77 Vt. 375 | Vt. | 1905
When this case was here on a demurrer to-the original bill — Jangraw v. Perkins, 76 Vt. 127, 56 Atl. 532, — it was held that the contract set forth therein was contrary to public policy and void. The cause was remanded, the
The facts now shown by the record, so. far as it is necessary to recite them, are as follows: Mary Jangraw, the unmarried minor daughter of the complainant, being pregnant, instituted bastardy proceedings against one Revett, and caused his arrest thereon. Revett gave bail, acknowledged that he was the father of the child, and offered to marry the girl. Mary and her father objected to the marriage and the discharge of the bastardy proceedings, unless Revett gave security for the support of the mother and child. Thereupon, the defendant, a relative of Revett’s, at Revett’s procurement, executed the mortgage here in question, and agreed to deliver the same to the complainant upon the marriage of Mary and Revett and the discontinuance of the bastardy proceedings. Relying upon this mortgage, the complainant and his daughter consented to the marriage; the ceremony was performed, the bastardy proceedings discontinued, and the mortgage delivered according to the agreement. After a time, Revett deserted his wife and child, and neglected and refused to care for and support them.
This is an entirely different case than was before presented. The new allegations relieve the contract of its objectionable features, and the rule which controlled the case as made by the original bill does not now apply. A marriage between parties situated as these were is especially favored and encouraged by the law, — not only that the most appropriate recompense may be afforded and the most effectual reparation may be made, but that the offspring may be made legitimate,— and the contracts and undertakings of the seducer made in contemplation of such a marriage are valid and binding. Bish. Cont. § 511. '
In Wright v. Wright, (Ia.) 55 L R. A. 261, the plaintiff had givfen birth to- an illegitimate child of which the defendant’s son was the father. She afterwards entered into a written agreement of marriag-e with the young'er Wright. At the same time, and as a part of the same transaction, the defendant executed a written agreement with the plaintiff which contained the following provision: “If she (the plaintiff) shall many said Edward Wright on this day, and per
Armstrong v. Lester, et al, 43 Ia. 159, was an action on the following contract: “One day after date I promise to pay Russell Armstrong .for the use of Isabel Nicholson, or the child with which she is now pregnant and of which the principal hereof is the father * * * the sum of five hundred dollars. * * * Provided that if A. W. Lester, principal, shall marry and in good faith live and abide with and support1 Isabel Nicholson, and support and keep and care for the child with which she is now pregnant and of which he is the father, no part of this note shall become due or payable; but if he should not marry, or, having married, leave or abandon her for any cause, * * * this note shall become and shall be considered due * *
(Signed) A. W. LESTER, Principal.
H. W. Lester. } Sureties J, T. Lester, / Sureties.
The sureties defended. After holding that the consideration was sufficient, the Court says: “It is urged that the contract is illegal and against public policy. But an obligation whereby one secures a provision made for a wife and child so far from being illegal, is regarded with favor by the law. * * * * Marriages celebrated under such circumstances are encouraged by the law. All settlements and contracts en
The new allegations of the bill bring the case under consideration squarely within the authority of these cases, — the reasoning of which is satisfactory and decisive.
Decree reversed, pro forma■, demurrer overruled, bill adjudged sufficient, and cause remanded, with costs in this Court to the complainant.