97 Ga. 673 | Ga. | 1896
TI. O. Orosthwait sued J. IT. & A. L. James, a banking partnership, and J. IT. James, individually, alleging that they had damaged him in the sum of $2,675, as follows: About May 20, 1892, plaintiff was employed as bookkeeper by David Lamar, president of the International Railway & Employees Accident Association, being required, in lieu of giving bond, to deposit $1,000 in defendant’s bank as security,- the same not to be subject to check. Lamar represented to plaintiff that the association had a paid in capital of $6,500, and after making certain charges against that sum,, an apparent-balance of $1,116.23 was left. Lamar also furnished plaintiff with a pass-book from defendant’s bank, which showed a credit of- the last named sum in the bank in favor of the association. The business of the association seemed to be good, and plaintiff inquired of the secretary if any stock was for sale. In a day or two Lamar came to- him and offered to sell him an interest of one third for $2,500. Plaintiff called on J. II. James, informed him of the contemplated purchase, and asked him if the amount apparently to the credit of the association was correct. James declined to give any statement as to the balance then in bank, but referred the plaintiff to Lamar, saying, “You go to Lamar. Tie-will tell you just how it is. You put yourself in his hands; he will treat you right and make you money.” Relying on this statement, plaintiff bought, and paid $2,500 for, a one third interest in the association, but in a few days, Lamar becoming engaged in a controversy and being arrested, plaintiff grew suspicious, and called on James and asked him, “How much money has the association in the bank?” James at first
The jury found for the plaintiff $2,215.25. Defendants’ motion for a new trial was overruled, and they -excepted.
There is some conflict in the evidence, but accepting as we must that version of the facts which the jury have found to be true, there can be no doubt that the recovery in the plaintiff’s favor was warranted. According to the evidence of the defendant J. II. James, the credit entered by him on the “pass-book” was. merely a fictitious credit. A banker may, it is true, without requiring the deposit of any money, give to a customer a valid credit upon his books in a stated amount, to be used for a special and limited purpose only; but this cannot be accomplished by entering the credit in the customer’s favor and immediately cancelling
It was argued that James did all that could be required of him when he referred the plaintiff to Lamar, and that
It appears further that the plaintiff was in fact deceived and defrauded. He returned to Lamar and asked him why he supposed James did not answer his question, and Lamar said he supposed it was because the plaintiff was a comparative stranger to James, but said “it was not because the.money was not in the bank.” The plaintiff then raised the money to purchase an interest in the business from Lamar, and paid him $2,500 for it. He testified that he did this upon the faith of the entry in the deposit book, in connection with the conduct and statements of James at the interview above referred to. It soon after turned out that the interest he had purchased was practically worth
It was not necessary, in order for the plaintiff to recover,, that the deceit in question should haye been the sole inducement which led him to make the investment. It was-sufficient if it influenced his conduct materially. Kerr, Fraud and Mistake, 74; 1 Jaggard, Torts, 589, 593. Nor was it necessary that the defendant should be benefited, by the deception. National Exchange Bank v. Sibley, 71 Ga. 731; 1 Jaggard, Torts, 562. Nor is a recovery precluded by the fact that James was not informed as to the extent of the proposed investment. In the cases referred to on this subject by the plaintiff (Slade v. Little, 20 Ga. 371, Hopkins v. Cooper, 28 Ga. 392, Glover v. Townsend, 30 Ga. 90), there was merely a general representation as to-the credit of a person, without any indication in the representation or the circumstances, as to the extent to which, the credit might safely go. Here there was a representation that a specified sum stood to the credit of the “association” in the defendants’ bank; and the amount of the-recovery in this action is considerably less than that, amount.
We do not deem it necessary to deal specifically with the-numerous grounds of the motion for a new trial. What, we have said covers the main and controlling questions-made in the record. Several of the grounds relating to- the admission and rejection of testimony, and to the charge of' the court, are too vague, general and indefinite to be considered, it not appearing what the testimony referred to was, or what particular portion of the charge is complained of. So far as we can discover from the motion, there was. no material error in rejecting or in refusing to rule out evidence. The requests to charge, so far as legal and pertinent, were covered by the charge given, which was free-from error, and which as a whole fully and ably presented the law of the case. This is the second verdict in favor of