*1 such as was notice to Bro. that ly suggests outstanding rights, deed Carter & liens, namely: vendor’s acquiring deeds and Wessels the surface estate. only was Co., (Tex. v. Rio Bravo Oil extend cited in these I would not the rule 1952, refd) Civ.App. writ —deed — Eastland eases, I would to the facts of this case. purchaser’s within оf title referred to chain question hold that a of fact remains prior an unrecorded and further contract therefore, and, would trier of fact to decide stated, “excepting reserving herefrom the cause to trial court on remand exceptions all the con and reservations issue of notice. by tained in the said so made instrument Railway the said Williams v. Company”; J., SPEARS, joins in this dissent. District, County Navigation Harris Houston 411, 99 (1936 ) —pur 128 Tex.
chaser’s deed directly referred to another title,
deed which was within its chain of regarding
that deed contained covenants
the execution of the court releases which purchaser by;
held the was bound Texas Dunlap, supra, pur
Co. v. deed within chaser’s chain of a vendor’s title reserved Petitioner, JAMES, Marguerite Frances lien, notice purchaser charged was land; against that a lien existed said Gue v. Guevara, v. supra, purchaser’s vara deed — M.D., BROWN, Raymond et M. purchase money recited the existence of a al., Respondents. lien; note and retention of a vendor’s No. C-1080. imputed contents of knowledge of the to the purchaser; Tuggle that note Texas. Supreme Court of Cooke, supra, pur in deed in — reference 14, July 1982. chaser’s chain of interest in 50 title to an conveyed being conveyed acres or had been 22, Rehearing Sept. Denied deed, purchaser by another bound was Bright, that conveyаnce; Abercrombie v. 734 (Tex.Civ.App. — Eastland n.r.e.) writ ref’d deeds —reference purchaser’s chain stated that of title subject to a conveyance
were former
acres; Cobb, (Tex. Loomis v. 159 S.W. ref’d) origi Paso Civ.App. — — El from the Elizario to
nal deed town of San pur original grantee, which was title, сhain of that it was
chaser’s recited virtue and in ac authority
executed with an the town
cordance ordinance of the ordi
council. The deed also stated that surveying, adjusting,
nance was for
providing granting division and unappropriated lands. Purchaser bound provisions
held be
ordinance; Davis, W. T. Bro. v. Carter & to another supra, deed referred —recorded deed,
recorded both were links deeds title, Bro.’s chain
Carter & therefore
reservation of the mineral estate in the first *2 granted The trial court sum-
Health Code.
judgment
for the doctors and
mary
Dr. diagnosis grounds Rosenthal also as for reversal. furnished his of Mrs. James to Blue Cross and Blue The is not men- Blue Shield communication Shield of Texas. While there is no evidence a of action for tiоned as the basis of in the record that any privilege attached to only libel it libel. Mrs. James discusses as communication, this the possibly issue of its to relates to the doctors’ communications libelous nature was never in raised the sent Dr. trial court and court. Mrs. James only mentioned the Blue Rosenthal for the James attorney to Shield communication in response to the children. The Blue communication is Shield doctors’ Motions Summary Judgment, only regard with to a cause of mentioned where she stated that the Blue Shield com- malpractice. for negligencе-medical munication preclude should a summary grounds It be as cannot now considered judgment as to her cause of action for summary judg- reversal of the trial court’s negligence: ment on the libel action. Tex.R.Civ.Pro. Rule admission, 166-A.
By his own Dr. Rosenthal was not certain diagnosis of his of Plаintiff While the doctors’ communications that was contained in the Certificate of diagnoses of Mrs. to the court of their he Mental Illness executed and had filed condition, regardless of how James’ mental in the proceeding. mental illness Dr. Ro- made, cannot serve as the basis negligently asked, senthal was “Do you sending recall action, diagnoses for a defamation written Blue to Shield may be actionable on other themselves Mrs. James was suffering from a condi- grounds. regard disapprove In this we paranoid tion of psychosis?”, and Dr. Ro- language Grigson, оf Clark v. in response: senthal stated “Yes.” ref’d (Tex.Civ.App. — Dallas upon matters, genu- foregoing Based n.r.e.), psychia inasmuch as extended proceed ine issues of material fact exist in this in testifying trists mental cause as to immunity whether Rosenthal acted all civil liabil ings a blanket from prudеnt physician as a with of defamation ac- ity. unavailability connection liability only tion does Article excuses from preclude plaintiff pur- not from 5547-18 See, faith, reasonably, other act suing Runge good remedies at law. those who Franklin, (1889) of material negligence. question Tex. 10 S.W. without Bank, respect and Tsesmelis v. 53 fact in this case Sinton State exists Brown, Hall, (Tex.Comm’n App.1932, judgmt. whether Drs. affidavits adopted). prevented Mrs. There are negligently. James not acted from the effect that recovering negli- psychiatrists from the doctors for from other ill, gent that the misdiagnosis-medical malpractice mentally Mrs. is not Hall, Brown, and Rosen- merely diagnoses diagnoses because their were later of Drs. to a at properly communicated the due course thal could not have been arrived judicial of observation. proceedings. during рeriods their brief Thus, granting sum- trial court erred pro- Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 5547-18 mary negli- on doctors vides: malpractice gent misdiagnosis-medical Liability cause is now remanded cause. That faith, persons All acting good reason- trial court. ably and without connec- to state a Mrs. James hаs failed examination, certification, ap- tion with imprisonment. false cause of action prehension, de- custody, transportation, imprison of false The essential elements tention, discharge any treatment detention; 1) 2) ment willful person, or are: without performanсe oth- *5 consent; of law. 3) authority and without er act required or authorized by [the Garcia, (Tex. 261 Moore’s Inc. v. 604 S.W.2d Code], Mental Health from shall be free 1980, writ ref’d criminal, Civ.App. Corpus Christi liability, by all civil or reason of — n.r.e.) an or detention is executed such action. If arrest is legally which sufficient process under It a well is settled rule of construction that compe a court of duly by form and issued the “express one mention or enumeration of impris jurisdiction, an for false tent action person, thing, equiv- or class is consequence, Impris lie. 35 False onment will not C.J.S. an еxpress alent to exclusion of all others.” (1960). James’ deten onment 27 As Mrs. § Co., 634, v. State Mauritz-Wells 141 Tex. a valid arrest warrant by tion was effected 639, 238, (1943). plain 175 S.W.2d 241 judge, the trial signed by probate implication persons art. of 5547-18 is that on the false im judgment court’s summary faith, acting in and unreasonably, negli- bad Pate clearly proper. claim was prisonment gently in connection with mental Stevens, (Tex.Civ.App.— v. 763 proceedings liability. are not free from 1953, dism’d). writ Texarkana faith, questions Fact regarding bad unrea- sonableness, therefore, negligence, or has Similarly, Mrs. James failed preclude summary should on judgment for malicious to state a cause of action otherwise valid causes of action. wrongful suit for civil prosecution. In a plead must and proceedings, plaintiff
A cause of
for medical mal
1)
continuation of
practice
prove:
aсtion.
the institution or
essentially
Perdue,
2)
of
or at the in
judicial
by,
See
J.
The Law Texas
generally
proceedings;
3)
in the
(1975).
psychiatrist
defendant(s);
Medical
malice
Malpractice
stance of
duty
4)
his
patient
proceedings;
owes
to exercise
commencement of
lack
5)
degree
proceedings;
of
under
ordinarily employed
probable
skill
of
cause
specialists
proceedings
plaintiff’s
similar
of the
by
circumstances
similar
termination
favor;
Trevino,
See,
Bourdon,
6) damages.
the field.
v.
Martin v.
e.g., Bowles
and
1,
(1949).
148 Tex.
(Tex.Civ.App. Corpus
WALLACE, ply summary J., default opinion dissents in an SPEARS, J., which joins. рroof necessary to establish movant’s right. SONDOCK, J., not sitting. *6 Id. at 678.
WALLACE, Justice, dissenting. present James as the non-movant did I concur majority’s decision con- state a court with facts that cerning James’ cause of action for mal- of action I for libel. would hold practice, but respectfully dissent as to their preserved has her cause of action based on decision that the summary judgment ren- Rosen- fact that movant defendant dered proper as to the possibly libelous thal did not meet his burden under Rule nature of Dr. Rosenthal’s 166-A. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Texas. I would hold the trial court’s summa- SPEARS, J., joins in this dissent. ry judgment was improper light fact that on at least three occasions James
pointed out the this existence of letter to
the trial They court. are:
1. Defendant, “Plaintiff’s Response M.D., Rosenthal,
Michael R. Motion
for Summary Judgment”; Response “Plaintiff’s First to Defend-
ants’ Motion for Summary Judg-
ment”; and
3. “Plaintiff’s First Supplemental Re-
sponse Motion Defendants’
Summary Judgment.”