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James L. Williams v. ryder/p.i.e. Nationwide, Inc.
786 F.2d 854
8th Cir.
1986
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*2 Before ROSS and BOWMAN Circuit ing. BRIGHT, Judge. Judges, Senior Circuit told a Caldwell friend who also was working Ryder at of the incident. Two BOWMAN, Judge. Circuit later, days on November friend re- Nationwide, (Ryder) Ryder/P.I.E. Inc. ported Rodgers, the incident to met who appeals jury awarding James L. with Caldwell that same afternoon. The $71,000 damages in actual day, Rodgers Ryder’s next called head- $300,000 punitive damages on his claim quarters Jacksonville, Florida and was prosecution. for malicious We reverse. advised contact the Federal Bureau (FBI). so, Investigation Rodgers did I. FBI refused to handle the case because freight This action stems from the theft five the theft involved worth less than $10,000. (VCRs) reported Rodgers RCA video cassette recorders from then the theft Ryder’s Department. one of trailers in St. Louis in No- St. Louis Police Sisco, assigned officer vember Most the facts are undis- Richard puted. Ryder’s operations following morning. Williams was visited the terminal the interim, manager Rodgers at Louis In the tried its St. terminal when to find the manager dispatch trip theft occurred. The terminal at sheet Caldwell’s freight Rodgers. parties that time was John Both bill on the Both miss- VCRs. were agree Rodgers ing. that Williams and were friendly on terms and once Sisco anoth- On November Officer only fired upper-level

had to have police er visited the terminal officer Ryder management his overturn decision. Rodgers. The and interviewed officers proceeded On November Williams instruct- to interview and other Caldwell terminal, Ryder driver, Caldwell, Ryder’s ed employees Charles St. Louis repair shop Ryder’s repair take one of trailers to a as the well owner lot, shop, drop it on the had left the trailer. Sisco and return. which Caldwell trailer, complet- moving before Caldwell noticed was not interview Williams eleven for either was un- asserts bases investigation he because ing the reversing jury’s remanding by phone or in either to reach Williams able Because our for a new trial. resolution of person. requires rever- the issue police investiga- Concurrently with the sal, argu- do not reach other own internal re- tion, Ryder conducted its ments. *3 The final internal of the incident. view sufficient there was not report concluded II. anyone of the theft. to accuse argues that the District Court the final he did not read Rodgers claims granted its should have motion for a direct- five months af- approximately report until judgment notwithstanding ed verdict for On November theft occurred. ter the the because Williams failed to es- per- negligent fired Williams Rodgers required the tablish all elements in a mali- managerial duties. of his formance prosecution This is cious action. a diversi- investigation, Offi- his completing After action, ty Missouri’s and substantive law to Circuit presented the case the cer Sisco Tomp- applies. See Erie Railroad Co. v. office, to Assist- Attorney’s specifically and 64, 78, kins, 304 U.S. 58 S.Ct. Attorney Daly. Sisco Thomas ant Circuit L.Ed. 1188 The Missouri to accompany to him the asked recently delineated the elements that on the Attorney’s office. Based Circuit plaintiff suing theory on a of malicious his Sisco police report and discussions with “(1) prove: prosecution must the com- Daly prepared a com- Rodgers, sworn and prosecution against of mencement the charging him with against Williams plaint (2) instigation plaintiff; the the defend- stealing goods $150.00. worth over ant; (3) proceeding termination of independently decided that judge circuit (4) plaintiff; in the want of favor a war- probable existed and issued cause (5) prosecution; probable cause for the On December rant to arrest Williams. by mal- defendant’s conduct was actuated in to the St. Louis turned himself Williams ice; (6) plaintiff damaged.” and Department and was arrested. The Police v. International Sanders Daniel against ultimately charges Williams were (Mo.1984). Although S.W.2d failed grand jury to dismissed when prove Ryder asserts that Williams failed to No was ever an indictment. one return cause, instigation of probable lack of of the theft and VCRs were convicted requisite prosecution by Ryder, and the never recovered. Sanders, we find level of malice of probable issue our resolution against Ry- action initiated this dispositive. of the other issues Some claiming false arrest. der in state merit, may that raises have but Ryder removed the action federal court and do not decide them. need not ground moved to dismiss on applicable Missouri statute of limita- that Missouri law We note the outset countered tions barred the prose favor actions for malicious does not claim for mali- complaint 806; stated a Joseph Harper v. cution. Id. at St. prosecution, subject (Mo.1950); which is Co., cious 233 S.W.2d Lead The Dis- different statute limitations. Pen Taylor, Zahorsky Griffin, Dysart, claim, (Mo. P.C., false arrest trict Court dismissed the Lay, ner 690 S.W.2d result, his granted leave amend elements Ct.App.1985). As prosecu complaint necessary to state a claim for malicious a malicious sustain trial, subsequent strictly clearly prosecution. At the be tion claim “must Williams, Knickmeyer-Fleer jury proven.” Higgins a verdict returned damages. 335 Mo. awarding punitive Realty him actual and & Investment Sanders, judgment on the S.W.2d The District Court entered 806; Harper, at 838. 233 S.W.2d Ryder appeals. This disfavor of malicious years ago, ac- “It is not essential to the exist- represents tions value choice based on probable ence of a. cause that the evidence or public policy considerations. public Sound upon facts party acted be suffi- policy justice and the ends of require the cient to insure a conviction question for the uncovering of crime and the probable cause ‘does upon not turn criminals. “A policy discourages citi- guilt actual innocence or accused [the] reporting zens from aiding pros- crime or prosecutor’s but the ... belief in it based ecution would be undesirable and detrimen- ” grounds.’ Higgins, society general.” tal to Eddy, Cates v. S.W.2d at 813. (Wyo.1983); Sanders, 669 P.2d To determine whether Williams made a (quoting Cates). S.W.2d at 806 For submissible case cause is example, “[ljarge judgments tort against sue, we must consider the manner in which individuals, well-meaning acting honestly charge originated. criminal prose If a good faith, might seriously inhibit *4 cuting attorney originates a charge attempting perform those in they what be- formation, duty.” Cates, it prima a “amounts to lieve civic a 669 P.2d at facie 917-18; showing Kroger see Bonzo v. probable that Grocery cause & exist for Co., Baking 127, 75, prosecution.” 344 Mo. Moad v. Pioneer Fi 125 S.W.2d 79 Co., Foster v. Chicago, Burlington nance 794, 496 S.W.2d (Mo.1973); 798 Co., Quincy Railroad Lipari 321 Mo. v. Volume Corp., Shoe 664 S.W.2d S.W.2d (Mo.Ct.App.1983). prima The fa showing cie probable cause is conclusive appellate standard of review of the plaintiff unless the can rebut with “evi- District Court’s denial of motion dence that false testimony formed the basis for a directed verdict and for judgment of the charge and falsity was notwithstanding the reason- is the same ably discoverable.” Montgomery law; under GMC thus, both federal and state we Trucks, Nunn, Inc. v. having analyze avoid likelihood that S.W.2d (citing Moad, (Mo.Ct.App.1983) federal and state law yield different 496 S.W.2d results, by Byrd required 799). as v. Blue Moreover, Ridge at no inference of lack of Inc., Rural Cooperative, Electric probable 356 U.S. cause arises from the later dismis- 525, 538, 78 S.Ct. 2 L.Ed.2d 953 sal of the charge. Moad, 496 S.W.2d at (1958). In keeping principles with followed 799; Higgins, 74 S.W.2d at 813. in both the courts, federal and the Missouri In Assistant Circuit At we consider the light evidence in the most torney Daly prepared complaint against a Williams, favorable to assume as true all Williams which another assistant circuit at facts that Williams’s evidence tended to torney eventually signed. swore to and In prove, give Williams the benefit of all so, doing both attorneys concluded there favorable inferences. We would not over probable was cause to believe Williams had rule the District Court if the evidence were stolen the law, five VCRs. Under Missouri susceptible any inference complaint a concise, which plain, contains a sustaining position. Williams’s See Crues and definite written statement of the facts KFC (8th 729 F.2d constituting charged, the offense sworn to Cir.1984). signed by prosecuting attorney, con dispute There is no here as to the Mis- stitutes an information. See State ex rel. probable souri law on cause. In a criminal Berrey, Martin v. (Mo. 560 S.W.2d action, probable test cause is Ct.App.1977). Having reviewed the sworn “whether the facts and circumstances complaint, we conclude that it meets the would warrant a belief in ordinarily an Berrey requirements and constitutes an person cautious that another had commit- information. ted a crime.” Dodson v. MFA Insurance Co., Moad, (Mo.1974). 509 S.W.2d Lipari, Accordingly, As the Nunn, Court said fifty over the facts of this case establish cution, element of his an essential mali- prima showing probable that cause facie Therefore, based on cious existed (here denoted as prosecutor’s majority information rules that district court erred Moreover, Nationwide, a circuit complaint). denying Ryder/P.I.E. sworn Inc.’s complaint indepen- judge reviewed verdict as motion for directed well ex- dently determined that notwithstanding judgment motion for Al- charge and arrest Williams. isted to verdict, judgment and reverses the entered showing proba- though prima this facie disagree. favor. below Williams’ rebuttable, on the burden was ble cause reviewing decision of a district charge the criminal to show that Williams upon a motion for a directed testimony, false predicated was judgment or a motion for a notwithstand- reasonably falsity was discover- verdict, ing the usewe the same standard Trucks, Montgomery GMC See able. applied by determining that court totally failed is, issue. That must determine whether that burden. meet or not evidence was sufficient create anything no made Horn jury. submissible case for investigating Rodgers told the officers E. Ray Friedman & F.2d as- key evidence that Williams false. (8th Cir.1985). is Caldwell’s statement serts false judgment A or a directed verdict notwith- five were in the he told Williams that VCRs standing granted only the verdict should be trial trailer. asserted *5 points way when all the evidence one and is VCRs, him about Caldwell had not told susceptible of no reasonable inferences sus- produce any he failed to evidence— taining position non-moving par- of the testimony refute Of- such as Caldwell’s —to Furthermore, ty. we must consider the manager Rodg- and terminal ficer Sisco’s in most favorable to the told each of ers’s statements that Caldwell non-moving party, assume as true all facts informed Williams about them that he had supporting non-moving party which the if Caldwell’s state- the VCRs. And even give prove, evidence tends the non- Sisco could ments to and Officer moving all party the benefit of Wil- be to be false —a shown Thomure v. inferences. See Truck Insur still did not make —Williams’s case liams 141, Exchange, (8th ance 142 781 F.2d Cir. proof he offered no falls short because Metromedia, 1986) curiam); v. (per reasonably falsity discoverable. Craft Inc., 1205, (8th Cir.1985), F.2d 766 1218 record, of the Based our review — denied, U.S. —, 1285, cert. 106 S.Ct. a matter of law that Williams hold as Barge (1986); SCNO L.Ed.2d 592 proba- on the not make submissible case Lines, Clayton Inc. v. Anderson proof Because of lack of ble cause issue. 1188, (8th Cir.1984); 745 F.2d 1192-93 probable cause was an essential element Corp., 729 F.2d Crues v. KFC case, the District Court erred Williams’s (8th Cir.1984). denying motion a directed ver- judgment its motion for presented dict as well as examining After the evidence verdict, notwithstanding judg- standards, I in this case under the above in Williams’s favor ment entered below Williams made submissible believe that must be reversed. case on his malicious Therefore, the district court did err BRIGHT, Judge, dissent- Senior Circuit Ryder's motion for a direct- when it denied ing. judgment motion ed verdict its notwithstanding the verdict. I respectfully dissent. however, entitled, to a new trial majority L. today holds that James intervening change Mis- of the

Williams failed to make a submissible case in view v. Dan- in Sanders expressed prose- lack cause for his souri law iel International banc). (Mo.1984)(en Sanders, In Mis- MULLIGAN, Appellee, Maria type souri Court focused on necessary liability to establish malice LABORATORIES, LEDERLE a DIVI- malicious action. The court re- OF SION AMERICAN CYANAMID standard, in law”

jected “malice COMPANY, Appellant. Missouri, had been used in and instead adopted legal In malice standard.1 No. 85-1111.

process, specifically disapproved the court United States of Appeals, Approved use of Missouri Instruc- Eighth Circuit. 23.07, tion No. 16.01and No. and held that giving these instructions entitled the Submitted Oct. 1985. defendant to a new trial. at 814. Id. Decided March court, district 8, 1986. May Rehearing Denied Sanders, without the benefit of used both Approved No. Instruction 16.01 appellate 23.07. “An and No. must

apply law in effect at the time it ren decision, unless to so

ders do * * injustice result manifest *.” Brad Board,

ley v. School U.S.

S.Ct. L.Ed.2d Northern, Inc., Burlington

Flanigan (8th Cir.1980),

632 F.2d cert. de

nied, 450 U.S. S.Ct. Therefore, in light

L.Ed.2d 349

Sanders, believe is entitled to

a new trial.2 *6 larged legal any improper Court noted that: sense embraces or * * * * is, wrongful malo motive—that animo. recognizes degrees general, the law three Third, degree in law.” First, there "malice This malice. there malice in its universal wrongful properly mind, of malice is as a act defined popular sense as understood intentionally just will, hatred, done excuse. personal without cause or spite, “ill or means vindic- * * * Daniel Int'l at 807- type Sanders v. This tive motives.” commonly malice is (citations omitted). referred to as in fact” “malice "actual malice.” 2. Williams contends that the district court’s use degree of A second malice is malice in its Approved of Missouri Instruction No. 16.01 and legal legal sense. The definition of malice has a argument prejudicial. was not This No. 23.07 meaning popularly broader than understood lacks merit. definition of malice fact. Malice its en-

Case Details

Case Name: James L. Williams v. ryder/p.i.e. Nationwide, Inc.
Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
Date Published: Apr 8, 1986
Citation: 786 F.2d 854
Docket Number: 85-1106
Court Abbreviation: 8th Cir.
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