which would permit this court to interfere. We need scarсely repeat the elementary rule that when parents are divorсed, the welfare of their children becomes the grave responsibility of the trial court. If a child is of tender age, almost
The judgment is affirmed.
