Ian Phillip JAMES, Appellant v. INTERNATIONAL PAINTERS AND ALLIED TRADES INDUSTRY PENSION PLAN and Gary J. Meyers, Appellees.
No. 13-7002.
United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit.
Argued Nov. 25, 2013. Decided Dec. 20, 2013.
738 F.3d 282
Kent Cprek argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief was Judith Sznyter.
Before: BROWN, Circuit Judge, and EDWARDS and SILBERMAN, Senior Circuit Judges.
Opinion for the Court filed PER CURIAM.
PER CURIAM:
Appellant Ian Phillip James asserts that the International Painters and Allied Trades Industry Pension Plan (“International Plan“) has denied him benefits to which he is entitled. The key factual issue is whether James accrued enough credit under an earlier plan, the Local 963 Plan, which was later merged into the International Plan. In light of certain concessions, the only time period at issue is between 1959 and 1962. Relevant contemporaneous records regarding this period are sparse. The International Plan determined that James had not demonstrated sufficient accrued credit during the period, and it denied James most of the benefits he sought. James sued in district court, arguing, among other things, that the district court should review the International Plan‘s determination de novo. According
The International Plan is an ERISA-governed pension plan.1 The Supreme Court has held that courts should review ERISA benefits determinations deferentially if the plan explicitly grants discretion to plan administrators to determine benefits eligibility. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115-16 (1989). The district court found, and James concedes, that the International Plan does grant the plan administrator discretion. James v. Int‘l Painters & Allied Trades Indus. Pension Plan, 710 F.Supp.2d 16, 24 (D.D.C.2010) (James I). Nevertheless, James argues that the district court should have reviewed the International Plan‘s determination under a de novo standard because of a number of procedural irregularities in the plan‘s administration of his claim.
Although the Supreme Court has never suggested that the standard of review applied to ERISA administrators’ benefits determinations should change because of procedural irregularities, a number of our sister circuits have carved out varying exceptions to the general rule. Some circuits substitute de novo review for deferential review only when the plan administrator committed severe procedural violations. See, e.g., Atkins v. Bert Bell/Pete Rozelle NFL Player Ret. Plan, 694 F.3d 557, 567 (5th Cir.2012); Trs. of Electricians’ Salary Deferral Plan v. Wright, 688 F.3d 922, 927 (8th Cir.2012); Anderson v. Suburban Teamsters of N. Ill. Pension, Fund Bd. of Trs., 588 F.3d 641, 646-47 (9th Cir.2009). The Tenth Circuit is stricter, stripping a plan administrator of deferential review unless the irregularity is “inconsequential.” LaAsmar v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 605 F.3d 789, 800 (10th Cir.2010). The Seventh Circuit, however, has held that procedural irregularities do not alter the standard of review. See Weitzenkamp v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., 661 F.3d 323, 329 n. 3 (7th Cir.2011).
The apparent rationale for applying a more stringent standard of review when there are procedural irregularities is that certain irregularities may call into doubt the plan administrator‘s good faith or even competence. But whatever the merits of the cases that have recognized a “procedural irregularity exception” to deferential review, we do not think that James has alleged ERISA violations that rise to that level.
First, James argues that the plan failed to maintain adequate records, as it was required to do, see
Second, James argues that the current plan administrator failed to timely produce documents that it was required to produce under ERISA. See
We recognize that James seems only inches away from having accrued sufficient credit to qualify for a greater pension, but without adequate records, it is quite difficult to show. The district court held that the plan administrator acted reasonably in dealing with the sparse record—at least once all available information was before it—and we see no basis in this case for applying a more stringent standard of review.
So ordered.
