Gust Marion JANIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. John ASHCROFT, Attorney General; Al Herrera, Warden, U.S. Penitentiary, Lompoc, CA; Kathleen Hawk, Director, Bureau of Prisons; David Woody; Victor A. Flores; Federal Bureau of Prisons, Defendants-Appellees.
No. 02-6506.
United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.
Submitted: Sept. 18, 2003. Decided and Filed: Nov. 5, 2003.
491
ALJ did not apply this provision. Here, the difference between the amount awarded and the amount tendered equals future medical costs for psychiatric care, plus $736.50 and interest. Yet, the ALJ made no attempt to quantify the award and take it into consideration when determining the amount of the attorney‘s fees award. Given the fact that this limited recovery is the sole basis for recovery of attorney‘s fees under
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the BRB erred by not remanding Davis‘s award of attorney‘s fees to the ALJ for further examination. Thus, we GRANT Avondale‘s petition for review, VACATE the BRB‘s decision, and REMAND for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Before: MARTIN and SUTTON, Circuit Judges; MILLS, District Judge.*
OPINION
BOYCE F. MARTIN, JR., Circuit Judge.
Gust Marion Janis, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals a district court order dismissing his civil complaint filed pursuant to the settlement agreement in Washington v. Reno, Lexington Civil Action Nos. 93-217 and 93-290 (E.D.Ky.), which concerned the propriety of prison telephone system policies. The settlement agreement afforded inmates an opportunity to enforce a specific portion of the agreement within the Eastern District of Kentucky. This case has been referred to a panel of the court pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 34(j)(1). Upon examination, this panel unanimously agrees that oral argument is not needed. See
On April 2, 2001, the defendants implemented new telephone policies which limited all Federal Bureau of Prison inmates to “300 minutes per calendar month for collect-call and/or dial direct telephone calls.” On April 29, 2002, Janis filed a complaint in the Eastern District of Kentucky against United States Attorney General John Ashcroft; Warden Al Herrera, United States Penitentiary—Lompoc, California; Director Kathleen M. Hawk Sawyer, Federal Bureau of Prisons; Chief David Woody, Federal Bureau of Prisons Trust Fund Systems; Inmate Trust Fund Supervisor Victor Flores, United States Penitentiary—Lompoc, California; and the Federal Bureau of Prisons. The complaint alleged that the defendants implemented the new telephone restrictions in retaliation against the inmates for pursuing the Reno litigation. According to Janis, the defendants acted in bad faith and committed a fraud upon the court when they settled the Reno lawsuit, because at the time of the settlement they intended to punish the inmates in the future for having brought the lawsuit. Janis also challenged numerous conditions of his confinement at the United States Penitentiary in Lompoc, California, where he is incarcerated. Janis sought enforcement of the settlement agreement approved in Reno, as well as injunctive, declaratory, and monetary relief.
The district court concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction and dismissed the complaint sua sponte pursuant to
We review de novo a district court‘s dismissal of a complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Friends of Crystal River v. United States Envtl. Prot. Agency, 35 F.3d 1073, 1077-78 (6th Cir.1994).
Upon review, we conclude that the district court improperly dismissed Janis‘s complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Certainly, the district court was correct in concluding that Janis had not sought enforcement of any provision of the settlement agreement and thus, jurisdiction could not be established “under the
However, inasmuch as the district court dismissed Janis‘s complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, but cited venue language in support of its decision, it appears that the district court confused these separate concepts. Janis‘s complaint alleged bad faith on the part of and retaliation by the defendants against him and other inmates because they pursued the Reno litigation. Properly understood, Janis‘s complaint essentially asserted constitutional violations rather than violations of the settlement agreement. We conclude that these allegations were sufficient to invoke federal question jurisdiction pursuant to
While
Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings. Janis‘s motion for a temporary restraining order is denied as it was filed in the first instance with the wrong court.
BOYCE F. MARTIN, JR.
Circuit Judge