*1 494 different, although “adopts
somewhat the Assimilative the MCA state law adopts Crimes Act also state laws to define purposes, for certain the offense remains a federally punish offenses that are not sufficiency federal offense and of the evi- defined. id. See by principles dence should be determined law”). of federal rejected
We have
the notion that
incorporation of state law for the definition
Thus,
light
purpose
of the
Assimilative
of offenses under the
Crimes Major
authority,
Act and uniform
Crimes
Act extends to “the whole criminal and
Huff's
the district court
constitutional law” of
the state
which
applied
should have
jeopar-
Idaho’s double
Smayda
the offense occurred.
v.
See
dy law fails.
States,
251,
United
352 F.2d
Cir.
might
What Idaho courts
think about
1965) (holding that California’s search and
legality
prosecution
of Huff s federal
apply
prosecution
seizure laws do not
in a
irrelevant. The
incorporation
MCA’s
ACA),
under
abrogated
on other
notwithstanding,
state law
the offense for
States,
grounds by Katz v. United
which Huff
prosecuted
was a federal
(1967).
sake adopt both statutes
state or territorial law to define crimes for exists,
which no federal definition and to specify penalty attached each of- TILLEMA, Petitioner-Appellant, James Therefore, fense. our limiting cases prosecutions reach of state law under ACA v. strongly indicate that the MCA does not LONG, Warden; Miles Frankie Sue
incorporate jeopardy Idaho’s double law. Papa, Respondents- Del Cases from other courts bolster con- Appellees. clusion that the MCA’s incorporation of No. 00-15974. in defining state law and punishing crimes is limited to the applicable elements and Appeals, United States Court of schemes, sentencing and does not include Ninth Circuit. aspects all example, state law. For Argued and Submitted March United States Norquay holds that feder- al courts need not apply state’s law Filed June regarding good time credits. 905 F.2d As Amended on Rehearing Denial of (8th Cir.1990). Eighth Circuit En Rehearing Aug. Banc sufficiency has also held that state of evi- dence rules do not apply prose- an MCA Elk,
cution. See United v. Long (8th Cir.1977)
565 F.2d (stating *2 Lambrose, Office of the Federal C.
John Nevada, Defender, Vegas, Public Las petitioner-appellant. Hulse, Attorney Gener- Deputy Rene L. California, respon- al, for the Vegas, Las dents-appellees. RYMER, REINHARDT,
Before: FISHER, Judges. Circuit REINHARDT; Opinion by Judge Partial Dissent Concurrence Partial by Judge RYMER.
REINHARDT, Judge: Circuit dismissal, appeals James Tillema corpus for habeas untimely, of his § 2254. We re- under 28 U.S.C. relief verse. Background and Procedural
I. Factual August indicted Tillema was Nevada, charged County, Clark (two burglary vehicle counts of three padlock Proper break-ins and theft of a from a mand for a Sentencing Hearing” on store) pos- Woolworth’s and two counts of again October 1995. Tillema once al- (a burglary session of tools screwdriver leged that his Investigation Pre-Sentence “penlight”). prosecuted and a He was un- Report erroneously represented had *3 der Nevada’s habitual offender statute he had parole prior violated his in a case. and, two-day jury a trial in after which he information, As a result of that incorrect himself, represented he was sentenced on contended, Tillema required he was 23, November 1993 to three consecutive alleged parole serve his violation of four burglary life sentences on the counts and years begin before his new sentences could year two concurrent sentences of one on to run. pending, While motion a was possession counts. Supreme divided Nevada Court considered appeal Tillema’s direct and affirmed his complex Tillema then commenced a conviction in published opinion April a on overlapping challenges series of state 3,1996.1 First, his conviction .and sentence. on 14, 1994, March pro Tillema filed a se 26, 1996, September On Tillema com- Illegal Sentence,” “Motion to Vacate proceedings by menced federal habeas which he contended that his Pre-Sentence mailing pro petition, his se section 2254 Investigation Report had contained “un- together proceed with motion to in for- true factual allegations” specifically, that — pauperis, ma to the United States District case, he had violated parole prior his in a for Court the District of Nevada. On No- allegation an that he denied—that resulted 15, 1996, vember the district court denied in an improper sentence. The motion to the in pauperis motion “[biased on forma court, vacate by was dismissed the trial information about Petitioner’s financial and that dismissal was affirmed on the status,” and noted that two of Tillema’s merits Supreme the Nevada Court on appeared seven claims to be unexhausted. 4,1994. December The court directed Tillema to “file an Meanwhile, counsel, through appointed amended showing when and how Tillema appeal initiated direct of his he grounds exhausted the stated for relief’ 27, 1994, conviction on June asserting six 3, no later than December 1996. Tillema grounds 3, 1995, for February relief. On complied pro peti- and filed an amended se appeal while that pending, Tillema 21, 1996, tion on asserting November pro filed a se corpus petition each of his seven fully claims was exhaust- court, state trial alleging two substantive ed. The district court acknowledged, in an grounds appeal, for as well as an ineffec- 16, 1997, January order dated that Tille- tive appellate assistance of counsel claim ma’s amended had been received based on appointed counsel’s failure to proper and was “now in order.” The court grounds raise those two appeal. on direct gave days Tillema 30 pay which to The trial court summarily dismissed the five-dollar fee. petition, and the Supreme Nevada Court appeal dismissed Tillema’s from that dis- The district court received Tillema’s fil- 28,1995. missal July on ing February fee on 1997. It acknowl- pro Tillema then filed a second edged receipt se “Mo- of the fee and ordered that Illegal tion to Vacate Sentence and Re- the state be served with Tillema’s State, 1. Tillema v. quately Nev. 914 P.2d permitting advised Tillema before him (1996). justices Two of the five dissented on to waive his to counsel. that the trial court had not ade- Nevada Su- that motion—the dismissal 1997. On June April dated in an order disposing of issued an mo- order preme filed a Court of Nevada the State it had of Tille- It dismiss, that one held because asserting the motion. rejected allegation [Tillema’s] claims—his “once considered seven ma’s non- claims,” life sentences was “law previous of three decision imposition its violated offenses property therefore dismissed The court violent the case.” against prohibition Amendment’s Eighth issued The Remittitur appeal. unex- punishment unusual cruel 15,1998. September —was presented hausted, Tillema had later, September One week courts “under Nevada the instant Tillema commenced reference to theory” without legal different ap- mailing a motion proceeding *4 and Report In a Constitution. federal the counsel, a new together with pointment on October entered Recommendation court.2 to the district petition, section 2254 the judge agreed with magistrate the the Public appointed Federal The court pe- that Tillema’s and recommended state that an and counsel ordered Defender as prejudice for without be dismissed tition be filed. petition amended Eighth his Amendment to exhaust failure on Pro Philip his amended Judge M. Tillema filed District claim. again recommendation once magistrate’s The state May the 1999. adopted in or- an on dismiss, principally Tillema’s time dismissed moved to The 1997. court’s December was dated that Tillema’s der the apprise Tillema failed to order on No- report dismissal In a entered time-barred. the unexhausted to strike option judge 2, 1999, magistrate the vember his exhausted only with proceed be that Tillema’s recommended to dismissal. as an alternative claims it was prejudice because with dismissed 2244(d)(1).3 § U.S.C. untimely under 28 years nearly three August On 1998— that Tillema concluded magistrate his second had filed Motion Tillema after un- statutory tolling entitled to Sentence, was almost as Illegal to Vacate 2244(d)(2)4 during the § der U.S.C. the trial court’s appealed had long after he (C) constitutional which the date on peti- regarding the instant proceedings All 2. by initially recognized right then District before asserted were conducted tion Rawlinson, Court, newly than has been rather if the Judge Supreme B. Johnnie Pro, the earlier presided over Judge Supreme who had Court and made by recognized proceedings. on collateral retroactively applicable to cases review; or 2244(d)(1) provides: Section (D) predicate which the factual on date apply to shall 1-year period of limitation “A have presented could claims or of the claim by corpus a writ of application for an through exercise of due been discovered judgment custody pursuant to person in diligence.” period shall limitation court. The of a State of— from the latest run 2244(d)(2) provides: 4.Section (A) became date on which review or by of direct filed during properly the conclusion final which time "The seeking such the time for expiration of or other post-conviction for State application view; pertinent respect to the review collateral (B) impediment which the date pending shall not judgment or claim by State created action filing an un- any period of limitation toward counted laws of the or the Constitution violation of this subsection.” der removed, applicant was if the United action; State filing such from prevented any pendency post-conviction of his Tillema contends that he was entitled to proceedings. adopted The district court tolling of period AEDPA’s limitations magistrate’s First, recommendation and dis- three reasons. argues he that his missed appeal Tillema’s an order en- Illegal Sentence,” “Motion to Vacate filed tered on March timely 2000. Tillema on October Sep- and denied on appealed. 15, 1998, tember “properly was a filed
application for post-conviction State other collateral review” within the mean- II. Analysis 2244(d)(2). § ing Second, of 28 U.S.C. he The Antiterrorism and Effective Death urges time excess of AEDPA’s (AEDPA) Penalty Act established a one- limitation equitably should be year statute of limitations tolled, because the district court erred corpus petitions. Under 28 dismissing original peti- section 2254 2244(d)(1)(A), U.S.C. prisoners providing without him option with the year have one from the date on which their proceeding on his exhausted claims ’ convictions become final in which to initi- of, only. agree We with both *5 ate federal corpus proceedings. contentions.5 That period of limitation is statutorily
tolled, however, during the time in which A. Statutory Tolling properly “a filed application for State post- conviction or other collateral with 2244(d)(2), § review Under 28 U.S.C. “[t]he respect to pertinent the judgment or claim during time properly which a applica- filed 2244(d)(2). is pending-” § 28 U.S.C. post-conviction for State or other col- parties The agree that Tillema’s conviction lateral respect review with pertinent 2,1996, July became final on when judgment his time or claim pending is shall not be expired to seek certiorari in the United counted any period toward of limitation Supreme Roe, Court. See Bowen v. under this subsection.” It undisputed Cir.1999). 188 F.3d that if Ab- Tillema’s second “Motion to Vacate” sent tolling of AEDPA’s pe- limitation limitations, tolled AEDPA’s statute of the riod, then, Tillema’s petition would instant timely was filed: the mo- have been July due on 30, 1995, Because tion was filed on October before did hot Tillema file the instant the period run, limitations began to and it September 22, 1998, until the was was September denied on untimely unless statutory equitable toll- days seven before Tillema peti- filed the ing delay. excused the tion.
5. Tillema 2244(d)(2) and, also contends that he ing result, was entitled of section aas the statutory tolling during pendency the of his period limitation statutorily is not tolled while petition. first section 2254 Concurrently with seeks federal habeas review. the issuance opinion, of our Supreme the Walker, Duncan v. Court held that a federal habeas (2001). Therefore, argument Tillema’s "application not an post-conviction for State on this is without merit. or other collateral review” within the mean- presented federal habeas quently successfully argued below that
The state
2244(d)(2) (emphasis
petition. 28 U.S.C.
“prop-
not
motion to vacate was
Tillema’s
added).
enough,
It is not
the state con-
meaning of section
erly filed” within
tends,
sought
that Tillema’s
Supreme
2244(d)(2),
because
Nevada
respect
judgment.
lief
to the same
motion under
doc-
Court denied
To allow Tillema’s motion to toll
stat-
However,
case.”
after
of “law the
trine
insists,
limitations,
ute
the state
“would
peti-
court dismissed
district
‘pertinent’ qualifies
ignore
‘judg-
both
ap-
tion,
argument
oral
before
but
”
‘claim,’
ment’ and
and would render “sur-
held,
Supreme
issued
peal
Court
was
plusage” the word “claim.”
Bennett,
in Artuz v.
U.S.
its decision
(2000).
In
L.Ed.2d 213
plainly
argument
The state’s
held, unanimously,
Bennett,
the Court
with,
begin
reading
To
the state’s
wrong.
solely
filed”
“properly
refers
term
fails on its own terms.
section
filing,
require-
not
requirements
“claim” are
“judgment”
words
argu-
relief.6 At oral
obtaining
ments
Thus,
disjunctive.
accept
used
ment,
appropriately conceded
the state
be to render
the state’s
Bennett,
that,
it is now clear
light
“surplusage.”
In
word
prop-
that Tillema’s motion
vacate
truth,
we
urge
read
state does
erly filed.
rendering any
so
to avoid
Rather, it
language “surplusage.”
its
sim
Nonetheless,
ar-
the state continues to
“surplus”
ply
that we render
one
prefers
did
toll
gue that Tillema’s motion
(al
of the other
particular term instead
AEDPA’s limitations
*6
necessary
do
or
though we
not believe
include a “claim” that
is
motion did not
term in that man
proper
treat either
petition.
in his
being
now
raised
ner). Moreover,
preference
the state’s
language
The
maintains that the
state
contrary
controlling
to the
rules
runs
2244(d)(2),
specifies
which
that
section
construction,
require
which
that
statutory
prop-
“a
period of limitation is tolled while
disjunctive
given
a
be
“terms connected
post-convic-
erly
application for State
filed
separate
unless the context dic
meanings,
”
respect
tion or other collateral review
v. Sonotone
otherwise....
Reiter
tates
judgment or claim is
pertinent
to the
330, 338-39,
Corp.,
that,
requires
trigger
pending,”
(1979);
order
re
also In
9. the untimeliness readily “cure” initial- petitioner that if the by fact scored amending it to by timely simply render ineffective- the meritless ly to include failed 502
It appears obvious to
that
us
when
any
Con-
way alter or excuse the fundamental
gress
claim,”
“judgment
wrote
or
it meant
requirement
petitioners
that habeas
must
just
that. Congress did not intend that
exhaust in state
they
claims that
federal claims resolved adversely to the wish to present
in federal court. See 28
petitioner by
highest
the state’s
court on
2254(b).
§
If,
U.S.C.
here,
as is the case
a
appeal
direct
simply
be forfeited
particular state collateral application that
because the
invoked
to tolls the statute of limitations does not
pursue in the state courts other claims
include
claima
is
that
later raised in the
better suited for collateral review than for
federal habeas corpus petition, the claims
Nor,
appeal.
direct
certainly, did Con-
that are raised in
petition must,
that
to the
gress
petitioner’s
intend that a
right to file
extent required
law,
state
have been
a federal habeas petition as to the federal
exhausted, either on direct appeal or in a
issues the state court decided on direct
separate state
proceeding.
collateral
Sim-
would depend whether,
review
after the
ply put,
(which
the statute of limitations
is
completion of the state collateral proceed-
case)
the issue before
inus
and the
ings, the petitioner
identify
could
one col-
(which
not)
exhaustion
impose
doctrine
laterally challenged federal issue resolved
entirely distinct requirements on habeas
in a manner adverse to him that he could petitioners; both must be satisfied before
in good faith include in his federal petition.
a federal court may consider the
merits
hold,
We therefore
consistent with the
petition.
a
language and purpose
statute,
AEDPA’s
of limitation is
Because
tolled dur-
Tillema’s motion to vacate
ing the pendency of a
tolled
state
AEDPA’s limitation
period from Oc
challenging
pertinent
judgment,
tober
even if
September 15, 1998,
until
the particular application does not
include
instant
days
seven
—filed
a claim later
asserted
the federal habeas
later —was timely, and should not have
petition.10
holding
not,
Our
course,
been dismissed.11
include the
along
meritless claim
with the
statute violates the canon that
"we are
potentially meritorious
effect,
claims
had
obliged
he
ex-
give
possible,
if
every
appeal.
hausted
direct
Reiter,
Congress
word
used.”
B.
may find themselves
when
time-barred
alternative,
In the
we hold that
they attempt to resubmit their exhaust-
peri
time in excess of AEDPA’s limitation
ed claims to the district court.
equitably
because the
od should be
tolled
legal
committed prejudicial
district court
“outright
Id. at 573. We held that
it
first fed
when
dismissed Tillema’s
error
dismissal”
to
of
without leave
amend
affording
without
him
petition
eral habeas
petitioner’s
petition
federal habeas
was
unex-
opportunity
to abandon
sole
“improper,” and reiterated that “district
to
hausted claim an alternative
suffer
provide
litigants
courts must
habeas
Lundy,
In Rose v.
ing dismissal.
peti-
their
opportunity to amend
mixed
(1982),
509,
1198,
71 L.Ed.2d
by striking
tions
their
unexhausted
Supreme Court held that “mixed” fed
”
574;
claims....
at
also
Id.
see
Freeman
is,
con
petitions—that
habeas
those
eral
(7th
572,
Cir.2000)
Page,
v.
208 F.3d
taining
exhausted and unexhausted
both
(dismissal
of mixed federal
“is not
for failure to
claims—must be dismissed
proper
step
jeopardize
when that
could
exhaust state remedies. The Court direct
attack”).
of a collateral
timeliness
provide
peti
courts to
ed district
returning to
tioners “with the choice of
why
Tillema’s
makes
case
clear
rule
court to exhaust
claims or
[their]
of
Rose,
explicated
enunciated in
further
.and
resubmitting
peti
the habeas
amending
Anthony
previous
in
Ninth Circuit
present only
to
to
exhausted claims
cases,
one,
why
is such a crucial
dis-
510,
Id.
the district court.”
at
special
trict
take
to
courts must
care
ad-
added).
Rose,
(emphasis
applying
In
petitioners
option
vise habeas
of their
to
“long
have
held that a federal habeas
we
AED-
light
strike unexhausted claims in
has a
amend a mixed
purposes
PA.
of AEDPA’s
For
statute of
an
delete unexhausted claims as
limitations,
fi-
Tillema’s conviction became
suffering
a dismissal.”
alternative
July
nal on
1996. In the absence
Giles,
v.
221 F.Bd
James
motion to vacate or other state collateral
Cir.2000);
see also Calderon
United
proceeding
statutory tolling
that meets the
981, 986
(Taylor),
Dist. Ct.
134 F.3d
requirement, Tillema’s federal
(9th Cir.1998).
Cambra,
Anthony v.
In
later,
year
due
would have been
one
(9th Cir.2000),
explained
As we
previously held,
have
“[w]hen ex
would
forces,
have
permitted
ternal
been
proceed
rather
petitioner’s
than a
with all
claims;
lack
but
diligence,
one of his
account for
because the
the failure
district
erred,
court
claim,
file a
Tillema
timely
lost all
equitable tolling
opportunity
of the
for federal
review of
may
all of
appropriate.”
his claims.12
Miles v.
Prunty,
We therefore
1104, 1107 (9th
hold
that Tillema
Cir.1999);
“entitled
to the benefit of
see
also
equitable
Calderon v.
tolling
United States Dist.
statute of
Kelly,
Court
(Kelly),
limitations.”
F.3d 530
(petition
We reverse the district court’s
er
order
to equitable
entitled
tolling
peti
where
dismissing
for habeas
tioner’s counsel withdrew and left replace
corpus relief as untimely, and we remand
ment counsel with unusable work product
to the district
court
further proceed-
timely filing
made
impossible); Kelly,
ings consistent with
opinion.13
this
505 held filing date. original We his preserved dissenting but RYMER, Judge, Circuit By this. authority to do had the court judgment: concurring in the case, we must in this token the same reversing for judgment in the I concur mistakenly court the district because verse 509, 102 S.Ct. Lundy, v. Rose petition mixed without dismissed Tillema’s error, (1982), al- 71 L.Ed.2d it to should leave but we offering options, rea- majority’s the disagree with though I to craft an on remand the district court remand. How- on instructions and soning direct I would not remedy. appropriate ground, this reverse on ever, because we tolling, equitable apply to court the district claim or “pertinent of what discussion beyond James goes well to do so § means in 28 U.S.C. judgment” uphold a thing to It is one Anthony. in this case unneces- or plays it out or how to of discretion I dissent exercise therefore court’s the decision. district sary to a or to relate petition of this issue. first any discussion the from reinstate hold back; another to quite it is new be because I judgment in the I concur apply equitable a district court must an informed did not have Tillema lieve that the “misapplied” it tolling just because peti his federal first to amend opportunity law. Eighth unexhausted and let the Giles, 221 v. go. James claim Amendment (let de- discussing alone from I dissent Cir.2000). (9th The district F.3d or claim” “pertinent ciding) the mixed original court dismissed because: issue give not did prejudice, but without petition certified;1 (1) not issue the claim exhausting him choice the it from court, deleting or returning to straightfor- (2) a there is agree We court. Per in federal stay to the reversing on another basis for ward occurred, the had oversight haps if (failure the Tillema give be not have of limitations or returning state court choice limi statute of Now the problem. come a the federal resubmitting Anthony v. but Cam problem, a tations is claim), which unexhausted the without (9th Cir.2000), sheds bra, F.3d 568 holding majority’s alternative makes (and approached it could light how judg- “pertinent (on what constitutes cured). Anthony, district In may be claim”) unnecessary; ment it had mistak recognized itself court to resolve (3) To reach issue peti mixed petitioner’s enly dismissed circuit creates majority does opportunity him an affording tion without Mitchell, split. See Austin with or resubmit to amend Cir.1999) (holding that a state claims, court and the treat only exhausted the statute toll (otherwise untimely) petition next ed his is raised claim that respect to a to and back that related an amendment court, see Nev.Rev. in state claim “only rem- Amendment (exhaustion applies requirement 34.810(1) (2), it shall deem Stat. at time still available edies exhausted. claim rem- court concludes If the petition”). in the Neva- to Tillema edy available remains the Certificate on which courts, 1. The issue opportuni- provide him it must da Pe- "whether was issued is: Appealability proceed with and to ty strike Anti- petition tolled the hand, If, first titioner's other remaining claims. Penalty Act Death Effective unlikely terrorism that Tillema determines ('AEDPA') period.” limitations Eighth adjudication of his a merits receive *12 federal not in petition), but the state other reason founded legislative histo- denied, rt. ry so; to do and ce 2211, 147 (2000); L.Ed.2d 244 (5) All this is based on done a few sentences in the provide briefs that no (4) important issue, This is an raising discussion, real certainly in-depth no questions serious statutory of interpre- analysis, of the issue.3 intent, tation Congressional which majority’s opinion resolves read- by ing adjective “pertinent” both the 2244(d)(2) §
the word “claim” out of
even though this construct plain2 is not opinion
and the offers no or contextual 2. It is no “pertinent” clear means that surprising, This is not parties as the were judgment refers judg- to the trial event, court’s focused any on other issues. In here is (as ment of conviction and sentence the ma- argument: sum total of the From the it), jority interprets any post-convic- such that state: attack judgment could undo that give meaning To language to the of 28 running regardless tolls of statute of 2244(d)(2), § U.S.C. the Second Motion to pursued which claims system are in the state Vacate cannot serve toll the limitations brought and which are on federal habeas. period because it does not perti contain a all, post-conviction After all efforts aim to being nent claim that challenged Further, judgment. undo that "pertinent” petition. interpretation federal An of this judgment purposes for pro- federal habeas any challenge judgment to the ceedings judgment can be the of the state will toll the period, limitations would ig Thus, appellate contrary court. majori- "pertinent” nore that qualifies "judg both view, ty's differently construe the text from ment” and "claim." regard, In that way it inevitably construes does not word "claim” would be surplus- rendered "judgment" read out of the statute. age. A statute must be construed such that majority's Nor is the reading required to every word operative has effect. United preserve grounds Lewis, raised on direct for (9th review v. States 67 F.3d Cir. review; timely 1995). federal habeas The claim raised TILLEMA’s may preserve grounds all (including those Second State Petition have [sic] no relation review) raised on timely direct ship to the claims raised in the instant by raising properly them in filed Accordingly, Amended Petition. that Mo (whether post-conviction proceedings or not tion cannot serve to toll AEDPA limita they will be procedurally held be default- tions because it challenge does not ed). stop This would the clock running from "pertinent judgment or claim.” See 28 toas them. 2244(d)(3). § U.S.C. It also is no means "judg- clear that From Tillema: "claim,” necessarily trumps ment” analysis or The begin princi with basic reading "judgment” as broader ples than "claim” statutory year construction. The one helps 2244(d)(2) § discern how should be statute is § tolled under when the construed, majority suggests. Some- challenge” "State ... [sic] attacks the state cognizable times there can judgment. is, course, judgment all, "claim” "judgment” without at conviction and sentence imposed; example, pre-trial case, no-bail detention. three life consecutive sentences. thing The one that does seem Congress clear is that separated "judgment” the words whatever "judgment,” or whatever the and "claim” with the "or” they word "claim,” it "pertinent” must be to be not provide intended to "separate and distinct one-year counted toward the period of limita- alternatives.” In re Atlantic Trading Pacific Co., In tion. order for or (9th to be Cir.1995); Unit "pertinent” there judgments Behnezhad, must be ed 907 F.2d "pertinent” unless, 1990). claims that are not Cir. — course, Congress distinguish only meant to This intent is further upon illuminated impertinent judgments. 2244(d). view entire text of For SHEEHAN; W. In re: Michael Sheehan,
Wilhelmina
Debtors. Oyama, Appellant,
Yoji *13 Sheehan; Wilhelmina W.
Michael
Sheehan, Appellees. 99-56391.
No. Appeals, Court of
United
Ninth Circuit. 14, 2001 Feb. Submitted
Argued and 19, 2001 June
Filed with that Congress (1)(A) wrote contemplates cause example, subsection date, Appellee's interpretation triggering whereas intent. "judgment” as its (1)(D) a claim or claims claim” should references phrase "pertinent subsection year period. triggering one key rejected by this court. meaning be- separate Clearly, has each word