James JOHNSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. K MART CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 99-14563.
United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.
Nov. 21, 2001.
Order Granting Rehearing En Banc Dec. 19, 2001.
273 F.3d 1035
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the judgments of acquittal are hereby reversed and this cause is remanded with instructions to reinstate the jury‘s verdicts of guilty as to both defendants and on all counts.
Mark J. Neuberger, Buchanan Ingersoll, P.C., Aventura, FL, Richard J. Antonelli, Littler Mendelson, Pittsburgh, PA, for Defendant-Appellee.
Caren I. Friedman, Washington, DC, for Amicus Curiae EEOC.
Before CARNES and BARKETT,
POLLAK, District Judge:
This case presents two questions regarding the interpretation of Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA“),
We begin with a brief description of the factual basis of appellant‘s claim. Because the judgment under review granted the defendant‘s motion to dismiss, our factual recital assumes the truth of the facts alleged in the complaint.
Appellant James Johnson worked for K Mart Corporation (“K Mart“) for thirty years beginning in 1967. In 1996, appellant, who was then the manager of a K Mart store in Tampa, Florida, sought medical treatment for severe depression and emotional illness. Appellant continued his employment with K Mart until October, 1997, when his physician advised him to stop working due to his mental illness. At that time, Johnson applied for and received long-term disability benefits from K Mart. Under K Mart‘s LTD plan, employees who are disabled due to a mental illness may receive salary-replacement benefits for two years, whereas employees disabled due to a physical illness may receive such benefits until age 65.
Johnson filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC“) on July 10, 1998, claiming that the cap on mental health-related disability benefits violated the ADA. After being issued a Right to Sue letter by the EEOC, appellant brought this action in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida on November 23, 1998. Appellant amended his complaint in February, 1999, after which K Mart responded by filing a motion to dismiss on two grounds: (1) that appellant was not within the protective ambit of
Johnson filed a timely appeal. The EEOC, as amicus curiae, filed a brief supporting plaintiff-appellant on both grounds raised by K Mart in its motion to dismiss.
DISCUSSION
This court reviews de novo a district court‘s order dismissing an action for failure to state a claim pursuant to
I Whether Former Employees are Eligible to File Suit Under Title I of the ADA
We start with the question whether a former employee who is no longer able to work because of a disability is eligible to challenge a limitation on post-employment benefits under the ADA. We commence with an examination of the parties’ arguments with respect to the coverage of former employees because this question is logically antecedent to a consideration of the merits of appellant‘s claim.2 Having answered the question whether Title I covers former employees in the negative in Gonzales, we agree with the EEOC that it is appropriate in the context of this case to reexamine the vitality of the Gonzales decision in light of the Supreme Court‘s recent analysis in Robinson (holding that
Johnson‘s entitlement to bring this action turns on the construction of a number of related sub-sections of the ADA. Our basic task is to construe
an individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position that such individual holds or desires.
As used in subsection (a) of this section, the term “discriminate” includes—
- limiting, segregating, or classifying a job applicant or employee in a way that adversely affects the opportunities or status of such applicant or employee because of the disability of such applicant or employee;
- participating in a contractual or other arrangement or relationship that has the effect of subjecting a covered entity‘s qualified applicant or employee with a disability to the discrimination prohibited by this subchapter (such relationship includes a relationship with an employment or referral agency, labor union, an organization providing fringe benefits to an employee of the covered entity, or an organization providing training and apprenticeship programs);
- utilizing standards, criteria, or methods of administration—
- that have the effect of discrimination on the basis of disability; or
- that perpetuate the discrimination of others who are subject to common administrative control[.]3
Before engaging in the statutory analysis required, we summarize the two cases—Gonzales and Robinson—that will
Gonzales was the first in a fractured series of decisions rendered by courts of appeals addressing former employees’ eligibility to bring claims under the ADA.4 In Gonzales we accepted as true the following description of the facts: Timothy Bourgeois was employed by a restaurant. After Bourgeois submitted health insurance claims for medical treatment of AIDS under his employer‘s health insurance plan, the employer discharged Bourgeois in an attempt to limit future health insurance claims. Following his termination, Bourgeois continued his health insurance benefit coverage pursuant to the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 (“COBRA“). See 89 F.3d at 1524. The employer then imposed a cap for AIDS-related treatment on health insurance benefit coverage at least in part because Bourgeois elected to continue in the benefit plan after he was discharged. After Bourgeois’ death, August Gonzales, as the administrator of Bourgeois’ estate, filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, and the court granted a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cognizable claim. On appeal, this court held—over a dissent—that the language of the ADA codified at
We based the holding in Gonzales on the statutory definitions of the terms “qualified individual with a disability,” “employee,” and “discriminate,” and found that all three supported the finding that Congress intended to exclude former employees: “Bourgeois does not satisfy the QID requirement under the plain language of the ADA ... because he neither held nor desired to hold a position with [defendant] at or subsequent to the time the alleged discriminatory conduct was committed. Rather, Bourgeois was a participant in the health benefit plan only by virtue of his status as a former employee.” Id. at 1526. With respect to the definition of “employee,” we observed that the ADA defines the term as “an individual employed by an employer,”
We found additional support in the statute‘s legislative history:
[T]he legislative history of the ADA specifically states that the purpose of including the phrase “essential functions” within the QID definition is to “ensure that employers can continue to require that all applicants and employees, including those with disabilities, are able to perform the essential, i.e., the non-marginal functions of the job in question [sic].” H.R.Rep. No. 485(II), 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 55 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 337 (emphasis supplied).
Id. at 1527.
In Gonzales we saw little merit in the argument that our decision in Bailey v. USX Corp., 850 F.2d 1506 (11th Cir.1988) (holding that former employees are protected under the anti-retaliation provision of Title VII), was properly transferable to the ADA. We distinguished the protection provided former employees under the ADA from the protection afforded former employees from retaliation under
This Court in Bailey cautioned that courts should avoid a literal interpretation of a statute when such an approach would frustrate the statute‘s central purpose. Bailey, 850 F.2d at 1509. There is no such risk in this case. As this Court in Bailey recognized, the expansion of the term “employee” to confer stаnding to sue upon former employees claiming retaliation is necessary to provide meaning to anti-retaliation statutory provisions and effectuate congressional intent. Id. There are, however, no allegations of retaliation in this case, and excluding former employees from protection under the Act is not inconsistent with the policies underlying the statute. To the contrary, interpreting the ADA to allow any disabled former employee to sue a former employer essentially renders the QID requirement under the Act, that an individual with a disability hold or desire a position the essential functions of which he or she can perform, meaningless.
Gonzales, 89 F.3d at 1528-29 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis supplied).
In dissent, Judge Anderson was not persuaded that the ADA protects only currently active employees. Specifically, the dissent rejected the notion that the plain meaning of the term “employee” was limited to current employees, and countered the majority‘s interpretation of the term “discriminate” in
The majority acknowledges that the protection of the Act extends to fringe benefits provided by employers, such as pension and profit-sharing plans and
Id. at 1532 (footnotes omitted).
With the above overview of Gonzales in mind, we now undertake to convey the pertinent aspects of Robinson, in which an unanimous Supreme Court resolved a split among the circuits by holding that the term “employees“—as used in
The Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Thomas, encapsulated standard rules of statutory construction, stating:
Our first step in interpreting a statute is to determine whether the language at issue has a plain and unambiguous meaning with regard to the pаrticular dispute in the case....
The plainness or ambiguity of statutory language is determined by reference to the language itself, the specific context in which that language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole.
Robinson, 519 U.S. at 340-41, 117 S.Ct. 843.
The Court observed that “[a]t first blush” the term “employees” in
Finding
Title VII‘s definition of “employee” likewise lacks any temporal qualifiers and is consistent with either current or postemployment. Section 701(f) defines “employee” for purposes of Title VII as “an individual employed by an employer.”
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) . The argument that the term “employed,” as used in§ 701(f) , is commonly used to mean “[p]erforming work under an employer-employee relationship,” Black‘s Law Dictionary 525 (6th ed.1990), begs the question by implicitly reading the word “employed” to mean “is employed.” But the word “employed” is not so limited in its possible meanings, and could just as easily be read to mean “was employed.”
Id. at 342, 117 S.Ct. 843.
The Court canvassed other provisions of Title VII in which the term “employees” was alternately inclusive and exclusive of former employees, commenting:
But those examples at most demonstrate that the term “employees” may have a plain meaning in the context of a particular section—not that the term has the same meaning in all other sections and in all other contexts. Once it is established that the term “employees” includes former employees in some sections, but not in others, the term standing alone is necessarily ambiguous and each section must be analyzed to determine whether the context gives the term a further meaning that would resolve the issue in dispute.
Id. at 343-44, 117 S.Ct. 843.
Satisfied that the term “employees” as used in
In the case at bar we have been presented with markedly discrepant views as to the pertinence of Robinson to the ADA. Appellant and the EEOC as amicus argue that the approach taken by the Court in Robinson undermines the Gonzales conclusion that the definitions of “qualified individual with a disability” in
Althоugh, fundamentally, the task of statutory interpretation begins with the text, in this case, given our prior ruling, legal precedent provides our starting point. Thus, we assess the continuing viability of the components of the rationale in Gonzales, turning first to the aspects that appear to stand in the greatest tension with the Robinson analysis. With little difficulty we conclude that the part of Gonzales wherein we decided that the meaning of the term “employees” in
Having determined that the above components of the reasoning in Gonzales have been undercut by Robinson, we are left to discern the viability of the distinctions that we drew in Gonzales between general Title I discrimination claims, on the one hand, and retaliation claims, on the other. Ultimately, we must determine whether the fact that the ADA provision under consideration refers to “discriminat[ion] against a qualified individual with a disability,”
In Gonzales, we distinguished the question of the coverage of former employees under
We now turn directly to an analysis of the comparative temporal significance of the terms “qualified individual with a disability” and “employee.” In Gonzales, we relied, without elaboration, on the statutory definition of “qualified individual with a disability” in
As with the term “employees” in Title VII, the ADA contains an ambiguity concerning the definition of “qualified individual with a disability” because there is no temporal qualifier for that definition. Congress could have restricted the eligibility for plaintiffs under the ADA to current employees or could have explicitly broadened the eligibility to include former employees. Since Congress did neither but still created rights regarding disability benefits, we are left with an ambiguity in the text of the statute regarding eligibility to sue under Title I.
Ford, 145 F.3d at 606-07; see also Castellano, 142 F.3d at 67.
Based on our reading of Robinson, we are convinced that this court in Gonzales and the Ninth Circuit in Weyer have found more clarity in the language of
We further conclude that our reliance in Gonzales on the legislative history of the ADA does not withstand the analysis in Robinson. This court stated:
[T]he legislative history of the ADA specifically states that the purpose of including the phrase “essential functions” within the QID definition is to “ensure that employers can continue to require that all applicants and employees, including those with disabilities, are able to perform the essential, i.e., the non-marginal functions of the job in question [sic].”
Gonzales, 89 F.3d at 1527 (citation omitted) (emphasis supplied). We continued, “[t]hus, a review of both the ADA and its
Finally, finding the term “qualified individual with a disability” ambiguous as used in
We turn, now, to the substantive coverage afforded by
II Whether Differential Benefit Levels for Mental and Physical Disabilities in an Employer-Sponsored Long-Term Disability Plan Can Be Found to Violate Title I of the ADA
The substantive issue before this court is whether a former employee can state a claim under Title I of the ADA based on an employer-sponsored long-term disability insurance plan that provides more limited benefits to individuals with mental disabilities than to those with physical disabilities. In the case at bar, K Mart‘s LTD plan provides disability benefits (payments in lieu of salary) to employees who have been totally disabled due to mental illness for a maximum of 24 months. In contrast, the same disability benefits are available to employees who have been totally disabled due to physical illness until age 65. The District Court framed the issue as follows: “[T]he question for the Court is whether the Plan‘s differential treatment of mental and physical illnesses qualifies as discrimination under the ADA.” The District Court concluded, in agreement with a number of our sister circuits, that such differential treatment does not fall within the meaning of the term “discrimination” under the ADA:
[S]everal federal circuit courts have addressed and resoundingly rejected the argument that the ADA is violated when an employer or a state provides varying benefits or coverage based on the type of disability. See, e.g., Lewis v. Kmart Corp., 180 F.3d 166, 170 (4th Cir.1999) (Title I,
§ 102(a) of the ADA , does not require a long-term disability plan that is sponsored by a private employer toprovide the same level of benefits for mental and physical disabilities); Rogers v. Dept. of Health and Environmental Control, 174 F.3d 431, 436 (4th Cir.1999) (denying someone with a mental disability the same benefits as somеone with a physical disability does not violate Title II of the ADA); Ford v. Schering-Plough Corp., 145 F.3d 601, 608 (3d Cir.1998) (“ADA does not require equal coverage for every type of disability“), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1093, 119 S.Ct. 850, 142 L.Ed.2d 704 (1999); Parker v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 121 F.3d 1006, 1019 (6th Cir.1997) (en banc) (same), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1084, 118 S.Ct. 871, 139 L.Ed.2d 768 (1998); EEOC v. CNA Ins. Cos., 96 F.3d 1039, 1045 (7th Cir.1996) (same). The Court is persuaded by the reasoning of these courts.
Thus, the District Court dismissed appellant‘s claim.
We now address the question of the permissibility of such distinctions in LTD plans for the first time.8 The answer to this question is dependent upon the meaning that we ascribe to three sections of the ADA, two of which—
In Part II(A)(1), we begin our analysis of whether the mental health cap in K Mart‘s LTD plan constitutes a legally cognizable form of discrimination with an examination of the scope of the concept of discrimination prohibited by Title I of the ADA. Thus, we look primarily to the construction of
(A) Determining the Scope of the Concept of Discrimination Embodied in Title I of the ADA
(1) The Language of the Statute
Whether the distinction between physical and mental disability benefits that marks K Mart‘s LTD plan is a violation of the ADA or a non-discriminatory differentiation turns largely on divergent views of the nature of the concept of discrimination embodied in Title I of the ADA. The District Court and a number of courts of appeals have concluded that claims based on differential treatment of people with mental and physical disabilities in LTD plans are not cognizable under Title I of the ADA because the Act only requires that the disabled receive access to the same benefits that are available to the non-disabled. In this vein, K Mart contends that the ADA merely prohibits discrimination between the disabled and the non-disabled. Appellant and the EEOC, as amicus, argue that the concept of discrimination in the ADA is not so limited. It is this core disagreement to which we address ourselves initially. We emphasize, however, that we clarify the concept of discrimination in Title I as a threshold matter. A finding that Title I prohibits a wider compass of discrimination than that between the disabled and the non-disabled merely allows us to proceed to a more specific consideration of disparate treatment in the insurance context, and, then, to an application of the insurance safe harbor provision, in Parts II(A)(2) and II(B) respectively.
We begin our analysis with the wording of
The EEOC, as amicus curiae, contends that the District Court erred when it dismissed appellant‘s claim, arguing that K Mart‘s LTD plan is discriminatory because “it precludes disabled individuals with mental illnesses from obtaining benefits that are available to all other disabled individuals.” In support of its reading of the statute, the EEOC argues that the Supreme Court in Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581, 119 S.Ct. 2176, 144 L.Ed.2d 540 (1999), on review of our decision, 138 F.3d 893, made clear that the concept of discrimination embodied in the ADA encompasses differential treatment of one disabled individual as compared to another disabled individual.10 Countering this argument, appellee K Mart asserts that its LTD plan is not discriminatory because the inequity created by the plan exists between people with physical disabilities and people with mental disabilities. According to K Mart, Congress intended only
Notwithstanding that Olmstead arose under Title II, we find that it controls our understanding of the concept of discrimination embodied in Title I of the ADA. Both our decision in Olmstead and the subsequent Supreme Court decision affirming our decision “in substantial part,”13 stand for the proposition that the
The State argues that L.C. and E.W. encountered no discrimination “by reason of” their disabilities becаuse they were not denied community placement on account of those disabilities. Nor were they subjected to “discrimination,” the State contends, because “‘discrimination’ necessarily requires uneven treatment of similarly situated individuals,” and L.C. and E.W. had identified no comparison class, i.e., no similarly situated individuals given preferential treatment. We are satisfied that Congress had a more comprehensive view of the concept of discrimination advanced in the ADA.
See Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 598, 119 S.Ct. 2176.14
Justice Thomas, joined by the Chief Justice and Justice Scalia, dissented in Olmstead. But the rationale of the dissent adds further support for the conclusion that Title I of the ADA—like Title II, as construed by the Olmstead majority—prohibits discrimination among the protected class of disabled persons. In challenging the majority‘s construction of Title II, the dissent argued that the “traditional” concept of discrimination does not encompass “disparate treatment among members of the same protected class.” Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 616, 119 S.Ct. 2176. The dissent invoked Alexander v. Choate and Traynor v. Turnage in support of its view that Title II should be read in the light of this “traditional” understanding. However, the dissent acknowledged that Title I may be violated by differential treatment of persons within the protected category. Justice Thomas reasoned that Congress advertently adopted a non-traditional concept of “discrimination” in Title I:
Elsewhere in the ADA, Congress chose to alter the traditional definition of discrimination. Title I of the ADA,
§ 12112(b)(1) , defines discrimination to include “limiting, segregating, or classifying a job applicant or employee in a way that adversely affects the opportunities or status of such applicant or employee.” ... The majority‘s definition of discrimination—although not specifically delineated—substantially imports the definition of Title I into Title II by necessarily assuming that it is sufficient to focus exclusively on members of one particular group. Under this view, discrimination occurs when some members of a protected group are treated differently from other members of that same group.
Id. at 622-23, 119 S.Ct. 2176.15
In sum, the Supreme Court‘s construction of the ADA in Olmstead leads us to the conclusion that K Mart‘s LTD plan—which differentiates between individuals who are totally disabled due to a mental disability and individuals who are totally disabled due to a physical disability because of the given individual‘s type of disability—appears prima facie to distinguish among beneficiaries on a basis that constitutes a form of discrimination contravening Title I of the ADA.16
(2) The Legislative History of the ADA
The next step in our analysis is to address the question whether—as some circuits have concluded—the ADA‘s legislative history should be read as insulating from liability what otherwise would seem to be discrimination.17 The legislative his
[E]mployers may not deny health insurance coverage completely to an individual based on the person‘s diagnosis or disability. For example, while it is permissible for an employer to offer insurance policies that limit coverage for certain procedures or treatments, e.g., only for a specified amount per year for mental health coverage, a person who has a mental health condition may not be denied coverage for other conditions such as for a broken leg or for heart surgery because of the existence of the mental health condition. A limitation may be placed on reimbursements for a procedure or the types of drugs or procedures covered[,] e.g., a limit on the number of x-rays or non-coverage of experimental drugs or procedures; but, that limitation must apply to persons with or without disabilities. All people with disabilities must have equal access to the health insurance coverage that is provided by the employer to all employees.
The Committee Reports suggest no intention to interfere with insurance ar
(B) The Safe Harbor Provision
To this point in the analysis, our focus has been on ascertaining the meaning and scope of the general prohibition against disability-based discrimination contained in
Subchapters I through III of this chapter and title IV of this Act shall not be construed to prohibit or restrict . . .
(3) a person or organization covered by this chapter from establishing, sponsoring, observing or administering the terms of a bona fide benefit plan that is not subject to State laws that regulate insurance.
Paragraphs (1), (2), and (3) shall not be used as a subterfuge to evade the purposes of subchapters I and III of this chapter.
In the case at bar, the disputed issue regarding the safe harbor provision is whether K Mart‘s adoption of the mental health cap constitutes a use of the safe harbor provision as “a subterfuge to evade the purposes” of Title I. Because we are reviewing the District Court‘s grant of a motion to dismiss, we must determine
Appellant and the EEOC contend that the safe harbor provision,
In Betts, the Supreme Court construed the meaning of the word “subterfuge” as it appeared in an analogous provision of the ADEA. See also United Air Lines, Inc. v. McMann, 434 U.S. 192 (1977). At the time Betts was decided,
It shall not be unlawful for an employer, employment agency, or labor organization . . .
(2) to observe the terms of a bona fide seniority system or any bona fide employee benefit plan such as a retirement, pension, or insurance plan, which is not a subterfuge to evade the purposes of this chapter, except that no such employee benefit plan shall excuse the failure to hire any individual, and no such seniority system or employee benefit plan shall require or permit the involuntary retirement of any individual specified by section 631(a) of this title because of the age of such individual[.]
The EEOC and appellant argue that the reasoning in Betts is not transferable to the ADA because Congress wrote the subterfuge exception in
We find the difference in the wording of
We conclude that McMann and Betts make clear that if K Mart adopted the policy of providing differing long-term disability benefits for mental and physical disabilities prior to the enactment of the ADA, K Mart could not be found to be using
Whereas K Mart correctly states that the Betts Court held that a benefit plan is not a subterfuge under the ADEA‘s safe harbor provision unless the plaintiff can show that the employer had a specific intent to interfere with non-fringe-benefit aspects of employment, that limitation on the categories of benefits addressed by the ADEA is not controlling here. While the specific intent requirement in Betts flows from the ordinary meaning of the phrase “subterfuge to evade the purposes [of the Act],” the requirement in Betts that discrimination affect a non-fringe benefit relates to elements of the ADEA‘s statutory context that are not shared with the ADA. Specifically, the Court held in Betts that, in order to be a subterfuge, a plan must discriminate in a non-fringe-benefit aspect of employment because the Court found that fringe benefit plans were not included in the ADEA‘s general prohibition against age discrimination, codified at
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, we conclude that the District Court erred in granting K Mart‘s motion to dismiss. Accordingly, the judgment of the District Court is reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED.
BARKETT, Circuit Judge, concurring:
I concur in Judge Pollak‘s comprehensive opinion and only write to explain why I believe Robinson v. Shell Oil Company, 519 U.S. 337 (1997), clearly abrogates Gonzales v. Garner Food Services, Incorporated, 89 F.3d 1523 (11th Cir.1996).
A basic proposition in federal law is that an intervening decision of the Supreme Court subjects a prior decision of this Court to reconsideration. See Chambers v. Thompson, 150 F.3d 1324, 1326 (11th Cir.1998) (“We are bound to follow a prior panel or en banc holding, except where that holding has been overruled or undermined to the point of abrogation by a subsequent en banc or Supreme Court decision.“) (emphasis supplied); Davis v. Singletary, 119 F.3d 1471, 1482 (11th Cir.1997) (“[t]o the extent of any inconsistency between our [prior opinions‘] pronouncements and the Supreme Court‘s supervening ones, of course, we are required to heed those of the Supreme Court.“); United States v. Hogan, 986 F.2d 1364, 1369 (11th Cir.1993) (recognizing same); Lufkin v. McCallum, 956 F.2d 1104, 1107 (11th Cir.1992) (recognizing same).
On review of Gonzales and Robinson, it is clear that there is more than a minor “inconsistency” between the two cases. As Judge Pollak explains, Robinson explicitly invalidates several of the propositions that informed the Gonzales Court‘s conclusion that Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA“),
The Supreme Court applied the same logic to interpret the phrase “applicants or employees” as it relates to the prohibition against discrimination in the employment context. Robinson, 519 U.S. at 344 (interpreting
the term “applicants” would seem to cover many persons who will not become employees. Unsuccessful applicants or those who turn down a job offer, for example, would have been applicants, but not future employees. And the term fails to cover certain future employees who may be offered and will accept jobs without having to apply for those jobs. Because the term “applicants” in
§ 704(a) is not synonymous with the phrase “future employees,” there is no basis for engaging in the further (and questionable) negative inference that inclusion of the term “applicants” demonstrates intentional exclusion of former employees.
This ruling also severely undercuts the Gonzales Court‘s interpretation of Title I, as the Gonzales Court concluded that the plain meaning of the term “applicants and employees” established that Title I of the ADA only covered current and future employees. See Gonzales, 89 F.3d at 1527 (interpreting
As shown above, the Robinson Court, analyzed the same terms we examined in Gonzales and found these terms to be ambiguous. The only remaining basis for the Gonzales Court‘s ruling was its view that the phrase “qualified individual with a disability” in
When viewed under this standard, it is clear that the phrase “holds or desires” in
Having concluded that the aforementioned Title I provisions do not clearly and unambiguously define the class of employees protected under the statute, оur remaining task is to determine whether Title I provides a consistent definition for covered employees in its remaining provisions and, for this reason, has a clear and unambiguous meaning. See Robinson, 519 U.S. at 341 (“[T]he plainness or ambiguity of statutory language is determined by reference to the language itself, the specific context in which the language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole.“)
Using this framework, it is clear that other provisions in Title I rebut the inference that the statute only protects current and future employees. Specifically,
In short, there is no doubt that the Robinson Court‘s decision invalidates Gonzales. The terms the Gonzales Court concluded had a “plain and ordinary meaning” instead were found to be ambiguous by the Supreme Court. Moreover, Robinson stands for the proposition that the Court‘s decision to deny an employment discrimination statute‘s protection to a class of employеes should turn on language that serves as an explicit temporal qualifier. Therefore, Robinson‘s rationale and holding abrogate the rationale and holding of Gonzales. Under our precedent, such a conclusion requires that we follow the Supreme Court‘s intervening law.
Certainly, it is easier to conclude that a Supreme Court decision invalidates an Eleventh Circuit decision when the Supreme Court expressly overrules a particular case, or baldly criticizes the precise proposition that is the basis for an Eleventh Circuit panel‘s ruling. See, e.g., Lufkin, 956 F.2d at 1107 (recognizing that a Supreme Court case had invalidated the Eleventh Circuit‘s retroactivity rule and overruling contrary Eleventh Circuit authority “in order to give full effect to [an] intervening decision of the Supreme Court“); Cottrell v. Caldwell, 85 F.3d 1480, 1485 (11th Cir.1996) (recognizing that a Supreme Court decision had invalidated the line of Eleventh Circuit cases holding that officers could not appeal interlocutory orders denying them qualified immunity when the courts involved had ruled that material issues of fact were in dispute). However, we are also compelled to overrule our precedent when the rationale the Supreme Court uses in a intervening case directly contradicts the analysis that this Court has used in a related area, and establishes that this Court‘s current rule is wrong. See, e.g., Footman v. Singletary, 978 F.2d 1207, 1210-11 (11th Cir.1992) (overruling Eleventh Circuit cases that allowed habeas petitioners to raise additional ineffective assistance of counsel claims not raised in state court because the policy rationale in Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1 (1992), a decision on evidentiary hearings in habeas cases, indicated that the Supreme Court disfavors allowing petitioners to raise new federal habeas claims not raised in state court); Hogan, 986 F.2d at 1370 (overruling Eleventh Circuit precedent applying a more liberal standard of the clear error test to review a trial court‘s determination that the defendant was competent to stand trial because, Demosthenes v. Baal, 495 U.S. 731 (1990), a Supreme Court case discussing a defendant‘s competence to waive habeas proceedings, suggested that a more stringent standard was required).
Judge Carnes cites a number of cases to support his view that, absent an express statement from the Suрreme Court that Gonzales is overruled, the case is still good law. However no case cited, with the exception of Morris v. City of West Palm Beach 194 F.3d 1203 (11th Cir.1999), involved an intervening Supreme Court case which undercut the basis for an earlier panel‘s ruling. For example, in United States v. Chubbuck, 252 F.3d 1300 (11th Cir.2001), this Court declined to overrule an Eleventh Circuit panel‘s interpretation of the term “conviction” in light of an intervening Florida Supreme Court decision. In Lapides v. Board of Regents, 251 F.3d 1372 (11th Cir.2001), this Court declined to overrule an Eleventh Circuit deci
Saxton v. ACF Industries, Inc., 239 F.3d 1209 (11th Cir.2001) is another case in which no conflicting Supreme Court decision was at issue; this Court merely recognized that a prior panel had failed to acknowledge the existence of the 1991 Amendments to Rule 15(c), and it applied the prior panel‘s rule and recommended en banc review. Similarly, in Turner v. Beneficial Corporation, 242 F.3d 1023 (11th Cir.2001), a panel of this Court recognized that a prior panel had misinterpreted the requirements of the Truth in Lending Act, but the panel faithfully applied the questionable rule and recommended en banc review. See also United States v. Steele, 117 F.3d 1231 (11th Cir.1997) (recognizing that a prior panel apparently had misunderstood the requirements for indicting a physician under
The only case Judge Carnes discusses that considered the effect of an intervening, related Supreme Court decision on an earlier Eleventh Circuit decision is Morris v. City of West Palm Beach 194 F.3d at 1207 n. 6.2 In Morris, this Court recognized that Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103 (1992), cast doubt on the viability of the “catalyst test,” a court-created modification of the attorneys’ fee provisions under
While Morris bears comparison to the instant case, I believe it is distinguishable. The Robinson decision directly challenges the statutory analysis we performed in Gonzales, as it overrules our decision regarding the threshold determination of whether the terms in the ADA were ambiguous. Additionally, the policy concerns that inform the ADA counsel that we must give the statute a broad cast, and therefore suggest that we should revisit the Gonzales Court‘s more restrictive interpretation of the statute. See
In summary, because Robinson clearly invalidates our analysis in Gonzales I believe that it requires that we revisit our interpretation of Title I of the ADA. As for the substantive question of whether the ADA only protects current employees, I join in Judge Pollak‘s cogent discussion explaining the statutory basis for interpreting the ADA to cover current as well as former employees, as well as his analysis of the statute‘s safe harbor provision.
CARNES, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
The threshold question in this case is whether a former employee is eligible to file suit against his erstwhile employer under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990,
The only reason the majority gives for not following the law of the circuit as established in Gonzales, is the Supreme Court‘s later decision in Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337 (1997). The Robinson case, however, arose and was decided under Title VII, not the ADA, and the two statutes have different language and different legislative histories. The Supreme Court in Robinson did not purport to overrule Gonzales or to establish any law about the ADA. And the majority does not contend that Robinson addressed any ADA issues or that it purported to overrule Gonzales. Because I think that the majority‘s action violates the prior panel precedent rule, which requires that we follow the Gonzales decision unless and until it is overruled by
The prior panel precedent rule is an essential principle, the number one ground rule, by which all of us on this Court must abide. It helps keep the peace, stabilizes our circuit law, and promotes efficiency by enabling us to move on once issues have been decided by a panel. See generally Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209-10 (11th Cir.1981) (en banc) (deciding to have Eleventh Circuit panels bound by all pre-split Fifth Circuit decisions, because “[s]tability and predictability are essential factors in the proper operation of the rule of law“); Jaffree v. Wallace, 705 F.2d 1526, 1533 (11th Cir.1983), aff‘d, 472 U.S. 38 (1985) (“Judicial precedence serves as the foundation of our federal judicial system. Adherence to it results in stability and predictability.“). Those important goals are achieved because, and only to the extent that, the prior precedent rule requires a later panel to follow a prior one‘s decision even though convinced it is wrong. See generally Cohen v. Office Depot, Inc., 204 F.3d 1069, 1076 (11th Cir.2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 957 (2000) (“[T]he prior panel precedent rule is not dependent upon a subsequent panel‘s appraisal of the initial decision‘s correctness.“); United States v. Steele, 147 F.3d 1316, 1317-18 (11th Cir.1998) (en banc) (“Under our prior precedent rule, a panel cannot overrule a prior one‘s holding even though convinced it is wrong.“) (quoting Cargill v. Turpin, 120 F.3d 1366, 1386 (11th Cir.1997)).
Our allegiance to the prior precedent rule, as well as the proper corrective mechanism for purging оur circuit law of earlier panel errors, is illustrated in two cases that resulted in en banc decisions earlier this year. One is Saxton v. ACF Industries, Inc., 239 F.3d 1209 (11th Cir.2001), rev‘d en banc, 254 F.3d 959 (11th Cir.2001). The panel in that case dutifully followed an earlier one‘s holding even though convinced it was wrong. See 239 F.3d at 1215. Then rehearing en banc was promptly granted and, in a decision written by the author of the second panel‘s decision, 254 F.3d at 959, the en banc court overruled the first panel‘s erroneous decision, id. at 963-66. The same thing happened in Turner v. Beneficial Corp., 236 F.3d 643 (11th Cir.2000), rev‘d en banc, 242 F.3d 1023 (11th Cir.2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 820 (2001). The panel in that case also followed a prior panel‘s decision even though convinced the earlier panel had overlooked controlling statutory language that dictated a different result. 236 F.3d at 649-50. Rehearing en banc was granted, 236 F.3d at 651, and the en banc court overruled the erroneous prior precedent that had bound the later panel, 242 F.3d 1023, all within the space of two months. As in Saxton, the en banc opinion in Turner was written for the Court by the author of the second panel opinion. See also United States v. Steele, 117 F.3d 1231, 1234-35 (11th Cir.1997) (reluctantly following a prior panel decision even though it had overlooked a controlling statute), rev‘d en banc, 147 F.3d 1316 (11th Cir.1998) (overruling the erroneous prior decision that had bound the panel), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 933 (1999); Smith v. GTE Corp., 236 F.3d 1292, 1303 n. 10 (11th Cir.2001) (“The erroneous result reached by the prior panel whose decision bound the Steele panel was corrected en banc, which is how erroneous panel decisions should be corrected.“) (internal citation omitted). If the Gonzales panel erred in holding that the ADA does not apply to former employees—and it is not at all clear to me that its holding is error—the proper way to change circuit
Of course, prior panel decisions can be overruled by intervening Supreme Court decisions, as well as by the en banc court, and where there is a conflict between the holding of an earlier panel decision and that of a later Supreme Court decision, subsequent panels must follow the Supreme Court decision. See In re Provenzano, 215 F.3d 1233, 1235 (11th Cir.2000), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1256 (2000) (“We would, of course, not only be authorized but also required to depart from [the prior decision] if an intervening Supreme Court decision actually overruled or conflicted with it.“); Cottrell v. Caldwell, 85 F.3d 1480, 1485 (11th Cir.1996) (“Where prior panel precedent conflicts with a subsequent Supreme Court decision, we follow the Supreme Court decision.“). But a panel is justified in disregаrding a prior panel decision because of the Supreme Court‘s holding in a later case only when that intervening holding is squarely on point.
As we have held on numerous occasions, a prior panel decision that has been weakened but not overruled by a later Supreme Court decision must be followed by later panels. See United States v. Chubbuck, 252 F.3d 1300, 1305 n. 7 (11th Cir.2001) (“We are not at liberty to disregard binding case law that is so closely on point and has been only weakened, rather than directly overruled, by the Supreme Court.“) (internal quotes and citation omitted); Lapides v. Bd. of Regents, 251 F.3d 1372, 1377 n. 3 (11th Cir.2001) (same); Morris v. City of West Palm Beach, 194 F.3d 1203, 1207 n. 6 (11th Cir.1999) (same); United States v. Smith, 122 F.3d 1355, 1359 (11th Cir.1997) (same), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1021 (1997); see also N.L.R.B. v. Datapoint Corp., 642 F.2d 123, 129 (5th Cir. Unit A April 1981) (“Without a clearly contrary opinion of the Supreme Court or of this Court sitting en banc, we cannot overrule a decision of a prior panel of this Court. . . .“). So, we have said in at least four decisions that a later panel must follow an earlier one‘s holding that has been weakened but not overruled by an intervening Supreme Court decision. Seven judges of this Court either wrote or joined the opinions in one or more of those four decisions: Judges Edmondson, Birch, Black, Wilson, Fay, Cox, and me. I think that we meant what we said.
The temptation can be great for a judge to read into an intervening Supreme Court decision more than is there in order to justify not following a particularly pesky prior panel precedent. To be tempted in that respect is just human, but we should resist the temptation. It is critical that when sitting as panel judges we be diligent in policing the line between prior precedent that has been contradicted and thereby overruled by intervening Supreme Court precedent, and that which has been only weakened by it. The strength and integrity of our prior precedent rule, upon which so much rests, is dependent upon that distinction.
The most that can be justifiably said about the effect of Robinson on the holding in Gonzales is that some of what is said, but not anything that is held, in the Robinson opinion arguably weakens some of the reasoning in the Gonzales opinion. That, however, is not enough for this panel to toss the Gonzales decision aside. The majority says that “legal precedent provides our starting point,” Majority Op. at 1044, but when prior panel precedent is directly on point, as the Gonzales decision is, it also ought to be the ending point for
Supreme Court decisions may provide a springboard for the en banc court to reconsider settled circuit law, but they should not be viewed as an opportunity for a later panel to cast aside circuit law with which that panel disagrees. A fair reading of the majority opinion indicates that is what this panel has done. The question is not, as the majority terms it, whether the reasoning of an intervening Supreme Court decision has “undermined” the reasoning of a prior panel precedent, but whether the Supreme Court decision has overruled that prior precedent. When it comes to their effect on prior panel precedents, Supreme Court decisions either overrule those precedents, or they do not. So far as a later panel is concerned, the effect of a Supreme Court precedent is all or nothing. And here it is nothing, so far as this panel (to be distinguished from the en banc court) is concerned. The Supreme Court‘s Robinson decision does not explicitly overrule Gonzales or its holding. Nor does Robinson clearly contradict Gonzales to the point of implicitly overruling it.
The extent to which the majority‘s decision defies our prior panel precedent rule is evident from the fact that the Supreme Court in Robinson held nothing more than what this Court had already held before the Gonzales decision was released. This Court had held in Bailey v. USX Corp., 850 F.2d 1506 (11th Cir.1988), that former employees may sue under the anti-retaliation provision of Title VII. The plaintiff in Gonzales, relying on Bailey, argued by analogy that the same should be true of former employees and the ADA. 89 F.3d at 1527. The Gonzales panel acknowledged that Title VII‘s anti-retaliation clause applied to former employees, as Bailey had held, but it distinguished that provision of Title VII from the ADA on the basis of the different statutory language and legislative history. Id. at 1527-29. What the Supreme Court did in Robinson was agree with our circuit law, as set out in Bailey, that Title VII‘s anti-retaliation provision does apply to former employees, something the Gonzales panel itself had acknowledged аnd considered in deciding that the ADA does not. It is a bit audacious for the majority to say that a Supreme Court decision whose holding was anticipated, acknowledged, and considered by a prior panel when deciding a different issue has undermined that prior panel‘s decision on the different issue to such an extent that it may be disregarded.
The fact that the Supreme Court‘s Robinson decision is not inconsistent with our Gonzales precedent is also evident from the post-Robinson decisions of two other federal court of appeals which reached exactly the same conclusion as Gonzales even in the wake of Robinson. The Court in Weyer v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 198 F.3d 1104, 1112 (9th Cir.2000), squarely faced the issue of whether the Supreme Court‘s Robinson decision was inconsistent with the holding of this Court in Gonzales and of other circuits that had reached the same conclusion this circuit had in Gonzales. After contrasting the language of the ADA with that of Title
Likewise, in Morgan v. Joint Admin. Bd., 268 F.3d 456 (7th Cir.2001), the Seventh Circuit re-affirmed its pre-Robinson decision holding that the former employees are not protected by the employment provisions of the ADA. After pointing out that the ADA requires plaintiffs to be able to perform the essential functions of their job before they are entitled to the protection of the Act, the Court pointedly asked about whether former employees are covered: “How could they be? They cannot perform the essential functions of their job, and therefore they have no rights under the statutory provisions [of the ADA].” Id. at 458.
The plaintiffs in Morgan conceded that EEOC v. CNA Ins. Cos., 96 F.3d 1039 (7th Cir.1996), a pre-Robinson decision of the Seventh Circuit panel, had held that the ADA does not apply to former employees, but they asked the Court to re-examine that position in light of Robinson‘s holding that Title VII‘s anti-retaliation provision does apply to former employees. Id. at 458. The Court concluded that Robinson had changed nothing about Seventh Circuit law on the ADA, reasoning that there is a “stark” difference between the anti-retaliation provision of Title VII and the employment provisions of the ADA, and that extending the scope of the ADA to former employees would “create perverse incentives” resulting in fewer employers offering disability benefits to their workers. Id.
Further, the Morgan Court observed that in CNA the panel had considered the very reasoning that would later be adopted by Robinson in a Title VII retaliation case, and had declined to apply it to the ADA. Morgan, 268 F.3d at 458. (“We anticipated the difference between [the Title VII] situation and the one here in the case the plaintiffs ask us to overrule.“). Because CNA had already distinguished Robinson‘s Title VII-retaliation situation from that of an ADA case not involving retaliation, the Morgan Court recognized that Robinson did not govern the case before it, and followed the prior panel decision, CNA. Similarly, as noted above, our Gonzales opinion distinguished Bailey, a Title VII retaliation case, from the case before it, an ADA case. Thus Gonzales, just like CNA, anticipated Robinson‘s Title VII arguments and rejected their applicability to an ADA case. In Morgan, the Seventh Circuit respected its CNA decision, specifically its distinction between Title VII and the ADA. In this case, our prior panel precedent rule requires that this panel afford the same respect to Gonzales.
A couple of other circuits in post-Robinson decisions have reached conclusions on the coverage issue that are different from the Ninth Circuit‘s in Weyer and the Seventh Circuit‘s in Morgan (and that of our prior panel in Gonzales). See Ford v. Schering-Plough Corp., 145 F.3d 601 (3rd Cir.1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1093 (1999); Castellano v. City of New York, 142 F.3d 58 (2d Cir.1998). The point, however, is not whether Weyer and Morgan are right or wrong on the ultimate issue involving the scope of the ADA as it concerns former employees. The point is that Weyer and Morgan irrefutably demonstrate that reasonable jurists can conclude Robinson does not undermine or contradict Gonzales to the point of overruling it, because two panels composed of six federal court of appeals judges have reached the same con
In view of that, Judge Barkett‘s statement that “there is no doubt that the Robinson Court‘s decision invalidates Gonzales” is one with which I cannot agree. Judge Barkett obviously disagrees with the conclusions of Judges Flaum, Posner, and Williams of the Seventh Circuit in Morgan and of Judges Beezer, Wiggins, and Kleinfeld of the Ninth Circuit in Weyer, but the fact that there is disagreement, and a two-to-two split of the other circuits that have addressed the issue since Robinson was released proves that there is substantial doubt about whether Robinson overruled or undermined to the point of abrogation the Gonzales decision.
That ought to be all this panel needs to know in order to decide this appeal, because if reasonable jurists can disagree about whether a Supreme Court decision contradicts the holding of a prior panel, as they undeniably have, that prior panel holding must be followed. The prior panel precedent rule—the fundamental ground rule under which we operate as members of a court that sits in panels, the rule that keeps the peace among us, and the rule that is essential to the stability and predictability of our circuit law—demands no less.
I express no view on how I would vote to decide the ADA coverage issue if we were reconsidering it en banc, see generally United States v. Steele, 147 F.3d at 1318 (en banc court not bound by prior panel decisions), nor do I express any view on the other issue the panel addresses (the one involving differential treatment of the mentally and physically disabled), because that issue would be moot if this panel followed Gonzales, as it is bound to and should do.
Before ANDERSON, Chief Judge, and TJOFLAT, EDMONDSON, BIRCH, DUBINA, BLACK, CARNES, BARKETT, HULL, MARCUS and WILSON Circuit Judges.
ORDER ON REHEARING
Dec. 19, 2001.
BY THE COURT:
A member of this court in active service having requested a poll on the suggestion of rehearing en banc and a majority of the judges in this court in active service having voted in favor of granting a rehearing en banc,
IT IS ORDERED that the above cause shall be reheard by this court en banc. The previous panel‘s opinion is hereby vacated.
GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY—MEDICAL SYSTEMS GROUP, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 00-1263.
United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit.
July 18, 2001.
Patrick C. Reed, Wasserman, Schneider, Babb & Reed, of New York, NY, for plaintiff-appellant.
Notes
(4) excluding or otherwise denying equal jobs or benefits to a qualified individual because of the known disability of an individual with whom the qualified individual is known to have a relationship or association;
(5)(A) not making reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability who is an applicant or employee, unless such covered entity can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the business of such covered entity; or (B) denying employment opportunities to a job applicant or employee who is an otherwise qualified individual with a disability, if such denial is based on the need of such covered entity to make reasonable accommodation to the physical or mental impairments of the employee or applicant;
(6) using qualification standards, employment tests or other selection criteria that screen out or tend to screen out an individual with a disability or a class of individuals with disabilities unless the standard, test or other selection criteria, as used by the covered entity, is shоwn to be job-related for the position in question and is consistent with business necessity; and
(7) failing to select and administer tests concerning employment in the most effective manner to ensure that, when such test is administered to a job applicant or employee who has a disability that impairs sensory, manual, or speaking skills, such test results accurately reflect the skills, aptitude, or whatever other factor of such applicant or employee that such test purports to measure, rather than reflecting the impaired sensory, manual, or speaking skills of such employee or applicant (except where such skills are the factors that the test purports to measure).
Additionally, K Mart urges us to rely on an unpublished decision of this court in which we followed Gonzales. See Bass v. City of Orlando, 203 F.3d 841 (11th Cir.1999) (per curiam). In Bass we noted that “[w]hile other circuit and district courts have disagreed with the holding in Gonzales, it is binding precedent within this Circuit.” We are not persuaded that Bass provides us with much assistance with our current task, not in the least part because in Bass we did not take note of Robinson.
Title III sets forth a general rule against disability-based discrimination in public accommodations:
No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation.
(c) Insurance
Subchapters I through III of this chapter and title IV of this Act shall not be construed to prohibit or restrict—
(1) an insurer, hospital or medical service company, health maintenance organization, or any agent, or entity that administers benefit plans, or similar organizations from underwriting risks, classifying risks, or administering such risks that are based on or not inconsistent with State law; or
(2) a person or organization covered by this chapter from establishing, sponsoring, observing or administering the terms of a bona fide benefit plan that are based on underwriting risks, classifying risks, or administering such risks that are based on or not inconsistent with State law; or
(3) a person or organization covered by this chapter from establishing, sponsoring, observing or administering the terms of a bona fide benefit plan that is not subject to State laws that regulate insurance.
Paragraphs (1), (2), and (3) shall not be used as a subterfuge to evade the purposes of subchapters I and III of this chapter.
Because K Mart is an employer, we are concerned here specifically with
The State‘s principal argument is that the district court‘s application of [42 U.S.C.]
L.C. v. Olmstead, 138 F.3d 893, 896 (11th Cir.1998), aff‘d in part, vacated in part, and remanded by 527 U.S. 581, 119 S.Ct. 2176, 144 L.Ed.2d 540 (1999).
We held that Title II of the ADA imposes a duty on states that provide treatment to disabled individuals to provide such treatment in the most integrated setting appropriate to a disabled individual‘s needs. See 138 F.3d at 902. In sustaining our holding, the Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Ginsburg, likewise concluded that the ADA demands more than like treatment of the disabled and the non-disabled, holding that “unjustified institutional isolation of persons with disabilities is a form of discrimination.” 527 U.S. at 600, 119 S.Ct. 2176. Justices Stevens, O‘Connor, Souter, and Breyer joined the pertinent portion of the majority opinion. Justice Kennedy concurred and Justice Breyer joined in Part I of his concurrence. Justice Thomas, joined by the Chief Justice and Justice Scalia, dissented. For a more extended analysis of Olmstead, see text infra at footnotes 14-17.
After the Court decided Olmstead, the Ninth Circuit dismissed a cognate claim on the authority of Alexander and Traynor, finding Olmstead to be inapposite. See Weyer, 198 F.3d at 1117-18 (Titles I and III). We respectfully differ with our Ninth Circuit colleagues. Because we understand Olmstead to establish that the ADA encompasses a prohibition against discrimination among members of the protected class, we do not agree that the general prohibition against discrimination in Title I fails to reach the differentiation at issue here. But see Kimber v. Thiokol Corp., 196 F.3d 1092, 1101-02 (10th Cir.1999) (dismissing a Title I claim challenging a mental-health cap on disability benefits without discussing Olmstead and in reliance on cases antedating Olmstead).
We note that the Second Circuit, reading Olmstead much as we do, has rejected the “view that [the] ADA requires no more than evenhanded treatment between the disabled and non-disabled“; the ADA, according to the Second Circuit, “generally affords ‘individualized protection’ against illegal conduct within its reach.” See EEOC v. Staten Island Savings Bank, 207 F.3d 144, 151 (2d Cir.2000) (Title I). Nevertheless, we are in disagreement with the Second Circuit‘s conclusion that the general prohibition against discrimination should be read narrowly with respect to insurance coverage. See id. We discuss the legislative history of the ADA, on which the Second Circuit relied for that conclusion, infra Part II(A)(2). Cf. EEOC v. Aramark, 208 F.3d 266, 268 (D.C.Cir.2000) (expressing no opinion as to whether a 24-month mental health cap in an LTD plan violated Titles I and III, but affirming the District Court‘s grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants on the ground that a plan that was adopted prior to the passage of the ADA was protected by the ADA‘s safe harbor provision, a portion of the statute discussed infra Part II(B)).
[E]mployers may not deny health insurance coverage completely to an individual based on the person‘s diagnosis or disability. For example, while it is permissible for an employer to offer insurance policies that limit coverage for certain procedures or treatments, e.g., only a specified number of blood transfusions per year, a hemophiliac who exceeds this treatment limit may not be denied coverage for other conditions, such as for a broken leg or for heart surgery, because of the existence of the hemophilia. A limitation may be placed on reimbursements for a procedure or the types of drugs or procedures covered, e.g., a limit on the number of x-rays or non-coverage of experimental drugs or procedures; but, that limitation must apply to persons with or without disabilities. All people with disabilities must have equal access to the health insurance coverage that is provided by the employer to all employees.
[E]mployers may not deny health insurance coverage completely to an individual based on the person‘s diagnosis or disability. For example, while it is permissible for an employer to offer insurance policies that limit coverage for certain procedures or treatments (e.g., a limit on the extent of kidneys dialysis or whether dialysis will be covered at all, or a limit on the amount of blood transfusions or whether transfusions will be covered). It would not be permissible, however, to deny coverage to individuals, such as persons with kidney disease or hemophilia, who are affected by these limits on coverage for procedures or treatments, for other procedures or treatments connected with their disability. It would also not be permissible to deny coverage to such individuals for other conditions not connected with these limitations on coverage, such as treatment for a broken leg or heart surgery. While limitation may be placed on reimbursements for a procedure or the types of drugs or procedures covered, that limitation must apply to all persons, with or without disabilities. Persons with disabilities must have equal access to the health insurance coverage that is provided by the employer to all employees.