James Robert Wilcox v. Honorable Edward MillerJames Robert Wilcox v. Honorable Edward Miller
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Plaintiff, James Robert Wilcox, appeals the district court’s denial of relief and dismissal of his civil rights action against a number of state officials. Wilcox claims that the district court erred in finding that there were no unreasonable delays in the appointment of counsel and in the preparation of a transcript for his direct appeal. He contends further that the court erred in finding that there was no evidence that state and private officials conspired to accuse him falsely of rape or to alter the transcript of his trial to assure an affirmance on appeal. We hold that the district court should have dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint without reaching the merits, in light of the fact that Wilcox’s conviction was still pending on appeal in state court.
Wilcox was convicted of aggravated rape and sentenced to life imprisonment on May 8, 1978. His retained attorney filed notice
Wilcox initially filed his pro se complaint under
On remand, Wilcox moved to amend his complaint
1
to add a claim under
In its Order of Dismissal, the district court stated that
there was no undue delay which denied the plaintiff of any of his constitutional rights, including perfecting an appeal to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, and .. . that such appeal was pending at the time the evidentiary hearing on this civil rights case was conducted, and ... that any deprivation of rights that the plaintiff may have could and should be brought to the attention of the Court of Criminal Appeals.
Record, Vol. II at 55 (emphasis added). Accordingly, we hold that the district court should have dismissed this case without reaching the merits of the plaintiff’s claim in light of the existence of a pending appeal of Wilcox’s criminal conviction. 2 See Huffman v. Pursue, 420 U.S. 592, 95 S.Ct. 1200, 43 L.Ed.2d 482 (1975); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 639 (1971). 3
In
Younger,
the Supreme Court held that “a federal court should not enjoin a state criminal prosecution begun prior to the institution of the federal suit except in very unusual situations, where necessary to prevent immediate irreparable injury.” 401 U.S. at 46, 91 S.Ct. at 751.
Younger
rests on notions of comity and federalism which
Virtually all of the evils at which Younger is directed would inhere in federal intervention prior to completion of state appellate proceedings, just as surely as they would if such intervention occurred at or before trial. Intervention at the later stage is if anything more highly duplicative, since an entire trial has already taken place, and it is also a direct aspersion on the capabilities and good faith of state appellate courts.
420 U.S. at 608, 95 S.Ct. at 1210. Whether or not Wilcox has chosen to raise his claims in his direct appeal, “the pertinent issue is whether [his] constitutional claims could have been raised in the pending state proceedings.” Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 425, 99 S.Ct. 2371, 2378, 60 L.Ed.2d 994 (1979).
As the district court found below, Wilcox may raise all of his constitutional claims in his appeal to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. See
The federal district court’s findings concerning the merits of Wilcox’s claim entail the exact risks that the Supreme Court sought to avoid in
Huffman.
When the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals hands down its decision in Wilcox’s appeal, the resulting findings by the two courts could conceivably be inconsistent and the processes will certainly be duplicative. There is no evidence that the State’s prosecution of Wilcox was in bad faith or that it constituted harassment. Indeed, the magistrate found that there had been no conspiracy falsely to accuse Wilcox of rape. Since Wilcox’s case falls within none of the exceptions recognized in
Younger,
the district court should not have considered his
AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART.
Notes
. Wilcox actually moved to file a supplemental complaint. Parties often confuse the two pleadings, and the district court’s treatment of the motion as a motion to amend was proper. See 6 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1473 (1971).
. The doctrine of the law of the case does not prevent us from ordering a dismissal of the complaint where an earlier panel of this court reversed a dismissal on other grounds.
Quern v. Jordan,
440 U.S. 332, 347 n. 18, 99 S.Ct. 1139, 1148 n.18, 59 L.Ed.2d 358 (1979);
United States v. Louisiana,
669 F.2d 314 (5th Cir. 1982);
Key v. Wise,
629 F.2d 1049 (5th Cir. 1980),
cert. denied,
454 U.S. 1103, 102 S.Ct. 682, 70 L.Ed.2d 647 (1981). Our prior decision merely held that the plaintiff’s initial claims stated a cause of action under
. Dismissal of the plaintiff’s request for declaratory as well as injunctive relief is appropriate. Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66, 91 S.Ct. 764, 27 L.Ed.2d 688 (1971).
. This contention goes in part to the validity of the plaintiffs conviction, and therefore it arguably should have been raised on a petition for habeas corpus relief rather than under