JAMES P. TEUFEL v. THE NORTHERN TRUST COMPANY, et al.
Nos. 17-1676 & 17-1677
United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit
Argued October 30, 2017 — Decided April 11, 2018
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. Nos. 14 C 7214 & 15 C 2822 — Rubén Castillo, Chief Judge.
Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and BAUER and EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judges.
James Teufel contends in this suit that the 2012 amendment, even with the transitional benefit, violates the anti-cutback rule in ERISA, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act.
The anti-cutback rule provides:
The accrued benefit of a participant under a plan may not be decreased by an amendment of the plan, other than an amendment described in section 1082(d)(2) or 1441 of this title.
To analyze this contention we need to be precise about how pension benefits are calculated for employees, such as Teufel, hired before 2002 and still covered by the Traditional formula until 2012. The plan first calculates an employee‘s accrued benefit as of March 31, 2012. That process starts with the number of years of credited service, multiplies that by the consecutive-high-five average salary, and multiplies by 0.018. The plan adjusts that result in following years by treating the high-five average (before 2012) as if that figure had continued to increase by 1.5% a year for each year worked after 2012. Finally, the plan adds benefits calculated under the new PEP formula for service after March 31, 2012.
This statement of the new formula shows why Teufel cannot succeed. If, instead of amending the plan in March 2012, Northern Trust had terminated the plan, calculated Teufel‘s accrued benefit, and deposited that sum in a new plan with additions to come under the new PEP formula, then Teufel would not have had any complaint. (He concedes that this is so.) What actually happened is more favorable to him: he gets the vested benefit as of March 2012 plus an increase in the (imputed) average compensation of 1.5% a year (for pre-2012 work) for as long as he continues working.
Teufel wants us to treat the expectation of future salary increases as an “accrued benefit,” but on March 31, 2012, when the transition occurred, the only benefit that had “accrued” was the sum due for work already performed. What a participant hopes will happen tomorrow has not accrued in the past.
Suppose the Traditional formula had remained unchanged but that in March 2012, as part of an austerity plan, Northern Trust had resolved that no employee‘s salary could increase at a rate of more than 1.5% a year. That would have had the same effect on the pre-2012 component of Teufel‘s pension as the actual amendment, but a reduction in the rate of salary increases could not violate ERISA, which does not require employers to increase anyone‘s salary. Curtailing the rate at which salaries change would not affect anyone‘s “accrued benefit.” Since that is so, the actual amendment also must be valid.
Teufel relies on decisions such as Hickey v. Chicago Truck Drivers Union, 980 F.2d 465 (7th Cir. 1992); Ruppert v. Alliant Energy Cash Balance Pension Plan, 726 F.3d 936 (7th Cir. 2013); and Shaw v. Machinists & Aerospace Workers Pension Plan, 750 F.2d 1458 (9th Cir. 1985). In these cases the language of the pension plan itself promised an increase in pension benefits—in one, a cost-of-living adjustment, in another a rate of interest added to the pension if the worker quit before retirement age, and in the third an adjustment in light of the salary earned by the current holder of the retiree‘s old job. The decisions all hold that these adjustments are part of the “accrued benefit” because they are among the pension plans’ terms. See also Central Laborers’ Pension Fund v. Heinz, 541 U.S. 739 (2004) (plan cannot attach new conditions to bene-fits already accrued). But nothing in the Northern Trust plan‘s Traditional formula guarantees that any worker‘s salary will increase in future years. Teufel and others like him have a hope that it will, maybe even an expectation that it will, but not an entitlement
One additional ERISA contention calls for brief mention. Teufel maintains that the plan‘s administrator violated
Teufel‘s argument under the ADEA fares no better. He acknowledges that the plan as a whole, and the 2012 amendment, is age-neutral, for pension eligibility is distinct from age. See Kentucky Retirement Systems v. EEOC, 554 U.S. 135 (2008); Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604 (1993). Still, he maintains, the correlation between pension eligibility and age—plus the fact that the high-five-average feature of the Traditional formula was most valuable to older workers approaching their highest-earning years—means that the 2012 amendment produces a disparate impact that violates the ADEA. (Smith v. Jackson, 544 U.S. 228 (2005), holds that a form of disparate-impact analysis applies under the ADEA.) The Traditional formula treats older workers better than younger ones (the high-five-average feature is more valuable the older one gets); and from this it follows that the elimination of the formula (or its reduction to a 1.5% annual increase) harms older workers relative to younger ones. So the argument goes.
We are skeptical about the proposition that curtailing a benefit correlated with age, and so coming closer to eliminating the role of age in pension calculations, can be understood as discrimination against the old. Kentucky Retirement Systems holds that a pension benefit for older workers does not violate the ADEA, but not that any such benefit, once extended, must be continued for life. At all events, the Supreme Court has never held that the disparate impact of an age-neutral pension plan can violate the statute. To the contrary, Kentucky Retirement Systems tells us that the relation between the ADEA and pension plans should be understood through the language of
Section 623 as a whole is the basic rule against age discrimination.
The Northern Trust pension plan, both before and after the 2012 amendment, complies with
AFFIRMED
