117 P. 1068 | Utah | 1911
Lead Opinion
This action was instituted by respondent to recover damages for tbe loss of the sight of one eye, which she alleged was caused through appellant’s unskillfulness and negligence. Respondent, in her complaint, among other things, alleged: “That on the 26th day of February, 1906, the plaintiff went to the office of the said defendant, at Bingham Junction, Utah, and that then and there, a.t plaintiff’s request, the defendant was employed to remove a cyst from the upper eyelid of plaintiff’s right eye. “That after the defendant removed said cyst from defendant’s eye, as aforesaid, the said defendant applied a certain liquid to the upper eyelid of the plaintiff’s right eye, which said liquid ■ plaintiff believes to have been some kind of an acid. That said liquid, which was applied to said plaintiff’s eye, as aforesaid, was allowed to drop from the instrument with which said defendant was applying said liquid upon plaintiff’s face, making a number of bums upon plaintiff’s face. That within a few minutes after said defendant applied said liquid to said plaintiff’s eye, as aforesaid, the said plaintiff began to' suffer intense pain and agony, and continued to suffer the same for a period of about twenty-five days. That said plaintiff continued to visit defendant for the purpose of having said eye treated until on or about March 12, 1906, when plaintiff was informed by defendant that he could do nothing more for her, and plaintiff then came to Salt Lake City, and entered St. Mark’s hospital March 17, 1906. . . . That for three weeks after defendant placed said liquid, as aforesaid, upon plaintiff’s eye said plaintiff was unable to get. any rest on account, of the intense pain and suffering which said liquid, being placed upon plaintiff’s eye, caused her, and was compelled to walk the floor intermittently day and night. That said liquid which said defendant placed upon plaintiff’s eye, as aforesaid, burned to the pupil of plaintiff’s eye in such a manner that the sight thereof is practically destroyed, and caused a scar to form upon the plaintiff’s said right eye, destroying the sight thereof, and that the plaintiff is compelled, when out of doors, to wear colored glasses, or some
Appellant, in his answer to the complaint, admitted that he had removed a cyst from the upper eyelid of respondent’s right eye; that he “applied a certain liquid to the outside of the upper eyelid of plaintiff’s right eye;” -and that “the sight of the plaintiff’s right eye was and is impaired by reason of a certain corneal ulcer, but that said ulcer was in no wise the result of the treatment of this defendant, or the operation aforesaid.” Appellant also denied all negligence and want of skill on his part, and affirmatively set forth the facts as he asserted them to be with respect to the operation, and as to what caused the loss of sight of plaintiff’s eye.
Upon substantially these issues a trial was had, and the jury returned a verdict in favor of respondent. The court denied a motion for a new trial, and judgment was entered on the verdict. Appellant produces the record in this court, and asks us to reverse the judgment.
One of the principal assignments is that the court erred in refusing to direct a verdict for appellant. The request for a directed verdict was based upon the ground that respondent’s evidence was insufficient to take the case to the jury.
The evidence in support of respondent’s claim in substance shows that on the 26th day of February, 1906, she went to defendant’s office to pay him a bill; that prior to that time he had been respondent’s family physician, and she then spoke to him about the “wart,” as she called it, on the upper eyelid of her right eye, and asked him whether he could remove it, and he informed her that he could do so easily; that he did remove the cyst by cutting it off, and in doing so she says “he applied something to the sore with a steel instrument.” The “something” referred to was a liquid, and some of it, she says, dropped on “two places on my cheek,” and produced a “burning sensation” and pain. “Q. Did any of it get into the ‘eye ? A. I don’t know. I had burning sensation and pain. It was quite severe in the eye. It was the eye that was giving me trouble. Q. Could you fe.el any liquid in the eye % A. My eye felt full of water —like water.” She says that she felt the pain in the eye immediately after appellant had applied the liquid; that when appellant applied the liquid she was sitting upright in a “straight chair,”, with her head “thrown back a little.” The record then proceeds: “Q. And some of the liquid ran into your eye and some on to yo-ur face % A. Yes, sir.” Respondent further stated that appellant obtained the liquid he used “from behind a little place he had there.” Q. Was any thing said about these burns that were on your face where the liquid had dropped onto ? A. He got some cotton batting and padded them, and said, T tried to bum you, didn’t I ?’ ” After this appellant bandaged the eye, and respondent says she suffered severe pain in it; that she at once left appellant’s office, and on her way home stopped at a
Mrs. Lewis, the woman to whom respondent referred as her neighbor, testified in substance that she saw the respondent on the day she had the cyst removed; that she then had her eye bandaged and “appeared to be in pain;” that the witness looked at the eye, and it was red — inflamed; that witness had known respondent for .about fifteen years, and
Respondent’s husband testified in substance that he saw respondent in the morning, when he went to work; that her eyes at that time were in good condition; that he and respondent had been married about twenty years, and that during that time she never had had any trouble with her eyes; that he saw respondent on the night of the operation, and she then had her eye bandaged, and removed the bandage, and the witness saw three burns about the size of a nickel on her face, two on the cheek, and one on the side of the nose. He further said: “I looked at the eye. There was a water blister, like a drop of water, on the pupil. It was all inflamed on the center of the eye; it covered the center of the eye — the dark part. It was a water blister, like from a bum.” That from her actions* it seemed she was suffering pain, and that she could not sleep.
An eye specialist, called on behalf of respondent, also testified that he had made an examination of respondent’s eye; that his examination was made in May and June, 1908; that there is a scar covering practically the lower half of the cornea of respondent’s right eye; that if some acid or caustic agency had been applied to the cornea or eyeball it would produce a condition like or similar to that which he found in respondent’s eye; that if some acid had been dropped into the eye, as claimed by respondent, it would produce the condition found in her eye; and that such condition was permanent. The witness, in answer to an hypothetical question, also- said that from his examination of the eye he believed that its present condition was caused by “the action of some caustic.- I am not sure that it was acid; caustic alkali would act in the same way. , . . Certain other caustics- might act in the same way.” On cross-examination the witness further said that in his judgment it was likely that the respondent had had “a corneal ulcer, and that such an' ulcer might be formed from the
As already intimated, since we cannot pass upon the probative force or weight of the evidence, it is useless for us to set forth appellant’s evidence, except to show his admissions. He admitted that he removed the cyst from respondent’s eyelid, and explained the manner in which it was done. He said that after the cyst had been removed by a severance from the eyelid it left a slight wound, which, in order to prevent a recurrence of the cyst, he scraped with a steel instrument. After this, he tells us: “I next took ,a piece of matchwood —soft wood like a match — and touched the end in a solution of one part in eight of carbolic acid, and applied that end to the sore spot. ... I then neutralized with alcohol by means of cotton wet with alcohol. Plaintiff complained, and said that I was burning her nose, but did not complain of any burning anywhere else until aftewards. I discovered that I was touching her nose with the matchwood, as I held it in my fingers, as I moved my hand in neutralizing the place, which rubbed against her nose. I held the match stick in the same hand I was using to apply the cotton batting with alcohol. I was holding the batting between my finger and thumb, and the match stick was between my fourth and third fingers. It did not drop any of the solution. I did not notice any place on the cheek at first, only the one place on the nose. I noticed three places the next day.” Appellant next explained his mode of treating respondent’s eye, and the visits she made, and his testimony in many respects directly conflicted with hers. Dr. Pfoutz, an eye, ear, and nose specialist, and to whom respondent went at the request of appellant, testified on behalf of appellant that when respondent came to him he “found an ulcer on the cornea, almost per
It seems to us that from the foregoing the conclusion is almost unavoidable that there is at least some substantial evidence in support of the jury’s findings. The following salient and, as we think, controlling facts are not seriously
The contention that respondent must fail because of the doctrine announced in Ewing v. Goode (C. C.), 78 Fed. 444, that, “when a plaintiff produces evidence that is consistent
In a case where the question is whether the defendant was guilty of negligence or not, the plaintiff need, however, merely show a state of facts from which the jury may logically infer negligence; and if the jury believe
In this connection appellant’s counsel strenuously insists that the court erred in refusing the following request to charge: “If it appears from the evidence that the loss of sight by plaintiff in her light eye might have been occasioned by one or more causes, for which defendant was not responsible, the plaintiff cannot recover, although the evidence may
Appellant also contends that the verdict is contrary to the charge of the court, which we have set
It is further insisted that the verdict and judgment cannot' stand because there is no competent evidence in this case
It is true, as appellant’s counsel suggests, that in order to authorize a finding that one who is following a profession or calling requiring special skill, knowledge, and experience is guilty of negligence or unskillfulness it is necessary to furnish some proof from some source possessing the required skill, knowledge, and experience that the acts complained of did not measure up to the standard of skill, knowledge, and experience required in the particular calling
It is also insisted with much vigor that the district court erred in denying a new trial. This contention is principally based upon the facts .that on a former trial of this case at which the evidence was substantially the same as upon the present one, and where the same judge who presided at the
While the district court, in the exercise of a sound legal discretion, without basing his ruling upon any specific error of law, may, under certain circumstances, possess the authority to grant a new trial, yet we cannot do so,
We have carefully examined the cases cited by appellant’s counsel. While the case of Shelton v. Hecelip, 167 Ala. 217, 51 South. 937, is in some respects very similar to the case at bar, yet the evidence upon the question of the physician’s negligence in that case was not only much more meager than in this case, but it was also much less clear with regard to what caused the injury complained of. Indeed, it is plainly inferable from what the court said'in that case that, if the evidence had been as strong in that case as it is in this upon the salient points, the result might, and doubtless would, have been different. In the case of Pettigrew v. Lewis, 46 Kan. 78, 26 Pac. 458, there was absolutely no proof of negr ligence. In the case of Stern v. Lanng, 106 La. 738, 31 South. 303, the finding was in favor of the defendant. If in the case at bar the jury had found for the defendant upon the facts, we would have no more difficulty in sustaining the finding that the court had in Stern v. Lanng. The other cases cited are readily distinguishable from the facts in the ease at bar, and need no further consideration.
Finally, counsel appeals to us with much force that, in
The judgment is affirmed, with costs.
Concurrence Opinion
(concurring).
I concur in the result. I do not concur in all that is said on the question of discretionary powers of trial courts in passing on a motion for-a new trial.. Much that is said,on that question I think is unnecessary and inapplicable to the pretended discretion which appellant claims the trial court abused. In overruling appellant’s motion for a new trial, the court observed that the only question for consideration on the motion was one of fact, and stated that, “while the court perceives no material difference in the aspect of the case as presented on the former trial, and is of the same opinion as on that trial, that while the verdict is justified by the evidence, it has not been proven to the satisfaction of the court by a preponderance, and, were the court sitting as a trier of fact, simply because of the failure of preponderance, the couid could not find a verdict for the plaintiff,” The court further remarked that the verdict must be sustained, if at all, upon the theory that the defendant dropped carbolic acid in plaintiff’s eye; that by the testimony of all the experts carbolic acid dropped in the eye would cause excruciating pain; that several days after it was claimed the defendant had dropped the acid in her eye plaintiff’s husband “inquired of the defendant if he was sure he had not dropped something in her eye;” that it was argued that the plaintiff, “a woman of heroic nerve,” was able to bear the pain without manifesting any immediate signs or indications of pain; that such
But the trial court expressed some doubt as to such fact because of the inquiry of plaintiff’s husband, and because she did not complain of pain a.t the time the acid came in contact with the eye, notwithstanding she complained of extreme pain fifteen or twenty minutes thereafter. For these reasons the court intimated that, had he tried the case on the facts without a jury, he would have made a finding contrary to that of the jury, on the sole ground of plaintiff’s “failure of preponderance” of the evidence. Because of such statements by the court, appellant now urges that the trial court ought to have granted his motion for a new trial, and abused his discretion in refusing it. The trial court being satisfied that the verdict was justified by the evidence did not feel authorized to interfere with it upon the ground only that, had he tried the ease on the facts, he would have reached a different conclusion. In that I think the court was right. Whatever legal discretion may rightfully be exercised by the trial court in passing on motions for a new tidal, I think it is clear that when the evidence, both in point of law and of fact, is sufficient to justify the verdict, and the trial court is satisfied of such sufficiency, he may not then, in his discretion, set it aside on the sole ground that, had he tried the case on the facts, he would have reached a different conclusion. To hold otherwise is to hold that the court in its discretion may invade the duty to decide by setting aside verdicts until he has found a jury-to agree with him.