James ROWLAND, Former Director, California Department of Corrections, et al., Petitioners,
v.
CALIFORNIA MEN'S COLONY, UNIT II MEN'S ADVISORY COUNCIL.
No. 91-1188.
Argued Oct. 6, 1992.
Decided Jan. 12, 1993.
Syllabus *
In a suit filed in the District Court against petitioner state correctional officers, respondent, a representative association of inmates in a California prison, sought leave to proceed in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), which permits litigation without prepayment of fees, costs, or security "by a person who makes affidavit that he is unable to pay." The court denied the motion for an inadequate showing of indigency. In reversing that decision, the Court of Appeals noted that a "person" who may be authorized to proceed in forma pauperis under § 1915(a) may be an "association" under the Dictionary Act, 1 U.S.C. § 1, which in relevant part provides that "in determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, unless the context indicates otherwise" " 'person' " includes "associations" and other artificial entities such as corporations and societies.
Held: Only a natural person may qualify for treatment in forma pauperis under § 1915. Pp. ____.
(a) "Context," as used in 1 U.S.C. § 1, means the text of the Act of Congress surrounding the word at issue or the texts of other related congressional acts, and this is simply an instance of the word's ordinary meaning. Had Congress intended to point to a broader definition that would include things such as legislative history, it would have been natural to use a more spacious phrase. In contrast to the narrow meaning of "context," "indication" bespeaks something more than an express contrary definition, addressing the situation where Congress provides no particular definition, but the definition in § 1 seems not to fit. Pp. ____.
(b) Four contextual features indicate that "person" in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) refers only to individuals. First, the permissive language used in § 1915(d)—that a "court may request an attorney to represent any such person unable to employ counsel" (emphasis added)—suggests that Congress assumed that courts would sometimes leave the "person" to conduct litigation on his own behalf, and, thus, also assumed that the "person" has the legal capacity to petition the court for appointment of counsel while unrepresented and the capacity to litigate pro se should the petition be denied. These assumptions suggest in turn that Congress was thinking in terms of natural persons, because the law permits corporations, see, e.g., Osborn v. Bank of the United States,
(c) Section 1915 manifests no single purpose that would be substantially frustrated by limiting the statutory reach to natural persons. Wilson v. Omaha Indian Tribe,
SOUTER, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which REHNQUIST, C.J., and WHITE, O'CONNOR, and SCALIA, JJ., joined. KENNEDY, J., filed a dissenting opinion. THOMAS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BLACKMUN, STEVENS, and KENNEDY, JJ., joined.
James Ching, Sacramento, Cal., argued for petitioners.
Charles D. Weisselberg, Los Angeles, Cal., argued for respondent.
Justice SOUTER delivered the opinion of the Court.
Title 28 U.S.C. § 1915, providing for appearances in forma pauperis, authorizes federal courts to favor any "person" meeting its criteria with a series of benefits including dispensation from the obligation to prepay fees, costs, or security for bringing, defending, or appealing a lawsuit. Here, we are asked to decide whether the term "person" as so used applies to the artificial entities listed in the definition of that term contained in 1 U.S.C. § 1. We hold that it does not, so that only a natural person may qualify for treatment in forma pauperis under § 1915.
* Respondent California Men's Colony, Unit II Men's Advisory Council is a representative association of prison inmates organized at the behest of one of the petitioners, the Warden of the Colony, to advise him of complaints and recommendations from the inmates, and to communicate his administrative decisions back to them. The general prison population elects the Council's members.
In a complaint filed in the District Court in 1989, the Council charged the petitioners, state correctional officers, with violations of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments in discontinuing their practice of providing free tobacco to indigent inmates. The Council sought leave to proceed in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), claiming by affidavit of the Council's Chairman that the Warden forbade the Council to hold funds of its own. The District Court denied the motion for an inadequate showing of indigency, though it responded to the Council's motion for reconsideration with a suggestion of willingness to consider an amended application containing "details of each individual's indigency."
On appeal, the Council was allowed to proceed in forma pauperis to enable the court to reach the very question "whether an organization, such as [the Council], may proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)," No. 90-55600 (CA9, July 20, 1990). The court requested that a lawyer represent the Council pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d).1
The Court of Appeals reversed,
We granted certiorari, 503 U.S. ----,
II
A.
Both § 1915(a), which the Council invoked in seeking to be excused from prepaying filing fees, and § 1915(d) employ the word "person" in controlling access to four benefits provided by § 1915 and a related statute. First, a qualifying person may "commenc[e], prosecut[e] or defen[d] . . . any suit, action or proceeding, civil or criminal, or appeal therein, without prepayment of fees and costs or security therefor." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). Second, a court may in certain cases direct the United States to pay the person's expenses in printing the record on appeal and preparing a transcript of proceedings before a United States magistrate. § 1915(b). Third, if the person is unable to employ counsel, "[t]he court may request an attorney to represent [him]." § 1915(d). And, fourth, in an appeal, the United States will pay for a transcript of proceedings below "if the trial judge or a circuit judge certifies that the appeal is not frivolous (but presents a substantial question)." 28 U.S.C. § 753(f); see ibid. (detailing slightly different criteria for habeas proceedings).
"Persons" were not always so entitled, for the benefits of § 1915 were once available only to "citizens," a term held, in the only two cases on the issue, to exclude corporations. See Atlantic S.S. Corp. v. Kelley,
B
The relevant portion of the Dictionary Act, 1 U.S.C. § 1, provides (as it did in 1959) that
"[i]n determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, unless the context indicates otherwise —
. . . . .
"the wor[d] "person" . . . include[s] corporations, companies, associations, firms, partnerships, societies, and joint stock companies, as well as individuals."
See 1 U.S.C. § 1 (1958). "Context" here means the text of the Act of Congress surrounding the word at issue, or the texts of other related congressional Acts, and this is simply an instance of the word's ordinary meaning: "[t]he part or parts of a discourse preceding or following a 'text' or passage or a word, or so intimately associated with it as to throw light upon its meaning." Webster's New International Dictionary 576 (2d ed. 1942). While "context" can carry a secondary meaning of "[a]ssociated surroundings, whether material or mental," ibid., we doubt that the broader sense applies here. The Dictionary Act uses "context" to give an instruction about how to "determin[e] the meaning of a[n] Act of Congress," a purpose suggesting the primary sense. If Congress had meant to point further afield, as to legislative history, for example, it would have been natural to use a more spacious phrase, like "evidence of congressional intent," in place of "context."
If "context" thus has a narrow compass, the "indication" contemplated by 1 U.S.C. § 1 has a broader one. The Dictionary Act's very reference to contextual "indication" bespeaks something more than an express contrary definition, and courts would hardly need direction where Congress had thought to include an express, specialized definition for the purpose of a particular Act; ordinary rules of statutory construction would prefer the specific definition over the Dictionary Act's general one. Where a court needs help is in the awkward case where Congress provides no particular definition, but the definition in 1 U.S.C. § 1 seems not to fit. There it is that the qualification "unless the context indicates otherwise" has a real job to do, in excusing the court from forcing a square peg into a round hole.
The point at which the indication of particular meaning becomes insistent enough to excuse the poor fit is of course a matter of judgment, but one can say that "indicates" certainly imposes less of a burden than, say, "requires" or "necessitates." One can also say that this exception from the general rule would be superfluous if the context "indicate[d] otherwise" only when use of the general definition would be incongruous enough to invoke the common mandate of statutory construction to avoid absurd results.3 See, e.g., McNary v. Haitian Refugee Center, Inc.,
III
Four contextual features indicate that "person" in § 1915(a) refers only to individuals, the first being the provision of § 1915(d) that "[t]he court may request an attorney to represent any such person unable to employ counsel." (Emphasis added.) This permissive language suggests that Congress assumed the court would in many cases not "request" counsel, see Mallard v. United States District Court,
The second revealing feature of § 1915(d) is its description of the affidavit required by § 1915(a) as an "allegation of poverty." Poverty, in its primary sense, is a human condition, to be "[w]anting in material riches or goods; lacking in the comforts of life; needy," Webster's New International Dictionary 1919 (2d ed. 1942), and it was in just such distinctly human terms that this Court had established the standard of eligibility long before Congress considered extending in forma pauperis treatment from "citizens" to "persons." As we first said in 1948, "[w]e think an affidavit is sufficient which states that one cannot because of his poverty 'pay or give security for the costs . . . and still be able to provide' himself and dependents 'with the necessities of life.' " Adkins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co.,
The third clue is much like the second. Section 1915(a) authorizes the courts to allow litigation without the prepayment of fees, costs or security "by a person who makes affidavit that he is unable to pay such costs or give security therefor," and requires that the affidavit also "state the nature of the action, defense or appeal and affiant's belief that he is entitled to redress." Because artificial entities cannot take oaths, they cannot make affidavits. See, e.g., In re Empire Refining Co.,
Of course, it is true that courts have often coupled this recognition of a corporation's incapacity to make an affidavit with a willingness to accept the affidavit of a corporate officer or agent on its behalf even when the applicable statute makes no express provision for doing so. See, e.g., In re Ben Weiss Co.,
The fourth clue to congressional understanding is the failure of § 1915 even to hint at a resolution of the issues raised by applying an "inability to pay" standard to artificial entities. It is true, of course, that because artificial entities have no use for food or the other "necessities of life," Congress could not have intended the courts to apply the traditional "inability to pay" criterion to such entities. Yet no alternative standard can be discerned in the language of § 1915, and we can find no obvious analogy to the "necessities of life" in the organizational context. Although the most promising candidate might seem to be commercial-law "insolvency," commercial law actually knows a number of different insolvency concepts. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 101(32) (1988 ed., Supp.III) (defining insolvency as used in the Federal Bankruptcy Code); Kreps v. Commissioner,
If § 1915 yields no "inability to pay" standard applicable to artificial entities, neither does it guide courts in determining when to "pierce the veil" of the entity, that is, when to look beyond the entity to its owners or members in determining ability to pay. Because courts would necessarily have to do just this to avoid abuse, congressional silence on the subject indicates that Congress simply was not thinking in terms of granting in forma pauperis status to artificial entities.
While the courts that have nonetheless held § 1915 applicable to artificial entities have devised their own tests for telling when to "pierce the veil" for a look at individual members or owners, none of their tests is based on the language of § 1915 or on any assumption implicit in it. For example, the leading opinion on the subject, a dissent from a majority opinion that never reached the issue, appears to frame the issue as whether the individual shareholders of a corporation "have adopted the corporate form as a subterfuge to avoid the payment of court costs." S.O.U.P., Inc. v. FTC,
The Council makes the argument, apparently accepted by the court below, that however difficult it might be to formulate comprehensive rules for determining organizational eligibility to file in forma pauperis, we are excused from facing the difficulty in this case, because the Council's circumstances would make it eligible under any set of rules. But we cannot construe the statute very well by sidestepping the implications of deciding one way or the other, and even if we did assume that some narrow band of eligibility escaped the contrary contextual indicators, it is not wholly clear that the Council could conclusively establish in forma pauperis entitlement. It is not obvious, for example, why the Council's inability to maintain a separate bank account should conclusively establish pauper status under § 1915, any more than a bank account with a one-cent balance would be conclusive. Account or no account, the Council, like thousands of other associations, appears to have no source of revenue but the donations of its members. If members with funds must donate to pay court fees, why should it make a conclusive legal difference whether they are able to donate indirectly through an intermediate bank account, or through one member who transmits donations by making a payment to the federal court when the Council files a complaint?10 Thus, recognizing the possibility of an organizational in forma pauperis status even in the supposedly "extreme" case of the Council would force us to delve into the difficult issues of policy and administration without any guidance from § 1915. This context of congressional silence on these issues indicates the natural character of a § 1915 "person."11
IV
We do not forget our cases holding that the broad definition of "person" in 1 U.S.C. § 1 applies in spite of incongruities as strong, or stronger, than those produced by the four contextual features we have noted in § 1915. But in each of these cases, some other aspect of statutory context independently indicated the broad reading. In Wilson v. Omaha Indian Tribe,
United States v. A & P Trucking Co.,
Thus, in both Omaha Indian Tribe and A & P Trucking Co., we found that the statutes in question manifested a purpose that would be substantially frustrated if we did not construe the statute to reach artificial entities. Section 1915, however, manifests no such single purpose subject to substantial frustration by limiting the statutory reach to natural persons. Denying artificial entities the benefits of § 1915 will not in any sense render nugatory the benefits that § 1915 still provides to individuals. Thus, Omaha Indian Tribe and A & P Trucking Co. confirm our focus on context, but turned on contextual indicators not present here.12
V
The Council argues that denying it in forma pauperis status would place an unconstitutional burden on its members' First Amendment rights to associate, to avoid which we should construe § 1915 broadly. See, e.g., NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago,
VI
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded with instructions that the case be remanded to the District Court, where the motion for leave to file in forma pauperis must be denied.
So ordered.
Justice KENNEDY, dissenting.
In determining whether the context of a statute indicates an intent to confine a word to a meaning more narrow than the one contained in the Dictionary Act, 1 U.S.C. § 1, it seems to me permissible to ask whether the broad Dictionary Act definition is compatible with a workable construction of the statute. To the extent the Court attempts to uncover significant practical barriers to including artificial entities within 28 U.S.C. § 1915, its analysis is quite appropriate and ought not to be condemned as policymaking. The problem, in my view, is that the Court does not succeed in this attempt. As the dissenting opinion by Justice Thomas well illustrates, the broad definition of "person," the one the Dictionary Act tells us to prefer, is not inconsistent with a common sense, workable implementation of § 1915.
With this observation, I join Justice Thomas's dissenting opinion.
Justice THOMAS, with whom Justice BLACKMUN, Justice STEVENS, and Justice KENNEDY join, dissenting.
The parties agree that the interpretive point of departure in deciding whether an association is a "person" for purposes of the in forma pauperis statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1915, is the first section of the United States Code. The question presented in this case may thus be formulated as follows: Must the presumption codified in 1 U.S.C. § 1—namely, that "[i]n determining the meaning of any Act of Congress," the word "person" should be construed to include an association—be given effect in determining the meaning of the in forma pauperis statute, or has the presumption been overcome because the context "indicates otherwise"? The answer to that question ultimately turns on the meaning of the phrase "unless the context indicates otherwise." In my view, the Court's holding rests on an impermissibly broad reading of that language. I see no basis for concluding that an association is not entitled to in forma pauperis status.
The Court states that the word "context" in 1 U.S.C. § 1 "means the text of the Act of Congress surrounding the word at issue, or the texts of other related congressional Acts." Ante, at ____. The Court then goes on to say that the word "indicates" has a broader scope than the word "context"; that it "imposes less of a burden than, say, 'requires' or 'necessitates' "; and that "a contrary 'indication' may raise a specter short of inanity, and with something less than syllogistic force." Ante, at ____. I share the Court's understanding of the word "context."1 I do not share the Court's understanding of the word "indicates," however, because its gloss on that word apparently permits (and perhaps even requires) courts to look beyond the words of a statute, and to consider the policy judgments on which those words may or may not be based. (It certainly enables the Court to do so in this case.) I agree that the exception to the rule of construction codified in 1 U.S.C. § 1 is not susceptible of precise definition, and that determining whether "the context indicates otherwise" in any given case is necessarily "a matter of judgment." Ante, at ____. Whatever "unless the context indicates otherwise" means, however, it cannot mean "unless there are sound policy reasons for concluding otherwise."
* The in forma pauperis statute authorizes courts to allow "[1] the commencement, prosecution or defense of any suit, action or proceeding, civil or criminal, or appeal therein, without prepayment of fees and costs or security therefor, by a person who [2] makes affidavit that he is [3] unable to pay such costs or give security therefor." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). Section 1915(a) thus contemplates that the "person" who is entitled to the benefits of the provision will have three characteristics: He will have the capacity to sue or be sued, to make an affidavit, and to be unable to pay court costs. An association clearly has the capacity to do each of these things, and that, in my view, should be the end of the matter.
An artificial entity has the capacity to sue or be sued in federal court as long as it has that capacity under state law (and, in some circumstances, even when it does not). See Fed.Rule Civ.Proc. 17(b).2 An artificial entity can make an affidavit through an agent. See, e.g., Davidson v. Jones, Sullivan & Jones,
Permitting artificial entities to proceed in forma pauperis may be unwise, and it may be an inefficient use of the Government's limited resources, but I see nothing in the text of the in forma pauperis statute indicating that Congress has chosen to exclude such entities from the benefits of that law. While the "context indicates" that an artificial entity is not a "person" for purposes of a statute providing benefits to individuals with disabilities,4 the same cannot be said of 28 U.S.C. § 1915, which provides benefits to impecunious litigants—a class encompassing both natural and artificial "persons."5
II
The Court's holding rests on the view that § 1915 has four "contextual features," ante, at ____, indicating that only a natural person is entitled to in forma pauperis status. These "features" include a few select words in § 1915 and a number of practical problems that may arise when artificial entities seek to proceed in forma pauperis. I do not believe that § 1915 contains any language indicating that an association is not a "person" for purposes of that provision, and I do not think it is appropriate to rely upon what are at bottom policy considerations in deciding whether "the context indicates otherwise." In my view, none of the "contextual features" discussed by the Court, either alone or in combination with the others, can overcome the statutory presumption that an association is a "person."
A.
The first "contextual feature" identified by the Court is the portion of the in forma pauperis statute providing that "[t]he court may request an attorney to represent any such person unable to employ counsel." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d). Because a corporation, partnership, or association may appear in federal court only through licensed counsel, and because the permissive language of § 1915(d) suggests that Congress assumed that there would be many cases in which the court would not appoint counsel, Congress, the Court says, "was thinking in terms of 'persons' who could petition courts themselves and appear pro se, that is, of natural persons only." Ante, at ____.
This does not follow at all. Congress' use of the word "may" is entirely consistent with an intent to include artificial entities among those "persons" entitled to the benefits of the in forma pauperis statute, and it does not necessarily rest on an "assumption that litigants proceeding in forma pauperis may represent themselves." Ibid. Section 1915 gives courts discretion both with respect to granting in forma pauperis status and with respect to appointing counsel. When a natural person seeks the benefits of § 1915, a court will often allow that person to proceed in forma pauperis but refuse to appoint counsel. Under such circumstances, the person may either obtain counsel elsewhere or proceed pro se. When an artificial person seeks the benefits of § 1915, a court might likewise permit that "person" to proceed in forma pauperis but refuse to appoint counsel. Under these circumstances, the artificial person has fewer options than a natural person: It can either obtain counsel elsewhere or lose the opportunity to appear in federal court. That an artificial entity without funds may in some circumstances be unable to have its case heard in federal court, however, does not prove that Congress intended to exclude such an entity from the benefits of the in forma pauperis statute. An artificial entity's inability to proceed pro se bears upon the extent to which such an entity may benefit from § 1915, but it has no bearing upon whether it may benefit. And that, after all, is the question presented in this case.
The second "contextual feature" on which the Court focuses is the use of the word "poverty" in § 1915(d). "Poverty," in the Court's view, is a "human condition"; artificial entities "may be insolvent, but they are not well spoken of as 'poor.' " Ante, at ____.
I am not so sure.6 "Poverty" may well be a human condition in its "primary sense," ante, at ____, but I doubt that using the word in connection with an artificial entity departs in any significant way from settled principles of English usage. One certainly need not search long or far to find examples of the use of "poor" in connection with nonhuman entities—and, indeed, in connection with the very entities listed in 1 U.S.C. § 1. No less a figure than Justice Holmes had occasion to write that the issuance of stock dividends renders a corporation "no poorer" than it was before their distribution, Towne v. Eisner,
B
The third "contextual feature" is § 1915's affidavit requirement, which, in the Court's view, raises a number of "difficulties." Ante, at ____. One such "difficulty" is the "problem of establishing an affiant's authorization"; a court may have trouble determining whether a member of an unincorporated association "has any business purporting to bind it by affidavit." Ibid. Another "difficulty" is that the affidavit requirement's deterrent function cannot be served "fully" when the litigant is an artificial entity. Ibid. This is because "[n]atural persons can be imprisoned for perjury, but artificial entities can only be fined," ante, at ____, and because the possibility of prosecuting the entity's perjurious agent is only a " 'second-best' solution," ante, at ____, n. 7.
But these are classic policy considerations—the concerns of a legislature, not a court. Unlike the majority, I am perfectly willing to assume that in adding the word "person" to § 1915 Congress took into account the fact that it might be difficult to determine whether an association's member has the authority to speak on its behalf, and that the possibility of a perjury prosecution might not deter artificial entities sufficiently. In deciding that "the context indicates otherwise," the Court has simply second-guessed Congress' policy judgments.8
The fourth "contextual feature" identified by the Court is the difficulty of the "issues raised by applying an 'inability to pay' standard to artificial entities," ante, at ____, and the difficulty of determining "when to look beyond the entity to its owners or members in determining ability to pay," ante, at ____. These, too, are policy matters that Congress should be presumed to have considered when it inserted the word "person" into § 1915. As with the difficulties associated with the affidavit requirement, any difficulties associated with the "inability to pay" test are relevant to the issue of why Congress might have chosen to include artificial entities among those "persons" entitled to in forma pauperis status, but they are not relevant to the issue of whether Congress has in fact made this choice.9
Petitioners essentially concede that this argument is ultimately one of policy when they say that the "test for indigency" will create "procedural problems" and will have "practical effects . . . on the administration of justice." Brief for Petitioners 17. Today the Court accepts this argument, but a unanimous Court rejected a similar argument only four Terms ago in a case involving another provision of the in forma pauperis statute. Neitzke v. Williams,
The Court suggests that a reading of § 1915 under which an artificial entity is entitled to in forma pauperis status would force it to confront "difficult issues of policy and administration." Ante, at ____. Far from avoiding policy determinations, however, the Court effectively engages in policymaking by refusing to credit the legislative judgments that are implicit in the statutory language. Any reading of the phrase "unless the context indicates otherwise" that permits courts to override congressional policy judgments is in my view too broad. Congress has spoken, and we should give effect to its words.
III
Congress has created a rule of statutory construction (an association is a "person") and an exception to that rule (an association is not a "person" if the "context indicates otherwise"), but the Court has permitted the exception to devour the rule. In deciding that an association is not a "person" for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), the Court effectively reads 1 U.S.C. § 1 as if the presumption ran the other way—as if the statute said that "in determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, unless the context indicates otherwise, the word 'person' does not include corporations, partnerships, and associations." While it might make sense as a matter of policy to exclude associations and other artificial entities from the benefits of the in forma pauperis statute, I do not believe that Congress has done so.
I respectfully dissent.
Notes
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Lumber Co.,
For a description of § 1915(d) and its relationship to § 1915(a), see infra, at ____.
The House Report noted three reasons for "extend[ing] the same privilege of proceedings in forma pauperis as is now afforded citizens." H.R.Rep. No. 650, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1959). First, "[i]t is the opinion of the Department of Justice that this proposal would be consonant with the ideas or policies of the United States." Ibid. Second, "the Judicial Conference of the United States in recommending this legislation pointed out that the distinction between citizens and aliens as contained in existing law may be unconstitutional." Ibid. Third, "it may also be in violation of various treaties entered into by the United States with foreign countries which guarantees [sic] to their citizens access of the courts of the United States on the same terms as American citizens." Ibid.; see also S.Rep. No. 947, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 2, U.S.Code & Admin.News 1959, pp. 2663, 2664 (quoting the portion of the House Report containing these three reasons). None of these reasons supports extension of § 1915 benefits to artificial entities, or suggests that anyone involved with drafting or evaluating this legislation was thinking of such an extension. The House debate on the bill contains a discussion about the deportation of alien criminals, a matter which obviously concerns only natural persons, see 105 Cong.Rec. 13714 (1959) (remarks of Rep. Gross and Rep. Rogers); otherwise, the congressional debates provide no additional information. See ibid.; id., at 18909 (remarks of Sen. Eastland).
This rule has been applied throughout the history of 1 U.S.C. § 1 and its predecessors. See, e.g., Green v. Bock Laundry Machine Co.,
This assumption reflects a reality well known within the legal community. See, e.g., Turner, When Prisoners Sue: A Study of Prisoner Section 1983 Suits in the Federal Courts, 92 Harv.L.Rev. 610, 617 (1979) (study of section 1983 cases filed by prisoners in five districts found that the "overwhelming majority" of cases were filed in forma pauperis, and that "almost all" the cases were filed pro se ).
Two federal cases cited by respondent are the only two, of which we are aware, to hold that artificial entities may be represented by persons who are not licensed attorneys: United States v. Reeves,
On occasion, when a party is a minor or incompetent, or fails to cooperate with appointed counsel, or is for some other reason unable to file a timely affidavit, we will accept an affidavit from a guardian ad litem or an attorney. By accepting such an affidavit, we bend the requirement that the affiant state that "he" is indigent and that "he" believes "he" is entitled to relief. In such a case, however, it is clear that the party himself is a "person" within the meaning of § 1915. The only question is whether Congress intended to deny § 1915 benefits to such a person who for some reason peculiar to him is disabled from filing an affidavit. It is quite a different question whether Congress intended to extend § 1915 to entities that, by their nature, could never meet the statute's requirements.
We are not ignoring the fact that the individual who made the affidavit as the entity's agent could still be prosecuted for perjury. However, this is clearly a "second-best" solution; the law does not normally presume that corporate misbehavior can adequately be deterred solely by threatening to punish individual agents.
One plausible motive for Congress to include artificial entities within the meaning of "person" in § 1915 would be to aid organizations in bankruptcy proceedings. But the fact that the law has been settled for almost 20 years that § 1915(a) does not apply to bankruptcy proceedings, see United States v. Kras,
Two other decisions allowing organizations to proceed in forma pauperis appear to place importance on the "public interest" character of the organization or the litigation in question. See River Valley, Inc. v. Dubuque County,
There is no evidence in the record suggesting that an inmate would not be allowed to donate part of the Council's court costs directly from his personal account to the court, or that the inmates could not coordinate such donations.
The dissent asserts that, by drawing an inference from congressional silence, we "depart[ ] from the definition of 'context' set out at the beginning of [our] opinion." Post, at [__ n. 9]. It is not from some dimensionless void, however, that we draw our conclusion. Rather, it is from a pointed silence in the face of obvious problems created by applying to artificial entities the text of § 1915, in this case the requirement that the person seeking in forma pauperis status be "unable to pay" costs, fees and security. As the dissent is willing to affirm without itself addressing these problems, it is apparently confident that workable, uncontroversial solutions can be drawn from the statute. Yet the rule it would affirm (that an unincorporated association is "unable to pay" whenever its "chairman" says that it cannot maintain a bank account in its own name) does not inspire confidence.
The dissent suggests that our reference to statutory purpose here is inconsistent with our interpretation of "context" in 1 U.S.C. § 1. Post, at [__ n. 1]. A focus on statutory text, however, does not preclude reasoning from statutory purpose. To the contrary, since "[s]tatutes . . . are not inert exercises in literary composition[, but] instruments of government," United States v. Shirey,
I should note, however, that the majority departs from that understanding in its discussion of Wilson v. Omaha Indian Tribe,
Under Rule 17(b), the capacity of a corporation to sue or be sued is determined by the law under which it was organized, and the capacity of an unincorporated association is determined by the law of the State in which the district court is located. An unincorporated association that lacks the capacity to sue or be sued under the law of the forum State may still litigate in federal court when the action is brought for the enforcement of a federal right.
Before acknowledging that an agent can make an affidavit on behalf of an artificial entity, the majority pauses to say that such an entity cannot make an affidavit itself. Ante, at ____. I suppose this distinction has some metaphysical significance, but I fail to see how it is otherwise relevant, since any action an artificial entity takes must be done through an agent. (It is noteworthy that two of the cases cited by the majority for the proposition that an artificial entity cannot make an affidavit recognize that an agent can make an affidavit on an entity's behalf. See In re Empire Refining Co.,
See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 6001(5) (1988 Ed., Supp.II) ("The term 'developmental disability' means a severe, chronic disability of a person"); 2 U.S.C. § 135b(a) ("[P]reference shall at all times be given to the needs of the blind and of the other physically handicapped persons").
The context also "indicates otherwise" in statutes dealing with marriage, see, e.g., 38 U.S.C. § 101(31) ("The term 'spouse' means a person of the opposite sex who is a wife or husband"); § 103(a) ("any claim filed by a person as the widow or widower of a veteran"), the military, see, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 244 ("any person wearing the uniform of any of the armed forces of the United States"); 38 U.S.C. § 101(2) ("The term 'veteran' means a person who served in the active military, naval, or air service, and who was discharged or released therefrom under conditions other than dishonorable"), drug addiction, see, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 201(k) ("The term 'addict' means any person who habitually uses any habit-forming narcotics drugs"), drunk driving, see, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3118(a) (1988 Ed., Supp.II) ("such person's driving while under the influence of a drug or alcohol"), kidnaping, see, e.g., § 1201(a) ("[w]hoever unlawfully seizes, confines, . . . kidnaps, abducts, or carries away and holds for ransom . . . any person"), sexual assault, see, e.g., § 2241(a) ("[w]hoever, in the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States or in a Federal prison, knowingly causes another person to engage in a sexual act"), language, see, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1827(b)(1) ("persons who speak only or primarily a language other than the English language"), jury duty, see, e.g., § 1865(a) ("The chief judge . . . shall determine . . . whether a person is unqualified for, or exempt, or to be excused from jury service"), "missing persons," see, e.g., § 534(a)(3) ("The Attorney General shall . . . acquire, collect, classify, and preserve any information which would assist in the location of any missing person . . . and provide confirmation as to any entry for such a person to the parent, legal guardian, or next of kin of that person"), and "homeless persons," see, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 12705(b)(2)(C) (1988 Ed., Supp.II) ("helping homeless persons make the transition to permanent housing and independent living").
Nor, apparently, are petitioners. At oral argument counsel for petitioners was asked whether the word "poverty" in § 1915(d) "helps" him, since one does not "usually think of a corporation as making an affidavit of poverty." Tr. of Oral Arg. 11. In response, petitioners' counsel said that he "really d[id] believe that a bankrupt corporation could make an affidavit of poverty," id., at ____, and conceded that he did not "pin much" on the word "poverty," id., at ____.
The majority says that we established the "standard of eligibility" for in forma pauperis status in "distinctly human terms," ante, at ____, in Adkins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co.,
The majority also gives "some weight," ante, at ____, to § 1915(a)' § requirement that the affidavit state the "affiant's belief that he is entitled to redress." If the "affiant" is "an agent making an affidavit on behalf of an artificial entity," according to the majority, "it would wrench the rules of grammar to read 'he' as referring to the entity." Ibid. This may be so, but only if the majority's premise is correct. Since an "affiant" is simply a person who makes an affidavit, see Black's Law Dictionary 79 (4th ed. 1951), and an artificial entity can make an affidavit through an agent, it is hardly unreasonable to understand the word "affiant" in § 1915(a) as a reference not to the agent but to the entity on whose behalf the affidavit is made. Such an understanding is all the more reasonable when the agent is an officer of the entity, since courts have held that under such circumstances the affidavit is considered to be the affidavit of the entity itself. See n. 3, supra.
In discussing the difficulty of determining whether an artificial entity is unable to pay costs, the majority says that the "context of congressional silence" on this issue "indicates the natural character of a § 1915 'person.' " Ante, at ____. See also ante, at ____. In relying upon "congressional silence" as a "contextual indicator," however, the majority once again departs from the definition of "context" set out at the beginning of its opinion: Rather than relying upon the words surrounding "person," the majority accords significance to the absence of words surrounding "person." Cf. n. 1, supra. But even if reliance on statutory silence is consistent with the majority's definition of "context," it is not apparent to me why the absence of a statutory "ability to pay" standard for artificial entities demonstrates that the in forma pauperis statute covers natural but not artificial persons, since § 1915 contains no such standard for any kind of "person."