60 Wash. 591 | Wash. | 1910
This controversy was commenced by the defendant, attempting to foreclose, by notice and sale, a chattel mortgage upon certain rooming house furniture belonging to the plaintiff. Thereupon the plaintiff commenced this action resulting in the foreclosure proceedings being transferred to the superior court under Rem. & Bal. Code, § 1110. The mortgage was given by the plaintiff to secure the sum of $110, balance of the purchase price of the furniture sold by the defendant to the plaintiff. The plaintiff seeks to recover $410 damages alleged to have resulted to her from false representations made in connection with the sale by the defendant, to have such damages offset against the balance of the purchase price secured by the mortgage, and to have judgment for the excess. A trial resulted in the court’s denying the foreclosure of the mortgage, and rendering judgment against the defendant in the plaintiff’s favor in the sum of $200. The defendant has appealed.
At the time of the sale, appellant stated to respondent, in substance, that respondent could get a lease of the place for two or three years; that the agent for the building was a Mr. Russell, in Seattle, but that he had no other authority than merely to collect the rent; that there was no use to go and see him except only to pay the rent; that the landlord was away in Alaska; that appellant was certain that if respondent would purchase the furniture she could remain there as a tenant as long as the house remained there, which would be not less than two years, probably three years; that appellant had positive information from the landlord that the building would remain there at least two years, and would not be torn down; and that during the period that the building was there the landlord would permit her to continue the business there.
In addition to the contention of learned counsel for appellant that the evidence does not establish the facts as above related, which need not be further noticed, it is further contended that the representations, even if false, “would only be a representation of somebody else’s statements, known to be such by the plaintiff, and she had no right to rely upon them.” We think the representations amounted to more than this. If appellant had merely told respondent what the landlord had said about allowing the house to remain and the tenancy to continue, and nothing more, there might be some merit in counsel’s contention. Appellant did not stop there, but took particular pains to say to respondent that she was certain appellant could remain there for two years or more; and then, evidently for the very purpose of inducing respondent to make no further inquiry, appellant informed respondent that the landlord was away in Alaska and there was no use of seeing the agent as he had no authority other than to collect the rent. We think this presents a different question from those decided in English v. Grinstead, 12 Wash. 670, 42 Pac. 121, and Walsh v. Bushell, 26 Wash. 576, 67 Pac. 216, cited by appellant’s counsel.
It is pointed out that respondent knew that the tenancy was only from month to month, and could be terminated by the landlord at the end of any month. In other words, that, even if the representation had been made by the landlord direct
The judgment is affirmed.
Rudkin, C. J., Mount, Fullerton, and Gose, JJ., concur.