James v. StateJames v. State
Appellant challenges his conviction of carjacking with a firearm, asserting that the trial judge erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal because the state failed to prove he had the intent to steal the 1973 Pontiac, and that his actions constituted, at most, attempted carjacking. We affirm.
In addition to the carjacking offense, appellant was convicted of burglary of a 1986 Cadillac, grand theft of the Cadillac, and fleeing a police officer. At the close of the state‘s case, defense counsel had sought a judgment of acquittal “on the grounds that it should not go to the jury because the evidence has not been shown to be beyond and to the exclusion of every reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of Counts I through IV charged in the information.” The motion was denied without further discussion. The renewed motion at the close of the case was also denied.
Appellant does not challenge the other three convictions, but he contends the record demonstrates that he did not intend to steal the Pontiac, which was blocking the stolen Cadillac, and that when he could not start the Pontiac, he threw the car keys back at the Pontiac‘s owner and made him move it. The state asserts that this argument was not presented to the trial court by the “barebones” motion for judgment of acquittal, and therefore cannot be presented for the first time on appeal, citing
We reject appellant‘s contention that his motion for judgment of acquittal adequately preserved the argument that the state failed to prove all the elements of the offense of carjacking,2 and we also reject his “fundamental error” argument. A careful reading of
Even if we were to address the substantive argument presented for the first time on appeal, we would find that the record contains sufficient evidence from which the jury could find that appellant took the Pontiac from the person or custody of its owner when he took the car keys from the owner, excluded him from control of the Pontiac, and attempted to start the vehicle; that he intended to at least temporarily, if not permanently, deprive the owner of possession or custody of the Pontiac; and that during the course of the taking he used force, violence, assault, or put the owner in fear by use of a firearm. Were we to rule on this issue, we would reject appellant‘s contention that conviction of carjacking requires, in every instance, proof that the vehicle was driven away.
AFFIRMED.
WOLF, J., CONCURS. ERVIN, J., CONCURS IN RESULT.