James E. Knight v. United StatesJames E. Knight v. United States
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- Before:
- Cudahy
James Knight brings this action pursuant to
Knight’s argument raises two separate questions: (1) whether the district court may exercise probationary power while a convict is on parole; and (2) whether the district court may revoke probation for pre-probation conduct occurring while the convict is on parole. These are difficult questions (the former question being one of first impression in this circuit) that require us to balance the goals of probation against the desire to maintain an orderly governmental structure. After a good deal of deliberation, we hold that the Probation Act empowers the district court to revoke probation while a convict is on parole and to consider all relevant conduct, including conduct that occurs while the convict is under executive branch control.
I.
In September of 1987, Knight pleaded guilty to a two-count indictment for false
Knight did not serve the full five years of imprisonment for which he was sentenced. In October of 1990, he was paroled. By September of 1991, however, Knight had violated the terms of his parole by illegally “playing the float” of his cheeking account. Knight and the United States Parole Commission agreed that Knight would plead guilty to the violation, and the parole board would allow Knight to remain on parole. 3 The parole board did not revoke Knight’s parole at that time. However, the parole board informed the Office of Probation for the Western District of Wisconsin of Knight’s conduct and the need for a request for judicial review of the terms of Knight’s probation. The district court apparently took a different view of Knight’s activities, revoking Knight’s probation and ordering him to serve the five-year term of imprisonment originally suspended on the mail fraud count. 4
II.
Parole and probation, now superseded by supervised release,
5
are distinct conditions. Parole is an extension of the Constitutional grant of clemency power given to the President. Under the clemency power,
Because parole and probation emanate from different branches of government, the responsibility for the terms, conditions and supervision of each lies with different agencies. The judiciary manages probation, while authority over parole is wielded under the Constitution by the executive branch.
Cf. Duehay v. Thompson,
223 F. 305, 307 (9th Cir.1915) (finding parole tantamount to a commutation). The Parole Commission supervises the paroled convict,
The federal court has no inherent power or authority over probation. Its jurisdiction derives solely from Congress by statute. The court’s jurisdiction to allow probation instead of a sentence of imprisonment and its power to revoke or modify a probationary term are provided for in
III.
The parameters of a federal court’s authority over probation is a question on which we have focused some attention in the past. In
United States v. Yancey,
827 F.2d 83 (7th Cir.1987),
cert. denied,
485 U.S. 967, 108 S.Ct. 1239, 99 L.Ed.2d 437 (1988), we held that a court may revoke probation based
On the other hand, in Williams, the Sixth Circuit held that a court may revoke probation for pre-probation conduct that occurred while the convict was under the control of the executive branch. In that case the convict, Williams, committed several new crimes while on parole. His criminal acts, however, were not brought to the district court’s attention until Williams had “successfully” completed his parole period and had begun to serve the consecutive five-year period of probation to which he had been originally sentenced. One month into the probationary period, Williams was indicted for the new crimes. Williams pleaded guilty to the new crimes, and the district court subsequently revoked his probation, finding that ‘Williams had violated the conditions of his probation by virtue of his pre-probation offenses.” 15 F.3d at 1357.
The Sixth Circuit considered whether allowing a court to revoke probation for pre-probation conduct would unduly interfere with executive administration of a convict’s sentence. 15 F.3d at 1360-64. The court concluded that such authority did not conflict with the “separation of powers” principle. We find its reasoning persuasive, although we are troubled by the direct conflict that apparently occurred in Knight’s case. Here, unlike in
Williams,
the parole board was aware of the violative conduct, chose to act on the conduct and chose to allow Knight to remain on parole. On the other hand, in
Williams,
we assume that the parole board was unaware of the conduct that occurred while Williams was on parole. What seems disturbing in our ease, is the action of the parole board in forwarding the information about Knight’s conduct to the Office of Probation. The parole board made an agreement with Knight: extracting a guilty plea and a promise not to contest liability in
any
future proceeding in exchange for allowing Knight to remain on parole. How this can be squared with bringing the matter before the district court apparently with the expectation that the court might put Knight back in prison after his parole has expired is not easy to understand. However, we do not believe that the parole board somehow lured
It is certainly possible for the parole and probation authorities to work together and this would seem to be highly desirable. In any event, the jurisdiction of the court to revoke probation for pre-probation conduct cannot be said to “conflict” with the authority of the agents of the executive branch to revoke parole and/or inform the judiciary of violative conduct. See Williams, 15 F.3d at 1364. Nor can we say that the district court may not revoke probation at the time that the defendant is in prison or on parole (and therefore under executive control) since it would make little sense for the court to first stay its hand and then take action later after the probationary term began. If we accepted Knight’s argument that such a denial of authority is required, we would provide incarcerated defendants with a grace period in which their activity, no matter how heinous, could not affect their probationary release into society. It is unlikely that Congress, which authorized probation, intended to deprive the original sentencing court of its continuing authority over the probationary sentence.
We believe that our reading of the jurisdictional grant of
The government, as well as the Sixth Circuit in
Williams,
points out that
Ajfronti
is distinguishable, addressing the question whether a district court may
grant
a probationary term to an imprisoned convict,
see
350 U.S. at 80, 76 S.Ct. at 172 (“power to suspend sentence”), whereas the case before us deals with the revocation, rather than the grant, of probation.
Williams,
15 F.3d at 1362.
Ajfronti
holds that the district court lacks jurisdiction to
grant
probation because such a grant of probation effectively amounts to a grant of clemency and thus infringes upon the domain of the executive branch. 350 U.S. at 83, 76 S.Ct. at 173-74.
Revoking
probation, however, certainly cannot be said to be an act of clemency. Admittedly, the district court here
acted
during a period when the executive branch had control of Knight. However, that action did not disrupt the authority given to the executive branch under the Constitution to grant or deny parole to eligible federal prisoners and to impose reasonable conditions on such parole. And, as we have indicated, it would make little sense to require the court to stay its hand until parole ended and probation began — a time at which its acting would presumably not intrude upon the jurisdiction of the executive branch. The Parole Commission chose to allow Knight to remain on parole despite his admitted violation of its conditions. In doing so, the executive branch effectively exercised clemency. However, this “clemency”, unlike the presidential par
That the district court may revoke a convict’s future probation based on an admitted parole violation while the convict is in executive branch custody, does not impinge upon the parole board’s clemency-like powers. To hold otherwise, would unnecessarily tie the hands of the district court and create an indefensible loop-hole, whereby a convict considered by the court to be unsuitable for public release would be entitled to probation merely because of the timing of his violative conduct. It is possible, of course, that the government may fail to obtain a parole revocation and may subsequently press for revocation of probation (as was apparently the ease here). Although this may lead to questionable results in the exercise of discretion, there is nothing so contradictory as to deny the court jurisdiction. Nor is the double jeopardy clause implicated. See United States v. Hanahan, 798 F.2d 187, 189 (7th Cir.1986) (finding that the protections of the double jeopardy clause are not triggered by a parole revocation proceeding); United States v. Whitney, 649 F.2d 296, 298 (5th Cir.1981) (per curiam) (declining to extend the double jeopardy clause to probation revocation proceedings).
The Supreme Court said in Affironti, that “within the Congressional intent, the probation statute should not be ‘applied] in such a way as to unnecessarily overlap the parole and executive-clemency provisions of the law” and should be interpreted in such a way as ‘to avoid interference with the parole and clemency powers vested in the Executive Branch.’ ” Wright, 744 F.2d at 1129 (quoting Affronti, 350 U.S. at 83, 76 S.Ct. at 173-74). Our interpretation of the Probation Act is cautious and, we believe, avoids unnecessary overiap. That “multiple authorities” may “impose multiple sanctions is ‘simply another manifestation of a central fact underlying modem federal criminal procedure: the power to determine the length and conditions of an individual criminal’s punishment is dispersed between the judicial and executive branches.’ ” United States v. Camarata, 828 F.2d 974, 978 (3rd Cir.1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1069, 108 S.Ct. 1036, 98 L.Ed.2d 1000 (1988) (quoting Diggs v. United States, 740 F.2d 239, 246 (3rd Cir.1984)). Here, the parole board chose not to return Knight to jail. The judiciary’s different decision with respect to the very same conduct is not a conflicting determination. Notwithstanding the fact that both may result in incarceration, probation and parole revocation proceedings involve different considerations, not to mention different periods of time. Accordingly, it is not inconsistent for the parole board to find a person suited to parole, whom the court believes not to be ready for a more lengthy period of probation.
This analysis aims to clarify our previous holding of Yancey. In Yancey we held that “the Probation Act does not preclude a court from revoking probation for a preprobation offense.” 827 F.2d at 88. Today we hold that at such a pre-probation revocation hearing the district court may consider all relevant conduct, including conduct that the parole board has also considered and/or acted upon. 10
Therefore, the judgment of the district court is
AFFIRMED.
Notes
. Redesignated in 1990 as
. This transcript was not originally part of the record on appeal. Knight filed a motion with the district court to supplement the record with the transcript. (See Appellant’s Br. at 4, n. 2, referring to a February 2, 1994 motion). We have no record that the district court acted on the motion. Consequently, we construe the request as being directed to this court and grant the motion.
. Under this plea agreement, Knight admitted to violations of both state and federal law and agreed not to contest liability in any future revocation proceeding involving these charges. Additionally, the plea agreement provided that Knight could be recharged if he violated the terms of the agreement, specifically, if at some future revocation proceeding he denied guilt.
. At oral argument counsel informed us that Knight‘s parole was revoked in February of 1991 after the district court revoked Knight’s probation. In February 1995, Knight was released on parole, which is his current status.
.
See
S.Rep. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 122-125,
reprinted in
1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3305-3308 (discussing
.
See
Pub.L. 98-473, Title II, § 212(a)(1), (2), Oct. 12, 1984, 98 Stat. 1987 (repealing
. The district court erroneously relied on
. Our opinion in Yancey, in dicta, expresses some uneasiness with some aspects of Wright:
Both Veatch, [792 F.2d 48 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 933, 107 S.Ct. 407, 93 L.Ed.2d 359 (1986)] and Wright, relying on Affronti, suggest that the district court can only modify probation when the defendant has not begun to serve a period of incarceration. Veatch, 792 F.2d at 50; Wright, 744 F.2d at 1131. Although we have some doubt as to the correctness of this holding, we need not decide this question because the defendant did not raise the issue on appeal.
827 F.2d at 88 n. 5.
. Previously, we have held that “[a] parole revocation proceeding is an administrative proceeding designed to determine whether a parolee has violated the conditions of his parole, not a proceeding designed to punish a criminal defendant for violation of a criminal law.” United States v. Hanahan, 798 F.2d 187, 189-90 (7th Cir.1986). Our reference to clemency-like powers does not conflict with this.
. Contrary to counsel‘s argument in the petition for rehearing, our decision is consistent with
Yancey’s
suggestion that the Probation Act should be broadly, rather than literally, con-straed. In
Yancey,
we interpreted