James W. Smith v. Charles MartinJames W. Smith v. Charles Martin
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We consider an appeal from summary judgment in favor of defendant-appellee Robert H. Helton, Jr. on the grounds of judicial immunity, and from an order dismissing the complaint against the remaining 22 defendants because of plaintiff-appellant’s lack of standing to maintain the action. The action was brought under
On appeal, Smith contends that the court erred in treating his cause of action as one for injury to a corporation. He asserts that instead, he pleaded injury as a result of defendants’ conspiratorial action to himself as an individual. He also contends that appellee Helton, a judge of the Circuit Court of Laurel County, Kentucky, lost his judicial immunity by participating in a conference held in the office of a defendant who had served as plaintiff’s attorney. We affirm.
The district court was correct in its holding that a stockholder cannot maintain an action under the Civil Rights Act for damages suffered by a corporation in which he owns shares. Erlich v. Glasner, 418 F.2d 226 (9th Cir. 1969). Although appellant is correct in his contention that the court did not consider his claim of a conspiracy to injure him as an individual, we nevertheless hold that the action was properly dismissed.
Although most of the 23 defendants were private citizens not acting under color of state law, they are, nevertheless, as private citizens subject to suit under
There are, however, defendants who as public employees might be held to have acted under color of state law for the purpose of suit under
Appellant contends that Judge Helton “doffed his robe of judicial immunity by his participation in- a conference held at the office of defendant Cato” and that he threatened, coerced, and intimidated plaintiff “by indicting him upon a baseless charge in the Laurel Circuit Court charging [him] with the offense of selling or disposing of mortgaged property; and in denying [him] a speedy trial of said indictment. »>
Extensive depositions were taken from which it clearly appears that Judge Helton’s role throughout the litigation in state court was solely that of a duly qualified circuit judge acting within his judicial jurisdiction. Accordingly, contrary to appellant’s contention, Judge Helton did not lose his judicial immunity by conducting a settlement conference in a place other than his courtroom at which all parties were present with their attorneys. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 87 S.Ct. 1213, 18 L.Ed.2d 288 (1967), Azar v. Conley, supra.
We hold that other state governmental officers whose duties are related to the judicial process also should be insulated from personal liability when.they, without malice or corrupt motive, carry out orders
This appeal presents issues similar to those in Stathas v. Cox, 539 F.2d 711 (6th Cir. 1976) in which a special panel of this court appointed pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 3(e) determined that the questions presented there were properly cognizable by the state courts, and held that the appeal was so unsubstantial as to permit summary affirmance under Sixth Circuit Rule 8. See also, Graves v. Sneed, 541 F.2d 159 (6th Cir. 1976), where Chief Judge Phillips stated, “This case involves yet another effort to make a federal question out of litigation where exclusive jurisdiction is in State courts.”
AFFIRMED.