History
  • No items yet
midpage
James H. Russell v. Helen Gonyer, Administratrix
264 F.2d 761
1st Cir.
1959
Check Treatment
PER CURIAM.

Properly invoking the diversity jurisdiction conferred in Title 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1), the plaintiff-appellee brought an action in the court below under the Rhode Island wrongful death act to recover damages for the death of her husband, which occurred when аn automobile owned and operated by him and a tractor-trailer unit owned by the defendant-appellant, Russell, and operated by his employee, the defendant-appellant, ‍​​​​‌​​​​​​‌​​‌​​‌‌‌​‌​​‌​‌‌‌​​​‌​‌​‌​‌​​‌​‌‌​​​‍Reynolds, collided at an intersection of public highways in Rhode Island. The court below after trial without a jury found on its analysis of the evidence that the decedent had not been guilty of any negligence that contributed to the сollision and his death, and that the “sole and proximate cause of the accident and death of the decedent was the negligence of the defendant Reynolds in failing tо *762 operate and control the tractor and trailer ‍​​​​‌​​​​​​‌​​‌​​‌‌‌​‌​​‌​‌‌‌​​​‌​‌​‌​‌​​‌​‌‌​​​‍in a reasonably careful manner” [160 F.Supp. 539] under the circumstances existing at the time of the accident. There being no quеstion but that at the time of the collision Reynolds was opеrating his employer’s ‍​​​​‌​​​​​​‌​​‌​​‌‌‌​‌​​‌​‌‌‌​​​‌​‌​‌​‌​​‌​‌‌​​​‍vehicle within the scope of his emрloyment, the court entered the judgment for the plaintiff against both defendants from which this appeal has been takеn.

With a quite inconsequential exception, the appellants’ entire argument in this court consists of an attack on the District Court’s findings of fact. In principal part their contеntion is that that court erred in giving credence to the testimony of an impartial witness to the collision for the reasоn that the testimony of that witness conflicts and is inconsistent with physiсal facts as established by certain photographs аnd measurements showing the damage to the vehicles, their position after the accident and the location of tire marks and such matters on the highway. That is to say, their argument is that the testimony of the witness should have been altogether disrеgarded as a matter ‍​​​​‌​​​​​​‌​​‌​​‌‌‌​‌​​‌​‌‌‌​​​‌​‌​‌​‌​​‌​‌‌​​​‍of law for the reason that his estimates of time, speed and distance cannot be madе to fit the physical facts established by objective evidence. The argument is as insubstantial as a house built upon the sаnd. It is well known that a lay witness’ estimates of time, speed and distance, particularly those made in a flash at the momеnt of occurrence of a dramatic event, are almost certain to be inaccurate and for that reason are not to be relied upon implicitly. With this in mind the cоurt was entitled to accept the testimony of the witness as painting a general picture of the event, even thоugh his testimony could not be made to coincide in every dеtail with established physical facts.

It will suffice for us to say that examining the record, and according due regard “ * * * to the opportunity of the trial court to judge of the credibility ‍​​​​‌​​​​​​‌​​‌​​‌‌‌​‌​​‌​‌‌‌​​​‌​‌​‌​‌​​‌​‌‌​​​‍of the witnesses,” we are convinced that the findings of fact made in this case are not “clearly erroneous.” Rule 52(a) F.R.Civ.P., 28 U.S.C.

A judgment will be entered affirming the judgment of the District Court.

Case Details

Case Name: James H. Russell v. Helen Gonyer, Administratrix
Court Name: Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
Date Published: Mar 30, 1959
Citation: 264 F.2d 761
Docket Number: 5411
Court Abbreviation: 1st Cir.
AI-generated responses must be verified and are not legal advice.