James T. CROSS, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES, Appellee.
No. 74-1367.
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
Argued Oct. 1, 1974. Decided Feb. 7, 1975.
512 F.2d 1212
See also, id. at 485-86. In terms of this case, if Hellenic pays the Government for transporting the flour to a port as satisfactory as Aqaba, the alternative yielding the larger recovery to the Government, there is no moral or legal justification for requiring it to return what the Government had paid it for that very purpose.
VI. The Government‘s Cross-Appeal.
The only point remaining for consideration is the Government‘s appeal from the district court‘s failure to allow the actual cost of shipment from Piraeus to Ashdod on an American-flag vessel rather than the lower cost at which foreign-flag shipment could have been obtained.
The Government relies on the Cargo Preference Acts,
The judgment is reversed insofar as it allows recovery of the prepaid freight and interest thereon and is otherwise affirmed. No costs.
Eloise E. Davies, Atty., U. S. Dept. of Justice (Carla A. Hills, Asst. Atty. Gen. of the United States, John K. Grisso, U. S. Atty., and Stephen F. Eilperin, Atty., U. S. Dept. of Justice, on brief), for appellee.
Before HAYNSWORTH, Chief Judge, and WINTER, CRAVEN, BUTZNER, RUSSELL, FIELD and WIDENER, Circuit Judges, sitting in banc.
WINTER, Circuit Judge:
We heard this appeal in banc to resolve the difference in views expressed by the panel in Welch v. United States, 464 F.2d 682 (4 Cir. 1972). The question in Welch, which plaintiff asks us to reconsider here, is whether under the Food Stamp Act of 1964,
We conclude to adopt the minority view in Welch1 and hold that the scope of judicial review extends to the period of administrative sanction, notwithstanding that the Secretary did not impose a penalty exceeding that permitted by the statute or the regulations. What was said to the contrary in the majority opinion in Welch is no longer to be deemed to be the law of this circuit, although, of course, the judgment in Welch is unaffected. In the instant case, the judgment of the district court that it lacked authority to review the penalty is vacated and the case is remanded for further consideration in the light of the views expressed herein.
I.
Plaintiff, James T. Cross, together with his son, operates a rural South Carolina grocery store. Since 1968, he has been authorized to participate in the federal food stamp program. Two of the requirements of the program are that food stamps be accepted only for eligible food items,
Because of two admitted violations in 1969 and an apparently abnormally high volume of food stamp redemptions, Department of Agriculture agents made five investigatory shoppings of plaintiff‘s store in 1971. On each occasion a clerk accepted food stamps for ineligible items2 and, on several, the clerk gave change in cash in excess of 49 cents in food stamp transactions. Plaintiff was advised of these violations and told that he could make an oral or written explanation to the Food and Nutrition Service (FNS), Florence, South Carolina. Plaintiff and his son responded promptly by writing to FNS, stating that the offending clerk had a problem of excessive drinking, which rendered him incapable of carrying out his instructions with regard to food stamp transactions, and that the clerk had been discharged since his drinking problem became apparent. Plaintiff added, “I do not think that we have violated any of the terms or provisions of the Food Stamp Program.”
After receipt of plaintiff‘s response, the FNS officer in charge of the Florence office recommended that plaintiff be disqualified from participation in the stamp program for ninety days in order to make plaintiff and his son “aware of Program regulations and their obligation to assure that all persons employed in this store were aware of and adhering to the regulations.” The Regional Office concurred in the proposed ninety-day disqualification, but the Acting Director of the Food Stamp Division in Washington increased the disqualification to a period of one year. He explained that the increase resulted from two factors: (1) that “the large number of major nongrocery items sold confirms that it is store policy . . . to sell major nongrocery items,” and (2) that “sufficient compliance action had been taken before the investigation” and warnings given so that the case fell within the guidelines for a one-year disqualification which the Department of Agriculture set forth in written instructions for recommending and making final determinations.
Plaintiff‘s counsel sought and obtained review by the Food Stamp Review Officer, but he affirmed the propriety of a
II.
The scope of review in an action of this nature is governed by
The Act vests in the Secretary the rule-making authority to devise a scheme of enforcement,
Once the Director, Food Stamp Division, makes his determination—and that determination may include a recommendation of disqualification for a certain period—the retailer may have the determination reviewed by a Food Stamp Of-
We recognize that disqualification from participation in the food stamp program is not a criminal sanction. At the same time, that disqualification may have grave economic consequences to a retailer engaged in business in a depressed economic area where there is widespread use of food stamps. In such an area one who holds himself out as a retailer of food would be cut off from a substantial segment of the buying public if he is disqualified from engaging in food stamp transactions.
The opportunity to engage in food stamp transactions as a retailer is, of course, a privilege and not a right,5 but, under current law, the dichotomy of treatment between privilege and right has been obliterated.6 The constitutional guarantee of due process of law applies to both; and we think it applies here, because in a very real sense plaintiff will
In concluding that the district court must afford review to the sanction of disqualification where, as here, the fact of violation is not contested, or where in other cases the district court finds de novo that a violation occurred, we add a word about the scope of judicial review. Due process on the issue of sanction requires that the punishment follow rationally from the facts,8 be au-
We deem all three of these expressions synonymous and they define the due process which we hold must be afforded. To be “valid,” a sanction must not be arbitrary and capricious, and a sanction is arbitrary and capricious if it is unwarranted in law or without justification in fact. Thus, the scope of review of a sanction is not as broad as the scope of review of the fact of violation. The more limited scope of review of a sanction results from the vesting of discretion by Congress in the Secretary to devise and administer a scheme of disqualifications (
In the instant case, there may be room to question the validity of the sanction,11 although we hasten to add that we express no view on what was a proper period of disqualification to impose on plaintiff. The district court characterized it as “harsh,” but we do not conceive this to be a test. Rather, only in those instances in which it may be fairly said on the de novo record as a whole that the Secretary, acting through his designates, has abused his discretion by acting arbitrarily or capriciously, would the district court be warranted in exercising its authority to modify the penalty. Even in those instances in which a district court may find on de novo review that the Secretary erred in his determination of the fact and gravity of the violations, it would be incumbent on the district court to prescribe an alternate penalty, not on the basis of what
Since, in the instant case, the district court understandably thought that it lacked power to review the period of disqualification, we vacate its judgment and remand the case to permit the review to be afforded.
Vacated and remanded.
WIDENER, Circuit Judge (concurring):
Although I concur in vacating the judgment of the district court and in remanding the case, I would do so for different reasons and under different standards than those set forth in the opinion of the court. I concur in the result reached by the majority, rather than with either dissent, because I think it more nearly expresses the intent of Congress, although to me neither of the three opinions reflects the intent of Congress and restrict the extent of review which I think was not contemplated by the statute.
It is well settled that Congress may authorize review of administrative actions by the courts under such terms, and to such extent as it chooses, and even, absent a constitutional requirement, to deny review altogether. See Labor Board v. Cheney Lumber Co., 327 U.S. 385, 66 S.Ct. 553, 90 L.Ed. 739 (1946); Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114, 66 S.Ct. 423, 90 L.Ed. 567 (1946). Further, there are the deeply imbedded principles that courts should decide constitutional questions only if necessary, and should construe statutes in a manner which requires decision of a serious constitutional question only if the statutory language leaves no reasonable alternative. United States v. Gambling Devices, 346 U.S. 441, 74 S.Ct. 190, 98 L.Ed. 179 (1953); United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41, 73 S.Ct. 543, 97 L.Ed. 770 (1953). I think the case at hand does not require us to reach the question of whether the opportunity to engage in food stamp transactions is an interest that is protected by the Constitution. I also note that the constitutional question is raised by the court rather than by the parties who simply ask that the statute be construed.
The Food Stamp Act provides for judicial review of an administrative disqualification of a store by the filing of a complaint in the district court. “The suit . . . shall be a trial de novo by the court in which the court shall determine the validity of the questioned administrative action in issue. If the court determines that such administrative action is invalid it shall enter such judgment or order as it determines is in accordance with the law and the evidence.”
Since the “administrative action” must consist both of the finding of a violation and punishment of disqualification, I think the statute as it allows a review of the “validity of the administrative action,” and provides that if the administrative action is invalid the court shall enter such judgment as “it determines” in accordance with the law and the evidence, may only be construed as granting a full right of review. The court‘s judgment is by statute to be based on its determination of both the law and the evidence, and I see no reason to read into this perfectly plain language a judicially imposed restriction.
As both the opinion of the majority and Judge Russell‘s dissent1 acknowl-
My views on the subject are in general agreement with the dissent of Judge Edwards in Martin v. United States, 459 F.2d 300, 302 (6th Cir. 1972), a case arising under the same statute at issue here, and are best articulated in the dissent of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Stark v. Wickard, 321 U.S. 288, 312, 64 S.Ct. 559, 88 L.Ed. 733 (1944), a part of the reasoning of which has been quoted with approval by Mr. Justice Douglas in the opinion of the court in Data Processing Service v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 156, 90 S.Ct. 827, 25 L.Ed.2d 184 (1970). Mr. Justice Frankfurter:
“Apart from legislation touching the revenue, the public domain, national banks and patents, not until the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887,
49 U.S.C.A. § 1 et seq. , did Congress begin to place economic enterprise under systems of administrative control. These regulatory schemes have varied in the range of control exercised by government; they have varied no less in the procedures by which the control was exercised. More particularly, these regimes of national authority over private enterprise reveal great diversity in the allotment of power by Congress as between courts and administrative agencies. Congress has not made uniform provisions in defining who may go to court, for what grievance, and under what circumstances, in seeking relief from administrative determinations. Quite the contrary. In the successive enactments by which Congress has established administrative agencies as major instruments of regulation, there is the greatest contrariety in the extent to which, and the procedures by which, different measures of control afford judicial review of administrative action.Except in those rare instances, as in a claim of citizenship in deportation proceedings, when a judicial trial becomes a constitutional requirement because of ‘The difference of security of judicial over administrative action,’ Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 285, 42 S.Ct. 492, 495, 66 L.Ed 938, whether judicial review is available at all and, if so, who may invoke it, under what circumstances, in what manner, and to what end, are questions that depend for their answer upon the particular enactment under which judicial review is claimed. Recognition of the claim turns on the provisions dealing with judicial review in a particular statute and on the setting of such provisions in that statute as part of a scheme for accomplishing the purposes expressed by that statute. Apart from the text and texture of a particular law in relation to which judicial review is sought ‘judicial review’ is a mischievous abstraction. There is no such thing as a common law of judicial review in the federal courts. The procedural provisions in more than a score of these regulatory measures prove that the manner in which Congress has distributed responsibility for the enforcement of its laws between courts and administrative agencies runs a gamut all the way from authorizing a judicial trial de novo of a claim determined by the administrative agency to denying all judicial review and making adminis-
trative action definitive.”2 321 U.S. 288, 311.
I would remand this case for a new trial by the district court in which it would make its own independent judgment as to the term of disqualification within the limits expressed in
FIELD, Circuit Judge (dissenting):
I adhere to the views expressed in my opinion in Welch and would note that the majority decision places this circuit at odds with every other federal court that has had occasion to consider this question. Martin v. United States, 459 F.2d 300 (6 Cir. 1972); Save More of Gary, Inc. v. United States, 442 F.2d 36 (7 Cir. 1971); Marcus v. United States Dept. of Agr., Food & Nut Serv., 364 F.Supp. 374 (E.D.Pa.1973); Eckstut v. Hardin, 363 F.Supp. 701 (E.D.Pa.1973); Miller v. United States Dept. of Agriculture, F. & N. Serv., 345 F.Supp. 1131 (W.D.Pa.1972); Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company v. United States, 342 F.Supp. 492 (S.D.N.Y.1972); Farmingdale Supermarket, Inc. v. United States, 336 F.Supp. 534 (D.N.J.1971); and Marbro Foods, Inc. v. United States, 293 F.Supp. 754 (N.D.Ill.1968).
DONALD RUSSELL, Circuit Judge (concurring in dissenting opinion of Judge FIELD):
I concur in Judge Field‘s dissent. I would add these further comments:
A critical fact in this case—and one the majority opinion I fear notices too little—is that at no time has the plaintiff-retailer sought a true de novo trial as provided in
The claim of the plaintiff, as baldly stated in his complaint, relates exclusively to the sanction imposed by the Secretary by reason of his admitted violations. He charged that the “sanction levied * * * [was] unwarranted, overly harsh, and unprecedented” and he asks by way of relief only that the sanction
The sole issue posed by this cause was accordingly the scope of review available in District Court over the sanction imposed by the Secretary, not the fact of violation of the Act, and that was the issue properly addressed by the District Court.
Turning now to the issue of scope of judicial review of the sanction imposed, it will be noted that the majority opinion concedes that ”
The majority opinion reasons that, unless a “hearing” is accorded the retailer, who has admitted his violation, on the issue of the sanction to be imposed in the District Court, such individual will have been denied his due process right to a hearing where he may exercise his constitutional right of confrontation of accusers and of cross-examination of witnesses.4 Even were this conceded, it is, however, of no moment here because under the facts in this case the plaintiff
has been admitted, thereby waiving the right to such a hearing, the power of the court becomes discretionary, involving no fact-finding and requiring no “de novo” or constitutional “hearing“, where there is confrontation with the accusers or cross-examination of the witnesses. See Brennan v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Com‘n (8th Cir. 1973) 487 F.2d 438, 442-443, n. 17; Save More of Gary, Inc. v. United States (7th Cir. 1971) 442 F.2d 36, 39, cert. dismissed 404 U.S. 987, 92 S.Ct. 535, 30 L.Ed.2d 549.5 The criminal defendant who has plead guilty is, it is true, generally given the right of “allocution“, the right to make a plea in mitigation,6 though the right is not “a constitutional right essential to fundamental fairness.” United States v. Leavitt (1st Cir. 1973) 478 F.2d 1101, 1104. That certainly was the extent of the right of the plaintiff, after he had admitted his violation and waived any right to a de novo fact-finding “hearing” or trial on his guilt. The plaintiff was accorded that right. After advising him of the violations charged, the plaintiff was given by the Secretary the opportunity to offer any statement he wished in mitigation and the plaintiff exercised that right, as evidenced by his letter of June 23, 1971, in which he claimed that the violations were committed contrary to instructions by an alcoholic clerk to whom plaintiff had entrusted the operation of his store. There is accordingly
Actually, though, the majority opinion does not give the plaintiff a right to a de novo hearing or what might be described as a fact-finding adjudication. A de novo hearing would mean that the court would review the sanction “anew” and would enjoy the same unfettered rights as the Secretary to impose a sanction according to its sense of justice and fairness.7 The majority opinion, on the contrary, states that the court has merely “a measure of revisory power over the sanction.” And it proceeds to give meaning to this indefinite and ambiguous phrase, “a measure of revisory power, for which there is no provision in
But when the majority opinion adopts this “abuse of discretion by acting arbitrary or capricious” standard, it is accepting a standard which has a well-defined meaning and definition in the law. The latest statement of this definition of what is meant by an “arbitrary and capricious” standard of judicial review, and one peculiarly appropriate here because it evolved in connection with the review of a sanction imposed by the Secretary of Agriculture, appears in Butz v. Glover Livestock Com‘n Co. (1973) 411 U.S. 182, 93 S.Ct. 1455, 36 L.Ed.2d 142. In that case, Butz, a stockyard operator, after a hearing, had been found guilty by the Secretary of Agriculture of a violation of the Packers and Stockyards Act and its registration under that Act had been suspended by the Secretary for twenty days. From this administrative ruling, the petitioner had a right of appeal to the Circuit Court of Appeals, which, in turn, had jurisdiction to “affirm, set aside, or modify” the order of the Secretary.
The majority opinion, while conceding that Butz establishes that “[m]ere unevenness in the application of the sanction does not render its application in a particular case ‘un-
And it concluded with the blunt statement, “[T]he fashioning of an appropriate and reasonable remedy is for the Secretary, not the court. The court may decide only whether under the pertinent statute and relevant facts, the Secretary made ‘an allowable judgment in [his] choice of the remedy” and to go beyond this will constitute “an impermissible intrusion into the administrative domain.”16
Butz cites with approval G. H. Miller & Company v. United States (7th Cir. 1958) 260 F.2d 286, 296, cert. denied 359 U.S. 907, 79 S.Ct. 582, 3 L.Ed.2d 572 (1959), which also involved the scope of judicial review over a sanction imposed by the Secretary of Agriculture. There, the petitioner was charged with a violation of the Commodity Exchange Act by the Secretary of Agriculture. It was found guilty of a violation and was suspended by the Secretary from trading for sixty days to one year. The petitioner appealed both the finding of violation and the sanction imposed. Under the Act the petitioner was entitled on appeal to “obtain a review of such order or such other equitable relief as to the court may seem just” and the appeal court had “jurisdiction to affirm, to set aside, or modify the order of the Secretary of Agriculture * * * .”
“It is, therefore, clear to us that if the order of an administrative agency finding a violation of a statutory provision is valid and the penalty fixed for the violation is within the limits of the statute the agency has made an allowable judgment in its choice of the remedy and ordinarily the Court of Appeals has no right to change the penalty because the agency might have imposed a different penalty (Italics in opinion).” (260 F.2d at 296).17
If the rule is that a remedy determined by the administrative agency is only to be voided on judicial review under the “arbitrary and capricious rule,” provided it is “unwarranted in law or without justification in fact” or provided it is not “an allowable judgment in choice of the remedy” or provided it “exceed[s] the agency‘s statutory power to impose and it bears [no] reasonable relation to the practice sought to be eliminated,” then there is, by the conclusions of the majority opinion itself, no basis or warrant for invalidating the Secretary‘s sanction or for reversing the action of the District Court in dismissing the proceeding. The majority opinion states “that the Secretary did not impose a penalty exceeding that permitted by the statute or regulations.” That is tantamount, I submit, to declaring that the sanction imposed was “an allowable judgment in choice of the remedy” and under those circumstances, any attempt by the court to invalidate such a sanction would be “an impermissible intrusion into the administrative domain“.18 But if we go beyond this and look at the record as prepared and submitted by the parties there can be no basis for remanding this proceeding or voiding the sanction imposed. The record shows that the
that “it is possible” to take another view and to regard the plaintiff‘s violations more leniently. The difficulty with this reasoning, however, is that it is for the Secretary, not the court to make the choice among the possible inferences to be deduced from the plaintiff‘s conduct. See Fairbank v. Hardin, supra (429 F.2d at 269); Hyatt v. United States (10th Cir. 1960) 276 F.2d 308, 312. “The court is not empowered [under the authority to review for ‘arbitrary and capricious’ judgment] to substitute its judgment for that of the agency.” Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe (1971) 401 U.S. 402, 416, 91 S.Ct. 814, 824, 28 L.Ed.2d 136. When the violation as admitted authorizes a disqualification that is “allowable” under both the Act and the administrative regulations (including guidelines, for sake of argument), and the Secretary has imposed that disqualification (which is this case since “the Secretary did not impose a penalty exceeding that permitted by the statute or regulations“), a Court has no right to inquire into “the * * * gravity of the violations” so as to “substitute its judgment for that of the agency.” After all, whether a violation of the Act is to be excused or not is for the Secretary and not the Courts.
In my opinion, the majority opinion errs, too, in concluding that, if the Secretary has committed error, it is “incumbent on the district court to prescribe an alternate penalty.” That is a power the Court, in reviewing a sanction under the “arbitrary and capricious” standard, may not exercise. If, in its judgment, the Secretary has violated the law or gone against his own regulations in the sanction he imposed, the remedy is to remand to the Secretary for further consideration. Should, however, the Court find there is no justification in fact for a sanction (i. e., there has been no violation), then the Court should vacate the proceedings in toto.20 But the District Court has no right to make its own determination, even if that determination is to be made under the Secretary‘s
Finally, it should be noted that this decision will give violators of the Act in this Circuit a right of judicial review of sanctions imposed by the Secretary under the Act not enjoyed by violators in any other Circuit where the issue has been considered. Moreover, if the majority opinion‘s application of the phrase “arbitrary and capricious” is upheld, it opens wide all administratively formulated remedies to judicial review.
I think the District Court was correct in its holding. The sanction imposed by the Secretary was not “unwarranted in law” or “without justification in fact“. I accordingly join in the dissent of my Brother Field.
Nos. 74-1542 and 74-1914 to 74-1918.
United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.
Argued Feb. 7, 1975. Decided March 13, 1975. As Amended May 22, 1975.
