James v. Paul

Danny JAMES, Respondent, T. PAUL, Respondent,

Robert M. Casualty

Farm Fire and Insurance

Company, Appellant.

No. SC 82867. Missouri,

Supreme Court of

En Banc.

May

Rehearing July Denied there,

siderable amount of beer. Once he peered living through the room window engaging witnessed his wife sexual Danny relations with James on the couch. Enraged, Paul unsuccessfully tried Undaunted, break down the front door. window, living he broke the room but was injured process in the and was unable to Phillip Grubaugh, City, B. for Kansas retrieving enter. After a knife from his appellant. truck, proceeded Paul to the kitchen win- Emison, Langdon, J. Kent Robert L. dow. He broke the window and climbed Blanton, Lexington, Michael Blue W. passed Kayleen, into the house. He who Locke, Springs, Independence, Thomas C. kitchen, proceeded was now in and respondents. for room, living where he found James. Paul in the stabbed James abdomen three HOLSTEIN, Judge. hospi- times. Both men were taken to the injuries. State Farm Fire and tal but survived their Casualty Company (State Farm) appeals from a summary degree Paul was with as- charged first it, judgment entered against garnishee, as pleaded guilty sault. He to the offense on in a garnishment proceeding filed in Jack August plea hearing, At 1989. County by Danny son circuit court T. counsel, represented by where Paul was challenges James. State Farm also stabbing Paul admitted He indi- James. summary denial of its own motion for pleading guilty cated that he was because judgment against claim arises James. The guilty. he was fact When counsel inter- from a policy homeowner’s insurance held rogated Paul about whether he understood by Robert M. Paul. The case was trans he as rights waiving constitutional was opinion by ferred here after the Missouri well as the terms and conditions of the 83.02; Appeals. Court of Rule Mo. Const. plea agreement, replied Paul that he did V, art. judg sec. 10. The trial court’s understand. The court reiterated these reversed, ment is and the cause is remand questions and asked Paul whether he was proceedings ed for consistent with this representation. satisfied with his Paul opinion. gave response the same and answered that perfor-

he was satisfied with counsel’s I. FACTS mance. The court found Paul’s voluntarily intelligently in made and that basic facts this case are not wife, dispute. there a factual Kay- supporting Robert Paul and his basis leen, assault him marriage. charge. filed for a dissolution of A The court sentenced to five hearing County years imprisonment suspended was scheduled in Jackson but sentence, placing probation. circuit Paul on court for June 1989. interim, couple separated, Kayleen At stabbing, the time of the Paul had family Independence retained the home policy homeowner’s insurance Paul custody daughters. arid of their Farm, personal provided which also liabili- apartment. moved to an II, L, Coverage ty coverage. Section policy provided part: relevant Paul, evening hearing,

On the before the infidelity, brought If a claim is made or a suit is suspecting Kayleen of traveled damages an because having to her home after consumed a con- insured for gar- if was unsuccessful damage to bodily injury property Farm, Paul would nishment coverage applies, caused which this $21,500. occurrence, pay will: an additional Farm] [State up liability to our limit of for the pay trial. The trial appear failed to for which the insured is damages judg- court entered proceeded, and the liable; legally $285,000, in the amount of ment for James expense by provide a defense at our $45,886.31, and prejudgment interest our choice. counsel of entry, the court In its costs. found, inter alia: is defined in the The word “occurrence” ... which results “[A]n as: accident 8, 1989, suffered [Paul] On June injury policy in ... ... the bodily during of alcohol- the medical conditions from II period.” policy Section of the contained ism, depres- adjustment disorder with following liability the exclusions from cov- sion, and obsessive disorder with anxiety erage: capacity. the result of diminished mental II

SECTION EXCLUSIONS sustained [Paul] 2. On June apply L ... COVERAGE does not to: intoxicated, physical injuries and was (A) which, with is medical dis- together [sic] bodily injury property damage or him, caused him to affecting orders then (1) expected which is either or intended shock, and unable [him] be rendered insured; by an or appraise the nature of his to control or (2) any person property or which is conduct. the result willful or malicious acts violent events of June 3. The of an insured. injured were during [James] which promptly Paul informed Farm of a State and the result of sudden disinhibition potential sought coverage claim and for resulting from a combina- loss of control any might claims James assert personality borderline fragüe tion of explaining him. In a letter that the inci- structure, adjustment acute reaction dent not an occurrence as defined distress and intoxication with emotional policy triggered and that it also the alcohol. provisions policy, exclusion of the State capa- 4. At the time ... was not [Paul] coverage. Farm denied comprehending appreciating or ble 9, 1992, February per- filed a On James his con- consequences the nature or injury County sonal claim in cir- Jackson expect for duct. did not intend [Paul] petition, cuit court. In his amended he injured. to be [James] on alleged negligent careless and conduct obtaining judgment, al- After James part specific of Paul. The conduct “incapacitat- garnishment a action State leged was that while Paul was filed deny Farm continued to cov- and unable to control the nature of his Farm. State ed conduct,” parties filed motions for sum- upon erage. he “inflicted a knife wound Both which the court denied. mary judgment, T. Farm de- DANNY JAMES.” State Then, party filed a renewed motion and Paul then each clined to defend. James The court denied summary judgment. It agreement. entered into a settlement trial, and sustained that of jury Paul not State Farm’s motion provided would waive order, $3,500. that the court ruled present pay evidence and James James. its coverage was resolved any to limit execution to the the issue of agreed Farm, tort action. State promised underlying Farm and further State proper point explained, duty appeal. court had to defend der is not action, Thus, in the tort failure to do so its it need not be addressed. Wilson v. coverage (Mo.1968). amounted to waiver of the de- Hungate, 434 S.W.2d garnishment fense in the under the doc- But though ruling question even Furthermore, trine pais. might normally be considered interlocu trial court that “law of held tory, appeal if the is otherwise properly prevent case doctrine” served to State Court, before the and a of law is it relitigating Farm from could almost certain to arise on retrial and has personal have raised before in the initial parties, fully been briefed the issue injury action.1 judicial will be addressed as a matter of Schnick, efficiency economy. State appeals, asserting

State Farm that nei- 1991); S.W.2d equitable estoppel ther the doctrine of nor Gotthardt, (Mo.1976). that it liti- of collateral bar gating coverage garnishment in this action. it claims is entitled to

Furthermore, plea of argues it summary judgment garnishment ac in the criminal case entitled tion under the of collateral estop- doctrine in summary judgment garnishment pel, preclusion, also referred to as issue proceeding.

because of Paul’s in the II. STANDARD OF REVIEW criminal case. Farm asserts that pursuant the conviction to the appeal considering an resolved the whether summary judgment, this Court reviews the was stabbing Paul’s of James intentional in the light record most favorable to the willful, resulting coverage or no under party against whom en judgment was Bank, policy. agrees. This Court Gaddy Phelps County tered. v. 20 2000). (Mo. S.W.3d banc This giving preclusive Before effect to essentially

Court reviews the record de prior adjudication estop- a under collateral propriety summary judg novo. Id. The pel principles, the Court must consider law, purely issue of and this (1) four factors: whether the issue decided Court need not defer to the trial court’s prior adjudication identical to ruling. ruling upheld Id. The will be action; presented present the issue appeal genuine if no issues of material fact (2) prior adjudication resulted whether judg exist and the movant is entitled to (3) merits; in a whether judgment on May Bell v. ment as matter of law. party against whom is assert (Mo. Dep’t Stores party privity or was in with a ed was 1999). banc (4) party prior adjudication; to the III. COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL party against whether the whom collateral

AGAINST JAMES estoppel is asserted had a full and fair litigate to the issue in the Ordinarily, opportunity denial of a motion for Am., prior v. Ins. Co. summary judgment interlocutory is an or- suit. Oates Safeco referring Generally, the law of the case doctrine is a court was to the doctrine of collater- applicable principle to cases where there has estoppel, by al which an issue determined prior appeal involving issues been same relitigated may not be in another one action Kimes, 25 S.W.3d facts. Williams Shahan, Shahan v. 988 S.W.2d action. Here, 2000). (Mo. banc there had 153-54 (Mo. 1999). banc Presumably, prior appeal. the trial been no 1979). third factor to be considered The The will not be estopped doctrine of collateral to be party whether the inequita applied where to do so would be to the privity party with a party to or Each ana ble. Id. at 721. case must be courts have stated prior adjudication. Our (describ facts. at 719 lyzed on its own Id. party sought where the privity exists ing employed the method in Bernhard v. interests that are so precluded to be has Ass’n, 19 Bank Am. Nat’l. Trust & Sav. party in the earlier closely aligned to (1942)). 807, 122 Cal.2d P.2d 892 fairly non-party that the can be litigation to collateral applicable The first factor day had its court. Cox said to have estoppel is whether the issue the earlier Steck, 224 (Mo.App.1999). adjudication pres- and that at issue in the description ambiguous This somewhat ent case are identical. Assault the first easy apply privity always has not been to attempt that the to degree requires actor in a every Danger set of facts. inheres attempt knowingly kill or cause or to cause “privity.” formalistic definition the word physical injury to another. Sec. serious Fullerton, Fire Co. v. State Farm & Cas. By pleading guilty 565.050.1. to that of- Cir.1997) (5th (citing 118 F.3d fense, purposely Paul must have acted or Arthur R. Miller and Wright, Charles Alan 565.050.1; 562.021.8; knowingly. Secs. Cooper, H. Federal Practice Edward “purpose” who acts with a One 561.011.1. (1981)). § uncer and Procedure Mil “knowing” or that his conduct was a formal definition tainty associated with practically certain to result in serious the authors of the “privity” has caused injury willful- physical intentionally acts (Second) Judgments Restatement (8). 562.016.2,.3(2), ly. See sec. The issue “privity” altogether.2 abandon the term of intent was identical in both the civil and substitute, specific rela it identifies As cases, pre- militating favor of a criminal that tionships with defendant clusion. “privity.” Restate serve the same end as The second factor is whether the of 85(2)(b). (Second) Judgments ment sec. of guilty resulted in a on the mer- judgment relationships is a con Among specified Following practice, its. the standard promisee, relationship tractual between trial judge underlying criminal case Paul, party beneficiary, a third such as voluntary by ensured that (Second) Restatement such as James. of inquiring attorney. of Paul and his Rule 56(1). claim is Judgments sec. James’ 21..02(c). inquired The trial court also beneficiary of party a third clearly that of defendant, attorney prose- his and the relationship with State Paul’s contractual to mak- regarding cutor the facts order A creditor stands judgment Farm. a factual ing a determination that basis no rights and has shoes of the insured 21.02(e). guilt. Rule existed for the no less than the insured’s greater and on the These determinations were made paid if the insured rights would have been presented of the facts and resolved merits sought then reimburse factor in favor of collateral the second Zurich from the insurer. Greer v. ment estoppel. (First) First Restate- Judgments sections from their Restatement In the Restatement (1942), (a) discuss and counterparts conspicuously sec. 83 and comment leaves sec. privies privity blank, within the context page. define only Re- one of two on 83 ap- preclusion. comparable I, section No (Second) Judgments, Table statement fact, pears in the Second Restatement. I, providing references to the Second Table 684 (Mo.1969). 15, par that the consequence 441 In- insurer and the

deed, rights James makes no claim that his the insurer are no ty’s rights against independent exist of the terms of Paul’s greater or less than the insured. See liability policy. say It is irrational to that Fullerton, & Casualty State Farm Fire than if Paul rights greater (5th Cir.1997) James has were 374, (holding 118 F.3d attempting here to enforce the insurance privity that stems the derivative na agreement. in- Equally clear is claim); plaintiffs ture of the American terest of on the of whether Savickas, Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. his attack on was intentional James 682, 445, Ill.2d 250 Ill.Dec. 739 N.E.2d tightly aligned with the interest (2000) plaintiffs (concluding rights in this case. entirely derivative of the were insured’s can rights, plaintiff contractual and the separate opinion

Judge Wolffs seizes insurer (Second) greater rights against have no upon Judgments Restatement insured). Thus, James, whose f., than the emt. illus. the lack argue sec. claim is derivative of Paul’s contractual privity case. The this illustration precluded rights, privity that the victim is not is in with Paul.3 indicates showing the criminal conviction from identified in The fourth factor a tort action the assailant that the subject Oates is to some misunderstand in negligent criminal act was rather than ing. opportunity The “full and fair to liti course, garnishment pro tentional. Of gate the issue in the first suit” is not a ceeding here is not a tort action analysis layer privity second under Paul but an action derivative of Paul’s only privity which those in who had actual event, any Farm. In contract with State opportunity may notice and an to intervene rejected illustration has been two of Rather, by prior adjudication. be bound the three cases which it has been cited. description analysis of the shorthand Jones, Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. See required to determine if non-mutual collat (1991); Conn. 596 A.2d Safe applied.4 be eral should Yon, co Ins. Co. Am. v. Idaho principle estoppel, of non-mutual collateral (1990); 796 P.2d Massachusetts Missouri, adopted permits use of a as Prop. Underwriting Norring Ins. Ass’n v. ton, prior judgment preclude relitigation of 751, 1364, to N.E.2d 1367 395 Mass. 481 (1985). party asserting an the though issue even contrary The illustration is also to estoppel party to the analyze collateral was not a majority the of recent cases that Caranchini, prior In 956 recognize the the derivative na case. re S.W.2d issue 1997). 910, an 911 party’s ture of a third claim argument Judge by reading the authorities process 3. The due asserted in 4. This is confirmed separate opinion again Cunningham, Estop Wolffs has time and cited Collateral in Oates: rejected similar circumstances to been under pel: Changing the Rule Mutual Role of privity those at hand where exists. State 521, (Fall 1976); ity, 529 Execu 41 Mo.L.Rev. Fullerton, Co. v. 118 F.3d Farm Fire & Cas. Assessors, Towers, tive Inc. v. Board 53 374, (5th Cir.1997) (citing 387 Parklane Ho 463, 604, (1976); N.Y.S.2d 612 A.D.2d 385 Shore, Co., 322, 7, siery Inc. v. 645, 439 U.S. 327 n. States, 606, Johnson v. United 576 F.2d 614 (1979)); 99 S.Ct. 58 L.Ed.2d 552 (5th Cir.1978) (concluding that the offensive 35, (Me. Bragg, v. A.2d 37 Mut. Ins. Co. 589 estoppel calls for use of non-mutual collateral Yon, 1991); Co. Am. v. 118 Safeco special scrutiny determining whether there 367, 1040, (1990); 796 P.2d 1044-45 Idaho opportunity litigate an was a full and fair Ltd., Stout, Co., Tradewind Ins. v. 85 Hawai’i prior proceeding). 177, 1196, (1997). 938 P.2d 1207

685 admissi- is only col held determining whether non-mutual evidence, party making the and the apply, the con ble estoppel lateral will Court plea. explanation an being must make first whether the doctrine siders defensively. See applied offensively or estoppel collateral Non-mutual Shore, 439 Hosiery Inc. v. Parklane For obvious recognized Oates. was first 322, 329-30, 99 58 L.Ed.2d U.S. S.Ct. reasons, re prior decided to Oates cases (1979); rel. v. 552 State ex O’Blennis that the evidentiary rule only lied on the (Mo.App.1985). Adolf, 691 S.W.2d 502 not con was admissible but in estoppel generally Defensive collateral take into account and did not clusive invoking a the doctrine to volves defendant analysis collateral non-mutual plaintiff relitigating a fact prevent from practice This contin requires. now Oates liti plaintiff decided earlier except case after Oates. Yet each ued necessary plaintiff that is for the gation reached the result Oates two the courts carry proof. his burden of establish and dictates, a claimed each involved because O’Blennis, 502; 691 see also S.W.2d Compare use of the doctrine. offensive (Mo. Laspy, Estate 409 S.W.2d case, pre-Oates Laspy (though Estate of (a judicial guilt determination of App.1966) estoppel prevented it held that collateral collaterally estop held to the widow who killer of the dece wife and convicted husband, decedent, from in killed her estate, a from his inheriting dent from contrast, heriting). By offensive collateral of a criminal conviction use defensive estoppel normally attempt by involves the estate). Oates, cases, After two Wal plaintiff rely prior adjudication on a Revenue, v. 786 S.W.2d lace Director of prevent an issue to defendant v. Ald (Mo.App.1990), Curtain plain a fact challenging necessary to rich, (Mo.App.1979), contin 589 S.W.2d plaintiff tiffs case and on which the carries pre-Oaies cite the cases for ued to proof. Generally speak the burden Id. rule, evidentiary recognize but failed to ing, courts have been less inclined to allow dealing with claims of they were defensive than offensive use of the doctrine rather analy engage collateral mutuality parties defensive when result, those required by Oates. As sis Id.; Wilform, see lacking. also Pruiett arguable inconsistency cases create (Mo.1972); Ferguson with To the extent Curtain Oates. (Mo.1970); Boyd, 448 S.W.2d arguably are inconsistent Wallace (Mo. Blake, Nichols v. Oates, they are overruled. 1967); Riley, Howard v. case, Farm invokes (Mo.1966); In the instant Spears, Sullivan v. pri- The 75, estoppel defensively. collateral (Mo.App.1994); n. 1 LaMar 76 S.W.2d Hannah, 444, distinguishing between mary reason for v. 445-46 tina cases, use of collateral the courts offensive and defensive (Mo.App.1984).5 those claiming precluded from he had Only permitted of He was later two Missouri cases have estoppel. presence One knowledge non-mutual collateral of the sub fensive no of attorney discipline in which the was an case activities the vehicle in a criminal stance in attorney estopped from re- respondent Daniels, 789 proceeding. State v. forfeiture litigating a in a federal case 243, (Mo.App.1990). Missouri 245 S.W.2d unprofessional which she sanctioned appears the narrow use of offensive to follow Caranchini, 910, S.W.2d In Re 956 conduct. estoppel in Parklane Ho laid down collateral other, 1997). the owner In the 912 322, 329-37, Shore, siery 99 439 U.S. Co. v. marijuana was found of a vehicle in which 645, (1979). L.Ed.2d 552 S.Ct. 58 guilty possession marijuana. pleaded to of the 686 Savickas, 378, nature v. 193 Ill.2d equitable is the of the Co. 250 Ill.Dec. Here, equitable (2000);

doctrine. one concern is N.E.2d 449 739 Restate give preclusive (Second) whether the failure to ef Judgments sec. 85. The of permit plea guilty fect to a of will plea same is not true where there was a pleaded party guilty who to assert facts guilty in the earlier case. Jurisdictions contrary plea guilty, thereby to the other than Missouri that have faced the permitting profit the criminal defendant to precise split fairly this case have wrongdoing. from her own fraud or evenly, being the recent trend to apply O’Blennis, (citing 691 S.W.2d at 504 Es estoppel defensively collateral in a civil Laspy, tate at 730 (Mo.App. proceeding following plea guilty. a 1966)). concern, coupled This with the Circuit, law, applying Fifth Texas ad fact that Farm attempting to use a nearly dressed case identical to this one defensively, the doctrine that the suggests Farm Fire & v. Cas. Co. Fuller weigh against fourth factor does not collat (5th Cir.1997). ton, 118 F.3d 374 eral in this case. Because of the Fullerton observed that numerous cases higher proof proce burden of and other guilty plea preclu- a with the same treat protections, dural a defendant in a criminal following sive effect as a conviction a full- opportunity case a full and fair to has blown trial.6 Fullerton a number of lists offense, litigate the elements of an includ giving plea guilty reasons for ing relating culpable those to the mental preclusive finding the same effect as state. majority is that guilt. Foremost Yet another equitable consideration rele- states, Missouri, including accept cannot vant a “full analysis to the of whether felony in a plea plea7 or an Alford opportunity litigate fair the issue” oc- found to be case unless the defendant is curred is whether the criminal conviction mentally competent, freely from a trial or a of guilty. resulted voluntarily given, and a factual basis exists Nearly jurisdictions all hold that a convic- Fullerton, 381; plea. for the 118 F.3d preclusive a criminal trial is as to tion after (e). 21.02(c), see also Rule actually issues determined that trial as num- contrary, equal To the an almost privity defendant and those defendant, ber of states make a distinction between which includes those claim- preclusive ing liability arising under the defendant’s insur- effect opposed Many a full policy. Family ance American Mut. Ins. as trial.8 Winker, Mauldin, N.C.App. v. Ideal Mut. Ins. Co. v. 319 N.W.2d Co. S.E.2d 1982); 214(1983). (Iowa Bragg, v. State Mut. Ins. Co. (Me.1991); 589 A.2d 35 State Farm Fire & Sallak, Alford, Or.App. v. 400 U.S. Cas. Co. v. 914 P.2d 7. North Carolina O'Hara, (1970). (1996); S.Ct. 27 L.Ed.2d 162 Bower v. 759 F.2d 1117 J., (3rd Cir.1985) (Slovitar, dissenting); Unit Cash, $31,697.59 Surety ed 665 F.2d 903 8. These include Aetna Cas. & Co. v. States Niziolek, (9th Cir.1982); Colorado Farm Bureau Mut. Mass. 481 N.E.2d 1356 Haven, (Colo. (1985); Rawling City Snowbarger, Ins. Co. v. 934 P.2d 909 New 100, (1988); App.1997); v. Conn. 537 A.2d 439 Continental State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. 173, 703, Groshek, Colo.App. Mich.App. Maguire, v. 28 471 161 411 N.W.2d 480 Cas. Co. Furs, Gonzalez, 239, (1970); (1987); N.J.Super. Teitelbaum Inc. v. Do State v. 273 P.2d 636 618, Co., 601, (1994), Cal.Rptr. aff'd, Cal.2d 25 641 A.2d 142 N.J. minion Ins. 559, (1962); (1995); v. Trans Mut. Ins. Co. v. 375 P.2d 439 Brohawn A.2d 684 Merchants Arzillo, A.2d 842 Inc. 276 Md. A.D.2d 472 N.Y.S.2d 97 america Hoium, (1975); Group Corp. v. (N.Y.App.Div.1984); Union Ins. Glen Falls Commercial criminal rely these 85 of Id. at rules of cases on sec. the Restate- 386-87. Missouri’s (Second) b, accept Judgments procedure guilty ment courts cmt. indi- ensure of only appropriate cating pleas under circum- that a of should not be Therefore, judicial system’s stances. given preclusive effect for collat- same judgments interest in not consistent does estoppel purposes given finding eral when a automatically give way guilt. rely But the cases that on the Re- So, consistency as guilty is well entered. appropriately fail to statement scrutinize in in weighs preclusion this favor case. estoppel. Restatement’s rationale for Specifically, the Restatement creates an argues James that the consis- unreasonable distinction between criminal tency preclusive having ef- judgments pleas of criminal guilty and convictions at by applying fect is not advanced collateral trial, any analysis. without real It fails to because, case, in this here there that, recognize practice, in modern a felo- already judgments, are two inconsistent ny plea an guilty requires evidentiary judgment the criminal and the later civil basis for the which facts are is against argument sophistry. Paul. The explored parties court, by the was, effect, The civil default judgment judicial is determination made with re- judgment plaintiff where both the and de- spect the essential elements of the had parallel fendant' interests to advance Winker, crime. Ideal Mutual Ins. Co. obtaining finding fact inconsistent (Iowa 1982). 319 N.W.2d Paul judgment. criminal Both seeking any judi- carefully avoided Fullerton, As noted in the driving force against cial relief Farm on the cover- behind preclusion issue is the concern for age question judgment until the default equity public policy: and sound had been entered. As will be discussed in Treating re- intent as IV, questions Part the determination only solved cut short declaratory will on civil touching culpability judg- one; as this suits such it will against any Paul were not entitled to expedite adjudication also of victims’ preclusive effect under suits who insured has admit- Indeed, principles estoppel. of collateral ted responsibility his for a act. the doctrine collateral was de- As the results of the trial court here part, very signed, to eliminate the sort demonstrate, danger of inconsistent legal here, maneuvering that occurred judgments large. recognize looms We leading to superficially inconsistent find- that criminal defendants sometimes en- To ings. apply fail to the doctrine favor pleas ter for reasons other than virtually of State Farm certain to en- charges against truth of the them. courage legal stratagems continued de- But disquieting judicial sys- when a factual signed adju- inconsistent create tem the continued tolerates incarcera- dications. tion of those defendants and at the same time, damages equitable support civil arguments giv- awards based Other those Paul’s If findings ing guilty plea preclusive defendants did not effect. will, preclusion permitted, commit all the elements of the crimes is not effect, they being punished. for which are be insulated an insurer (1972); (1992); Pru Ins. Co. per. 294 Minn. 200 N.W.2d 189 618 A.2d 945 Safeco Kollar, McGrath, Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. dential Wash.App. 708 P.2d 657 (1990); Stid N.J.Super. 578 A.2d 1238 (1985). Club, Sportsmen’s ham v. Millvale 421 Pa.Su mentally responsibility alleging the full brunt of economic that was unable to resulting admittedly intentionally from his intentional stab James. James was also plea contrary required guilty criminal act. This runs to the to show Paul’s of itself respect in to public policy of Missouri. State Farm was some tainted so as make Caley, application estoppel inequita- Fire & 936 S.W.2d of collateral Cas. Co. (Mo.App.1997). Both and Paul ble. James profit duplicity stood to from Paul’s plea At hearing, any the Paul denied admitting wrongdoing intentional the history except of mental illness counseling while, effect, proceeding9 deny- to breakup. only related his marital ing present it in the case. collat- Applying hints of such illness were his statements estoppel eral this situation serves control,” “just that he lost “became en- prevent potential the of collusive litigation “snapped” and he raged,” when saw his promoting policies as well the other of as having wife with James. The sex state- judicial finality, consistency economy ments, conjunction taken in context and in discussed above. illness, any with his denial of mental are noted, previously application As of col insufficient to undermine confidence the depends plea By plea ultimately guilty. guilty lateral his conviction, principles culpability derived from the Paul admitted his fairness facts of each case. The record here in for his role in the criminal violation. Cork transcript plea guilty County, cludes the of the v. St. Charles 10 S.W.3d that was attached to motion for sum (Mo.App.2000). absolutely the There was no mary judgment. transcript That includes plea involuntary, that evidence Paul’s was by criminal trial that finding judge unduly that into pressured entering he was Paul voluntarily intelligently pleaded plea, effectively repre- that he was not counsel, guilty degree offense of first by any assault sented or that other rea- response filed no attack undermining James. James confidence in the son existed validity plea guilty. of the Once ing plea or the determination of a transcript establishing plea. was filed factual that basis for This Court by factual determination speculate not that Paul had some should intentional, Paul’s conduct pres- James hidden or felt some reason unstated allegations could not rest on mere or deni plead guilty, sure to when such fact was als, required by but he was to show affida supported by an or other not affidavit not proof Application vit or otherwise that State Farm was in the trial court. of the summary judgment. ITT plea entitled to Com doctrine of collateral to a defensively v. Mid-America Marine mercial Finance as used this case is 371, 376 Supply Corp., inequitable, given not the record "with 1993); Economy Casualty presented. Fire & Co. which the Court is Haste, (Mo.App.1991); IV. ESTOPPEL AND COLLATERAL 74.01(c). preclusive Rule To overcome the ESTOPPEL STATE AGAINST by judicially effect of the facts determined FARM plea, it incumbent on Paul’s James affidavit, claims that just produce psychiatrist’s equitably estopped claiming years guilty, made four after hearing transcript Thé discloses that restitution to James was one of the condi- of the probation imposed the trial court. present at some of the crimi- tions of that James was accuracy disposition, of the proceedings, James does not contest nal consented to transcript. partial beneficiary matters stated in the and was a agreement a sec. 537.065 settlement adjudication be into of the criminal benefit any assess- the bulk of designed to shift Paul duty to defend cause it violated its mini- insurer while damages to his ment of alleging negli suit when he filed his civil damages. exposure to mizing personal his Baron relies on McCormack gence. James inter- had identical Both Paul Servs., American Guar. & Mgmt. Inc. v. un- in Paul’s conduct declared having ests 168, 170 Liab. S.W.2d obligation to the intentional so as shift 1999), that, ordinarily, the providing Farm. to State State damages paying comparing by to defend is determined duty criminal relying in on the Farm’s interest policy provisions allegations coverage exclusion were plea and the But insured made a petition. where the that of James or aligned with either judi judicial part prior admission as of a result, privity in civil action. As in case that cial determination a criminal impose necessary to collateral intentional, conduct the insured’s Finally, Farm was absent. against State announced in McCormack general rule Farm conflict between State the inherent give estoppel. Estoppel, rise to does not ef- Farm from prevented and Paul State doctrine, applies an where being equitable in its fectively asserting defenses unjustified under the refusal defend was pro- garnishment action until the the civil justifiably Farm the circumstances. State reasons, all it would be ceeding. For these prior judicial admission and relied on the Farm to be collater- inequitable for State concluding in it had no cov determination coverage its ally estopped asserting from and, thus, Paul. erage duty no to defend proceeding. in garnishment defenses For Farm to have defended Paul on intention ground that his conduct was CONCLUSION than have creat negligent al rather would in favor summary judgment granted conflict with the in ed irreconcilable proceeding is garnishment of James (Mo. Steck, sured. Cox the trial court failed reversed because Therefore, App.1999). eq the doctrine of preclusive to the effect give regard due apply prevent does not uitable The criminal prior judgment. asserting Farm from the absence of any party Paul and foreclosed conviction coverage. asserting him from that claiming through trial intentional. The his conduct was not any argues James also that equitable in holding court erred preclusion resulting from the estoppel precluded State collateral in negated by judgment the civil coverage exclusion. asserting its collater case and that State Farm is now material fact genuine issue of There is no pre ally judgment. bound the civil As intentionally. Paul acted to whether as noted, collateral viously offensive use of to the trial court The cause is remanded James, disfa estoppel, proposed by as in favor of State entry addition, In there is a lack of vored. garnishment proceeding. Farm the Farm in privity between Paul and State action, civil Paul’s the civil case. C.J., PRICE, LIMBAUGH and left little question earlier BENTON, JJ., concur. liability to of his regarding the issue J., Indeed, WHITE, part and dissents agreed he to make resti concurs James. WOLFF, filed; only opinion part separate in that case. The tution to James J., part part and dissents damages concurs real was the extent filed. separate opinion enter only Paul’s defense was to issue.

WALLACE, J., in Sp. opinions pal opinion concurs fails adequately to address WOLFF, of WHITE and using guilty plea JJ. when Paul’s trigger to the insurer’s exclusion clause is that STITH, J., LAURA DENVIR not bargains do not result from full litigation participating. of factual underlying issues.1 Com- WHITE, Judge, part in concurring (b) (Second) to the Restatement of in dissenting part. Judgments, highlights section this dis- in pertinent part: tinction and states I. A pleads guilty defendant who may be I majority opinion’s concur with the con- in estopped subsequent held to be civil summary judgment clusion that not does litigation contesting rep- from the facts by estoppel preclude lie of to virtue resenting the elements of the offense. Casualty Fire and Insurance Com- However, under the terms this Re- (State Farm) pany raising its cover- estoppel statement such an is not a mat- age subsequent garnishment defense preclusion, ter issue because the issue dissent, I proceeding. respectfully howev- has not actually litigated, been but is a er, principal opinion’s from the analysis matter beyond the law evidence that defensive collateral estoppel may be scope (Emphasis this Restatement. applied by using State Farm Robert Paul’s added)! (Paul) guilty deprive Danny (James) day challenge of his court to principal The opinion attacks the Re- intentional act in a exclusion homeowner’s position claiming statement’s it fails policy. I garnish- would remand to the appropriately scrutinize the rational for es- proceeding ment court for a full on the discusses, toppel. opinion length, The merits. equal split authority applying jurisdictions; Restatement’s rule outside

II. however, curiously jurisdic- it ignores the issue, majority opinion grants binding The State Farm tion with authority on this summary judgment concluding namely precedent. the deter- Missouri This Court “intent,” liability, mination of or made consistently has followed the be- reasoning (b) “[wjith plea bargain dispositive Paul’s and is of hind comment regard insurance If coverage. estoppel collateral collateral ... rule established applied by is to be equating prior adjudica- the factual is that the in the issues, issue of intent coverage, operates only points, issue of tion as to the questions litigated then all four factors of the must actually doctrine and deter- be satisfied and it must shown that regard be mined.” With to a criminal (b) fully plea specifically, Paul’s “intent” litigated correctly comment ex- evidence, bargain proceeding. princi- plains What the that this is an issue of Shore, 322, 329-30, recognizing siery 1. When the use of Inc. v. non-mutual 439 U.S. (1979). estoppel, acknowledged collateral 99 S.Ct. 58 L.Ed.2d While this Court litigation may offensive use that the full and fair factor must be doctrine be a less approach, favored this does dispense satisfied in order to with the doc not excuse requirement by par satisfaction of this those mutuality. trine of Oates v. Ins. Co. Safeco employing America, (Mo.1979) defensively. ties the doctrine ("Fairness overriding is the consideration in determining apply City whether or not to the Doc Kansas American Polled Hereford (Mo.1982). City, Mutuality.”). trine Parklane Ho See also rarely will be available collateral preclusion. The well-settled eviden- in a criminal context.6 that while a tiary rule Missouri is subsequent in a civil plea is admissible this opinion misreads principal it, it the one who made proceeding against Oates v. Co. Court’s decision Safeco conclusive, may explained, is not be Acceptance of the doctrine America.7 relitigated.3 thus estoppel is not collateral of non-mutual and does not eliminate inconsistent with guilty plea A is a declaration that a evidentiary rule long-standing interest, objective independent, not evi- interest, a declaration guilty plea is full guilt.4 litigation dence of Without admissible, conclusive, in not a subse but issues, particularized such as the elements fact, proceeding. the liberal quent civil oppo- charged, subsequent of the crime izing of the doctrine of collateral determination in a civil suit does not site mutuality of the re by the elimination necessarily judg- an inconsistent generate weighs preservation in favor of quirement in a full Even a fact determined ment. evidentiary rules to ensure the full of such jury trial must be distilled to fair of the relevant issues. litigation and specific, unambiguous, necessary and find- exemplifies the rationale under This case fact, ing particular finding of one or on one position that this lying the Restatement’s issue, for that fact to be specific or issue preclusion, not issue is an issue of evidence relitigation.5 barred from In State v. Sim- proceed of Paul’s because record mons, this observed that it Court because ing is devoid of evidence that there was specific usually impossible to discern of the factual ele litigation full and fair verdict, upon jury basis which a reaches its of “intent.” 76, tors, (Mo. Witform, Reorganized Christ v. Inc. v. Church Jesus 3. Pruiett 477 S.W.2d 80 901, 1972); Saints, 495, Ferguson Boyd, v. 448 S.W.2d Day S.W.2d 500 Latter 821 Blake, (Mo. 1970); Johnson, v. S.W.2d 1991); 903 Nichols 418 (Mo. banc State v. 598 188, (Mo. 1967); Riley, 189-90 Howard v. 409 123, 1980); (Mo. v. banc State S.W.2d 125-26 154, (Mo.1966). S.W.2d 156 See also Wallace 90, 1976). Booker, (Mo.App. 540 S.W.2d 93 Revenue, Mo., 786 v. Director State Swenson, 436, 445, Ashe v. 397 U.S. See also 893, (overruled (Mo.App.1990) S.W.2d 895 1189, (1970). L.Ed.2d 469 90 S.Ct. 25 Revenue, grounds by v. other Riche Director of 331, (Mo. 1999)); 987 S.W.2d 335-36 banc Simmons, also 6. S.W.2d at 760. See 955 Adolf, State ex rel. v. 691 S.W.2d O’Blennis Mason, v. 594 S.W.2d State ex rel. Westfall 498, Aldrich, 1985); (Mo.App. 503 Curtain v. Booker, 908, (Mo. 1980); 540 913 banc 61, 1979); (Mo.App. 65 Tramunti, 93; States v. 500 S.W.2d United Worthington, Farm Mut. Auto. Co. 405 Ins. v. 1334, (2d Cir.1974); United States F.2d 1346 (8th Cir.1968), Worthing affirming, F.2d 683 492, (2d Cir.1973). Cioffi, F.2d 498 v. 487 Stevens, (W.D.Mo. F.Supp. ton v. 294 349 principal opinion Laspy, The cites to Estate of 1967); Cooper Co. v. National Life 725, 1966), (Mo.App. S.W.2d 731 for the 409 USA, Mo.App. S.W. 467 Co., proposition that defensive use of collateral (1923); Surety Zimmerman v. Southern conjunction judi with is allowed (Mo.App.1922); 241 S.W. 96-97 otat Ann guilt. That determina cial determinations Acquittal Conviction or as Evidence of ion: tion, however, upon jury based a full trial on which it was Based in Civil the Facts Action, specific 1311. instruction on the individual ele A.L.R.2d crime, including "intent.” It did ments of the Spica, 4. See footnote See also State bargain without reference not involve a (Mo.1965). S.W.2d to this factual element. Simmons, (Mo. 1979). (Mo. 7. 583 S.W.2d 713 banc 1997); Nunley, banc State v. 1996); King General Contrac Reviewing plea bargain proceeding Paul's tran- that Paul demonstrated suf- script, capacity clear that trial court fered from diminished at the met time requirements capable of Rule 24.02 at- of the incident and was not comprehending if un- tempting appreciating to ascertain the defendant or the nature the nature charge consequences derstood of the of his conduct. The tri- “Defendant, concluded, penalties to which the al court Robert M. was offered. Plaintiff, However, Paul, expect the rule did not require any does intend James, injured.” (Empha- specific Danny evidence to be adduced on the T. to be added). crime, individual elements of abso- sis lutely transcript nowhere in the does there appears to majority opinion also appear conclusive evidence “in- of Paul’s requirement fully litigated confuse the litigation tent” that could constitute full requirements accepting with for a the that factual issue. plea. freely A and plea, offered expected

Whether an by competent insured or intend- a individual with voluntarily fact, injury ed is a and the equate every a factual basis not does burden on the fairly insurer to establish that being fully litigated factual issue and an exclusion bars For an coverage.8 Only exclu- being relitigation. and barred from expected sion for or intended conduct the civil case was there a negligence bar coverage, only particular- the insurer must not specific determination of this acted, show that the insured intentionally the minimum finding, ized factual which at expected but that the in- also insured or fact disputed leaves the issue one of not tended the that occurred.9 In appropriate judgment. result the summary for plea bargain proceeding, judge the never defendant,

questioned attorney, or his III. toas whether or not Paul acted with the motion summary judgment Farm’s intent injury, to cause or intended the provides poli- insurance only copy a of the fact, result that In occurred. the recita- superintendent cy, the affidavit of a claim by tion of facts offered Paul tends to re- effect, stating was in and the exactly opposite. flect transcript plea proceeding. of the The any

Paul’s rendition the incident included motion does not include additional evi- just complete such statements as “I lost of Paul’s relating dence to a determination control,” him,” “I “I struck out at and intent. State Farm concedes its brief snapped.” control and that not re- Losing striking out the issue of intent has been it. establishing by asking at someone falls short of an solved this Court to infer expected ap- intentional act and an and intend- court of cites several peals support proposition ed result. While these factual statements cases to that acted, if support they the fact that Paul do intent to harm is inferred the natural conclusively probable consequences not resolve the issue of intent. and of an act are to Expert produce testimony negligence distinguishing the civil harm.10 The factor Pacchetti, L.D.G., Cir.1993); Family Mid-Century 8. American Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ins. Co. v. 1991). Economy 808 S.W.2d 370-71 (Mo.App.1992); Haste, Casualty Fire and v. Co. 824 S.W.2d Id. Farm Bureau Town & (Mo.App.1991); Turnbo, Country Ins. Co. v. 740 S.W.2d Casualty Caley, 10. State Farm Fire & Co. Cole, Travelers Ins. Co. (Mo.App.1987); (Mo.App.1997); B.B. v. Truck (Mo.App.1982); (8th Continental Ins. F.3d but is not proceeding, civil subsequent these cases the one before in a between and may explained. be that in all cited cases conclusive Court is of these this made a that the trial court determination WOLFF, part Judge, concurring rath- the insured’s conduct was intentional part. dissenting Moreover, er re- negligent. than when opinion judgment, separate motion for I concur viewing summary White, to em- separately and write Judge the non-movant the ben- who receives pro- I due phasize what believe are basic efit of all reasonable inferences from applicable case. record, principles to this cess support and facts set forth in only are true if not party’s motion taken as Danny opinion that principal holds by party’s re- non-moving contradicted victim, James, stabbing is bound sponse.11 of intent finding Paul, the criminal case the state’s summary renewed James’ motion who him. It is a matter man stabbed court, garnishment he process one is not fundamental due presented evidence of the trial court’s de- by judgment to which he was bound of Paul’s re- negligence termination by a adequately represented party previous arguments newed motion’s Lee, 311 U.S. Hansberry See party. psychi- the expert that included affidavit of (1940); 40-41, 61 S.Ct. 85 L.Ed. Schmitz, atrist John M. M.D. Dr. Schmitz Kay Mary Friedenthal, Kane & H. Jack trial court and the both concluded R. Miller, Arthur Procedure Civil incapable comprehending the na- was (3d ed.1999). § 14.13 consequences or actions at the ture his victim, incident did not James, time and that he Danny stabbing expect injured. intend James to be Paul. party against to the state’s case not Consequently, there evi- was substantial only theory that would conform The contradicting the dence facts set forth opinion process is that majority due summary judgment State Farm’s motion. by his represented victim’s interests were and, proof State Farm has burden of in the criminal case. assailant facts, these that under cannot establish Only it an strange, If that seems is. genuine dispute no the mate- there is as to “privity” flexible excessively notion support rial facts to its motion.12 explanation like would sound —that claiming apply, not bound because he is Since collateral does James is pro- subsequent through coverage civil result- that State proceeding and the relies majority opinion ed in to Paul. The negligence, a determination of vides (Second) Judg- dispute the mate- the Restatement minimum there is over on “intent,” ments, 85(b)(2), privity judg- to establish summary rial fact of section however, Paul; Farm is I appropriate. for State between James by opinion is principal to the court taken garnishment position would remand rejected f of that proceeding coverage specifically on in comment for a full in comment f evidentiary rule Illustration No. 10 following the well-settled section. (Second) Judg- this state that is admissible of the Restatement Corp. v. Mid-America Exchange Pickering, ITT Commercial Fin. Corp., Supply Marine 854 S.W.2d v. New Hanover Ins. Co. (Mo.App.1982); 1993). (Mo. banc comer, (Mo.App.1979). 12. Id. at 381.

ments, virtually ply section the same parties as because the are interested this case: the same or in proving or dis proving the same state of facts.”

D Clem inflicts a blow on X aas result of Pittman, ents v. which X dies. D is convicted of inten- 1989). P, tional homicide. administrator of X’s estate, brings an action D In it proceeding, cannot be said death, wrongful alleging D’s act was that James’ adequately rep- interests were I negligent. previously had issued a resented Paul for James to have had D, liability insurance to insur- day his in court. ing liability negligent for D’s acts but short, I would remand this case to excluding intentional acts. In P’s action the circuit hearing court for a in which D, P precluded by is not both company James and the insurance showing conviction from day have their in court. The issue is negligent D’s act was rather than inten- injury whether Paul’s to James was inflict- tional. intentionally, company ed the insurance as appendices to the Restatement contends, or other than whether (Second) of Judgments cite numerous intentional, which would invoke the cover- cases, agree some that and some that dis- age of the policy. insurance agree position. with this But I as far as determine, can the Restatement has not

changed position its point, this and the position

Restatement closely more con- process

forms to due norms than the cases reject position. the Restatement process,

On due the United States Su Lee, preme in Hansberry Court 311 U.S. In the Interest D.C. 32, 40-41, (1940), S.Ct. 85 L.Ed. A.C., Minor Children. particularly instructive. Whether one is represented by in previous adju Nos. ED ED 78593. another depends dication on whether their inter Appeals, Missouri Court of ests are the same or in conflict. Id. at District, Eastern 115; 61 S.Ct. see also American Polled Division Two. City City, Kansas Hereford (Mo.1982). Paul, May case, representing only his Rehearing Motion for Transfer and/or own interests. His goal emerge Supreme July Court Denied from the criminal minimum case consequences. say, Needless to Paul protecting was not James’ interests when

Paul stabbed James. It is likewise hard to

fathom that Paul was representing James’ pled guilty stabbing

interests when Paul action, negligence

James. the civil may

and James both have been interested proving factual of negli element

gence, “privity but is not sim- established

Case Details

Case Name: James v. Paul

Court Name: Supreme Court of Missouri

Date Published: May 29, 2001

Citation: 49 S.W.3d 678

Docket Number: SC 82867

Court Abbreviation: Mo.