*1 288 1446(b), § differently procedural, jurisdictional, to hold with re-
reasoned basis one-year subject limitation. and therefore to forfeiture. Ac- gard “[NJoth- to the affirm ing suggests cordingly, judgment in the text of the statute operates differently correctly limit district court it one-year ruled 30-day provision objection from the limit. Neither that Music forfeited his jurisdic- limit expressly purports to federal removal.
tion, prohibitive terms of the one- and the mandatory no more
year limit ... are compulsory 30-day
than the terms of the Ariel, F.3d at 614-15. In-
limit[.]”
deed, previously we have held that where express-
a removal did not limiting statute
ly jurisdiction restrict of the federal courts, requirements the statute PRICE, Plaintiff-Appellee, R. James procedural were and thus waivable. Car- v. Co., penter v. Baltimore & O.R. 109 F.2d (6th Cir.1940) 375, (holding statute BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF the limiting the removal of cases to federal INDIANA LABORER’S PENSION procedural part court to be because the FUND; Indiana Laborer’s Pension statutory language purport “does not Fund, Defendants-Appellants. jurisdiction limit the of the District Court 09-3897, Nos. 09-4204. but personal privilege confers a on the waived”). Appeals, United States Court of Sixth Circuit. that, in unpublished opinion,
We note panel Syntex this court Brock v. 6, Argued: Aug. 2010. Laboratories, Inc., 232, 7 F.3d 1993 WL 12, Decided and Filed: Jan. (6th 1993) 389946, Oct.1, at *1 (unpub Cir. opinion), lished table held that the one-
year period jurisdictional limitation is a
mandate, subject and therefore not to for respectfully
feiture. We disagree with the decision,
Brock and for the reasons stated
herein, choose not to follow it. See United Sanford, v.
States 476 F.3d
Cir.2007) (noting unpublished opinions
are not binding precedent under the doc TriHealth, decisis);
trine of stare Inc. v. Comm’rs, Ohio,
Bd. Cnty., Hamilton (6th Cir.2005) (same). authority
Brock cites no holding its
and, above, as detailed is inconsistent with published opinions of our court.
III. conclusion, one-year we hold that the removal,
time limitation rule for 28 U.S.C. *2 Winters, Gary McCaslin,
ARGUED: R. McCaslin, Cincinnati, Ohio, Imbus & for Appellants. Tony Merry, Law Offices C. LLC, Columbus, Ohio, Tony Merry, C. Gary BRIEF: R. Appellee.
for ON Win- ters, McCaslin, McCaslin, & Imbus Cincin- nati, Ohio, Tony Merry, apply the district court Appellants. appro- C. failed LLC, Tony Merry, C. Co- standard of priate analyzing Law Offices of review when lumbus, Ohio, Appellee. Accordingly, Price’s claim. we VACATE *3 the district opinion court’s and order and McKEAGUE, Before: and SUTTON proceedings REMAND for further consis- JONKER, Judges; District Circuit opinion. tent with this Judge.* I. McKEAGUE, J., opinion delivered the The facts in this case undisputed. are court, SUTTON, J., joined. in which The Indiana State District of La- Counsel - JONKER, 301), (pp. D.J. delivered a borers and Hod Carriers Pension Fund separate concurring opinion. (the “Fund”) multi-employer employee is a pension plan benefit established and main- OPINION in tained accordance with ERISA. As re- McKEAGUE, Judge. Circuit ERISA, quired by the Fund has a written (the pension plan “Plan”), document appeal This arises at the intersection of sets forth the provid- terms of the benefits complex numerous areas of federal law. ed the Fund. The Plan indicates that upon through We are called to sift participants Fund must employ- be union complexity hopes adding clarity. in ees, working under various collective bar- many years prior appeal, For to this addition, gaining agreements. the Plan occupational James Price received disabili- provides also that the Fund will be admin- ty payments an employee under (the istered a Board of Trustees benefit plan established and maintained in “Board”). The in possesses Board turn accordance Employee with the Retirement authority determinations, to make benefit (“ERISA”). Security Income Act of 1974 Plan, interpret and amend the Plan. Price’s benefits were discontinued after In granting the Board amendment power, plan trustees amended the to limit the Section 15.1 of the Plan specifically states: payment occupational disability benefits Any amendment to the Plan period to a years. of two He then filed retroactively by made court, majority ac- suit in federal challenging district tion of the Board present of Trustees the denial of alleging his benefits and voting bring order to the Plan in the plan amendment violated ERISA be- compliance any with the Act and subse- occupational disability cause his quent amendments thereto. It is the had vested aas matter of law. The dis- desire of the Board of Trustees to main- trict court determined that occupa- Price’s tain qualified the Plan as a Plan and tional benefits did indeed vest 401(a) Trust under Code sections under this court’s Yard-Man line of cases 501(a). and, accordingly, found that the amend- applied ment as to Price violated ERISA. The present Trustees who are and vot- pension plan appeals The now ing may this deter- by majority amend the Plan mination, arguing However, the benefits were action. no amendment shall considering vested. After all of the be made which results reduced bene- law, relevant bodies of conclude that fits for Participant rights whose * Jonlcer, The Michigan, Honorable Robert J. sitting by designation. United States Judge District for the Western District of Board, already become vested under the arguing have the Amendment as provisions of the Plan on the date the applied to him violated ERISA. The made, except upon amendment the Board denied appeal stated advice and counsel of enrolled actu- a written letter to Price’s attorney that ary. Occupational Disability Benefits could be amended under the terms of the Plan. began receiving James Price first dis- Price then filed suit federal district ability Plan in benefits under the 1132(a)(1)(B). § court under 29 U.S.C. injuries after a series of work-related left complaint His alleged that the Amendment him unable to work. Price’s benefits were deprived violated ERISA because it him of initially approved under the Plan’s “Total *4 a benefit that had a vested as matter of Disability and Permanent Benefit” catego- law. 2001, ry. In the Fund notified Price that longer qualified he no for benefits under period After a short of discovery, the him category, this but advised that he parties cross-filed summary judgment. could continue receiving benefits under Ar- The granted judgment district court provisions “Occupational ticle 7A’s Dis- favor of Price under this precedent court’s ability Benefit.” At the time Price began Union, Auto., in Int’l United Aerospace, & Benefits, receiving Occupational Disability Agrie. Implement Workers Am. v. payment of those benefits was limited ac- Yard-Man, Inc., (6th 1476, 716 F.2d 1482 7A.5, cording to terms set forth in Section Cir.1983). Price v. Bd. Trustees Occupational
which stated that “[t]he
Dis-
Fund,
al.,
Ind. Laborer’s Pension
et
2:07-
ability
payable only during
Benefit shall be
7,
(S.D.Ohio
ev-00933 at
Price appealed the discontinuation of his “[S]ummary judgment ap Occupational Disability Benefits to ‘if propriate pleadings, discovery 292 file, question properly, To answer this we materials on
and disclosure
genuine
is no
there
law
creating
affidavits show
trace Sixth Circuit case
fact and that the
any material
issue as to
inference that
intended for
judgment as a matter
entitled to
movant is
ap-
benefits to vest. The inference first
”
Philips Display
v.
of law.’ Schreiber
decision in
pears
this court’s seminal
Co.,
F.3d
Components
Yard-Man;
indeed, the
has
inference
been
56).
Cir.2009) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P.
many
simply
of our
renamed
cases
creating
the “Yard-Man inference.”
III.
inference,
the Yard-Man
this court ad-
by noting that disabili
begin
We
question of
specific
dressed the
“whether
welfare-type
benefit un
ty benefits are
beyond
retiree insurance benefits continue
such,
ERISA,
ERISA’s statuto
der
and as
bargaining
expiration
collective
ry
apply.
do not
See
vesting requirements
agreement
upon the intent of the
[based]
1002(1);
§
Robinson v. Sheet
U.S.C.
Yard-Man,
parties.”
(6th (finding intent to vest could disabled” was a status similar to the “retir general be inferred where CBA contained ee” status open because both are to their clause); Joy durational Maurer v. Techs. benefits being negotiated away by future Inc., Cir.2000) F.3d 917-18 bargaining parties. 2:07-cv-00933 (finding intent to vest where durational at persuaded 6. We are not that the occu general clause of was rather than pationally CBA disabled status and retiree sta Union, Auto., specific); Int’l quite easily United Aero tus can be so analogized. And space, Agric. Implement & again Workers believe that Yard-Man’s own Inc., Am. v. Liquidating, BVR 190 F.3d language makes that case apply difficult to (6th Cir.1999) 768, 774 (holding that dis outside the context of retiree health bene trict court should have considered terms of fits. agreement insurance where CBA was am with, begin To the Yard-Man court spe- vest).
biguous as to intent to Price now cifically recognized uniqueness in the upon seizes our reasoning Yard-Man retiree status because retiree benefits are its progeny argues that the intent delayed considered form of compensation to vest can be inferred in this ease. past reward for compensation. 716 Admittedly many Yard-Man contains F.2d at 1482. Because these benefits are a case, similarities to this delayed which would make form of compensation, it is unlike- application its Occupa- ly attractive. Price’s parties would leave them sub- tional Disability arguably ject Benefits are sim- Thus, to future negotiations. ilar in nature to the retiree health may properly court infer that the Additionally, at issue in Yard-Man. intended for retiree benefits to vest. Id. *6 Plan in this case indicates that Price was a While reasoning may this hold true for member, union working under a CBA. retiree it resonates less in the plunge headlong per- Yet before we context of Specifically, benefits. —and haps haphazardly finding a occupational disability Yardr- generally —into here, Man pause inference to consider cannot delayed be considered a form of And, whether Yard-Man’s framework is even compensation. unlike retiree bene- workable present. with the facts In con- fits where everyone meeting length-of- issue, sidering principled this we note that service requirement will realize the bene- fit, only distinctions exist between this case and the portion a small of those meeting Yard-Man line of cases. length-of-service After careful requirement for occu- consideration, we believe that pational disability these dis- actually benefits will re- against tinctions applying Thus, caution Yartd- alize the benefit. repre- rather than Man’s set of rules in this context. senting a delayed compensation, form of appropriately benefits are more that, Chief among these distinctions is characterized as an potentially uncertain Yard-Man, unlike in where the benefit at realized benefit. benefit, issue awas retiree health the ben- at occupational Moreover, efit issue here is an disabil- unique- Yard-Man notes a ity benefit. Our case law has not ad- ness in the retiree status because unions dressed whether the Yard-Man inference do not persons any obligation owe retired can be appropriately applied bargain outside the to for their continued benefits. Thus, teaches, context of retiree health benefits. This was Id. Yard-Man it is more a distinction that appar- likely the district court that would intend the ently significant. Instead, did not find retiree benefits to vest avoid the bene- “occupationally court reasoned that being negotiations. fits left to future Id.
294 status, employer demonstrates undue less the of retiree this feature
Unlike
12112(b)(5)(A).
§
hardship.
status does not
42 U.S.C.
disabled
occupationally
unrepre- Also,
open
specifically
itself
noted that
necessarily leave
this court has
This status is
negotiations.
provide
future
employer might
required
sented
an
status, as
likely
permanent
to be a
not as
period
part
an extended leave
status, because
the retiree
is the case with
accommodation. See Cleveland
reasonable
person might
disabled
occupationally
an
Express Corp.,
Fed.Appx.
v. Fed.
point and return
at some
expect to recover
Cir.2003)
(6th
(holding
question
that a
representation. A
of union
position
to a
month leave
fact existed as whether six
related to the oc-
more fundamental issue
accommodation). Thus,
was a reasonable
is whether a
status
cupationally disabled
persons
disabled
possible
it is
some
considered an
in this status is still
person
never leave the confines of union
would
purpose of union bar-
“employee” for the
strongly
bargaining.
possibility
This
cuts
in this case is silent
gaining. The record
inference
against applying
Yard-Man
employee
Price remained an
as to whether
to this status.1
membership.
union
purpose
for the
analysis
convinced that
Our
leaves us
However,
likely
it is
that at least some
applied
Yardr-Man’s framework cannot be
occupationally
disabled sta-
persons
Yet,
inquiry
our
not end there
here.
does
employees
tus would be
union mem-
—and
argues
the Board
that in the ab-
requirements imposed
bers' —due
Yard-Man,
apply
we should
sence
Family
Specifically, the
Med-
federal law.
precedent
Sprague
court’s
v. General
that employers
ical Leave Act mandates
Corp.,
Motors
Cir.
employee with
provide
eligible
must
an
1998) (en banc).
Sprague,
In
we evaluated
during
of leave
a 12-
twelve workweeks
whether retiree health benefits vested
required
if
period
month
the leave is
due
salaried,
favor of
non-union
Mo-
General
that makes
to “a serious health condition
employees.
tors
Id. at 393. We ultimate-
employee
perform
unable to
the func-
ly
unilaterally
held
when
benefit is
position
employee.”
tions of the
of such
2612(a)(1)(D).
addition,
provided by
employer,
plan
docu-
§
while
U.S.C.
*7
express
ments must contain a clear and
the Americans with Disabilities Act does
statement of intent to vest.
Id. at 400.
require employers
grant
specified
not
language
lacking
Because that
was
employees,
amount of leave to disabled
Sprague,
the benefits
not vest.
Id.
require employers
this act does
to reason-
did
ably
employees,
Applying Sprague
pres-
accommodate disabled
un-
to this case also
Furthermore,
specific
we note that even if the Yard-
These so-called
durational clauses al-
applicable
occupa-
Man framework was
parties
any
low the
to overcome
inference
pro-
tional
Price has not
might
regarding
that otherwise
exist
their in-
any
upon
duced
CBA
we can infer that
which
Applying
Yard-
tent for benefit to vest.
the
the
intended for his benefits to vest.
case,
Man inference to this
without the bene-
apply
To
the Yard-Man inference in the ab-
CBA,
consulting
might
fit of
the relevant
in-
require
sence of a CBA would
a court to
advertently
parties’
spe-
the
intent
thwart
any
confirming—
assume—without
evidence
cifically
vesting
prevent
Occupational
of
Occupational Disability
that Price’s
Benefits
minimum,
appli-
Disability
At
Benefits.
this
Moreover,
provided
were
for in the CBA.
cation of Yard-Man would undercut future
consistently
law
our case
has
stated that the
vesting through spe-
parties’ ability
prevent
parties can establish a lack of intent to vest
clauses,
cific durational
which would under-
by including language
stating
within the CBA
carefully
mine
balanced reason-
Yard-Man’s
specific
that the
benefit would not survive the
ing.
Noe,
expiration
of
CBA.
295
already
Yet for
many
an attractive solution.
determined
neither
ents
ERISA
above,
provide
nor Yard-Man
for
vesting
the reasons stated
do not
this
of
Moreover,
case.
Price’s own
Sprague governs
complaint,
outcome
believe
following
benefits at
filed
of
appeal
this case either. The
issue
an
the denial
of
of
Benefits,
Occupational Disability
his
Sprague
specifically
were
characterized
was
393,
1132(a)(1)(B),
§
unilaterally
brought
Id. at
under 29
offered benefits.
U.S.C.
however,
Here,
the administra-
allows for civil actions “to
402-03.
recover
record
that Price’s Occu- benefits due to
under
[a claimant]
tive
makes clear
Disability
plan.”
Benefits were bar-
terms of his
When the
pational
issue is
unilaterally provided. properly
framed as whether
gained-for and
Price’s Occu-
Again,
pational Disability
that the factu-
Benefits
we are not convinced
vested under
Plan,
can so
then de
easily
al distinctions
this case
terms
this
novo review
Moreover,
Rather,
appropriate.
we believe that this
seems less
dismissed.
the stan-
properly
under a differ- dard for reviewing
case
understood
an administrator’s de-
framework,
does not
one that
include
termination on an individual’s claim
ent
appropriate.
Yard-Man or
benefits seems
Sprague.
either
most
When
ERISA benefits plan
IV.
gives the administrator discretion in inter
Disability
If
Occupational
Price’s
Bene- preting
making
its terms or
benefits deter
statutory
fits do not vest under ERISA’s
minations, both
court
and the district
vesting requirements
Yard-Man
court review the administrator’s decision
Sprague
inapplicable,
frameworks are
under
arbitrary
capricious
stan
only
possible
vesting
then the
source
Co.,
dard. See Kovach v. Zurich Am. Ins.
Price’s benefits is the Plan itself. Section
(6th
323,
Cir.2009)
587 F.3d
328
(citing
clearly gives
15.1
the Plan
the Board
Bruch,
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v.
489
authority to amend
Plan. Yet it
also
101, 111-15,
948,
U.S.
109 S.Ct.
any
specifically prohibits
amendment
(1989));
L.Ed.2d 80
Jones v. Metro. Life
“which results in
benefits for
reduced
Co.,
(6th
Ins.
659-60
F.3d
Cir.
Participant
rights
already
whose
have
be- 2004);
Baptist
Wilkins v.
Sys.,
Healthcare
provisions
come vested under the
Inc.,
Cir.1998).
Un
made,
Plan on the date
amendment is
review,
der this
up
standard of
“we must
except upon the advice and counsel of an hold the
decision if
administrator’s
the ad
actuary.”
issue
enrolled
The
then be-
interpretation
ministrator’s
the Plan’s
Occupational
whether
comes
Dis-
Kovach,
provisions is reasonable.”
*8
ability
vested within
Benefits became
the
(alteration
quota
F.3d at 328
and internal
meaning of
Plan
that the
the
such
Amend-
omitted).
tion
While federal case
.marks
to
applied
ment could not be
him.
law has
on
applicable
created confusion
the
outset,
At the
pause
applicable
determine
standard of review
to cases in
benefits,
denying volving vesting
decision
of
whether
Board’s
welfare
court-
appeal
given any
principles
Price’s
should be
defer-
fashioned common-law
for inter
question
preting
plans
proper
The answer to this
lies in
“are
ence.
ERISA welfare
ly
how the issue is framed. The district
understood
aids to determining
as
by
reviewed the Board’s decision
whether the
benefits
court
de
denial of
the ad
reasonable,
by framing
as
ministrator
rather
than
novo
the issue whether the
resolving interpre
violate[d]
“Plan Amendment
ERISA.” warrants for a court’s
disputes
any
3. Yet we
tive
deference
2:07-cv-00933 at
have
without
to the
sug-
concurring colleague nonetheless
interpretive discretion.”our
exercise of
administrator’s
Inc.,
disability
benefits be-
gests
v. Motorola
that Price’s
Mar
rs
Cir.2009).
they
786-87
time
were award-
F.3d
came vested at the
ed,
the use of the terms of
regardless of
here, we
these mandates
Applying
Plan or
intent inferred therefrom.
that,
gives the Board
if the Plan
conclude
fact,
concurring colleague states
In
our
terms,
the es
interpret
its
discretion
subsequent amendment
to the
that
on the reasonable
case turns
sence of this
at all” on
proper impact
had “no
plan
And, indeed,
the Board’s decision.
ness of
The concur-
receipt
of benefits.
discretion, and
give such
the Plan does
Plan found
rence claims that when the
Board
invoked
that discretion was
benefits,
disability
it ef-
eligible
Price
for
Price’s benefits. Section
terminating
that was “a sin-
fectively issued
“IOU”
Board of Trustees
that
provides
“[t]he
11.9
complete
that was
gle and discrete event
right and discre
have the exclusive
shall
Plan
the award deci-
provisions
terms and
at the time the
made
interpret
tion to
” Therefore,
Yet,
provides
sup-
the Board’s
no
colleague
of the Plan....
sion.”
our
the arbi
assertions,
must be reviewed under
decision
either from the
port for such
review,
standard of
trary
capricious
controlling
or from the
statuto-
Plan itself
principles as aids
using common-law
Contrary
the claims in
ry or case law.2
review,
looking
to the
undertaking this
concurrence, review of the Board’s de-
Plan
whether or
terms of the
to determine
necessarily
looking
entails
cision
interpretation was reason
not the Board’s
Plan to determine if Price’s
terms of the
Marrs,
F.3d at 786-87.
able. See
vested,
disability
as it is the Plan
benefits
forth the terms
that,
itself
sets
pause briefly to note
while
We
conferred, vested, or terminat-
benefits are
arbitrary
capricious
that the
agreeing
claim,
of Price’s
ed.3
applies
standard
to review
years
ser-
held that where an
Benefits must have at least ten
2. The Second Circuit has
employee
plan provides
disability.
benefits
vice at the time of his
The Plan
benefits,
than the
those benefits vest "no later
recipient provide
copy
requires that the
also
employee
time that the
becomes disabled.”
reporting
any federal income tax form
in-
Am., 306 F.3d
v. Prudential Ins. Co.
supplemental employment
Feifer
earned from
come
Yet,
(2d Cir.2002).
both Feifer
receiving
continue
benefits. Most
in order to
and in
ex rel. Estate Gibbs v. CIGNA
Gibbs
importantly,
explains
the Plan
that benefits
Cir.2006),
(2d
Corp.,
where that
would be to find that lan- his “Future Credited Service Benefit.” Plan guage indicates an intent to The Future Credited Service Benefit pro- vest the Plan provides vision provides differing formulations de- amendments not reduce benefits that pending on the participant’s retirement have become “vested” in Section 15.1. date, and the Past Credited Service Bene- However, analysis of the context in fit specifically references the “retired sta- which the word is used ap- shows it tus.” plies to retiree benefits and not Reading all of provisions these together, 7A, governs benefits. Article which Occu- it would not seem unreasonable for the pational Disability Benefits, does not use Board to determine that Occupa- Price’s the term vested accrued to refer to or tional Disability Benefits were not “Ac- modify “Occupational the term Disabili- crued Benefits” and therefore did not vest. ty Benefit.” provide any Nor does it other above, 7A, As noted Article which covers vesting provisions for disability benefits. Occupational Disability Benefits, does not Thus, one must look to other sections of specific contain vesting language. Nor do the Plan for a definition vesting, since 9.2, 2.1(a), Sections or 4.2 contain language the Plan does not expressly provide one. including Occupational Disability Bene- The gets closest the Plan to a definition of fit within meaning of “vested” or “Ac- 9.2, “vesting” is “Vesting Section titled Instead, crued Benefit.” Section 4.2 spe- Schedule,” which states that partici- “[a] cifically refers to the “retired status” and pant begins who payments on or provides amounts based on retirement after June 1997 shall be vested his dates.4
Accrued Benefit....”
This section then
points
Benefit,”
to the term “Accrued
Price nevertheless argues that his bene-
2.1(a)
is defined
Section
as “the
fits vested under Section 7A.2 because that
monthly benefit that
has been earned
provides
section
Occupational
“[t]he
Participant
years
for the
of Service he Disability Benefit shall
monthly
be a
bene-
Employer
worked for an
according to the
fit equal
percent
to 65
of the Participant’s
benefit formula described in section
Benefit,
4.2 vested Accrued
unreduced for ear-
4.2,
hereof.” Moving to Section
ly payment.”
which is
Although Price’s alternate
titled “Amount of Normal Retirement
interpretation of Section 7A.2 could be
Benefit,”
provides
this section
plausible,
a detailed
that would not
render
formula
calculating
a participant’s
interpretation
Board’s
unreasonable. Fur-
monthly
ther,
“Normal Retirement Benefit.”
interpretation
does not seem
Specifically, Normal Retirement Benefits
to be
logical
the most
reading of that
are
using
calculated
partici-
sum of a
section. The term “vested” modifies the
that,
pause
4. We
despite
to note
requires
interpreta-
assertion
a review of the Board’s
concurrence,
colleague
made
our
in the
tion of the
applied
terms of the Plan as
suggest
do not
that the difference between
interpretation
and whether such
was
pension
Thus,
arbitrary
benefits
welfare benefits
capricious.
alone
our discus-
justifies the Board’s decision to revoke Price’s
sion of the reasonableness of the Board's de-
Occupational Disability Benefits. As we ex-
cision focuses on the Plan’s use of the term
above,
plained
pension
the difference between
"vest” in relation to the use of the terms
Benefit,”
compel
and welfare benefits
"Occupational
does
our conclu-
Disability
"Retire-
Benefit,”
applied
Benefit,”
sion that Yard-Man cannot be
to this
ment
and "Accrued
However,
not,
case.
properly
whether the
suggests,
Board
as the concurrence
on the dif-
decided to terminate Price's
ference between those benefits.
*10
V.
Benefit,”
the defini-
and
“Accrued
phrase
2.1(a)
in Sections
Accrued Benefit
tion of
reasons,
foregoing
we VACATE
For the
any language
contain
4.2 does not
and
court and RE-
of the district
the decision
Disability
Occupational
indicating that
consistent
proceedings
for further
MAND
adopt
Benefits. To
Accrued
Benefits are
opinion.
with this
7A.2 would
reading of Section
section to state
rewrite that
seemingly
JONKER,
concurring.
Judge,
District
Disability Benefit
Occupational
“the vested
fully
opinion’s
the lead
agree
I
with
“Occupation-
the term
...” or would insert
v.
conclusion that Wilkins
analysis and
the definition
Disability Benefit” within
al
Inc.,
Sys.,
150 F.3d
Baptist Healthcare
logical
A more
read-
Benefit.
of Accrued
Union,
(6th Cir.1998),
than Int’l
rather
be that
would seem to
7A.2
ing of Section
Auto.,
Agric. Imple
Aerospace, &
United
right
a vested
to
providing
than
rather
Inc.,
v. Yard-Man
ment Workers Am.
of
Benefits,
Disability
Section
Occupational
(6th Cir.1983), establishes
lective the death routinely obligated pay treat ERISA Plan would be courts way federal provided Plan in on involving benefits benefit if the terms of the effect disability cases death— n contract. private a insurance through qualifying the date —the date federal staple a of the cases are I required again, Such it. Once believe I know of no such court docket. district agreed with both the result is consistent or the court has party case in which general governing rules ERISA welfare change disability a in bene- suggested that benefits, and the reasonable contractual disability by employer’s the fits offered expectations parties. the terms of a change Plan back to reaches Finally, opinion’s if the lead view of the disability benefit un- awarded previously disability then I would prevails, benefit Plan, and the insur- the terms of the der employees that union whose dis- submit Plan, in at funding the effect policy ance ability protected only by benefit is a Trust the initial award. The the time of purchase one here had better their like the proper- appear the courts assume — too, disability policy, private own insurance ly my governing in view—that the terms of they really meaning- because do not have in effect disability award are ones that, disability say ful I be- protection. original my of the award. at the time disabled, person they cause once a is are Price, view, employee a union like Mr. in engage definition not able to income- disability benefit is funded a
whose work, generating or at least not income- bargaining created under a collective Trust generating they work of the kind are ac- by private than insur- agreement, rather Nor, performing. obviously, customed to contract, reasonably expects nothing ance they purchase private disability are able to in at less: the terms of the Plan effect they already are disabled. insurance after time of the initial benefit award should obligated prom- If the Trust to fund their rights define the contractual and obli- disability power to ised benefit also has the gations parties. of the qualifying amend the Plan after the dis- Plan in at Using the terms of the effect ability way event in a that cuts off the participant qualifies the time a for the people already benefit even for who have disability initial award also works with the qualified, really then there is no reliable through funded other welfare benefit disability protection at all. Mr. in this case. The Plan at issue here Trust course, exactly position if the disability provides only pension for not opinion’s power lead view of the Plan’s benefits, A but also a death benefit. death prevails. benefit, benefit, like a is a wel- opinion suggests The lead that the well- fare benefit under and therefore ERISA under be- established difference ERISA subject general against vesting rule hand, pension on the one tween Suppose of welfare a covered benefits. including disability and welfare qualified employee triggers dies and benefits— hand, may justify benefits—on the other the Plan have the death benefit. Does the dis- the Plan’s decision here to revoke power lawful to amend terms originally it award- ability package benefit employee’s death after the death respectfully disagree I ed to Mr. Price. way prevent payment that would my with that view it overlooks a opinion’s analy- the lead benefit? Under sis, critical difference between the Plan’s unde- it the Plan could do so would seem of a power change niable the terms because the amendment would allow the on the welfare benefiN-in- deny place generally applicable Plan to what had been record, prospectively Wilkins eluding a standard to this or to any benefit — qualified expanded people who have record the District Court benefit, hand; and the proper. on the one Plan’s find *13 have the quite different claim to unilateral eliminate change to or even disabili-
power already has
ty packages benefit it award- I nothing
ed. see ERISA welfare cases, dealing those including with
benefit suggests health
retiree care power to make undisputed pro-
the Plan’s spective benefit changes pack- available GOODWIN, Michael Petitioner- ages yet not includes power awarded Appellee/Cross-Appellant, unilaterally or eliminate a change to bene- already fit A conferred. benefit v. recurring decision; is not annual award a Warden, JOHNSON, Respondent- David
rather, it grant is a one time decision to or Appellant/Cross-Appellee. deny package by the benefit followed on- 06-3571, Nos. 06-3572. including periodic going administration — package review status —of Appeals, United States Court of awarded. Sixth Circuit. reason, For this I do not believe it is Argued: Dec. 2009. necessary reasonably to reach the even of the amendment possible constructions Decided and Filed: Jan. I
provision simply of the Plan. do not by it its terms to applies
believe
unique provision permits situation. The
amendments to the offered benefits
Plan, my but this in view is not the same
thing eliminating as changing particu-
lar benefit already Nothing conferred. language permit
the Plan purports change
retroactive contractual already of a
terms conferred. the Plan Mr.
Once awarded Price the dis- benefit,
ability I the Plan believe was con-
tractually obligated pay the benefit on
the terms as defined the date of the
award. And in this case these terms did permit
not Plan to cut off Mr. early Price reached retirement
before disabled,
age long as he remained as all
agree day. he very is to this readily I
Accordingly, would vote to af- now,
firm the District but I do Court
object give to a remand to the District opportunity apply
Court first