Case Information
*1 Opinions of the United 2005 Decisions States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit 12-8-2005
James v. York Cty Police
Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
Docket No. 05-2852
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DPS-46 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT NO. 05-2852
________________
TYRONE P. JAMES,
Appellant
v. YORK COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT; JAMES H. MORGAN, Agent/Investigator; DETECTIVE RICHARD PEDDICORD; RAYMOND E. CRAUL, Detective; SERGEANT GENE FELLS; DETECTIVE KESSLER, York County Drug Task Force; CORRECTIONAL OFFICER BAYLARK, York County Prison; RANDY SNIPES; BRIAN WESTMORLAND; DETECTIVE GLOWCZESKI ____________________________________ On Appeal From the United States District Court For the Middle District of Pennsylvania (D.C. Civ. No. 01-cv-01015) District Judge: Honorable Yvette Kane _______________________________________ Submitted For Possible Dismissal Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or Summary Action
Under Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 November 10, 2005
Before: ROTH, FUENTES AND VAN ANTWERPEN, CIRCUIT JUDGES (Filed: December 8, 2005 ) _______________________ OPINION
_______________________ *3
PER CURIAM
Tyrone James sued the York County Police Department and policе and correctional officers for alleged constitutional violations arising from his treatment during his January 2001 arrest, detention, interrogation, and prosecution for state drug charges. Specifically, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, he claimed violations of the Fourth Amendment (for an illegal search and seizure, and the use of excessive force during his arrest), the Fifth Amendment (for compelled self-incrimination, Miranda violations, and violations of his right to counsel), the Sixth Amendment (for violations of his right to counsel), the Eighth Amendment (for the use of excessive force and the setting of an excessive bond), and the Fourteenth Amendment (for the use of excessive force).
Because the allegations on which James based his claims are familiar to the parties, we will recount them only briefly. A California employee of a mailbox rental company reported a suspicious package to a California narcotics officer. After finding drugs in the packagе, the narcotics officer called the Pennsylvania authorities to set up a sting. Police in Pennsylvania constructed a dummy package and placed it in the Pennsylvania mailbox rental facility where James leased a mailbox. When James claimed the package, two undercover police officers approached him. James dropped the box and began to move away from the officers. The side of a slow-moving van, driven by another offiсer, hit him. Other officers surrounded him, stepped on him, and handcuffed him. The police arrested James, but they did not read him his Miranda rights *4 before interrogating him. Police and correctional officers refused his requests to call his family members and his lawyer. While James was being interrogated, police officers harassed his wife. Three officers took James to his bail hearing, where his bond was set at $2.5 million dollars, payable in cash only. Those three officers harassed James’ wife and hеr sister at the bail hearing.
After screening James’ case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, in an order dated September 18, 2001, the District Court dismissed the harassment claims that James brought on behalf of his wife and her sister, as well as the claims James filed in order to end or alter his state prosecution and confinement. On the motion of some Defendants, the District Court, in its order of October 8, 2003, dismissed James’ Sixth Amendment claim of denial of counsel, and his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment claims of excessive force, for failure to state a claim. On November 12, 2003, upon review of a motion for summary judgment, the District Court dismissed James’ claims against Correctional Officer Baylark, for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The District Court dismissed the suit against Randy Sipes for lack of personal jurisdiction on Sipes’ [1]
motion pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2) and Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Under § 1915A, the District Court again evaluated the claims against the York County Police Department, and dismissed them for failure to statе a claim in its order of May 6, 2005. In that order, the District Court also granted summary judgment in *5 favor of the remaining Defendants on the remaining claims. Over the course of the case, the District Court also denied James’ motions for appointment of counsel and his discovery motions. James appeals and moves for appointment of counsel.
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. The first issue is the scope of our review. James identified two District Court orders in his notice of appeаl, the final judgment entered on May 6, 2005, and an order of February 20, 2002, in which the [2] District Court denied two of James’ motions for appointment of counsel and denied one of James’ discovery motions without prejudice to refiling after the District Court ruled on a then-pending motion to dismiss. Although Rule 3 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure requires an appellant to designate the “judgment, order, or part thereof appealed from,” an appeal from a final judgment will implicate all non-final orders and rulings which produced the judgment. See Polanski v. Trump Taj Mahal Assocs., 137 F.3d 139, 144 (3d Cir. 1998). For that reason, we will review all the District Court orders described above, insomuch as they dismiss James’ claims, not just the two District Court orders that James listed in his notice of appeal.
James also specifically appeals from “the Order dated May 4, 2004,” in which a Magistrate Judge denied some of James’ discovery motions. Because a Magistrate Judge issued the order of May 4, 2004, under the authority of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A), James *6 was obligated to preserve his objections to that order by timely objecting to it in the District Court. See United Steelworkers of America v. New Jersey Zinc Co., 828 F.2d
1001, 1007-08 (3d Cir. 1987). James only objected to a portion of that order, insomuch as it granted Defendants’ motion to depose him and denied him a protective order from the proposed deposition pending the resolution of one of his motions for appointment of counsel. Therefore, wе will review the aspect of the Magistrate Judge’s order that the District Court considered.
After considering the relevant District Court orders, we will affirm because no substantial question is presented on appeal. See L.A.R. 27.4. Our review of the District
Court’s orders dismissing James’ claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for
failure to state a claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and Rule 12(b)(6) is plenary. See
Gould Electronics, Inc. v. United States,
First, the District Court properly dismissed, on screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A, the claims that James wished to bring on behalf of his wife and her sister.
Ordinarily, a person does not have standing to vindicate the constitutional rights of a
third party. See Barrows v. Jackson,
In its order of October 8, 2003, the District Court properly dismissed some of
James’ claims. Specifically, to the extent that James brought his excessive force claim
under the Eighth Amendment or the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
he failed to state a claim. The Eighth Amendment prohibits the use of excessive forсe
against those convicted of a crime. See Graham v. Connor,
(1989). The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects pretrial
detainees, those charged with, but not yet convicted of, a crime, see Bell v. Wolfish, 441
U.S. 520, 523 (1979), from the use of excessive force. See Brown v. Borough of
*8
Chambersburg,
for denial of counsel. The Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not attach until the
initiation of formal judicial proceedings. See Brewer v. Williams,
In its order of November 23, 2003, the District Court properly granted summary
judgment in favor of the York County prison because James admitted that he brought no
claims against the prison. (Objections to Report & Recommendation dated March 23,
2003, at 16-17.) The District Court also properly granted summary judgment in favor of
Baylark on the ground that James did not exhaust his administrative remedies through the
prison grievance system. Prisoners must exhаust all available administrative remedies
*9
before bringing a suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 about prison conditions. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 1997e(a) ; Spruill v. Gillis,
James also claimed that the administrative remedy was not available to him
because he was not given a copy of the prison handbook, which describes the grievance
procedures, or otherwise made aware of the prison procedures. Baylark admitted that
James did not receive a handbook until a month after the incident in question, but
claimed that James was apprised of the procedures for filing a grievance upon admission
into the prison. Construing the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party,
the District Court concluded that James could not have filed a grievance because he was
unaware of the grievance procedure when Baylark denied him use of the telephone. The
District Court nonetheless granted summary judgment on the basis that James did not file
a grievance even after he reсeived a handbook one month later. James, however, claimed
that he never received a handbook, and only later learned of the grievance procedure
while researching his criminal case in the prison law library. Nonetheless, the result in
*10
the District Court was correct. James should have filed a grievance when he discovered
the administrative process. Although the prison could have rejected James’ later-filed
grievance as untimely, had it dоne so, the District Court could have evaluated whether
James’ resulting procedural default was excused because the application of the ordinary
deadline for filing a grievance offended the Federal Constitution or the policy behind
§ 1997e(a). See Spruill,
*11
The District Court also properly granted summary judgment in favor of
Defendants Morgan, Westmoreland, Peddicord, Craul, Glowczewski, Kessler, and Fells,
in its order of May 6, 2005. Although James argued that Craul and Morgan gave “false”
testimony to influence the bond decision, and otherwise played a significant role, with
Peddicord, in setting the bond amount, the District Court properly granted summary
judgment in favor of those Defendants on the Eighth Amendment excessive bond claim.
First, in Pennsylvania, the district justice, not the police officers, set bail. See Pa. R.
Crim. P. 120. Although authority tо set bail is not a determinative factor, see
Wagenmann v. Adams,
hearing on James’ motion to reduce bail in the Court of Common Pleas. James submitted the transcript, which sets forth the attorneys’ arguments on whether James was a flight risk and the trial court’s decision that the amount of bail was necessary. (Appendix to Objections to Report & Recommendation, Ex. 3.) Moreover, as the District Court concluded, in light of the state court’s decision to deny a bail reduction, principles of federalism, comity, and judicial economy precluded review.
The District Court also properly granted summary judgment on the Fifth
Amendment claims based on police interrogation without the benefit of Miranda
warnings and the denial of his right to counsel. The Fifth Amendment protects against
compelled self-incrimination. See Chavez v. Martinez,
The District Court’s grant of summary judgment on James’ Fourth Amendment
claims for unlawful search and seizure was proper, too. James argued that his rental
mailbox was unlаwfully searched and that he was unlawfully seized. However, he
conceded that his arrest and conviction were based on the evidence gathered from the
mailbox rental company and its facilities. (James’ Brief in Support of Motion to Compel
Discovery (doc. 120) at 5; Appendix to Objections to Report & Recommendation, Ex. 5.)
Therefore, his Fourth Amendment claims were a thinly-veiled collateral attack on his
conviction. Accordingly, review of his Fourth Amendment сlaims is barred by Heck.
See
The District Court did not err in granting summary judgment on the Fourth
Amendment claims of excessive force on the basis of qualified immunity, either.
Qualified immunity shields government officials from liability for civil damages “insofar
*13
as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutionаl rights of
which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald,
Whether James alleged a deprivation of his right to be free from excessive force in
the course of his arrest turns on whether he showed that a seizure occurred and that it was
unreasonable. See Kopec v. Tate,
The District Court also properly held that Defendant Glowczewski did not use an
unreasonable amount of force, despite hitting James with the side of a van. The parties
dispute whether the van was moving at the time of impact, but, for our purposes, we
assume, as James testified at his deposition, that the van was moving at a nominаl speed.
(Supplement to Brief in Support of Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, Ex. 1.)
Although James claimed physical injuries, he was able to stand up immediately after he
was hit. (Id.) Under the circumstances, Glowczewski, in slowly moving the van to block
James’ escape, did not use unreasonable force. Cf. Sharrar v. Felsing,
In its order of May 6, 2005, the District Court also granted the motion to dismiss
the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction filed by Randy Sipes, the California
narcotics officer involved in this case. James did not dispute that Sipes’ only contacts
with Pennsylvania were calling the Pennsylvania Attorney General’s Office by
telephone, shipping a package to that office, and testifying against James at a preliminary
hearing. (Declaration of Randy Sipes.) The District Court held that such contacts were
insufficient to establish personal jurisdiction under the “effects” test of Calder v. Jones,
The District Court had personal jurisdiction over Sipes because Sipes’ allegedly
tortious acts were intended to have an impact on James in Pennsylvania. Defendants can
“‘reasonably anticipate being haled into court’” in the forum toward which they direct
intentional and allegedly tortious conduct. Calder,
In its order of May 6, 2005, the District Court additionally dismissed any
remaining claims against York County Police Department pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A
for failure to state a claim. Although the complaint, amended complaint, and supplement
to thе complaint do not include claims of a custom or policy to use excessive force or to
deny Miranda warnings, the District Court addressed the policy claims that James put
*16
forth in his Objections to a previous Report & Recommendation. (“Plaintiff Objection to
Magistrate Proposed Findings For Report & Recommendation,” filed March 26, 2003.)
Specifically, James claimed that his treatment demonstrated that the Police Department
had a policy of using excessive force and denying Miranda warnings. (Id.) The District
Court held that success on James’ policy claims was impossible because James had failed
to show the constitutional violations on which his policy claims were based. Although at
first blush, the District Court appears to go outside the pleadings to resolve the claims
against the Police Department, the District Court only indirectly relies on other
Defendants’ submissions in support of summary judgment in their favor. The District
Court more directly relies on law of the case, see Arizona v. Califоrnia,
After the District Court dismissed the claims against the York County Police Department and determined amendment was futile, no other claims remained. Therefore, the District Court did not err in denying, as moot, James’ additional motion fоr appointment of counsel and for discovery, as well as his motion to amend the complaint.
The District Court also did not abuse its discretion in previously granting Defendants’ motion to depose James and denying James a protective order from the *17 proposed deposition pending the resolution of one of his motions for appointment of counsel. Defendants filed a motion to depose James because he was in prison. James, seeking to defer his deposition until after counsel was appointed, moved for a protective order. The District Court, having declined to appoint counsel, did not abuse its discretion when it denied James’ motion and granted Defendants’ motion. Likewise, in the order identified as the order of February 20, 2002, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying James’ motion to compel and granting Defendants’ motion for a protective order, both without prejudice to refiling after the District Court considerеd a pending motion to dismiss James’ complaint.
Furthermore, the District Court did not clearly abuse its discretion in denying
James’ motions for appointment of counsel. The District Court identified the appropriate
considerations and did not err in concluding that it was not necessary to appoint counsel.
See Tabron,
In sum, because our review of the pertinent orders entered by the District Court reveals no substantial issue on appeal, we will summarily affirm. James’ motion for aрpointment of counsel is denied.
Notes
[1] We substitute the correct spelling for Defendants’ names where necessary.
[2] The order that James identifies as the February 20, 2000 order is the order stamped as filed on February 20, 2002, but listed on the District Court docket as filed on February 25, 2002. It is the order entered on February 26, 2002.
[3] Additionally, the “generalized notion of ‘substantive due process’” under the
Fourteenth Amendment, was not the guide for analyzing his claim because James could
seek relief under a more explicit textual source of protection, the Fourth Amendment.
Graham,
[4] James’ complaint and amended complaint differ only in that his amended complaint was filed against three additional defendants. A document (doc. 22) that fleshes out his specific claims against the three additional defendants was treated as a supplement to his complaint.
[5] Even by James’ description, the “false” testimony of which he complains is Craul and
Morgan’s testimony about the crime for which he has since been convicted. To the extent
that success on his excessive bond claim against Craul and Morgan would imply the
invalidity of his conviction, Heck v. Humphrey,