delivered the opinion of the Court.
In a series of decisions arising from personal injuries sustained by business invitees on the premises of businesses whose operations involve customer self-service, this Court has recognized a principle known as “mode of operation.”
See Nisivoccia v. Glass Gardens, Inc.,
175
N.J.
559, 563-65,
In this appeal as of right from a judgment in favor of plaintiff Janice J. Prioleau, pursuant to Rule 2:2-l(a)(2), we review the trial court’s application of the mode-of-operation rule to plaintiffs personal injury claim. Plaintiff sustained injuries in a fall as she walked to the restroom in a Kentucky Fried Chicken restaurant. She alleged that she fell either because defendants failed to exercise reasonable care to keep the restaurant floor dry on a rainy evening or because defendants’ employees tracked oil and grease from the restaurant’s kitchen to the area near the restroom.
At trial, although the evidence suggested no nexus between any self-service aspect of the restaurant’s operations and plaintiffs accident, the trial court instructed the jury to consider the mode-of-operation rule. The jury returned a verdict in plaintiffs favor, and defendants appealed. A majority of the Appellate Division reversed, holding that the trial court’s mode-of-operation charge was improper in the circumstances of this case, and remanded for a new trial. A member of the panel concurred in part and dissented in part, finding ample support for the mode-of-operation charge in the testimony presented at trial.
We affirm as modified the judgment of the Appellate Division. The trial record establishes that plaintiffs injuries were unrelated to any aspect of defendants’ business in which the customer foreseeably serves himself or herself, or otherwise directly engages with products or services, unsupervised by an employee. Neither theory of liability advanced by plaintiff involved the limited circumstances in which the mode-of-operation rule has been held to apply. Because the mode-of-operation rule significantly reduced plaintiffs burden of proof, and may have determined the outcome, the trial court’s charge on the rule constituted *250 reversible error. Accordingly, we remand this matter to the trial court for a new trial on the issue of liability.
I.
This appeal arose from a slip-and-fall accident that occurred on December 26, 2009, at a Kentucky Fried Chicken restaurant in Cherry Hill. 1 The restaurant was owned by KFC U.S. Properties Inc., whose parent corporation is Yum! Brands Inc. 2
According to the deposition testimony of Yum! Brands’ Loss Prevention Manager, which was read into the record at trial, the corporation’s policy is that employees are expected to regularly monitor customer areas and to set up safety signs to alert customers in areas where the floors are wet. The Cherry Hill Kentucky Fried Chicken store manager testified that the restaurant did not have a policy to clean the floors “throughout the course of the day,” but that the floors would be cleaned “if there was a spill.” She testified that on rainy days, when customers tracked water into the restaurant, employees would post “wet floor” signs and would use a mop to remove water “if it’s too wet[.]”
The corporate area manager testified that oil was used to cook the food served and that oil sometimes spilled on the kitchen floor. She acknowledged that kitchen employees could “possibly” track cooking oil to customer areas when they used the restrooms. The restaurant’s manager on duty stated that the facility cleaned the floors with color-coded mops, which are used to clean either the kitchen or the customer areas, to prevent the spread of oil from *251 the kitchen to floors used by customers. According to the assistant manager on duty, when she arrived for her shift about four hоurs prior to plaintiffs accident, she did not conduct a detailed inspection of the floor.
On the evening of her accident, plaintiff and her adult son and daughter, Richard Prioleau and Adriana Prioleau, were on a trip from their home in Delaware to New Jersey. The family planned to meet a friend who would then drive plaintiffs son to his destination, New York City. Plaintiff and her children recalled that the weather that evening was rainy; plaintiff stated that there was a “torrential storm.”
At approximately 6:00 p.m., plaintiff and her children decided to stop at the Kentucky Fried Chicken restaurant to have dinner. When plaintiff entered the restaurant, she immediately went to the counter to tell her son what she wanted to eat, and then headed to thе restroom. Plaintiff testified that, because of the heavy rain outside, she and her children “tracked water” into the restaurant.
As she approached the restroom, plaintiff slipped and fell, landing on her buttocks and hands. According to plaintiff, the floor near the restroom felt greasy and wet, and she testified that it was slippery “like I was on ice ... like Ice Capades.” She stated that there were no mats or warning signs in the area where she fell. Plaintiffs son, daughter, and another patron came to plaintiffs aid; plaintiff stated that “they were sliding around, too,” as they tried to lift her to her feet. Plaintiffs children agreed with her that the floor near the restroom at the restaurant was “slippery” and “greasy.”
Significantly, for purposes of this appeal, nothing in the record suggests that when she fell, plaintiff was engaged in, or in contact with, any self-service activity, such as filling a beverage cup at a restaurant soda machine, selecting items from a condiment tray, or that patrons were carrying their drinks or food to the restroom area. Indeed, plaintiffs testimony established that she had not yet ordered or purchased her dinner when her accident occurred. *252 Instead, by her own account, plaintiff fell immediately after entering the restaurant.
According to plaintiff, she was in pain after her fall but did not immediately seek medical attention. Pursuant to corporate policy, the assistant manager on duty apologized to plaintiff and provided free meals to her and her children. The assistant manager testified that, although she observed no liquid on the floor where plaintiff had fallen, she posted a cone by the restroom. Plaintiff and her children left the restaurant and continued their trip to meet their friend.
After returning to Delaware, plaintiff went to the emergency room, and was subsequently examined by her family physician, who referred her to a neurosurgeon. The neurosurgeon prescribed physical therapy. Plaintiff alleged that she experiences constant pain in her lower back and takes pain medication, that she refused treatment involving needles or surgery because she considers it invasive, and that her pain has affected her ability to perform some of the tasks assigned to her at work. 3
Plaintiff filed this action in the Law Division. She asserted a negligence claim and specifically alleged that defendants failed to exercise reasonable care by failing to provide plaintiff, an invitee, with “a safe place to traverse the premises[.]”
The case was tried before a jury over three trial days. At the close of the proofs, defendants moved for a directed verdict, and the trial court denied defendants’ motion.
At the jury charge conference, plaintiffs counsel asserted that, because oil may have been tracked from the restaurant kitchen to the floor near the restroom, plaintiff was entitled to a mode-of-operation jury charge. Plaintiffs counsel defined the mode of operation in this ease as “[t]he fact that there’s grease being used *253 in the operation,” and “[t]he fact that [defendants’ managers] have testified that they should go out and look at and examine the floor all the time or everyday[.]” Over defense counsel’s objection, the trial court agreed to give the mode-of-operation jury charge, stating that “this was a fast food restaurant [with] only six tables, [and] a lot of people in and out on a rainy day.” The court also cited testimony that “they should have a cone out on any rainy day” because the floor would become wet and slippery.
The trial court did not choose one of the alternative model charges on the mode-of-opеration rule set forth in Model Jury Charge (Civil) 5.20F(11), “Notice Not Required When Mode of Operation Creates Danger” (May 1970), 4 but gave both alternatives in sequence. In addition, the trial court separately instructed the jury based on Model Jury Charge (Civil) 5.20F(9), “Notice Not Required When Condition is Caused by Defendant,” which permits a plaintiff to recover without showing that the defendant had actual or constructive notice of the unsafe condition, if the jury finds that the premises “was not in a reasonably safe condition” and “the owner[,] occupier or his/her agent, servant or employee created that condition through his/her own act or omission[.]”
The jury found defendants negligent, without identifying the theory of negligence on which its verdict was based, and concluded that defendants’ negligence was а proximate cause of plaintiffs accident. It allocated 51% of the fault to defendants and 49% to plaintiff, and awarded plaintiff $250,000 in damages. Pursuant to the Comparative Negligence Act, N.J.S.A 2A:15-5.2(d), the trial court molded the verdict to reflect the allocation of fault. It awarded $11,143.09 in prejudgment interest and entered judgment in plaintiffs favor, totaling $138,643.09.
*254
Defendants appealed the trial court’s judgment. A divided Appellate Division panel affirmed the trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion for a directed verdict and declined to review an evidentiary issue regarding plaintiffs prior medical history.
Prioleau v. Ky. Fried, Chicken, Inc.,
434
N.J.Super.
558, 564,
The majority reasoned that “the unifying factor” in case law recognizing the mode-of-operation doctrine “is the negligence [that] results from the business’s method of operation, which is designed to allow patrons to directly handle merchandise or products without intervention from business employees, and entails an expectation of customer carelessness.”
Id.
at 574,
A member of the panel agreed with the majority’s denial of the defendants’ motion for a directed verdict and its view of the evidentiary issue regarding plaintiffs medical records, but disputed the majority’s reversal of the trial court’s determination on the mode-of-operation rule.
Id.
at 588,
Based on the dissenting opinion of the Appellate Division judge regarding the mode-of-operation rule, plaintiff appealed as of right. See R. 2:2-l(a)(2).
II.
Plaintiff argues that the Appellate Division mаjority improperly limited the scope of the mode-of-operation rule. She asserts that application of the rule is not contingent on whether the hazard was created by customer self-service, but hinges on whether the dangerous condition was created by the defendant’s customers or employees and is inherent in the defendant’s business. Plaintiff argues that the use of cooking oil and grease is an integral feature of defendants’ fast-food operation, and that the evidence adduced at trial supported a jury determination that plaintiffs accident occurred because employees tracked oil and grease from the kitchen to the floor near the restroom.
Alternatively, plaintiff argues that even if the trial court erroneously charged the jury to consider the mode-of-operation rule, the jury was properly instructed under Model Jury Charge (Civil) 5.20F(9), supra, an alternative theory of liability that obviates the need to prove actual or constructive notice if the dangerous condition is caused by the defendant. Thus, in plaintiffs view, *256 even if the trial court’s mode-of-operation charge was erroneous, that error was harmless.
Defendants contend that the mode-of-operation rule is irrelevant to this case because the rule applies only to operations arising from self-service aspects of supermarkets or other retail establishments, in which customers’ activities, such as pulling items from shelves and bins, give rise to dangerоus conditions. Defendants assert that the trial court erroneously extended the mode-of-operation rule to virtually all retail establishments. They claim that the trial court’s mode-of-operation instruction was not harmless error because impermissible jury instructions are presumed to be reversible error, and because plaintiff prevailed in this case by the slimmest of margins — an allocation of 51% of the fault to defendants and the remaining 49% to plaintiff.
III.
A.
The sole issue raised by this appeal is whether the trial court’s decision to charge the jury on the mode-of-operation rule constituted reversible error.
“It is fundamental that ‘Appropriate and proper charges to a jury are essential for a fair trial.’ ”
Velazquez ex rel. Velazquez v. Portadin,
163
N.J.
677, 688,
Nonetheless, not every improper jury charge warrants reversal and a new trial. “As a general matter, [appellate courts] will not reverse if an erroneous jury instruction was ‘incapable of producing an unjust result or prejudicing substantial rights.’ ”
Mandal v. PortAuth. of N.Y. & N.J.,
430
N.J.Super.
287, 296,
“Generally, a proprietor’s duty to his invitee is one of due care under all the circumstances.”
Bozza, supra,
42
N.J.
at 359,
The burden imposed on a plaintiff invitee is substantially altered in settings in which the mode-of-operation rule applies. The rule gives rise to a rebuttable inference that the defendant is negligent, and obviates the need for the plaintiff to prove actual or constructive notice.
See Nisivoccia, supra,
175
N.J.
at 563-65, 818 A.2d
314; Wollerman, supra,
47
N.J. at 429, 221
A.2d 513;
Bozza, supra,
42
N.J.
at 359-60,
This Court first addressed the mode-of-operation rule in
Bozza, supra,
42
N.J.
at 359-60,
Two years later, the Court reached a similar conclusion in a ease arising from a plaintiffs fall on a string bean in the produce aisle of a supermarket.
See Wollerman, supra,
47
N.J.
at 428-30,
*259 When greens are sold from open bins on a self-service basis, there is the likelihood that some will fall or be dropped to the floor. If the operator chooses to sell in this way, he must do what is reasonably necessary to protect the customer from the risk of injury that mode of operation is likely to generate; and this whether the risk arises from the act of his employee or of someone else he invites to the premises. The operator’s vigilance must be commensurate with that risk.
[Id at 429,221 A.2d 513 (citing Kahalili v. Rosediff Realty, Inc., 26 N.J. 595, 603,141 A.2d 301 (1958); Ambrose v. Cyphers, 29 N.J. 138, 144,148 A.2d 465 (1959)).]
The Court identified that there were three potential reasons for the plaintiffs aeeident-a store employee’s carelessness in piling and displaying the beans, an employee’s carelessness in handling the beans, and “carelessness of a patron.”
Id.
at 429,
The Court again applied the mode-of-operation rule in a ease arising from a customer’s fall in a grocery store in
Nisivoccia, supra,
175
N.J.
at 561, 563-66,
*260
This Court reversed, holding that the plaintiff was entitled to a mode-of-operation jury instruction.
Id.
at 565-66,
Customers typically unload their carts onto the checkout counter. Droppage and spillage during that process are foreseeable. Indeed, because of the way the grapes were packaged, they could easily have fallen out when accidentally tipped or upended in a shopping cart anywhere in the store. The open and air-vented bаgs invited spillage. It was foreseeable then that loose grapes would fall to the ground near the checkout area, creating a dangerous condition for an unsuspecting customer walking in that area.
[Ibid.]
The Court stated that the mode-of-operation rule applies when, “as a matter of probability, a dangerous condition is likely to occur as the result of the nature of the business, the property’s condition, or a demonstrable pattern of conduct or incidents.”
Id.
at 563,
Thus, in all of its prior mode-of-operation cases, this Court has emphasized the self-service nature of the defendant’s business.
Id.
at 563-66,
Taking a similar approach, the Appellate Division has applied the mode-of-operation rule to cases arising from injuries in both indoor and outdoor areas in which defendants conduct self-service operatiоns.
See Ryder v. Ocean Cnty. Mall,
340
N.J.Super.
504, 507-09,
Moreover, appellate panels have consistently denied plaintiffs’ requests for a mode-of-operation charge in the absence of any nexus between the self-service aspect of defendant’s business and the plaintiffs injury.
See Arroyo, supra,
433
N.J.Super.
at 241, 244,
We derive several principles from these cases. First, the mode-of-operation doctrine has never been expanded beyond the self-service setting, in which customers independently handle merchandise without the assistance of employees or may come into direct contact with product displays, shelving, packaging, and other aspects of the facility that may present a risk.
See Nisivoccia, supra,
175
N.J.
at 563-66,
Second, the rule applies only to accidents occurring in areas affected by the business’s self-service operations, which may extend beyond the produce aisle of supermarkets and other facilities traditionally associated with self-service activities.
See Nisivoccia, supra,
175
N.J.
at 563-65,
*263
Third, the mode-of-operation rule is not limited to cases in which customer negligence created the dangerous condition; it also applies to self-service settings in which the injury may have resulted from the manner in which employees handled the business’s products or equipment, or the inherent qualities of the merchandise itself.
See Nisivoccia, supra,
175
N.J.
at 566,
Fourth, if the mode-of-operation rule applies, it affects the parties’ burdens of proof in two respects. The rule relieves the plaintiff of the burden of proving actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition.
Nisivoccia, supra,
175
N.J.
at 563-64,
*264 Applied here, those principles clearly establish that the trial court did not properly apply the mode-of-operation rule and that the Appellate Division majority correctly stated the scope of the rule. 6 There is no evidence in the trial record that the location in which plaintiffs accident oecurred-the section of the restaurant traversed by plaintiff as she walked from the counter to the restroom-bears the slightest relationship to any self-service component of defendants’ business. Instead, plaintiffs testimony establishes that she walked into the restaurant from the street, briefly stopped at the counter, and then proceeded directly to the bathroom. As described by plaintiff, the accident was unrelated to any self-service component of defendants’ business.
Moreover, neither of plaintiffs theories of liability involves a self-service operation that might warrant a mode-of-operation jury instruction. The theory offered by plaintiff to justify the mode-of-operation charge, that oil and grease are used in cooking at the restaurant and that managers regularly examined the floor, establishes no nexus to customer self-service or related business operations. If the accident occurred because restaurant employees tracked oil and grease from the kitchen to the restroom area, it resulted from the preparation of food in a kitchen area off limits to patrons, a component of the business in which customers played no part. While that evidence might support a finding that a plaintiff need not show actual or constructive notice because the
*265
condition was created by defendant or its employees,
see, e.g., Smith, supra,
94
N.J.Super.
at 464-66,
Nor does plaintiffs alternative theory of negligence that patrons tracked water from the outdoors intо the restaurant on a rainy evening bear any relationship to self-service activities. The potential for customers to track water into a building during inclement weather is not contingent on a defendant’s business model; that risk exists in virtually any facility that admits patrons from public sidewalks or parking areas into its facility. Thus, plaintiffs second theory of negligence does not support the jury charge given by the trial court.
The trial court’s characterization of the “mode of operation” that prompted the jury charge in this case — the fact that there were only six tables in the Kentucky Fried Chicken restaurant, and the presence of many people walking in and out of the restaurant on a rainy night — is similarly unrelated to any self-service method of doing business. Indeed, those features underscore that this case involves an ordinary premises liability negligence claim and is not a mode-of-operation case. Accordingly, the trial court erroneously instructed the jury regarding the mode-of-operation rule.
B.
Plaintiff contends that even if the trial court erred in giving the mode-of-operation charge, the charge was harmless error that does not warrant a new trial. Plaintiffs harmless error argument is premised on the notion that the jury in this case may have based its finding of negligence not on the mode-of-operation rule, but on the different standard that governs cases in which the defendant or its employees caused the dangerous condition. 7 In *266 plaintiffs view, by virtue of this separate charge, the jury had an independent basis on which to find negligence, and the mode-of-operation charge, even if erroneous, may have been irrelevant to the jury’s verdict of liability.
Based on the record at trial, we cannot conclude that the trial court’s error was harmless. It is undisputed that there was no evidence of actual or constructive notice in this case. Accordingly, the jury’s finding of negligence was either premised on the mode-of-operation charge, or on the rule set forth in Model Jury Charge (Civil) 5.20F(9), supra, regarding dangerous conditions caused by the defendant or its employees.
Only one of the plaintiffs two theories of negligence — her contention that defendants’ employees tracked cooking oil and grease from the restaurant’s kitchen to the restroom area— supported a finding that the dangerous condition was created by the defendant or its employees. If the jury concluded that the accident was caused by rain water tracked into the restaurant by a customer, then it could have found liability based only on the mode-of-operation rule. In light of plaintiffs reliance on that theory, the trial court’s erroneous mode-of-operation charge may well have determined the jury’s verdict on the question of liability.
Moreover, the mode-of-operation charge was given twice. The jury was instructed on both of the alternative forms set forth in Model Jury Charge (Civil) 5.20F(11), supra. The mode-of-operation rule was accordingly overеmphasized in the jury instruction as a whole, and the two alternative charges, presented in succession, may have confused the jury.
Because “the jury could have come to a different result had it been correctly instructed,”
Viscik, supra,
173
N.J.
at 18,
IV.
The judgment of the Appellate Division is modified and affirmed, and the matter is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.
For affirmance as modification and remandment — Chief Justice RABNER; and Justices LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, FERNANDEZ-VINA, and SOLOMON and Judge CUFF (temporarily assigned) — 7.
Opposed — None.
Notes
Our summary of the facts is derived from the trial record. The facts are not stipulated; the parties substantially dispute the condition of the restaurant flоor, the cause of plaintiff's accident, and the extent of her injuries.
Defendants assert that the lead defendant named by plaintiff as the owner of the restaurant, Kentucky Fried Chicken, Inc., does not exist. They represent that "Yum! Brands, Inc. is the parent company of KFC U.S. Properties, Inc.; and KFC Corporation is a sister corporation of KFC U.S. Properties, Inc.”
Plaintiff's expert diagnosed a contusion with sprain and strain to the lower back and several bulging and herniated discs, as well as activation of preexisting asymptomatic degenerative changes in the lumbar spine. Defendants did not present expert testimony regarding plaintiff's medical condition.
Since the trial in this case, the mode-of-operation charge has beеn renumbered as Model Jury Charge (Civil) 5.20F(10), "Actual and Constructive Notice Defined" (rev.Dec.2014).
The mode-of-operation charge that has been in use since 1970, Model Jury Charge (Civil) 5.20F(10), supra, neither reflects recent jurisprudence regarding the rule nor clearly explains the purpose and application of the rule. We therefore urge the Model Civil Jury Charge Committee to review the model charge.
We respectfully disagree with the concurring and dissenting Appellate Division judge's view that the mode-of-operation rule applies whenever "there is a 'risk of injury inherent in the nature of the defendant's operation/ ''
Prioleau, supra,
434
N.J.Super.
at 592,
Under the model charge that explains that standard, which was properly given in this case, if the jury finds that premises "was not in a reasonably safe *266 condition and that the owner/occupier or his/her agent, servant or employee created that condition through his/her own act or omission, then” the plaintiff need not demonstrate "actual or constructive notice of the” unsafe condition. Model Jury Charge (Civil) 5.20F(9), supra.
The mode-of-operation charge was unrelated to the jury's separate determination of damages, and accordingly, our holding has no impact on that determination.