OPINION
Opinion by
Dаrren Keith James’ motion for post-conviction forensic DNA testing, see Tex. Code Ceim. PROC. ANN. art. 64.01 (Vernon Supp.2005), did not allege the existence of аny biological material that could be subjected to DNA testing, but merely stated that James’ accuser was examined by a doctor at the time the accusation was made. The trial court denied the motion because it failed to specify what evidence James wishеd to have tested for DNA.
James’ sole issue on appeal concerns whether the trial court erred in denying the motion for testing without first appointing an attorney to represent James in the proceeding. We affirm the trial court’s judgment because (1) we have plenary jurisdiction over this appeal, (2) we have subject-matter jurisdiction, and (3) the trial court properly denied James’ motion for court-appointed counsel.
(1) We Have Plenary Jurisdiction
The issue of whether an appellate court has plenary jurisdiction may be raised by the court itself at any time.
See, e.g., Davis v. State,
“In a criminal case, appeal is perfected by timely filing a sufficient notice of appeal.” Tex.R.App. P. 25.2(b). The notiсe of appeal in a criminal case must be filed within thirty days from the date the trial court enters its judgment, unless a timely filed motion for new trial hаs been filed. Tex.R.App. P. 26.2(a). “The appellate court may extend the time to file the notice of appeal if, within 15 days after the deadline for filing the notice of appeal, the party: (a) files in the trial court the notice of appeal; and (b) files in the аppellate court a motion complying with Rule 10.5(b).” Tex.R.App. P. 26.3 (referencing appellate rule regarding extensions of time). On Februаry 23, 2006, James filed a motion with this Court, asking for an extension of time to file his notice of appeal. That motion was timely filed within forty-five days of thе trial court’s judgment, and we granted James’ motion. James has, therefore, timely invoked this Court’s appellate jurisdiction. See Tex.R.App. P. 26.3.
(¾) We Have SubjecL-Matter Jurisdiction
We next turn to another jurisdictional issue. The State contends we lack *849 subject-matter jurisdiction over James’ sole point of error. The State asserts we should follow an unpublished opinion by the Amarillo Court of Appeals in McGuire v. State 2 and conclude we lack subject-matter jurisdiction to consider any issuе related to a trial court’s failure to appoint counsel for post-conviction DNA testing.
The lack of subject-matter jurisdiction mаy be raised by any party, or by the court itself, at any time.
Saudi v. Brieven,
The Amarillo court first noted that a trial court has a mandatory duty to provide an indigent applicаnt with appointed counsel for purposes of filing an application for post-conviction DNA testing.
Id.,
at * 1, at *2 (citing Tex.Code CRIM. ProC.
Ann.
art. 64.01(c) (Vernon Supp.2004);
Winters v. Presiding Judge of Criminal Dist. Court No. Three of Tarrant County,
Effective September 1, 2003, the Texas Legislature amended Article 64.05 by removing the limitation that an appealable order concern either Article 64.03 or Article 64.04. See Act of April 25, 2003, 78th Leg., R.S., Gh. 13, § 5, 2003 Tex. Gen. Laws 16, 17 (current version at Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 64.05 (Vernon Supp. 2005)). Article 64.05, in its current form, рrovides:
An appeal under this chapter is to a court of appeals in the same manner as an appeal of any other criminal matter, except thаt if the convicted person was convicted in a capital case and was sentenced to death, the appeal is а direct appeal to the court of criminal appeals.
Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 64.05 (emphasis added). Because the aрplicable statute no longer limits an appeal to rulings under Article 64.03 or 64.04, we disagree with the State’s contention that we lack subject-matter jurisdiction over James’ appeal.
(3) The Trial Court Properly Denied James’ Motion for Court-Appointed Counsel
The trial cоurt denied James’ request for court-appointed counsel in this matter after the court determined James’ “[ajpplication is fatаlly defective for failing to specify what evidence he desires to be subjected to DNA testing.”
The Texas Legislature has mandated that а trial court provide court-appointed counsel to an applicant pursuing post-conviction DNA testing, but only if three criteria are first met:
*850 (a) the applicant must tell the trial court that he or she wishes to submit an application for post-conviction DNA testing,
(b) thе trial court must find reasonable grounds for the application to be filed, and
(c) the court must determine the applicant is indigent.
See Tex.Code Crim. PROC. Ann. art. 64.01(c). If any of these three criteria arе missing, the trial court has no statutory duty to appoint counsel. See Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 64.01(c).
Neither James’ application for DNA testing, nor his affidavit in support thereof, state, allege, or even suggest that any biological evidence remains that could be subjected to DNA testing. His affidavit merely states, “The accuser was infact [sic] examined by a Medical doctor at the time this accusation was made.” Such a statement amounts to no suggestion that any biological evidence was obtained during, or retained from, any such examination.
A motion for post-convictiоn DNA testing may request testing only of evidence containing biological material “that was secured in relation to the offense that is the bаsis of the challenged conviction.... ” Tex.Code CRIM. Proc. Ann. art. 64.01(b). James’ motion does not make this statutorily required request, nor does it allege facts which would form the basis of a finding that the motion was reasonable. Accordingly, the trial court properly denied James’ request fоr court-appointed counsel because his application fails to show there is any reasonable ground for the application.
For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Notes
. The certificate of service on James’ notice of appeal shows the notice was hand-delivered to the State, also February 21, 2006.
. See McGuire v. State,
No. 07-03-0288-CR,